A pluralist model of tax-benefit policy. by Truscott, Philip.
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY 
By Philip Truscott
i
ProQuest Number: 10804609
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10804609
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my affection 
and gratitude to Sara Arber and Nigel 
Gilbert for reading countless drafts of 
this thesis and supplying copious comments 
and corrections. I would also like to thank 
Bea and Gloria for providing moral support 
and material sustenace in spite of my 
often cheerless and unsociable 
behaviour.
SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS
Detailed Tables of Contents iv
List of Figures ix
Abbreviations xii
Abstract xiii
Chapter Page
1 The Need for a New Tax-Benefit Model 1
2 Review of Existing Tax-Benefit Models 43
3 Principles of Tax-Benefit Policy 125
4 Four Case Studies in Tax-Benefit Policy 142
5 A Case Study in Behavioural Responses 174
6 Features of a Pluralist Model 203
7 Structure of the Policy Option Model 228
8 User Interface 269
9 Output from the Policy Option Model 278
10 Potential Users' Reactions 291
11 Conclusion 301
Bibliography 319
Appendix A - POM User Manual 331
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
CONTENTS
Section Page
1. The Need For a New Tax-
Benefit Model 1
1. Introduction 1
1.1 The Importance of Tax-Benefit
Modelling 1
1.2 The Need for a New Tax-Benefit
Model - The Conceptual Arguments 4
1.3 The Need for a New Tax-Benefit
Model - The Practical Arguments 20
1.3.1 1st Case Study - Politicians
vs Civil Servants 21
1.3.2 2nd Case Study - Pressure Groups
vs Government Ministers 25
1.3.3 3rd Case Study - Opposition
Parties vs Government 30
1.3.4 Conclusion 34
1.4 Tax-Benefit Models:
Usability and Flexibility 35
1.5 Conclusion 42
2. Review of Existing Tax-
Benefit Models 43
2.1 Introduction 43
2.1.1 Programming Approach 44
2.1.2 Objectives & Knowledge Base 44
2.1.3 Output from the Model 45
2.2 DHSS TAX-BENEFIT MODEL
2.2.1 Objectives of the Model 46
2.2.2 Knowledge Base 46
2.2.3 Programming Approach 47
2.2.4 User Interface Issues 47
2.2.5 Output from the Model 48
2.2.6 General Merits and Problems 50
2.3 CITY UNIVERSITY BUSINESS
SCHOOL MODEL 50
2.3.1 Objectives 50
2.3.2 Knowledge Base 51
2.3.3 Programming Approach 52
2.3.4 User Interface Issues 54
2.3.5 Output from the Model 54
2.3.6 General Merits and Problems 56
2.4 LSE TAXEXP PACKAGE 57
2.4.1 Objectives of the Model 57
2.4.2 Knowledge Base 57
2.4.3 Programming Approach 58
2.4.4 User Interface Issues 58
2.4.5 Output from the Model 60
2.4.6 General Merits and Problems 62
iv
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
Section Page
2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.5.4
2.5.5
2.5.6
ALVEY DHSS DEMONSTRATOR PROJECT 
Objectives of the Model 
Knowledge Base 
Programming Approach 
User Interface Issues 
Output from the Model 
General Merits and Problems
64
64
66
66
67
68 
69
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
2.6.4
2.6.5
2.6.6
TRAP (TAX REFORM ANALYSIS PACKAGE) 69 
Objectives of the Model 71 
Knowledge Base 72 
Programming Approach 72 
User Interface Issues 74 
Output from the Model 74 
General Merits and Problems 74
2.7
2.7.1
2.7.2
2.7.3
2.7.4
2.7.5
2.7.6
LSE TAXMOD PACKAGE 
Objectives of the Model 
Knowledge Base 
Programming Approach 
User Interfaces Issues 
Output from the Model 
General Merits and Problems
77
77
78 
80 
81 
81 
85
2.8
2.8.1
2.8.2
2.8.3
2.8.4
2.8.5
2.8.6
IFS TAX AND BENEFIT MODEL 
Objectives of the Model 
Knowledge Base 
Programming Approach 
User Interface Issues 
Output from the Model 
General Merits and Problems
86
86
86
88
88
92
92
2.9
2.9.1
2.9.2
2.9.3
2.9.4
2.9.5
2.9.6
INLAND REVENUE PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX MODEL 
Objectives of the Model 
Knowledge Base 
Programming Approach 
User Interfaces Issues 
Output from the Model 
General Merits and Problems
93
93
94
95 
95 
98
100
2.10
2.10.1
2.10.2
2.10.3
2.10.4
2.10.5
2.10.6
POLICY STUDIES INSTITUTE MODEL 
Objectives of the Model 
Knowledge Base 
Programming Approach 
User Interface Issues 
Output from the Model 
General Merits and Problems
103
103
103
104
105
106 
106
2.11
2.11.1
2.11.2
THE IGOTM MODEL
The Objectives of the Model
Knowledge Base
V
107
107
108
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
Section Page
2.11.3 Programming Approach 109
2.11.4 User Interface Issues 111
2.11.5 Output from the Model 113
2.11.6 General Merits and Problems 113
2.12 DHSS POLICY SIMULATION MODEL 114
2.12.1 Objectives of the Model 114
2.12.2 Knowledge Base 115
2.12.3 Programming Approach 115
2.12.4 User Interface Issues 117
2.12.5 Output from the Model 118
2.12.6 General Merits and Problems 118
2.13 CONCLUSION 120
3. PRINCIPLES OF TAX-BENEFIT
POLICY 125
3.1 Introduction 125
3.2 The Proportionality Principle 126
3.3 The Egalitarian Principle 128
3.4 The Protection of Property Rights 130
3.5 The Prevention of Poverty 131
3.6 Maintenance of Incentives 133
3.7 Administrative Efficiency 135
3.8 Horizontal Equity 137
3.9 Influencing Behaviour 139
3.10 Conclusion 141
4. FOUR CASE STUDIES IN TAX-
BENEFIT POLICY 142
4.1 Introduction 142
4.2 The 1911 National Insurance Act 143
4.3 The Beveridge Plan 151
4.4 Child Benefit 159
4.5 The 1979 Tax Changes 166
4.6 Conclusion 172
5. CASE STUDY IN BEHAVIOURAL
RESPONSES 174
5.1 Introduction 174
5.2 Macro-Economic Studies 177
5.3 Cross-Sectional Indiv. Studies 182
5.4 Cross-Sectional Household Studies 192
5.5 Longitudinal Studies 193
5.6 Conclusion 199
6. FEATURES OF A PLURALIST MODEL 203
6.1 Introduction 203
6.2 Policy Input 203
6.2.1 Programming Language vs Menus 204
6.2.2 Interpreted Code vs Compiled Code 207
vi
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
Section Page
6.2.3 Iteration 209
6.2.4 Branching 212
6.3 Policy Output 213
6.4 Equipment 214
6.5 The Data 216
6.5.1 Structure of the FES 217
6.5.2 Standard Errors and
Design Factors 219
6.5.3 Response Rates 220
6.5.4 Reliability of FES 223
6.5.5 Data Storage 226
6.6 Conclusion 227
7. STRUCTURE OF POM 228
7.1 Introduction 228
7.2 Overall Structure 229
7.3 Data Storage 230
7.4 Data Initialisation 232
7.5 The Editor 234
7.6 Policy Simulation Language 235
7.6.1 Policy Simulation Functions 235
7.6.2 Policy Simulation Operators 237
7.6.3 Policy Simulation Variable Names 240
7.6.4 Policy Simulation Pointers 241
7.6.5 Policy Simulation Value Labels 242
7.6.5 Miscellaneous Features of PSL 244
7.6.6 Technical Description of the PSL 245
7.7 The Lexical Analyser 249
7.8 The Parser 251
7.9 The Interpreter 256
7.10 The Tabulator 262
7.11 Conclusion 267
8. USER INTERFACE 269
8.1 Introduction 269
8.2 The Policy Option Model Approach 269
8.3 Programming with a Mouse
and Menu System 272
8.4 Pop-up windows for
categorical Variables 272
8.5 Pull-Down Command Menu 274
8.6 Quick Keyboard Commands 274
8.7 Error-Detection on Screen 275
8.8 Conclusion 276
9. OUTPUT FROM POM 278
9.1 Introduction 278
9.2 Illustrative Effect of
Income Tax Changes 279
9.3 Simulation of Family Income
Supplement 284
VI1
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
Section Page
9.4 Simulation of Labour Supply
Responses 286
9.5 Conclusion 290
10. POTENTIAL USER REACTIONS 291
10.1 Introduction 291
10.2 Readability and Comprehensibility 293
10.3 Usability 296
10.4 Data Representation 298
10.5 Flexibility 298
10.6 Speed 299
10.7 General Strengths and
Weaknesses of POM 299
11. CONCLUSION 301
11. Introduction 301
11.1 Usability 301
11.2 Flexibility 303
11.3 Output 305
11.4 Future Developments of POM 308
11.5 Practical Effects of POM
on Government 311
11.6 Conceptual Arguments on POM's
effect on the Policy Process 313
Bibliography 319
Appendix A - User Manual 331
viii
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
List of Figures
1.1 Comparison of different tax-benefit models
1.2 Computer screen image produced by the 
Inland Revenue Personal Income Tax Model 
showing constants to define the tax 
schedule
1.3 Fragment of Source Code from the DHSS Tax- 
Benefit Model
2.1 Output from DHSS Tax-Benefit Model
2.2 Example of user interface session with 
City University Business School Model
2.3 Output from City University Business 
School Model
2.4 Computer Screen Image produced by TAXEXP 
program to summarise family
characteristics
2.5 Computer Screen Image produced by TAXEXP 
which shows a graph of Gross Income on the 
horizontal axis against net income on the 
vertical axis
2.6 An illustrative indifference curve
2.7 Sample Output from TRAP
2.8 Output from TAXMOD showing the percentage
of people in different income bands before 
and after a policy change
2.9 Output from TAXMOD showing the percentage
of people gaining or losing cash amounts 
by income bands and by amounts of income 
gain and loss
2.10 Output from TAXMOD showing details of an 
individual case
2.11 Computer screen display produced by IFS
model showing initial menu of options
2.12 Computer screen display produced by IFS
model showing options for altering tax and
benefit system
2.13 Computer screen display produced by IFS
model showing housing benefit menu
2.14 Output from the IFS model showing number
of people paying/ receiving various taxes 
and benefits
2.15 Output from IFS model showing number of 
people in different ranges of marginal tax 
rate
2.16 Computer screen image produced by Personal 
Income Tax Model showing the initial menu 
of options
2.17 Computer screen image produced by Personal 
Income Tax Model showing how to select a 
data file
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
2.18 Computer screen image produced by the
Personal Income Tax Model showing menu to 
change tax rates and tax bands
2.19 Computer screen image produced by the
Personal Income Tax Model showing menu to 
alter investment income surcharge
2.20 Computer screen image produced by the
Personal Image Tax Model showing options 
for reduced rate tax bands
2.21 Computer screen image produced by the
Personal Image Tax Model showing options 
for the tax treatment of couples
2.22 Output from the Personal Income Tax Model 
showing gainers and losers from a policy 
change by income groups
2.23 Example of output from PSI Model
2.24 Computer screen image produce by IGOTM 
showing questions about National Insurance 
Contributions
2.25 Questions posed by IGOTM model
2.26 Output table produced by IGOTM Model
2.27 Computer screen image produced by the DHSS 
Policy Simulation Model showing commands 
for using the model
2.28 Sample of the Output from the Policy 
Simulation Model
4.1 Income Tax as a proportion of Gross Income 
by Quintile Groups
4.2 VAT Payments as a proportion of Gross
Income by Quintile Groups
5.1 Model to predict real wages
5.2 Model to predict employment status
5.3 Labour Supply of Married Men
5.4 Labour Supply of Married Women
5.5 A Household Model of Labour Supply
5.6 Labour Supply Responses to the New Jersey 
Income Maintenance Experiments
6.1 Pascal Procedure to compute Total 
Household Income
6.2 PSL Procedure to Compute Total Household
Income
6.3 Example of a Pascal Case Statement
6.4 Measures of Accuracy for the Family 
Expenditure Survey
7.1 Overall Structure of POM
7.2 Policy Simulation Language Expressed in 
Backus-Naur Form
7.3 Recursive Parser Procedures
7.4 Example of Heap Contents
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
7.5 Simplified Interpreter Procedure
7.6 Flowchart of Analysis Level Interpretation
7.7 Data Analysis for Table Construction
8.1 Computer Screen Image produced by POM
showing the initial Screen
8.2 Computer Screen Image produced by POM
displaying an error message shown when a 
mistake is found during parsing
8•3 Computer screen image produced by POM
showing how POM indicates the 
characteristics of a table to be displayed
9.1 Net Incomes before and after a tax 
reduction by income range and tax unit 
type produced by POM
9.2 Net Incomes by Income Range - IFS Model
9.3 Net Incomes by Type if Family
9.4 Equations for Family Income Supplement
9.5 Family Income Supplement
9.6 Equations to predict work hours
9.7 Model to predict work hours
9.8 Predicted work hours before and after a 
policy change
A.1 Summary of POM's Commands
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
ABBREVIATIONS
CIO Central Information Office
CSO Central Statistical Office
DIG Disablement Income Group
DHSS Department of Health and Social
Security
DOE Department of the Environment
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
FES Family Expenditure Survey
GHS General Household Survey
HMSO Her Majesty's Stationary Office
ICERD International Centre for Economics
and Related Disciplines 
IFS Institute for Fiscal Studies
LSE London School of Economics
NIT Negative Income Tax
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development 
PAYE Pay As You Earn
POM Policy Option Model
PSI Policy Studies Institute
PSL Policy Simulation Language
SPI Survey of Personal Incomes
SSRC Social Science Research Council
UCL University College London
UK United Kingdom
US United States
A PLURALIST MODEL OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
ABSTRACT
In order for a pluralist democracy to function 
well it is necessary that the means to bring 
forward policy proposals should be dispersed 
widely among a variety of political parties, 
pressure groups, and institutions. The goal of 
this thesis is to define and solve the problems 
of creating a computer model of tax-benefit 
policy suitable for a pluralist society.
Computer modelling of tax-benefit policies
poses two serious problems. Firstly, can such 
computer models be sufficiently easy to use so 
that non-experts can use them without the need
for computer specialists? Secondly, can they 
be flexible enough so that truly innovative 
policies can be simulated, or must the user be 
restricted to a narrow set of policy options?
The first section of the thesis defines the 
major dilemmas involved in creating a tax-
benefit model. Chapter 1 outlines the problems
Q, inherent in solving the aforesaid problems of
^  usability and flexibility. Chapter 2 shows how 
far these problems have been solved already by 
describing the features of eleven existing 
models of the British tax-benefit system.
The second section of the thesis examines the 
store of knowledge on which an ideal tax- 
benefit model should be based. Chapter 3 
discusses the various principles which have 
been advanced as yardsticks by which to measure 
tax-benefit policy. Chapter 4 examines four 
case histories of major changes to the tax-
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benefit system in the past. Chapter 5 makes a 
detailed examination of the form of behavioural 
response to tax-benefit policy which has been 
most frequently explored by policy researchers 
: the extent to which work incentives are 
affected by tax-benefit policy.
The third section describes the characteristics 
of a new computer model and a new computer 
language which have been constructed for this 
thesis which attempt to deal with the problems 
of tax-benefit modelling in a pluralist 
society. Chapter 6 outlines the general 
features of the data, the new computer 
language, the Policy Simulation Language, and 
the new model the Policy Option Model which 
have been created. Chapter 7 gives a detailed 
explanation of how the features of the Policy 
Simulation Language and the Policy Option Model 
have been implemented. Chapter 8 describes the 
characteristics of the Policy Option Model's 
user interface. Chapter 9 gives examples of 
the output from the Policy Option Model. In 
order to collect the data for chapter 10 the 
Policy Option Model was demonstrated to a 
number of people in the field of tax-benefit 
modelling who use other models. Chapter 10 
contains a selection of the comments of these 
people after these demonstrations. Chapter 11 
outlines possible future developments of the 
Policy Option Model and discusses the extent to 
which it has succeeded in solving the problems 
of tax-benefit modelling in a pluralist 
society.
xiv
1. THE NEED FOR A NEW TAX-BENEFIT MODEL
1. Introduction
This chapter is arranged in four sections. Section 1.1 
explains the importance of tax-benefit modelling in 
British society. Section 1.2 outlines the conceptual 
arguments for a new tax-benefit model based on a 
discussion of the nature of power. Section 1.3 deals 
with the practical arguments for a new tax-benefit model 
based on three case studies of power relationships which 
highlight the inequalities in the access to tax-benefit 
policy making resources. Section 1.4 explains the dilemma 
which faces the designers of the type of tax-benefit 
model which would solve the problems outlined in sections 
1.2 and 1.3.
1.1 The Importance of Tax-Benefit Modelling
Taxation has often been a matter of passionate debate. 
Such debates have sometimes changed the course of 
history. An excessive tax burden may have contributed to 
the fall of the Roman Empire (Coffield, 1970:58). Henry 
IV's Poll Tax was the direct cause of the great Peasant's 
Revolt of 1381. It was a "Cause Celebre" of the American 
Revolutionary War when James Otis declared that "Taxation 
without representation is Tyranny". In more recent times 
the fate of elected governments has often been linked to 
the issue of taxation. Governments have to do a complex 
balancing act to raise enough money on the one hand, 
while maintaining the support of the governed on the 
other. Leaders failing to keep this balance have 
sometimes toppled into political oblivion like Henry IV's 
Treasurer Sudbury who was lynched by objectors to the 
Poll Tax.
Avoiding mistakes in fiscal policy is therefore a matter 
of political importance. Indeed, it is even more crucial 
today than in the great taxation debates of the past 
because of the sheer scale of the current system.
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Currently 34 per cent of Britain's National Income is 
taken in taxation. Of this figure (some 122 bn pounds of 
a gross domestic product of 354 bn pounds) (CSOf 1987) 
the state spends some £44 bn per annum on state benefits 
to individuals (CIO, 1989). This is easily the single 
largest item of government spending. In no previous 
century was so large a proportion of national wealth 
consumed by taxation, nor was there ever such a highly 
developed social welfare system.
Policy-making in the area of taxation and social security 
is made more complex because of the public's 
contradictory expectations. For example, it was found in 
1985 that 61 per cent of the British public said they 
thought it was "very important" or "quite important" to 
cut the standard rate of Income Tax to 25 per cent, while 
86 per cent agreed that the government should spend more 
money to get rid of poverty (Heald & Wybrow, 1986: 128). 
Similarly, 66 per cent said they thought that high income 
tax makes people work less hard (Heald & Wybrow, 1986), 
while the British Social Attitudes Survey found that 59 
per cent of respondents agreed with the proposition that 
"it is the responsibility of government to reduce the 
difference between people with high incomes and people 
with low incomes" (Brook, Jowell, and Witherspoon, 1987). 
Balancing the requirements of equality and incentives is 
all the more difficult because of this lack of clarity 
about what the system is intended to achieve.
If policy-making only involved decisions about the 
aggregate levels of taxation and benefit spending, then 
it would be relatively easy. Unfortunately for the 
policy analyst, it is necessary to weigh up the effect of 
a policy on millions of individuals - who may be affected 
in unexpected and sometimes contradictory ways by 
different elements of the tax and social security system. 
For example, consider a hypothetical man:-
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with a two child family ... [who] earned £
35.00 per week in July 1977. He would be 
paying Income Tax and National Insurance 
Contributions, receiving family income 
supplementation, receiving a rent rebate, and 
entitled to free school meals. Each involves a 
separate form and different criteria. 
Incidentally, if the father were so exasperated 
with all this form filling that he assaulted 
one of the officials, he would then be eligible
for legal aid. (IFS, 1978:82)
Here we see a case where the taxes and benefits affect an 
individual in conflicting ways. In this case the state 
acknowledges that the man's income is too low to pay his 
rent and raise his children, yet at the same time that it 
offers him benefits to increase his income it makes him 
pay Income Tax and National Insurance Contributions. The 
policy analyst must therefore take into account the 
conflicting effects of uncoordinated tax-benefit 
policies. This complexity is increased by the fact that 
one cannot know with certainty whether the man described 
above would actually claim the rent rebate and family 
income supplement.
Policy analysts have to assess how a change will affect 
millions of such cases. The tax-benefit system has grown 
into a structure of such labyrinthine complexity that 
pencil and paper methods of assessing changes in policy 
are no longer adequate. Computer models have become an 
unavoidable necessity. Computers can analyse the
effects of a policy change on a large number of cases to
give policy predictions which are far more detailed than 
is possible with other methods. The type of information 
which can be generated by a computer includes:-
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(i) showing how net incomes of different groups 
will be affected by a policy change;
(ii) estimating the incentive or disincentive 
effects of a policy;
(iii) calculating a breakdown of gainers and 
losers by family type and level of income;
(iv) estimating the global Exchequer costs of a 
policy;
(v) calculating the "take-up rate" of a given 
benefit;
(vi) showing who bears the burden of a 
particular tax;
(vii) predicting the behavioural responses to a 
given policy.
It should be stressed that this is not an exhaustive
list. It is merely shown to give an impression of the 
range of different policy issues which must be
considered. [A fuller discussion of the issues which 
need to be included in the assessment of tax-benefit 
policy is given in chapter 3.]
Computer models have thus become a vital feature in
determining how the burden of tax and the benefit of 
welfare are to be distributed. Given the large
proportion of national income which is channeled through 
the tax-benefit system, these computer models are of 
undeniable importance as they help to shape opinions 
about whether or how the current system should be
changed.
1.2 The Need for a new Tax-Benefit Model 
- The Conceptual Arguments
Given that tax-benefit modelling is an inevitable feature 
of policy-making, is the current pattern of access to
4
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such models appropriate for the efficient working of 
democracy?
This thesis accepts a prescriptive view that in a 
democracy a pluralist pattern of access to tax-
benefit models is desirable; it is necessary for 
effective policy-making abilities to be available to a 
range of pressure groups, opposition parties, and groups 
within parties, rather than simply to the dominant
faction within the governing party. This prescriptive
view accepts that the propagation of a series of
alternative policies is useful to ensure that the optimum 
policy will be adopted. Even if the constant questioning 
of a government's policies does not lead to their 
rejection, it may lead to modifications which would not 
have been made if a vigorous alternative case had not 
been put. This prescriptive view was asserted eloquently 
by Laski:-
We prefer a state where sovereignty is 
distributed, where the richness of corporate 
lives is insurance against ... sterility of 
outlook ... There can be no servility in a 
state which divides its effective governance.
The necessity of balancing interests, the need 
for combining opinions, results in a wealth of 
thought such as no man can attain. The price 
of liberty is exactly the divergence of opinion 
on fundamental questions ... No man, and even 
more, no state can ever be so right as not to 
need doubts about its rightness.
(Laski, 1917:273-274)
In the field of tax-benefit policy, these essential 
"doubts", which Laski considered so important, can best 
be supplied by groups with views which differ from the 
government. Such groups may exist both inside and
5
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outside the governing party. Groups outside the 
governing party would include pressure groups and the 
opposition parties. Examples of intra-party groups would 
include such bodies as the Monday Club and the Tory 
Reform Group within the Conservative Party, or the 
Campaign for a Labour Victory and the Tribune Group 
within the Labour Party. It is all the more important 
for alternative views to be expressed within the British 
political system because it has no distribution of power 
between levels of government as in federal systems, or 
between branches of government as in the USA where there 
is a constitutional separation of powers between the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The lack 
of checks and balances within the British polity is so 
marked that a former Lord Chancellor has described it as 
a system of "elective dictatorship" (Hailsham, 1978:9).
How far does the pattern of access to tax-benefit models 
parallel the concentration of political power? Who owns 
and has access to the existing tax-benefit models?
There are eleven major models of the UK tax-benefit 
system. Four of these were developed inside government 
departments. These are the DHSS tax-benefit Model table 
program (which shows the net income and implied tax rates 
of hypothetical families); the Inland Revenue Personal 
Income Tax Model (which uses a sample of 55,000 tax 
returns to predict the revenue costs and distributional 
effects of Income Tax changes); the DHSS Policy 
Simulation Model and the Inter-Departmental Group on Tax- 
Benefit Modelling program which both use the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) to predict the effects of 
general tax-benefit changes. The government have a 
monopoly of the use of these programs, except for the 
facility afforded to MPs to ask parliamentary questions. 
However, the government can refuse to answer a question 
on grounds of cost. In practice, this means questions
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about policies which are a relatively minor deviation 
from the status quo (and which are therefore cheap to 
simulate) will be answered, whereas questions about more 
complex policies will not be.
Apart from the four models in government departments, 
there are two in the quasi-governmental sector. The 
Policy Studies Institute (PSI) has a model. Though the 
PSI is independent, the overwhelming majority of the 
contracts for its work come from government or quasi- 
govemmental bodies. There is no evidence that an 
opposition party or pressure group has paid the PSI to do 
tax-benefit simulations on its behalf. The other quasi- 
governmental model is the Alvey DHSS Policy Demonstrator. 
This is a joint project between government, private 
industry, and higher education. It is not clear that the 
Policy Demonstrator will be made available to opposition 
parties after its completion. Even if it is, non­
governmental organisations would have difficulty in 
affording the extremely expensive computers that the 
Demonstrator is designed to run on.
Five of the eleven models are not owned directly by 
government. For example, the City University Business 
School Model (CUBS) was developed primarily to 
demonstrate the effect of the tax-benefit system on 
labour supply. Its structure displays a keen concern for 
possible disincentives in the tax-benefit system, and its 
authors (such as Michael Beenstock) are associated with 
the ideological right. It has not been used by any 
pressure groups or opposition parties.
The Tax Reform Analysis Package (TRAP) has been developed 
by academics at the London School of Economics. Like the 
CUBS model it is chiefly concerned with the labour supply 
effects of policy. The users of this package would have 
to supply their own data and spend considerable amounts
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of time in becoming familiar with it. It has not been 
used by any opposition parties or pressure groups in the 
U.K.
Two models have emerged from the Suntory-Toyota 
International Centre for Economics and Related 
Disciplines (STICERD) at the London School of Economics. 
TAXEXP is like the DHSS Tax Benefit Model Table program 
in that it is based on hypothetical families. TAXMOD is 
based on a sample of actual cases from the FES, but it 
does not include cases of people who are unemployed or 
retired. TAXMOD has been supplied to a number of 
pressure groups such as the Low Pay Unit, however there 
are limitations on the type of output it can produce, and 
there is no evidence that it is regularly used by any 
opposition parties. It has been used to assess the 
former Liberal Party's Tax Credit Proposals, but not by 
the Liberal Party itself but rather by researchers at the 
LSE. Thus it was not used during the process of policy 
formulation, but afterwards to criticise the policy.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) model has been 
used regularly by the government and by the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP). Indeed the SDP's use of the IFS 
model is the only example in the 1980s of an opposition 
party actually commissioning research to be done on a 
tax-benefit model.
The different characteristics of the eleven models are 
summarised in figure 1.1. It will be seen from this that 
there is no model available to opposition parties and 
pressure groups which can simulate the effect of policies 
on the full population. By far the best of the publicly 
accessible tax-benefit models is the LSE TAXMOD package 
but as it excludes the unemployed and retired it only 
covers 51 per cent of the population.
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Figure 1.1 Comparative Table of Tax-Benefit Models
DHSS Ta 
Benefit 
Tables
City Uni 
Business 
Sch .Mode
L.S.E.
TAX-EXP 
Package
Alvey 
DHSS 
Demons tr
TRAP Tax
Reform
Analysis
Level of 
Analysis
House­
hold
Householc 
/Tax Unit
Tax Uni 
/Househlc
Tax/Benf
Rule
Tax Unit
Major 
Exclusions 
From Population
Investm* 
Income, 
Pensione 
Jobless
Sick,
Disabled
Pensione
Jobless
Not
Applic.
The Non 
Working *
Proportion of 
Population Covered
under
50%
above
95%
c. 55% Not
Applic.
c.50%*
No. of Cases Not
Applic.
Not
Avail.
Not
Applic.
Not
/^Dplic.
c.3000*
Based on Hypoth 
-etical Examples
Yes Yes Yes No
Based on Actual 
Survey Data
No Yes No Yes
Survey Data Used
Correction for 
Under-representing 
of household types
Not
Applic.
Not
Applic.
F.E.S.
1978,81
No
None
Not
/^>plic.
None
Not
Applic.
Variable
No
Correction for 
Under-representi ng 
of income groups
Not
Applic.
No Not
Applic.
Not
Applic.
No
Simulation of 
Behaviour Responses
No Yes in 
Batch ver
No No Yes
Computer Language BASIC F0RTRAN77 BASIC LISP F0RTRAN77
Availability General 
tovernm! t 
Users
tot Meant 
or Dist.
May Be 
Bought 
£20.00
Still in
)evelopmt
Stage
May Be 
Bought 
£50.00
Includes Indicators 
Of Accuracy e.g. 
Standard Deviation
Not
Applic.
No
No Not
Applic.
Yes
Assessment of 
User-friendliness
Medium Medium Good Superb Poor
Date Written ate 60*s 1982 1982 1985-? 1982
Documentation None None Good None Yet Poor
* Trap can be used with a variety of data sets, these figures refer to
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It should be stressed that access to these models is not 
the only factor affecting the ability to do tax-benefit 
policy analysis. The ability to use some of these models 
also necessitates the employment of people with 
specialist computer skills. This problem could be solved 
by producing more models like TAXMOD which are extremely 
easy to use, but such programs are the exception rather 
than the rule. When the availability of skilled labour 
is considered, in addition, to the accessability of the 
models themselves, it is clear that opposition parties, 
pressure groups, and groups inside the governing party 
(other than the dominant faction), are all at a serious 
disadvantage in comparison with government.
Tax-Benefit models can make a difference to the balance 
of political power. By predicting the likely effects of 
a policy, tax-benefit models can help to show whether a 
particular policy is viable or not. The ability to 
determine the viability of different options is important 
in influencing opinions. Clearly if one group in society 
has the resources to show that a particular policy option 
can be implemented without serious disadvantages, then 
that group will be more powerful than another group 
without the same ability.
Does this matter? Is the British political system 
sufficiently diverse that alternative policies may be 
brought forward and implemented within the existing 
structure anyway? These questions involve a conceptual 
debate about the nature of power itself. Is power 
concentrated in the hands of an elite, or does it exist 
in a distributed form in a variety of different power 
centres? This debate involves the use of the word 
"pluralist" in both a prescriptive sense (to explain, by 
those who support the concept of pluralism, what the 
political system ought to be) and a descriptive sense (to 
explain how the political system actually is). In order
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to avoid this confusion, the term will be used in the 
following discussion purely in its descriptive sense.
Among the recent contributions to the academic discussion 
is a debate which has become a classic study for students 
of political science. This is the dispute between Dahl 
who argued that power is distributed in a pluralist 
manner, and Bachrach and Baratz who argue that it is 
concentrated. Dahl's (1961) argument was based on an 
empirical study of political conflicts within New Haven, 
Connecticut. Dahl concluded that there were several 
centres of power, because no single group appeared to win 
all (or even a large majority) these disputes.
Commenting on Dahl's research Bachrach and Baratz (1970) 
pointed out that the assumption of a pluralist power 
structure was incorrect because an elite could have 
manipulated the political debate so that only minor 
issues were brought into the political arena while the 
major ones were never allowed to be contested. Thus even 
though observed conflicts did not show a monopoly or even 
a hegemony of power by a single group, an elite could 
have prevented significant conflicts from being observed. 
Bachrach and Baratz argued that the control of the 
political agenda meant that issues such as poverty and 
racism, which were of major concern to significant 
numbers of people in New Haven, were not raised.
Lukes (1974) has termed Dahl's perspective on power 
relationships the "One Dimensional View" because it only 
takes into account power relationships from a single 
narrow perspective: that of visible actualised conflicts. 
Conducting empirical research at this one dimensional 
level involves a risk that the researcher will conclude 
that the distribution of power is more dispersed than it 
actually is because, as Bachrach and Baratz (1970) have 
shown, the conflicts which succeed in rising to the
11
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surface of the political maelstrom, may only be of an 
inconsequential nature. This echoes Schattschneider's 
view that "some issues are organised into politics while 
others are organised out" (Schattscheider, 1960:34).
Lukes (1974) categorised Bachrach and Baratz's 
methodological perspective as the "Two Dimensional View". 
This view is capable of explaining more power 
relationships than the one diminsional view by taking 
into account suppressed conflicts. Power relationships 
may be illustrated not only by decisions but also by 
"non-decisions". However in Lukes' view there is a 
crucial flaw in Bachrach and Baratz's methodology because 
they insist on only taking into account observable non­
decisions. Bachrach and Baratz write that if "there is 
no conflict, overt or covert, the presumption must be 
that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of 
values, in which case nondecision-making is impossible" 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 49). Lukes suggests that power 
may be manifested in forms so subtle that it cannot be 
measured in terms of conflict, either overt or covert. 
Bachrach and Baratz seem at times to dismiss this more 
subtle view of power simply because it might defy the 
power of social scientists to measure it. This seems to 
involve sacrificing the accuracy of social theory on the 
altar of empirical methodology.
Lukes argues that a "three dimensional view" should be 
taken so as to explain the structure of power fully. 
This view would make it possible to take into account 
forms of power which do not express themselves either in 
open or suppressed conflict.
The bias of the system is not sustained simply 
by a series of individually chosen acts, but 
also, most importantly, by the socially
structured and culturally patterned behaviour
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of groups and practices of institutions, which 
may indeed be manifested by individuals' 
inaction.
(Lukes, 1974:21-22)
These structures, practices, and patterned behaviours can 
prevent issues from being raised at all so that they 
never reach the point at which they could be suppressed. 
Not only does Lukes maintain that the three dimensional 
view of power helps better to explain the structure of 
power, but he refutes the Bachrach and Baratz view that 
it is impossible to measure the forces which lead to 
politically significant inaction. The patterned
behaviours which Lukes mentions could help to support 
Poulantzas' (1986) case that a social class's objective 
interests could differ from the way those interests are 
represented. Thus if the way a class's interests are 
represented so as to confine the class's goals to a 
narrow range of "safe" issues, its real interests can be 
ignored.
As a paradigm for the type of research methodology which 
could help to assess power relationships using the three 
dimensional view Lukes takes a study by Crenson (1971) 
which seeks to explain the reason why different cities in 
the USA tackled their air pollution problems at different 
points in time.
Crenson conducted a detailed case study of two American 
cities, and also completed a survey of the opinions of 
community leaders in 51 American cities, to try to 
determine why certain cities dealt with their air 
pollution problems years or even decades earlier than 
others. Crenson's data indicated that a strong 
reputation for power by local industry and strong party 
organisation in a given city made it less likely that the 
pollution issue would be dealt with quickly. For
13
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example, East Chicago which lacked strong party 
organisation and whose commercial, power was split between 
a number of companies succeeded in enacting local clean 
air legislation in 1949. In contrast Gary, Indiana, had 
a strong party organisation and was seen as a "one 
company town". The company, U.S.Steel, was a major air 
polluter and therefore had a vested interest in the 
status quo. The existence of party organisations tended 
to impede progress, because the parties provided a 
mechanism by which the companies could give local 
politicians inducements not to take action on the clean 
air issue. Thus Gary did not institute air pollution 
controls until 1962. To understand Crenson's research 
and Lukes' three dimensional view of power it is crucial 
to understand that these commercial and political 
obstructions to change do not need to take active steps 
to exert power. The fact that institutions merely have a 
reputation for being powerful is sufficient to discourage 
potential reformers from entering the political fray and 
trying to change a policy.
It has been argued here that undemocratic 
restrictions on the scope of local political 
activity are the products of indirect 
influence. They are not the result of
suppressive acts or directly applied pressure 
but are responses to the power reputations of 
various local groups, organizations, and 
individuals.
(Crenson, 1971 : 181)
Foucault's research would also tend to support Lukes' 
concept of power, in that he concentrated on the 
underlying assumptions of societies which could be gauged 
from their patterns of speech. Foucault is concerned with 
the question "What rules of right are implemented by the 
relations of power in the productions of discources of
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truth?" (Foucault, 1986: 229). It should be stressed
that the words "right" and "truth" are used here in an 
existentialist sense. "Right" and "Truth" are not 
absolute concepts with an independent existence for 
Foucault. They are "right" and "truth" in a relative 
sense as they are defined by a particular society. This 
is the basis of Foucault's studies of 
"discourse/practice" in which he shows how in certain 
situations the language of societies has shaped what 
behaviour is acceptable, and therefore it has acted as an 
invisible form of control. This control exerts itself 
purely by shaping the underlying values of society, and 
never through overt conflict. It is, par excellance, an 
example of power exertion which can only be measured if 
one accepts Lukes' three dimensional view of power. 
Arendt's definition of "authority" is similar to 
Foucault's and Lukes' concept of power "Authority ... Its 
hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those who are 
called to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is 
needed" (Arendt, 1986: 65).
If the dominant position of the ruling groups in a 
society depends on this preservation of underlying 
values, then it is necessary for the values of the status 
quo to go unquestioned. Alternative policies and systems 
must be excluded from regular discussion. Lukes and 
Foucault imply that there is an invisible dictatorship of
the mind which is kept in force without the overt
exercise of power. For such mind control to exist
alternatives must be suppressed. Thus if status quo is 
to be altered then different ideas must be promulgated. 
In order to make possible this disemination of different 
ideas it is necessary to have information transfer 
mechanisms to undermine the consensus of the status quo. 
Thus writing, ink, paper, printing, literacy, and 
independent broadcasting all tend to undermine power 
concentration. The dissemination of a generally usable
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tax-benefit model would also be a tiny step forward in 
this process of knowledge dispersal. Some adherants of 
Lukes' radical view of power might argue that it would be 
hopelessly idealistic to suggest that mechanisms of 
information transfer could alter the structure of power. 
But this would be to expose a weakness of the radical 
view of power, because it only furnishes a theory about 
how domination is maintained; it does not provide a 
theory about how domination is undermined. The radical 
view cannot explain how monarchies become oligarchies and 
how oligarchies become democracies.
Lukes (1974) locates his various conceptions of power 
within different categories, which represent different 
outlooks on politics. He implies that the one­
dimensional view is best applied to liberals, the two- 
dimensional view best fits those who are reformists, and 
that the three dimensional view is best suited to 
radicals. There would seem to be various political 
persuasions which are not covered by this typology. Would 
a true conservative only be interested in maintaining the 
status quo and so take a zero-dimensional view of power? 
Where would Marxists fit into Lukes' schema?
Some of Marx's arguments about the distribution of power 
and control of the mode of production have parallels with 
the debate over information technology. To understand 
this argument it is important to understand how some 
Marxist concepts have been adapted by writers like 
Foucault. Marx argued that the capitalist class 
maintained its power through its monopoly ownership of 
the mode of production (Marx, 1976). However economic 
developments since Marx have made the mode of production 
a much less useful yardstick by which to measure the 
distribution of power. When Marx wrote the vast majority 
of the working population were employed in the secondary 
(industrial) sector of the economy, rather than the
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primary sector (agriculture). However, in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century many countries have an 
entirely different pattern of employment. In the United 
States the majority of workers are now in the tertiary 
(service) sector. As Poster puts it, the fact that fewer 
people are employed producing material objects means 
that: -
labor now takes the form of men and women 
acting on other men and women, or, more
significantly, people acting on information and 
information acting on people. Especially in
the advanced sectors of the economy, the 
manipulation of information tends to
characterize human activity... The creation, 
transformation, and movement of information are 
the objects of most of the important new 
technologies that are introduced into the 
economy. We are told that very soon movement 
in the social field will involve information 
(electronically processed), not men or
commodities. People will stay put while 
information will flow through social space.
(Poster, 1984: 53)
In order to signify this transition, Foucault's writings 
concentrate on the "mode of information", a deliberate 
modern parallel of Marx's concept of the mode of
production. Thus it could be argued that the 
government's dominant access to the tools for making tax- 
benefit policy parallels Marx's theory about the
capitalist class's monopoly ownership of the means of
production. In the Marxist era ownership of capital was 
the litmus test of power; in the late twentieth century 
it is the control of information.
As an example of the potential effect of control and use
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of information Burnham (1983) points to a referendum 
campaign in Missouri in 1978. This resulted in a victory 
for trade unionists supporting the retention of the 
"closed shop" principle, even though the opinion polls 
had shown Missouri residents were against the closed 
shop. The trade unionists' campaign had involved massive 
use of demographic and opinion poll data to devise a 
highly selective information campaign which allowed the 
forces in favour of the "closed shop" to tell different 
groups of voters the types of argument that were most 
likely to be effective. This resulted in a last minute 
swing in favour of the closed shop. Burnham (1983) 
commented that this method of using computers is normally 
only accessible to the richest and most powerful 
institutions in society because it requires a large 
amount of sophisticated expertise and equipment.
Burnham's assessment of the power-concentrating impact of 
computers was echoed by Downs who made an empirical 
investigation of the effect of information on local 
government in the USA - "The government bureaucracy as a 
whole gains power at the expense of city and state 
legislators, the general electorate, and non-governmental 
groups" Downs (1971 : 331). The development of
expensive main frame computers up to 1971 made it easy to 
believe that computers would lead to a monopoly of 
information in the same way that nineteenth century 
industry lead to a monopoly of capital. The computers of 
that era were bulky, difficult to use, and extremely 
expensive. By their very nature they could only be 
purchased and used by organisations with substantial 
monetary resources.
However the threat the computers would concentrate 
political power was swept away with the advent of 
silicon-chip based micro-circuitry. This made it 
possible for computer circuits of considerable complexity
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to be reproduced very cheaply. The machines based on 
this technology were called micro-computers and because 
of their relative cheapness and availability it is
probable that they will lead to a dispersal rather than a 
concentration of power. While main frame computers were 
produced in the thousands or tens of thousands, micro­
computers have been produced in the millions. A logical 
result of this dissemination of information power would 
be to alter societies in the direction of greater 
pluralism.
The spread of cheap, universal computer power 
will result in a gradual loosening of the 
restraints on the movement of information
within a society. The world of the 1980s and 
90s will be dominated not only by cheap
electronic data processing, but also virtually 
infinite data transmission. This kind of 
development will encourage lateral
communication - the spread of information from 
human being to human being across the base of 
the social pyramid.
(Evans, 1983: 208)
The arrival of cheap micro-computers had a profound 
effect on the way information technology was to be used. 
In the case of large main frame computers there was a 
general practice that the large investment in capital to 
buy the equipment would be matched by a large investment 
in labour. The machines were so expensive that 
"experts'1 were needed to get the most cost-effective use 
out of them. Then the silicon chip shattered the 
specialist's monopoly and threw open the doors of 
computing to the generalist. Millions of people who were 
not primarily programmers found computers in their 
everyday use. This created a market for computer 
programs which could perform complex tasks and yet still
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be operable by "non-experts". Spurred on by this profit 
motive the greatest improvements in human-computer 
interactions came from companies in the field of micro­
computing: TV games, calculating programs like Visicalc, 
business graphics, writing systems like Wang's word- 
processing (Martin, 1984). Thus the silicon chip has 
improved not only the accessibility of the computer 
equipment itself but also of the method of using it.
It might be assumed that the decentralising potential of 
micro-computers would inevitably lead to pluralism in 
areas where policy-making can be facilitated by 
information technology, such as tax-benefit modelling. 
Sieghart disputes the logic of such an assumption 
"technology is not neutral. It does not develop 
according to the laws of some technological determinism, 
breeding clinically according to some inner logic of 
development." (Sieghart, 1982:147). Experience has shown 
that the availability of computers to non-governmental 
groups has greatly increased, but their use for tax- 
benefit modelling has not. One micro-computer based 
program, TAXMOD, is used by several pressure groups. 
None of the opposition parties makes regular use of a 
tax-benefit model (see below). Though the potential for 
developing a pluralist tax-benefit model exists, it is 
not clear that one has yet been constructed. Section 1.4 
outlines the reason why such a model has not be 
developed. Though the silicon chip has broken the 
barrier of equipment costs, the barrier of usability 
stands firm.
1.3 The Need for a new tax-benefit model 
The Practical Arguments 
The discussion now turns from the theoretical arguments 
about tax-benefit models and the structure of power to an 
examination of tax-benefit policy making in practice. 
This examination is arranged in the form of case studies
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of three areas where there is potential for conflict over 
tax-benefit policy. Such conflicts or potential 
conflicts are likely to arise in the relations between 
politicians and civil servants, between pressure groups 
and the government, and between opposition parties and 
the government. This is intended to be an illustrative 
rather than exhaustive list of relationships in which 
tax-benefit modeling could be significant.
1.3.1 1st Case Study - Politicians vs Civil Servants
The conventional theory of representative democracy is 
that the many are able to exercise power through the 
ballot box by choosing from among two or more political 
parties to form the government. It is necessary for the 
alternative parties to present policies at the election 
which are significantly different from each other. 
However popular electoral power is undermined if 
political parties do not follow their manifestos once 
they become the government. Political parties may fail 
to carry out their policies because they have a greater 
incentive to promise change before an election than they 
do to effect change after an election. Pareto developed 
a theory that power is wielded by elites which often 
promise significant changes on their accession to power 
only to renege on them when their position is secure:-
The new elite ... assumes the leadership of the 
oppressed, declares that it will pursue not its 
own interests but those of the many ... Of 
course, once victory is won, it subjugates the 
erstwhile allies, or at best offers them some 
formal concessions.
(Pareto, 1968: 36)
One example of this was the Conservative Party's promise 
to spend 30 million pounds on increasing Family 
Allowances prior to the 1970 election (Brown, 1984: 54) -
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a commitment extracted by the Child Poverty Action Group. 
This promise was not fulfilled as the rate of Family 
Allowance remained the same when the Heath government 
went out of office in 1974 (which represents a 
substantial decline in value when inflation is taken into 
account).
A similar volte face nearly happened in 1977 when the 
Callaghan government contemplated deferring the 
introduction of Child Benefit because of fears about 
trade union opposition to the reduction in father's take 
home pay which would be caused by the abolition of child 
tax allowances (Barnett, 1982).
Such changes of policy are probably less the result of 
deliberate dishonesty than the intervention of political 
forces which were unforeseen when the original policy 
commitment was made. Politicians and their advisers have 
sometimes claimed that civil servants have prevented 
political promises from being implemented. Williams is 
one of the most outspoken critics of the civil service
It is undemocratic, particularly at the top; 
exclusive; and with a strange personality of 
its own, half reminiscent of the Army, half of 
a masonic society. Certainly many members of 
the Administrative Class seem unrelated to the 
outside world.
(Williams, 1972: 346)
Williams complains that the obstructiveness of the civil 
service prevented the implementation of a number of 
radical policies by the first Wilson government, and that 
the higher Civil Service is biased towards the 
Conservative Party (Williams, 1972). Haines has argued a 
slightly different case. He maintains that the higher 
civil service does try to influence policy, but not in a
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way which demonstrates a bias to a particular party. In 
Haines' view, the civil servants in a particular
department tend to favour a specific set of policies 
which becomes part of that department's unspoken
ideology. Thus, according to Haines, the Treasury in 
the 1960s and 70s had a bias towards incomes policy 
regardless of which party was in power. It is
significant that between 1964 and 1979 every incoming 
government opposed incomes policy, and each government 
ended up adopting one. In Haines' view the civil 
service's favoured policies tended to be pragmatic and 
centrist (Haines, 1977). This view has been echoed by 
Tony Benn (Sampson, 1983:203), who also complains of 
higher civil servants' bias to consensus politics. In 
contrast Hurd (1979) asserts that civil servants
positively need strong direction from their ministers to 
operate, and that it would be against their nature to try 
to initiate policy themselves. It should be noted, 
however, that Hurd was commenting on his experience as a 
political insider during the Heath government. As many 
of Heath's policies happened to coincide with the civil 
service's own policies, Hurd would not have had the 
opportunity to observe the bureaucracy trying to obstruct 
government policy.
One case where the Heath government's policies did not 
coincide with the preferences of the civil service was 
its support for the introduction of tax credits. Under 
this scheme a number of tax reliefs were to be converted 
from allowances of tax free ,income into positive cash 
payments, so that lower paid workers below the tax 
threshold would benefit from them. It also involved
abolishing the cumulative system under which unused tax 
allowances from one week would be carried forward to a 
future week. These changes were such a radical 
departure from the existing P.A.Y.E. system that the 
Inland Revenue was very antagonistic to it. Antony
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Barber and Sir Keith Joseph commented that they had to 
face the opposition of civil servants who continually
said that implementing tax credits simply could not be 
done (DHSS, 1972). This bureaucratic delay had important 
consequences. Although the Heath government was elected 
in the summer of 1970, it was 1972 before it even 
published a consultative Green Paper on the scheme. 
Legislation for tax credits was to be incorporated in the 
1974 Budget, however the Heath government lost the 
February 1974 election and so the tax credit policy was 
lost. The failure of the tax credit policy was only 
partly due to civil service obstruction. However it is 
notable that it was possible for the civil service to
draw up an extremely detailed statutory incomes policy in
1972 at very short notice, while it took nearly four
years for legislation to be prepared on tax credits.
To understand how access to tax-benefit models may affect 
the implementation of policies like tax credits, it is 
necessary to understand how they are used. Tax-Benefit 
models exist in several departments of government, 
notably the Treasury, the Department of the Environment, 
and the Department of Social Security. In addition there 
is a model which can be accessed by any department, 
IGOTM. Such models tend to be used by civil servants at 
many levels of seniority below those who come into 
personal contact with government ministers. Thus it is 
possible for higher civil servants to manage the flow of 
information to their political masters. This could be 
used extremely effectively in a situation where a civil 
servant was attempting to prevent the adoption of a 
particular tax-benefit policy. The permanent secretary 
would be responsible for ordering the tax-benefit 
modellers to produce tables to illustrate the effects of 
several different versions of a given policy. He or she 
could choose to show those tables which indicated that 
the policy would seriously change the distribution of
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income, and suppress those which predicted a minor 
change. Thus it would be possible to reduce the chance 
that the policy would be adopted.
It should be stressed that this is described as a 
possible scenario. By the very nature of such an action, 
no civil servant would have an incentive to preserve 
evidence of it. If the memoires of Benn and Williams are 
accurate then civil servants certainly have the motive to 
behave in this way. What evidence there is about the 
inter-actions between civil servants and politicians 
comes from political memoires, a source which may be 
prone to serious bias. However, it is true to say that 
such a scenario would not be possible if an accurate and 
widely accessible computer model existed outside 
government. In this case politicians would be able to 
work out their policies in detail while in opposition, 
and when they were in government detailed options could 
be put forward by officials from within the governing 
party itself or by political advisers to government 
ministers.
1.3.2 2nd Case Study - Pressure Groups vs Government 
Ministers
If a society is to have a pluralist structure then it is 
necessary for influence to be exercised by groups other 
than the government. It has long been recognised that 
organisations independent of the state tend to undermine 
the concentration of power. Aristotle's Politics 
contained the following advice to a tyrant who wants to 
maintain his power base - "don't allow the getting 
together in clubs or education or anything of that kind; 
these things are breeding grounds of independence and 
confidence, two things a tyrant must guard against" 
(Saunders, 1981: 344-345}.
In the field of tax-benefit policy a special category of
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such associations are particularly important - pressure 
groups. The term "pressure groups" probably arose out of 
the writing of Bentley
All phenomena of Government are phenomena of
groups pressing one another, forming one
another, and pushing out new groups.
(Cit. Mann, 1983)
A number of groups interested in tax-benefit policy apply 
pressure on government directly through political 
lobbying. In the field of social security policy a 
plethora of groups exist to further the interests of 
people with similar concerns. "Age Concern" and "Help 
the Aged" have a special interest in state pensions, old 
age tax allowances, and income support for the elderly. 
The National Association of Widows, Cruse, and the War 
Widows Association of Great Britain are concerned with 
National Insurance widows benefits and Industrial Death 
Benefit. Gingerbread and the National Council for One 
Parent Families are interested in single parent's 
benefits, while the Child Poverty Action Group is 
concerned with family benefits in general. The 
Disablement Income Group, the Disability Alliance, and 
the Royal Association for Disability and Rehabilitation 
are concerned with a range of benefits including 
Attendance Allowance, Mobility Allowance, benefits for 
the industrially injured, and non-contributory benefits 
for the handicapped. Some groups exist to further a 
specific benefit policy such as the National Maternity 
Grant Campaign. Others fall outside this categorisation. 
The Basic Income Research Group exists to promote the 
provision of a universal cash benefit at subsistence 
level to replace personal tax allowances and unemployment 
benefit. It thus exists to serve an idea rather than a 
specific client group.
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It is difficult to assess how successful these groups 
have been. Two of the major groups to champion the cause 
of the disabled were set up in the late 1960s - the 
Disability Alliance, and the Disability Income Group 
(DIG). DIG has the specific aim of persuading 
governments to introduce a unified national disability 
benefit payable regardless of contribution conditions or 
the cause of the disability. This national disability 
income concept is now also supported by the Disability 
Alliance and the Spastics Society. In the late 1960s and 
'70s several major benefits for the disabled were either 
planned or introduced. In 1970 Attendance Allowance was 
introduced; in 1971 Invalidity Benefit and Allowances; in 
1975 the Invalid Care Allowance, Non-Contributory 
Invalidity Pensions, and Mobility Allowances; in 1979 the 
Vaccine Damage Fund. It is likely that these pressure 
groups were at least a contributory cause of these 
changes. However, although the government did take 
action on disability benefits, it is worth noting how far 
this departed from the main policy supported by the 
disability pressure groups. At no time since DIG was set 
up, has a government seriously planned the introduction 
of a National Disability Income. Indeed there has been a 
one sided debate between the government and pressure 
groups over the feasibility of introducing such a scheme 
- "one-sided" because of the superior resources which the 
government has to conduct such a debate. Brown writes :-
The government throughout has cited the cost 
[of a national disability income] as between 
two and three billion pounds. The disability 
organisations have attempted to cost their 
proposals, though they have had the 
disadvantage of not having full access to the 
data.
(Brown, 1984: 388)
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This estimate was similar to one by the Spastics Society 
of 2,012 million pounds based on 1982-83 benefit rates 
(Spastics Society, 1983). However Wilson (1981) 
estimated that a National Disability Income could be 
introduced at a cost of 1640 million pounds (at 1980-81). 
However if this was to be limited solely to those deemed 
to be 100 per cent disabled then the cost would be only 
120 million pounds. (All figures are "net costs" over 
and above the expenditure on existing disability benefits 
which would be replaced).
For the debate over benefit policy to be genuinely
pluralist it would be necessary for the information on 
benefit policy to be available to the various
participants in the debate. In the case of the pressure 
groups with an interest in social security policy, this 
is not the case. There are restrictions both on the data 
itself (generally large government surveys of the 
population) and on computer programs to manipulate the 
data into a form which is useful for policy predictions.
In the case of the data there are some sources which it 
is very difficult for pressure groups to gain access to. 
The most important set of data about benefit claimants is
the DHSS Annual Statistical Enquiry (DHSS, 1987). This
gives the fullest possible detail about the circumstances 
of those on benefit. Unfortunately, it is not available 
to extra-governmental researchers. Some other major data 
sets may be acquired for the purposes of academic 
research namely the General Household Survey (GHS), the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES), and the Inland Revenue 
Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI). Even if the government 
allowed the pressure groups access to all of this data 
(they do not in the case of the Annual Statistical 
Enquiry) it is only available in a form which makes it 
virtually unusable by a pressure group of insubstantial 
means. The data is supplied in the form of large
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computer tapes of the kind normally used by large main 
frame computers or minicomputersr rather than the 
microcomputers which are often owned by pressure groups. 
It is reasonable to expect that an increasing number of 
pressure groups will have access to micro-computers 
costing in the range of 400-3000 pounds. It is extremely 
unlikely that any pressure group is likely to spend (or 
be able to spend) the tens of thousands necessary to 
acquire a main frame or a mini-computer.
Even if a pressure group had access to the data and to a 
suitable computer, there would still be serious 
difficulties in using the data to produce meaningful 
predictions about the tax-benefit system.
The pressure group would have two choices. One option 
would be to purchase one of the existing menu-driven tax- 
benefit programs like TAXMOD, however this type of 
program restricts the user to a narrow range of policy 
options (see section 1.4 below).
The other option would be to design a new tax-benefit 
model from scratch. This would be a labour of hercules. 
It would involve writing a computer program to represent 
the existing tax-benefit system, and to represent an 
alternative system which the group wanted to simulate. 
If a group wanted to pay for a computer programmer to 
undertake such work from a commercial software agency it 
could be extremely expensive. One such agency recently
quoted 400 pounds per day as the price to supply a 
programmer familiar with the computer language Scientific 
Information Retrieval (SIR) - the language the FES data 
is compatible with. Assume that it would take at least 
four weeks to correct for missing values and response 
bias and to write equations representing the tax-benefit 
system (an optimistically low estimate). This means that 
one would need to have access to 8,000 pounds worth of
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computing resources. In practice, a pressure group would 
probably have to depend on people (probably academics) 
giving their time voluntarily, but the figure of 8,000 
pounds is useful in showing the value of the skills that 
would be needed to produce a tax-benefit model. It 
should be stressed that these figures are illustrative 
minima. The actual effort in workhours which has gone 
into the existing tax-benefit models vastly exceeds this.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the pressure 
groups have an important role to play in advocating 
policies for sections of society with specific needs. 
Their effectiveness in performing this role would be 
increased by access to computer data on the circumstances 
of the groups they campaign for combined with a facility 
for analysing this data in such a way as to assess the 
feasibility and cost of alternative policies.
1.3.3 3rd Case Study - Opposition Parties vs Government 
In addition to the discussion between pressure groups and 
government there is also a vigorous debate between the 
governing party and opposition parties. For a country to 
have a pluralist structure of power it is necessary that 
information resources should be dispersed. For an 
opposition to be constructive and effective it must not 
be limited to purely negative criticisms of the 
government's policies; it should be able to put forward 
its own practical alternatives, otherwise electors are 
not offered two or more credible options to choose from. 
This propogation of credible alternatives is hampered by 
the imbalance of policy-making resources which operates 
to the advantage of the government.
The only case of a political party actually commissioning 
the use of a tax-benefit model in the 1980s occurred in 
the case of the SDP. Dick Taverne was the chairman of 
the SDP panel on tax-benefit policy, and had close links
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with the IFS. He had been one of its founders. In 1986 
the SDP commissioned a report by the IFS on the SDP's 
Basic Benefit policy. The IFS report indicated that 
people on incomes higher than 15,000 pounds per annum 
would be worse off. This figure was a matter of 
considerable controversy at the SDP's 1986 conference. 
Some Social Democrats were concerned that such a policy 
would seriously reduce their electoral support among 
those on incomes of more than £15,000. Some leading 
Social Democrats disputed the accuracy of the IFS 
findings.
However at least the SDP had some access to a detailed 
assessment of the implications of their tax-benefit 
policies. In the case of the Liberal Party there was a 
consistent dearth of authoritative information about its 
tax credit policy. In the early 1950s the Liberal Party 
proposed a tax credit scheme involving the merging of 
National Insurance Contributions (NICs) with Income Tax 
and the payment of a universal credit of 10/- per week to 
all adults. In spite of the considerable outlay on these 
payments the Liberal Party calculated that the net result 
of the policy would be a surplus of funds. In 1951, 
Professor Hicks made the following comment about the 
Liberal submission to the Royal Commission on the 
Distribution of Profits and Income:-
I think one is right in saying that there are 
not enough minuses to balance the pluses ... 
and something therefore needs to be explained, 
because this is essentially a redistributive 
scheme ... and therefore somebody must lose for 
somebody else to gain.
(Royal Commission, 1951)
Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams, the author of the scheme, 
explained that this was because the National Insurance
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Fund was running at a surplus during this period, and
that the merging of Income Tax and NICs would release
money to be used for general government spending. The 
Liberal Party had a similar experience in the 1980s with 
their document "To Each According ..." (Vince, 1983). 
Like the earlier policy in the 1950s, there were 
proposals to introduce a universal system of tax credits 
and to merge Income Tax and NICs. The paper concluded 
that this policy could be financed if this combined tax
were set at a standard rate of 44 per cent (Vince, 
1983:41). However, the Vince proposals were examined by 
Atkinson using a version of the LSE TAXMOD program. 
Atkinson concluded that a tax rate of at least 47 per 
cent would be required (Atkinson, 1984: 28).
This use of tax-benefit models is significant, in that
the models are used to expose deficiencies in the 
policies of opposition parties after they have been
published (rather than being used to advise policy-makers 
before they are published). During the 1987 general 
election Independent Television News commissioned a 
report on the Labour Party's tax-benefit policies, and 
was able to confront the shadow Chancellor, Roy
Hattersley, with the finding that on average people with 
annual incomes over 15,000 pounds would be worse off 
under Labour's policies. The relative weakness of the
Labour Party's research resources was exposed on April 
15th 1985 when Micheal Meacher, M.P., held a press 
conference to launch a Labour Party consultative document 
on the reform of the social security system. The scheme 
included controversial plans such as the phasing out of 
mortgage interest tax relief. The correspondent for the 
Times (1985a) commented that "Mr Meacher could not
provide any details of the impact of his proposals on 
individual families." It is difficult to advocate such 
policies effectively if there is an absence of knowledge 
about their effects.
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Ranged against this paucity of research resources is the 
government, with four of its own tax-benefit models, full 
rights to use the IFS model, and the status of a virtual 
monopoly buyer of the output from the PSI model. It also 
has large numbers of expert staff to operate these 
models. One example of the government's superior skills 
was the research which was used to produce the Green 
Paper "Paying for Local Government" (DOE, 1986). This 
outlined a controversial scheme for the replacement of 
domestic rates with a community charge. It analysed the 
effects of the scheme with the IFS model using four
entire years of FES data combined. Thus a detailed 
simulation was performed using a sample of 27,000
families. The Green Paper showed the numbers of gainers
and losers broken down by family type, gross household 
income, and net household income. No opposition party 
could hope to match this research effort.
In spite of the apparent thoroughness of the Green 
Paper's analyses of the community charge, there was one 
major weakness in the government's methodology. This 
flowed from the fact that the IFS model is based on tax 
units rather than individuals. This meant that although 
the basis for the community charge was to be the 
individual rather than the tax unit or the household, the 
Green Paper was unable to present the effects of the 
community charge at the individual level. Though the 
Green Paper showed large income gains by low income tax 
units, it was unable to show large income losses by low 
income individuals because of the basis which had been 
chosen for the analysis. For example, economically 
inactive household members such as students and non­
working wives were to be subjected to local taxation for 
the first time. In almost every case these people would 
be poorer than the head of household. Thus the 
distributional effects of the charge are likely to be
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extremely regressive when examined on an individual 
basis. The paucity of the opposition parties' research 
resources meant that they were unable to point this out. 
It was left to a researcher in higher education to 
publish tables showing the income losses of individuals 
(Truscott, 1986).
1.3.4 Conclusion
The experience of recent years indicates that the 
research resources available to the dominant faction of 
the governing party greatly exceeds those of opposition 
parties and pressure groups. On occasions even the 
representatives of the governing party, the ministers, 
may find themselves at a disadvantage compared to civil 
servants. However, as the next section will show, the 
remedy for this situation depends not only on access to 
survey data and computer programs to analyse it.
These case studies help to show that the access to 
effective tax-benefit modelling resources is extremely 
limited. This tilts the balance of power in favour of 
those with access to these resources. Government becomes 
more powerful at the expense of pressure groups and 
opposition parties.
How could this concentration of power be altered? It 
would be necessary to have a tax-benefit model for 
pressure groups and opposition parties to simulate their 
policies which would be as effective as those available 
to the government. This model will be referred to as a 
pluralist tax-benefit model as it is intended to promote 
that dispersal of information resources which is 
necessary for a pluralist democracy to be effective.
A pluralist tax-benefit model must have two main 
characteristics. Firstly, it must be sufficiently easy 
to operate so that it is not restricted to a small number
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of experts. This ease of operation will be referred to 
as usability. Secondly, it must not restrict the user to 
a narrow range of policy options; it must be flexible. 
The following section analyses these twin problems of 
usability and flexibility.
1.4 Tax-Benefit Models: Usability and Flexibility 
In order to assess the problems of usability and 
flexibility it is useful at this point to undertake a 
brief review of some of the characteristics of the 
existing tax-benefit models. Figure 1.1 shows 16 
characteristics of the 11 tax-benefit models reviewed in 
chapter 2 (a fuller description of the terms in figure
1.1 is given in chapter 2). The row labelled "user- 
friendliness" provides an assessment of each model's ease 
of use. Inevitably, this is a subjective assessment. 
The problem of usability in tax-benefit modelling stems 
from a conflict between the goals of flexibility and 
comprehensibility.
To understand one of the problems of flexibility it is 
necessary to grasp the difference between "source code" 
and "object code" in computer programming. All of the 
computer models have been created with the aid of a 
programming language. These languages allow the user to 
express concepts in a way which may be more or less 
similar to the English language. For example, a 
programmer might use a statement like :-
"If Age > 60 then Entitled_To_Pension := True".
(This kind of statement would be acceptable in the 
language PASCAL). Once the programmer has created a 
series of these statements, they are then used by a 
compiler which checks for errors and then translates the 
kind of "human readable" statement shown above into a 
series of binary numbers which can be understood by a
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computer. The "human readable" statement is referred to 
as the "source code" in computer programming, and the 
resulting binary numbers are the “object code". It 
should be stressed that the "source code" of programs is 
comparatively easy for human beings to alter and adapt; 
however if a person only has access to the binary object 
code it is very difficult to change it.
Some of the models shown in figure 1.1 are only supplied 
in object code form : TAXEXP, TAXMOD, IGOTM, and the
Inland Revenue Personal Income Tax Model. This means 
that the user cannot alter the basic structure of the 
program. However, some of the other models have been 
supplied with both the source and the object code. The 
Department of the Environment, for example, purchased the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies Model in this way.
Where a model is supplied in object code form the user 
cannot alter its structure or underlying assumptions. In 
order to test different policy assumptions with these 
models the user is only allowed to alter numbers which 
help to define the tax-benefit system. Such numbers 
would, for example, be the rates of Income Tax, National 
Insurance Contributions and the main social security 
benefits. These numbers hold the same value throughout 
any particular analysis of a tax-benefit system so they 
will be referred to as "constants". Figure 1.2 shows a 
computer screen image produced by the Inland Revenue 
Personal Income Tax Model.
The user of the program is given a "menu" of options to 
change tax rates and tax bands. For each option the user 
has the ability to alter the numerical value associated
with the tax or tax band. This method has many
advantages. It is simple for a non-expert user to 
understand. It is difficult to input policy assumptions
in such a way that a novice user could produce misleading
36
1. THE NEED FOR A NEW TAX-BENEFIT MODEL
results. Thus it is relatively 'fool proof'.
Figure 1.2 Computer Screen Image produced by Inland 
Revenue Personal Income Tax Model showing constants to 
define the tax schedule
NUMBER OF TAX RATES =«=> 7 <1 TO 24)
1ST RATE ssssn) 30 1ST BAND ===> 14600
2ND RATE «===>1 40 2ND BAND ===> 2600
3RD RATE cr=a> 45 3RD BAND ««> 4600
4TH RATE ===*> 50 4TH BAND ===> 7100
5TH RATE ===> 55 5TH BAND ===> 7100
6TH RATE ===>. 60 6TH BAND sss) 8000
7TH RATE *===> 70 7TH BAND ««> 0
8TH RATE ===> 0 8TH BAND ===> 0
ALL RATES ARE TWO DIGIT INTEGERS 
THERE MUST BE 1 LESS BAND THAN THERE ARE RATES
There is also a major disadvantage, inflexibility. No 
one can use a model supplied in object code form to 
simulate a policy which the creator of the model did not 
allow for. This means that such models tend to 
concentrate on small departures from the status quo. 
Such models cannot cope with major policy changes. The 
menus make the program very simple to use but they place 
the user in a form of policy straight-jacket. Minor 
alterations to existing policies can be simulated; but 
not totally new policies. For example, in January 1986 
the British government announced its intention to abolish 
the local property tax, domestic rates, and replace it 
with a flat rate poll tax on all adults. At the time 
none of the object code models could have simulated this 
because there was simply no "menu option" to allow it to
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be done. The IFS model was used to predict the effects 
of the poll tax because the Department of the Environment 
were able to purchase the source code of the program. 
This meant that the model could be adapted to the 
specific requirements of simulating the poll tax.
Figure 1.3 Fragment of Source Code from the DHSS Tax- 
Benefit Model
FIS=<FISPA-EA )/2 
FIS=FI5/100 
FIS=INT<FIS+. 9)
FIS=FIS*100
IF EA>FISPA THEN FIS=0
IF FIS<B<7) THEN FIS=0
IF FIS>FISMAX THEN FIS=FISMAX
IF EA=EB AND FIS=0 THEN FSMN0TE=2
REM
RETURN
Because the Department of Environment was able to adapt 
the source code, it could simulate the effects of an 
entirely new policy while retaining all the work which 
had been done on the other aspects of the tax-benefit 
system. However breaking out of the policy straight- 
jacket imposed by object code models carries with it a 
heavy cost. The source code is often written in language 
which appears incomprehensible to the non-expert. To 
illustrate this figure 1.3 shows a typical fragment of 
source code written in the computer language BASIC. Even 
for an expert computer programmer, it is very time- 
consuming to alter a program of this type, because each
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time a program is written the programmer creates a set of 
names which is specific to that particular program. For 
example, in the top line of figure 1.3 the term "FIS" 
stands for "Family Income Supplement" and "EA" stands for 
"Earnings". These may hold different values at different 
times as a program is running and so are referred to as 
"variables". Someone attempting to alter a program must 
be thoroughly familiar with all the variable names in 
the program. To alter a program's source code it is 
necessary to have a thorough working knowledge of the 
entire program. Serious errors may result if a new user 
alters a small section of a program without understanding 
the importance of that section to the program as a whole. 
A full scale model of the tax-benefit system like the IFS 
model now exceeds 8,000 lines in length. Clearly, 
learning to understand a program of this size is a major 
task, especially as it involves learning a new vocabulary 
of cryptic variable names.
The great problem with the current programming approaches 
in tax-benefit modelling is this tendency to create a new 
set of variable names for each model. There is no 
technical reason why the vocabulary cannot be
standardised between one model and another. The most
logical course of action would be to define tax-benefit 
equations in a language as close to English as possible. 
As figure 1.3 shows, the existing tax-benefit models are 
a long way from achieving this.
However the unfamiliarity of variable names is not the 
only cause of the inaccessibility of tax-benefit 
programming to non-experts. In any program it is 
necessary to have devices to ensure that different
actions are taken in different circumstances. For
example, if a family contains children and there is only 
one parent it will have a one parent benefit entitlement; 
otherwise there will be no such entitlement. It would be
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possible to express this concept as follows:-
If Family-Type = Single-Parent
then One-Parent-Benefit = £ 4.55 
Else One-Parent-Benefit=0. [1]
An empirical study of the process of learning computer 
languages indicates that this kind of construct (known as 
an—"if . . . Then . . .— Else"— statement-) is relatively easy 
for novices to use (Allen, 1982:10). The process of 
choosing between alternatives (known as branching) is 
often accomplished by programming devices which are much 
further removed from English language concepts. The 
following case statement in the language PASCAL could be 
used to express the one-parent-benefit equation shown 
above (as follows):-
Case Family-Type of :
Single-Parent : One-Parent-Benefit : 
else
One-Parent-Benefit := 0; 
end;
For a language to be comprehensible to the non-expert it 
would be better to use only the type of "If... Then ... 
Else" statement shown in equation 1.
Working with computer languages could also be made easier 
by the sensitive treatment of errors. At the compilation 
stage of computer programming any errors in the source 
code are indicated. Some compilers show the user exactly 
where in their source code they have made the error, and 
give a clear explanation of the cause of the error. 
However, most compilers fall short of this ideal. They 
often give incomprehensible error messages, make the 
computer emit an angry beeping noise, and do not show 
clearly where the error occurred. This is particularly
= 4.55;
[2]
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true of computer languages on main frame computers, which 
are often designed with “expert" users in mind. 
Schneiderman has pointed out that errors can be dealt 
with in such a way as to reassure, inform, and encourage 
the user :-
The phone company long used to dealing with 
non-technical users, offers this tolerant 
message: "We're sorry but we were unable-to ” 
complete your call as dialled. Please hang up 
and check your number". [A computer programmer 
would probably have written this error message 
as follows] ... "illegal phone number. Call 
aborted. Error number 583-2R6.9. Consult your 
user's manual for further information."
(Scheiderman, 1982:59)
It would be a gross understatement to suggest that the 
designers of some compilers lack the human touch. They 
bombard novice users, already lacking in confidence, with 
statements like "Fatal Error: Program Aborted",
"Disastrous String Overflow" (Schneiderman, 1982). When 
the messages do not contain suggestions of the 
apocalyptic nature of the user's offence, they are often 
unsettling by their sheer incomprehensibility. "Stack 
Overflow" and "Floating Point Underflow" (Borland, 
1987:629-630) are two messages produced by Turbo Pascal, 
the popularity of which suggests it is probably one of 
the most easily usable of computer languages.
The problems of unfamiliar variable names, difficult 
control structures, and unfriendly error messages, are 
not the only problems facing a non-expert trying to adapt 
a tax-benefit program. Various developments in the 
technology of computer languages could overcome these. 
All but one of the existing tax-benefit models are 
written in what are called "third generation languages".
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These are vastly easier to use than programming in the 
binary numbers understood by the computers, but still 
suffer from the drawbacks described above. In recent
years fourth generation languages have been developed to 
try to improve on the usability and comprehensibility of 
the third generation languages. Some of them have 
attempted to create a syntax closer to the English 
language. More recently still, fifth generation 
languages like PROLOG and LISP have tried to combine 
these aspects of usability with an ability to process 
logical statements in a more flexible and powerful way. 
The creators of these languages have tried to develop 
features which mimic some of the thinking power of the 
human brain, which has given rise to the term "Artificial 
Intelligence". Some of these developments can doubtless 
be used to enhance tax-benefit modelling. The 
distinctions between the various types of language and 
their implications for tax-benefit modelling are explored 
more fully in chapter 2.
1.5 Conclusion
Though there are at least eleven tax-benefit models, the 
non-expert user is still impaled on the horns of an 
uncomfortable dilemma - whether to choose between the 
inflexibility of object code or the incomprehensibility 
of source code. In chapter 2 the existing computer 
models are described in greater detail. The extent to 
which the existing models have dealt with the twin 
problems of usability and flexibility will be explored 
more thoroughly. It is crucial that these problems 
should be solved if opposition parties and pressure 
groups are to make an informed contribution to the debate 
on tax-benefit policy. If they are not the effect of 
computers on tax-benefit policy-making will be to 
increase the concentration of power, rather than to help 
create a more genuinely democratic pluralist society.
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter is intended to give an overview of the 
models of the UK tax-benefit system as they existed in 
1986. The characteristics are summarised in figure 1.1. 
Eleven models are covered. These are certainly the 
eleven most significant models in terms of published 
research. It is possible that some smaller models in 
some universities or institutions have not been included 
because they have not been publicised widely enough, or 
because they do not deal with the tax-benefit system as a 
whole (several models exist within the DHSS, for example, 
which model the effects of a single benefit in
isolation).
In order to undertake each review a visit was made to the 
institution or government department responsible for the 
model being reviewed. In all cases there was a 
demonstration of the model and an interview - either with 
the creators of the model or with the staff members who 
currently have to use it professionally. In each of the 
reviews there has been an attempt to give a general 
overview of the model, and also to assess the model 
according to the criteria of usability and flexibility 
outlined in chapter 1.
In order to examine the problem of "usability" there is a 
section on "user interface issues" for each model. In 
this context the "user interface" refers to the part of 
the computer program which the user actually sees on the 
screen (this has given rise to the term "front end" of a 
program which some people use as an alternative to the 
user interface). What makes a good user interface is 
inevitably a value judgement. The review seeks to define 
the quality of the user interface according to the
following criteria. Can a novice operate the program
easily by reading the information displayed on the
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screen, or is it necessary to refer constantly to
documentation or to seek expert help? Is it easy to
input policy options, to go back and correct mistakes, 
and to make slight alterations to a set of parameters 
without typing them in anew for each run of the program? 
Gan the user understand what is going on at all times 
during the execution of the program? The flexibility of 
the user interface is also assessed.
2.1.1 Programming Approach
The potential flexibility of the program is also assessed 
by exploring the programming environment of the model. 
In some cases it was possible to see fragments of the 
source code of the model. Where it was not possible to 
view the source code, the characteristics of the computer
language it was based on have been reviewed in order to
give a flavour of how difficult it would be to alter the 
source code.
This section also attempts to show some of the underlying 
assumptions on which the model is based. For example, 
some models such as the DHSS tax-benefit model table 
program make very simple assumptions about the claiming 
of benefits (i.e. it assumes that all of the people 
entitled to a specific benefit actually claim it). 
TAXMOD on the other hand assumes that only a proportion 
of eligible people will claim Housing Benefit and Family 
Income Supplement.
2.1.2 Objectives & Knowledge Base
The objectives of the model are outlined in order to give 
the reasons why the model was written, which helps to 
explain its current structure. In order to give an idea 
of how each model makes its predictions the "Knowledge 
Base" section shows whether a model Is based on 
hypothetical cases or on actual survey data, and if so it 
describes the characteristics of the survey. It also
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shows whether the model concentrates on or is limited to 
any particular part of the population (i.e. whether the 
model excludes the elderly or the unemployed etc).
2.1.3 Output from the Model
This section attempts to show how detailed and clear the 
output from the model is. In some cases the output is 
easily comprehensible, in other cases it would be 
impossible to interpret without frequent reference to 
explanatory documents. The clarity of the output is no 
less important in producing a usable model, than creating 
an easy mechanism for entering policy options.
Finally each review seeks to give an overall assessment 
of the strengths and weaknesses of each program.
Eleven models are reviewed below. In general the 
ordering of the reviews introduces the reader to the 
simplest models first and continues to consider the more 
complex and sophisticated ones. The first three reviews 
cover those programs which were originally developed as 
models based on hypothetical cases - The DHSS Tax-Benefit 
Model, the "CUBS" model, and the "TAXEXP" package. Next 
the reviews consider a special case - the Alvey DHSS 
Demonstrator Project. This is intended to produce a 
model which is neither based on survey data nor on 
hypothetical households. It is intended to show the 
implications of changing some tax-benefit rules on other 
rules. The remaining seven models are those which are 
based on sets of survey data: the Tax Reform Analysis
Package (TRAP), TAXMOD, the DHSS Policy Simulation Model, 
the IFS Tax-Benefit Program, the Inland Revenue Personal 
Income Tax model, the Policy Studies Institute Model, and 
the IGOTM model. As the models based on hypothetical 
cases are less complicated than those based on survey 
data, this ordering of the models represents a gradual 
progress from the simplest tax-benefit packages to the
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most sophisticated ones.
2.2 DHSS TAX-BENEFIT MODEL
2.2.1 Objectives of the Model
The purpose of the DHSS Tax-Benefit Model Tables is to 
show the gross and net incomes of a series of household 
types under the existing tax-benefit regime. These 
objectives deliberately exclude the estimation of the 
numbers of people in each income band or household type, 
and the calculation of the number of gainers and losers. 
The effect of changing the existing system on families of 
a supposedly typical category is the sole aim of the 
model tables.
The model has existed in some form since the 1960s. The 
output from the model was used to answer occasional 
parliamentary questions and internal inquiries from 
within the ministry. In the early 1970s the output from 
the model started to be used for tables published in 
"Social Trends". In April 1979, the model tables were 
first released as a separate publication.
2.2.2 Knowledge Base
The knowledge incorporated in the model is a set of basic 
facts about the tax-benefit system. It includes:-
(i) the rate schedule for Income Tax, the amounts of the 
three main tax allowances (single person's, married man's 
and wife's earned income relief);
(ii) the rate schedule for National Insurance 
contributions;
(iii) the Child Benefit rate;
(iv) the rules of entitlement and rates of Family Income 
Supplement, Housing Benefit, Free School Meals and milk.
Travel to work costs are also included in the model, but
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unlike the "CUBS" model (see below) the model does not 
assume that the individual will alter the number of 
journeys to work in response to differing numbers of work 
hours per week. Furthermore the model assumes a full 
working week in each case - which has implications for 
eligibility for Family Income Supplement (which cannot be 
claimed by one of a couple where the weekly hours are 
under 30, or under 24 in the case of a single parent).
2.2.3 Programming Approach
The knowledge within the program is represented in the 
computer language BASIC. The programming approach used 
suffers from the disadvantage that it is difficult for 
some one unfamiliar with the program to understand it. 
The use of very short variable and array names requires 
the new programmer to search through the program to find 
the meaning of a variable. Because the language is not 
self-explanatory it would be unwise for a programmer 
unfamiliar with the whole program to alter it. Changing 
one part of the program might have unforseen and 
unwelcome consequences for other parts of the program. 
To give an impression of the flavour of programming 
within the DHSS Tax-Benefit program a fragment of it is 
shown in figure 1.3, which defines Family Income 
Supplement.
The model assumes that there is 100% take up of benefits 
among the hypothetical families and that there is no tax 
evasion. The equations lead inexorably from data about 
the family's composition, earnings, and housing costs to 
an exact calculation of its net income. There is no need 
for error terms or probability factors, as there are no 
unknowns in the equations.
2.2.4 User Interface Issues
The user is guided through a series of questions to 
define a particular type of family. The user is asked in
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turn to answer questions on whether the family unit is a 
single adult, or a couple; the number and ages of any 
children; whether or not the family unit is also a 
household; the type of housing tenure; and the amount of 
rates, rent or mortgage payments. Alternatively the user 
may choose to run the model using one of 10 pre-defined 
family types (which are the types used for the published 
model tables).
The user cannot alter any of the parameters of the tax- 
benefit system through the interface. The only question 
connected with this requests the user to select a "budget 
file" containing parameters about the tax-benefit system. 
So to simulate a different tax-benefit regime one must 
first produce a file of the same structure as the 
existing budget file, but with different tax-benefit 
rates.
The model calculates the "total income support" payable 
to the family, which is the total value of all the state 
benefits it receives. The user can choose to see total 
income support displayed in cash terms, or it can be 
adjusted for inflation so that the income support is 
comparable with a specific date in the past. The user 
can also choose to see the ratio between the family's 
actual net income and its supplementary benefit scale 
rate. For example, the supplementary benefit scale rate 
of a single householder is taken to be 86% of the net 
income the person would receive with gross earnings of 
50.00 pounds per week. Furthermore the user can specify 
the earnings levels which the tables are to be based on.
2.2.5 Output from the Model
For each household type the tables show the net incomes 
for people on different levels of earnings. The tables 
show the net income after tax has been deducted and after 
the receipt of various benefits for various types of
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Figure 2.1 Example of output from DHSS Tax-Benefit Model 
showing gross and net incomes of a family with three 
children aged 4, 7, and 15 with a non-working wife.
EARNINGS TAX HI FIS CHILD RENT RENT RATES R/r.r
HEAD BENEFIT REBATE Rc
71. Cd 0. 21 4. 97 26 .00 21 .30 15. 00 12. 41 9 .5 0 5.
72.80 0.30 5 .04 25. 50 21.30 15. 00 12. 29 9, 50 *j.
73.00  
74. e8
73.00
0.79
1.08
1.37
3.11  
5. 18 
5 .2 3
25. 00 
24. 50 
24, 00
21. 30
21.30
21.30
15. 00 
15.00  
15. 00
12. 16 
12. 04 
11.91
9, 50
9.50
9.50
5.
c*
*■U.
76.80 1.66 5. 32 23. 50 21.30 15. 00 11.79 9. 50 5.
77.00 1.93 5. 39 23.00 21.30 13. 00 11.66 9. 50 5.
78. 00 n na4L< 4.M 3.46 22. 50 21. 30 15. 00 11. 54 ?. 50 5.
7?. 00 2. 33 3 .53 22.00 21.30 15. 00 11. 41 9. 50 5.
80. 00 2 .82 5. 60 21.50 21.30 15.00 11.29 9. 50 5.
81.00 3.11 3. 67 21. 60 21 .30 15.00 11. 16 9. 50 5.
82.60 3. 40 3. 74 20.50 21.30 15. 00 11. C4 9. 50 5.
83.00 3. 69 3.81 20. 00 21.30 15. 00 10.91 9, 50 «J«
84. 00 3. 98 3.88 19. 50 21.30 15. 00 10. 79 9. 50 5.
83.00 4 .27 5 .95 19. 00 21.30 15. 00 10. 66 9. 50 5.
86.09 4 .36 6.02 18.50 21.33 15. 00 10.54 9.50 . 5.
87.80 4 .83 6.0? 18.00 21. 30 15. 00 10. 41 9. 50
88.08 5.14 6. 16 17.50 21.30 15. 00 10. 2? ?. 50 5.
8?. 08 3.43 6. 23 17. 00 21.30 15. 00 10. 16 ?. 50 5.
90 .00 3 .72 6. 30 16. 30 21. 30 15. 00 10. 04 ?, 33 5.
91.00 6. 01 6.37 16. 00 21 .30 15.00 9.91 9, 50 5.
92 .00 6.30 6. 44 15. 50 21 .30 15.00 9. 79 9 .50 5.
93.00 6.59 6. 31 15.00 21 .30 15. 00 9. 66 9.50 5.
94.00 6 .88 6.38 14. 58. _ 21 .30 15.00 9.54 9.50 4.
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family. The example shown in figure 2.1 concerns a 
family with three children aged 4, 7, and 15 with a
non-working wife.
2.2.6 General Merits and Problems
The most serious limitation of the DHSS tax/benefit 
tables is that the choice of family types the user is 
given excludes large numbers of people. The choice of 
family types excludes those whose heads are retired, 
unemployed, or in receipt of investment income. In 1983, 
the model also excluded non-householders and owner- 
occupiers. It was argued that the model tables applied 
to less than 4% of the population. (Atkinson, King, & 
Sutherland, 1983:64). However since then the program has 
been updated to allow for the modelling of a wider 
variety of family and household types. At the time of 
the interview with the relevant DHSS staff for this 
review the program had just been altered so that output 
tables could be produced which would model the effect of 
policies on owner-occupiers.
2.3 CITY UNIVERSITY BUSINESS SCHOOL MODEL
2.3.1 Objectives of the Model
The main object of the City University Business School 
Model (CUBS) is to show marginal tax rates faced by 
people working different numbers of hours per week. The 
intention is to demonstrate the economic gains and losses 
people face if they work more or less. It was written in 
order to answer questions such as whether a particular 
policy would cause more or less unemployment. It is 
thus more of a labour supply model, than a tax-benefit 
model. However the output produced by the model shows 
taxes paid and benefits received. The CUBS model is 
unique among the models based on hypothetical families in
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that it bases its analysis on the number of hours worked 
rather than on the level of income. The model therefore 
gives a graphic illustration of the individual's labour 
force participation decision. The net financial gain 
from working is shown after the withdrawal of benefits 
and the deduction of taxes and travel to work costs.
There are two versions of the CUBS model. The original 
version was based solely on hypothetical cases (which is 
why it has been considered at this point in the reviews). 
The most recent developments in the evolution of the CUBS 
model have involved the addition of the "batch mode", 
which analyses the effects of tax-benefit policies on a 
sample of actual families drawn from the FES. This form 
of the model calculates the net incomes of a large number 
of cases and makes a prediction of how many hours they 
are likely to work as a result of the modelled tax- 
benefit system. This prediction is based on a labour 
supply theory, of the type described below in the review 
of the TRAP model. These predictions of individual 
labour supply effects are intended to give an indication 
of the effects of tax-benefit policy on gross domestic 
product and labour supply on a national scale.
2.3.2 Knowledge Base
The data incorporated in the CUBS model are in some areas 
more detailed than those in the DHSS model tables. Like 
the DHSS model tables, the CUBS model simulates Income 
Tax and National Insurance liabilities, and entitlements 
to supplementary benefit and housing benefit. However 
the CUBS model goes further by including other 
calculations, based on user-specified characteristics of 
the hypothetical family. The user may specify the daily 
travel to work costs and the model will calculate the 
weekly travel costs based on the number of hours worked. 
The user can state whether the primary earner's job is 
subject to superannuation contributions and (if it is)
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whether the pension scheme is contracted out of SERPS. 
The CUBS model uses this information to work out a 
hypothetical superannuation contribution. The user can 
specify whether F.I.S. is claimed. The user is asked if 
the amount of capital held by the family exceeds 3000 
pounds; if it does the entitlement to Supplementary 
Benefit will be removed accordingly. If the earner 
receives an occupational pension then the amount of the 
pension can be calculated from the earner's leaving 
salary and the length of time in the scheme (this routine 
is based on the University Superannuation Scheme for 
purely illustrative purposes).
2.3.3 Programming Approach
The model is programmed in FORTRAN66. It was not 
possible to analyse the source code of the model for the 
purposes of this review. However FORTRAN66 has many of 
the same characteristics as BASIC (and was developed not 
long after it). The short variable names required by 
FORTRAN66 probably means that it suffers many of the same 
disadvantages as the DHSS Tax-Benefit Model described 
above.
Results are inferred from the data in a straightforward 
manner - with exact values calculated from user supplied 
input values. Unlike the models based on large data 
sets, there are few unknowns in the models based on 
hypothetical families, so the more complex issues of how 
to deal with non-take-up of benefits and behavioural 
responses do not arise.
These issues do arise when considering the "batch" 
version of the model which assesses the labour supply 
effects on a selection of tax units from the FES. The 
batch version uses the information in the FES to simulate 
take-up rates (i.e. if the FES shows that a given family 
surveyed did not claim Family Income Supplement the CUBS
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model will also assume that it is not claimed by that 
family in any simulations). There are no special 
adjustments for response bias or unrepresentativeness of 
the FES. The model predicts how the family's work 
behaviour will be influenced by tax-benefit policy on the 
basis of a labour supply function which attempts to 
predict whether a given person will be in or out of work.
Figure 2.2 Example of user interface session with City 
University Business School Model
'WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING FAMILY TYPES APPLIES?
1=C0UPLE, MAN ONLY WORKING 2=C0UPLE, BOTH WORKING 
3=SINGLE PERSON, NOT A PENSIONER, NO DEPENDANTS 
4=SINGLE PERSON,NOT A PENSIONER, WITH DEPENDANTS 
5=UID0W, 6=PEN3I0NER COUPLE, 7=SINGLE PENSIONER 
-7
HOW MANY ADULTS (EXCLUDING SPOUSES) AND HOW
MANY CHILDREN ARE DEPENDANT ON THE PRIMARY EARNER?
WHAT ARE THE AGES OF THE DEPENDANT ADULTS?
—67
IS THE PRIMARY EARNER MALE<=1) OR FEMALE (=2)?
HOW MUCH TAXABLE INCOME DO YOU HAVE ANNUALLY
EXCLUDING EARNINGS 
ALL SPOUSE EARNINGS AND ALL SOCIAL SEC. BENEFITS? 
=6000
FROM YOUR MAIN OCC.,
WHICH TYPE. OF TENURE APPLIES?: RENTED(=1 )
OWNER OCCUPIEDC=2) OR OWNED OUTRIGHTC-3 )
WHAT IS YOUR MONTHLY MORTGAGE INTEREST PAYMENT?
WHAT ARE THE RATES PAYABLE ANNUALLY ON YOUR ACCOMM.? 
=200
IS THE P.E. RETIRED?
=Y
BEFORE RETIREMENT, WAS THE P.E.7 S JOB SUPERANNUABLE? 
=Y
Therefore the CUBS model gives a prediction of how a 
particular measure is likely to affect the overall level 
of unemployment. This approach differs from the type of 
labour supply function used in the TRAP model (see below)
53
2. REVIEW OF EXISTING TAX-BENEFIT MODELS
which generally predicts changes in the number of working 
hours (as well as whether a person will move in or out of 
employment).
2.3.4 User Interface Issues
In the hypothetical case version the user interface 
prompts the user to answer a series of questions which 
describe the family circumstances, income, and 
expenditure of the hypothetical case. Certain questions 
will only be asked if a response to a previous question 
implies that they need to be asked. For example, 
questions about occupational pensions will only be asked 
if the individual was in a pensionable job before 
retirement.
If a mistake is made then the user is required to go back 
to the first question of the series. The answers given 
to one series of questions are not saved so that the same 
responses cannot be used again with minor alterations. 
For example one cannot define a particular family and 
then make a minor change to a saved definition (as is 
possible with the TAXEXP package). The answers have to
be input anew. Only the family circumstances can be 
altered through prompted questions. If one wanted to
change a tax rate or the amount of a benefit, then the 
user would have to alter the program itself. An example 
of the type of question which the user is prompted to 
answer is given in figure 2.2. In the batch version of 
the model, actual families from the FES are used so this 
definition of individual circumstances is unnecessary.
2.3.5 Output from the Model
A table of output from the model showing a range of taxes 
paid and benefits received over a range of work hours per 
week (the range of working hours may be specified by the 
user) is shown in figure 2.3. Net incomes and the total 
marginal tax rates are also shown. A routine which
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translates this information into a graph is available. 
Figure 2.3 gives an example of the output from the CUBS 
model. The column headings could be improved. The third 
column from the left labelled HBS is presumably Housing 
Benefit Supplement (but as the case shown does not claim 
it this cannot be verified without consulting the authors 
of the program). The rightmost two columns the marginal 
tax rate and the total disposable income and are also 
difficult to interpret.
2.3.6 General Merits and Problems
The chief merit of the model is the clarity with which it 
represents the incentive/disincentive effects of the 
current tax-benefit system. The range of items, such as 
travel to work costs and pension contributions is clearly 
an advantage in that there is great flexibility in 
specifying the characteristics of the hypothetical 
family. This is only to be expected since the main 
function of the CUBS model is to demonstrate labour 
supply decisions and for this purpose it is more useful 
than any of the other hypothetical case models. CUBS was
not intended to do anything more than demonstrate these 
labour supply issues - and its authors stress that it 
should not be assessed as a full blown tax-benefit model. 
CUBS is fairly user-friendly in the specification of 
hypothetical cases but it does not allow the user to 
specify new tax-benefit policies. It is not possible to 
specify changes in tax-benefit rates without altering the 
program itself.
To make CUBS more generally useful as a tax-benefit model 
it would be necessary to have a menu-driven system for 
altering tax rates, benefits, tax allowances, and benefit 
tapers. This issue has been tackled by the authors of 
TAXEXP described below.
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2.4 LSE TAXEXP PACKAGE
2.4.1 Objectives of the Model
The objective of the TAXEXP program is to simulate the 
effects of a given tax-benefit system on hypothetical 
families. In this respect the goals of TAXEXP are 
similar to those of the DHSS tax-benefit model tables. 
TAXEXP was originally called "TAXBEN" and was first 
written by A.B.Atkinson. Since then it has been added to 
and improved - principally by Holly Sutherland. The 
authors of TAXEXP deliberately set out to ensure that it 
could apply to the large sections of the population 
excluded by the DHSS model tables (e.g. owner-occupiers, 
non-householder tax units, and those with investment 
income). The model-builders thus set out to demonstrate 
the contribution which can be made by simulations based 
on hypothetical cases, without the more obvious defects 
of the existing methods. TAXEXP is used for teaching at 
the London School of Economics. It is used in 
conjunction with an excellent manual (Sutherland, 1985), 
illustrating the uses of the model.
2.4.2 Knowledge Base
The store of knowledge within the model is basically a 
representation of the existing tax and benefit system. 
Specifically the user can alter the rates, thresholds, 
and tapers of Family Income Supplement, Child Benefit, 
One Parent Benefit, Housing Benefit, National Insurance 
Contributions, and Income Tax. The major exclusions from 
the model are benefits which do not affect the working 
population:- supplementary benefit, unemployment benefit, 
and retirement pensions. In addition, the model also 
incorporates information about some of the better known 
proposals for changing the tax-benefit system - for 
example the user is able to model the effects of a "Basic 
Benefit system" of the type supported by the SDP (1981).
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2.4.3 Programming Approach
The model is written in BBC BASIC, so the facts and rules 
about the tax-benefit system are represented in the form 
of BASIC language statements. The source code is not 
supplied to the user, and it has not been possible to 
examine it for this review. In general it can be said 
that the programming problems are probably very similar 
to those of the DHSS tax-benefit model. However it 
should be mentioned that the BBC version of BASIC is 
comparatively easy to use when compared to other versions 
which is probably a result of its intended use by schools 
and home computer users.
The model shows the marginal tax rates and net incomes of 
a family type defined by the user. The model 
accomplishes this by applying the parameters describing 
the tax-benefit system to the household with the 
particular circumstances the user has specified.
2.4.4 User Interface Issues
The interface is very easy to use. When the program is 
invoked the user is first prompted to key in a set of 
details to describe the hypothetical family which the 
model will carry out its simulations on. The user will 
be asked to describe a number of characteristics about 
the intended family by answering a series of yes or no 
questions. The user will state in turn whether or not 
the head of the family concerned is a householder, an 
owner-occupier, a claimant of FIS, and a claimant of 
Housing Benefit. In addition the user will be asked to 
enter certain numerical information to describe the 
person's rent/mortgage payments, rates, earnings, taxable 
income other than earnings, whether the person is 
contracted out of SERPS, and the numbers of any children 
and their ages. If the head of tax unit is married then 
there will also be income questions about the head's
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spouse. When all of this data has been entered, a 
"FAMILY SUMMARY" is shown on the screen (see figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4 Computer Screen Image produced by TAXEXP 
program to summarise family characteristics
FAMILY SUMMARY
H-holder Y Owner N Claim FIS Y HB Y
Rent/Mortgage 15.00 Rate3 6.00
Married Y Non-dependents in hshld 0
Children ages : under 5 5-10 11-15 16+
Total: 2 1 1 0 0
Head earns 90.00 Contracted out Y
Wife earns 0.00 Contracted cut N
Other income : taxable
Of head 0.00 Of wife 0.00 
✓
Non-taxable 0.00
If the user wishes to alter any of these answers, then he 
or she can simply move the cursor key up to the relevant 
position on the screen in order to make a change. If the 
"return" key is pressed when the cursor is over the 
answer to be changed then the user is able to enter a new 
value in place of the old one. This greatly enhances the 
program's operation as the user would otherwise have to 
return to the first question and key in all the data 
again. This "FAMILY SUMMARY" table allows the user to 
see all the data at one time, and to check that the 
combination of family circumstances was what he or she 
intended.
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After entering family details a table of output is shown 
indicating the net incomes, tax paid, and benefits 
received by the chosen family type - before and after a 
user-supplied policy change.
After this table is produced the user is presented with a 
menu of options which include changing family details, or 
making policy changes. If family details are to be 
altered then the user is shown the "FAMILY SUMMARY" 
screen and is invited to make changes through it. An 
example of this is shown in figure 2.4. Each of the 
terms which is underlined contains a number which the 
user is able to alter. If the user selects the option 
to make a policy change then a menu appears which invites 
the user to specify one of five policy areas:- Child 
Benefit & FIS, National Insurance Contributions, Income 
Tax, Housing Benefit, or a New Benefit system. In each 
of these areas of policy the user is able to alter the 
various tax rates, tapers, thresholds, and cash amounts 
associated with each tax or benefit. Furthermore once 
output tables have been produced by the model, the user 
is able to start a new enquiry session either from the 
state of the tax-benefit system which was input during 
the previous enquiry or from the existing "real world" 
tax-benefit system (i.e. the model is returned to the 
state it was in before the user started altering any of 
the policy parameters). Coupled with the ease with which 
family details can be simulated this makes TAXEXP an 
extremely user-friendly package.
2.4.5 Output from the Model
There are four main types of output from the model. One 
type of output is produced whenever the model is run. 
This is a table showing (for both the current and the 
proposed system) the gross income, income tax, National 
Insurance Contributions, FIS, Child Benefit, Housing
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Rebates, and levels of a new proposed benefit of the 
family specified by the user. This can show the changes 
in income of this family before and after a policy 
change.
There are three further types of output from the model: 
tables of marginal tax rates, tables of net incomes with 
varying earnings, and graphs of net incomes with varying 
earnings. The marginal tax rate table calculates the 
total marginal tax rate by totalling the National 
Insurance Contribution rate and Income Tax rate the 
earner is subject to, combined with the taper for any 
relevant means-tested benefits. Thus if a person was 
subject to a 30 per cent Income Tax rate, 6.85% National 
Insurance, and Housing Benefit was withdrawn at 38%, then 
the marginal tax rate would be 74.85%. These marginal 
tax rates are shown for increases in earnings of 1.00, 
10.00, and 25.00 pounds for both husbands and wives.
The tables showing net incomes with varying earnings give 
results for a range of income levels specified by the 
user. For example, the user can choose to see the net 
income of people earning between 0 and 500 pounds per 
week rising in 25 pound steps. For each income level the 
table shows the total gross earnings, tax plus National 
Insurance Contributions, FIS plus any new benefits, 
Housing Benefit and net income. The same tables can be
produced for husbands and wives. If the graph is based
on the varying earnings of the wife, then the husband's 
income is constant. The reverse is true if the graph is 
based on the husband's income.
The option to plot the net incomes against gross incomes 
allows the user to request that a graph should be drawn 
showing how an increase in gross income will affect the 
net income of a specified family (see figure 2.5). Thus 
the model is able to depict graphically such issues as
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the poverty trap.
Figure 2.5 Computer Screen Image produced by TAXEXP which 
shows a graph of Gross Tax Unit Income on the Horizontal 
Axis against Net Income on the Vertical Axis
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2.4.6 General Merits and Problems
TAXEXP is the best simulator of policy changes based on 
hypothetical families. It is very user-friendly allowing 
parameters to be entered and altered easily. It produces 
a wide selection of output tables. TAXEXP has developed 
analysis based on hypothetical families further than any 
other model. If one were to attempt to improve on
"TAXEXP" one would need to give the user a larger 
selection of policy parameters to alter. TAXEXP's user-
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friendliness extends only as far as the options which its 
authors have seen fit to provide. For example, if one 
were to model the Liberal Party's tax credit proposals it 
would be necessary to simulate a flat rate credit for all 
adults plus a variable credit which would be withdrawn as 
income rises. One cannot simulate this option with 
TAXEXP as it exists at present. Ideally the menu driven 
part of TAXEXP should give a much wider variety of 
policies to choose from. This could be done by 
increasing the number of menu questions within TAXEXP. 
The problem with this approach is that no matter how many 
options one included among the menu options a new scheme 
could always be proposed which the designers of the menu 
system had not thought of.
The alternative to this would be to adopt a programming 
language approach. This would mean that there would be 
less of a dividing line between the program itself and 
the questions asked by the user. A model based on LISP 
or PROLOG might allow this kind of flexibility. Even if 
artificial intelligence techniques are not used, the 
minimum requirement for a truly flexible interface is a 
system which allows the user to gain access to the 
individual variables within the data. An ideal tax- 
benefit model would have the flexibility of a programming 
language without requiring the massive investment of time 
needed to learn one. The Alvey DHSS demonstrator project 
described below goes some of the way to providing this 
flexibility.
The crucial defect of any model based on hypothetical 
families is that the diversity of family circumstances in 
the real population is so great that it cannot be 
represented by hypothetical cases. The overall number of 
gainers and losers from a policy, and the global 
exchequer costs of a policy cannot be predicted from 
hypothetical cases. Thus the designers of TAXEXP felt it
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necessary to produce a model based on survey data, 
TAXMOD.
2.5 ALVEY DHSS DEMONSTRATOR PROJECT
2.5.1 Objectives of the Model
The DHSS Policy Demonstrator is part of a programme of 
research which is intended to put Britain in the 
forefront of artificial intelligence. The term 
"artificial intelligence" is used to refer to computer 
systems which attempt to mimic some of the flexibility 
and sensitivity of the human brain. This contrasts with 
the more traditional use of computers to manipulate 
numbers and perform repetitive tasks. The ultimate goal 
of the DHSS Policy Demonstrator is to produce a facility 
for policy makers which will be capable of making 
inferences which one might expect of a human adviser 
rather than a computer. For example, if one wished to 
ask the model the consequences of making supplementary 
benefit available to a new group of people, the existing 
models might tell you how this would affect the incomes 
of a hypothetical family within this group, or how much 
the policy might cost the national exchequer. The Policy 
Demonstrator could be able to give qualitative rather 
than quantitative information - such as the fact that 
this change would make passport benefits like Free School 
Meals available to this group. Thus the model is 
intended to make connections of considerable subtlety. 
Another goal of the project is to design a system which 
will be so simple to use that it will be accessible to 
people without special computing skills. Most of the 
existing models do require such expertise. At best the 
user will be invited to select options from a series of 
highly structured menus. At worst the user has to use a 
programming language to specify a change.
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The flexibility offered by artificial intelligence could 
make it possible not only to make inferences which mimic 
human thought processes, but also to interpret the sort 
of questions which a human inquirer might wish to ask. 
For example, if one were consulting a human adviser one 
might pose a question like:- "How do you solve the 
problem that people on Invalidity Benefit never become 
eligible for the long-term rate of Supplementary 
Benefit?" (this problem has not applied since April 1983 
when Invalidity Benefit could also count towards 
entitlement to long term Supplementary Benefit). One of 
the properties of Artificial Intelligence is its 
potential for interpreting English language sentences. 
In theory a system could understand the structure of 
English questions, and so allow the user far greater 
flexibility in using the model (though the interpretation 
of natural language is theoretically achievable through 
artificial intelligence it is not one of the goals of the 
DHSS Demonstrator Project). Using artificial
intelligence to maximise user-friendliness is thus a 
major concern of the DHSS Demonstrator Project.
It should be stressed that the Demonstrator is not a tax- 
benefit model in the same sense as the other models 
reviewed here. To date those developing the Demonstrator 
have concentrated on building a model to produce 
qualitative rather than quantitative information. For 
example, the Demonstrator is likely to be able to predict 
the effect of a social security rule change on other 
social security rules (and any consequent inconsistencies 
in the system). This search for inconsistencies is one 
of the most promising areas for the use of artificial 
intelligence, and has been a central goal of the 
demonstrator project. The Demonstrator does not 
currently produce statistics such as the Exchequer costs 
of a policy change.
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2.5.2 Knowledge Base
The knowledge incorporated into the model is a subset of 
rules about the social security system. The various 
characteristics that give rise to a benefit entitlement 
such as the age at which certain benefits are payable, 
family circumstances, the level of earnings, the amount 
of capital that may be held are all included. The type 
of knowledge is thus very different from that included in 
other models. The majority of the knowledge incorporated 
in TAXMOD and the IFS Model (reviewed below) is a set of 
data about actual tax units. These models do contain 
facts about the existing tax-benefit system but these are 
the minimum that are required for the measurement of net 
incomes and cost effects. The vast majority of the 
Demonstrator's domain knowledge is a set of rules which 
describes the social security system. The interaction of 
different parts of the social security system have thus 
been described in far more detail than in any of the 
other models.
2.5.3 Programming Approach
Knowledge is represented in the Demonstrator in a way 
which is very different from the other models. The 
programs based on survey data such as TAXMOD and the IFS 
Model are based on a set of data which is arranged in a 
simple array with a fixed number of variables. Each 
record within the array is identical in form for each 
case. The database used by the Demonstrator could not be 
more different. The Demonstrator's database consists of 
a set of rules of differing lengths, structures, and 
complexity. There is no requirement for there to be a 
single structure for each rule within the database. The 
model can operate on both simple and complex rules.
At the time of writing, the procedures for making 
inferences from the data and outputting the results from
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the model were still in the development stage, so it is 
not possible to comment on the inference mechanisms 
within the model. The model is being written in the 
Artificial Intelligence language LISP. LISP requires the 
programmer to design his or her own mechanisms for 
drawing conclusions from the data in the model. The 
mechanism (termed an "inference engine") is thus being 
tailor-made for the Demonstrator.
2.5.4 User Interface Issues
The method of asking questions of the Policy Demonstrator 
is simpler and friendlier, than it is with any of the 
existing models. The system is being developed on a 
Xerox Dandelion, which has an extremely clear and 
detailed display screen. All of the communication with 
the computer is through a "mouse" (a hand held pointer 
which is rolled around the desktop in order to move a 
corresponding pointer around the display screen). When 
the pointer is resting on an option the user wants to 
select he or she clicks a button on the top of the mouse 
in order to make the choice. To help the user realise 
which choices are available a black line surrounds the 
phrase or word the pointer is resting on.
Unlike any of the other models reviewed here the 
Demonstrator makes extensive use of "windows" on the 
computer's display screen. When a choice is selected 
which makes information on the screen change not all of 
the previous information on the screen disappears. Thus 
if one selects the option to input a numerical 
characteristic, a "window" of such characteristics 
appears on part of the screen allowing the users to see 
those parts of the screen not covered by the window.
The Demonstrator works by inviting the user to input a 
policy, and then printing the consequences which flow 
from that policy. An example of the sort of policy the
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user might enter is:-
"Underlying title to Retirement Pension" "Is" "True" "If" 
"Age" "Greater Than" "55".
The term "Underlying title to Retirement Pension" means 
the right to claim retirement pension. The inverted 
commas indicate which parts of the sentence are selected 
as entire units. To state the policy above one would 
move the mouse so that the pointer was resting over the 
option to select a menu of symbolic terms. The mouse 
would then be clicked, and a window of symbolic terms 
would appear on the upper half of the screen. The user 
would move the mouse around the window till it was 
resting on the phrase "Underlying Title to Retirement 
Pension". The mouse would then be clicked and this 
phrase would be written on a "scratch-pad" area of the 
screen where new sentences are built up. The user is
continually shown a menu of standard words like "is", and 
"true", and "greater than". The user would thus point to 
the options "is", "true", and "if" in turn and click the 
mouse to add them to the sentence. To select the word 
"age" one calls up a window of numeric terms and moves 
the pointer to it. "Greater Than" is selected from the 
menu of standard words. To input the number 55, a 
numeric keypad is called up on a window in the screen and 
the numeral "5" is clicked twice.
This procedure allows the user to build up a potentially 
complex question in a matter of seconds, with little 
training.
It should be stressed that the preceding description of 
the interface applied to the Demonstrator as it existed 
in 1986. It has been substantially changed since.
2.5.5 Output from the Model
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At the time of writing the mechanisms for outputting 
answers from the model were still being developed so it 
is not possible to comment on them.
2.5.6 General Merits and Problems
It would be inappropriate (if not impossible) to give an 
overview of the Demonstrator's strengths and weaknesses 
at the current stage of its development. The Policy 
Demonstrator will have an extremely friendly user 
interface, and will allow for a wide range of policy 
options to be simulated. Policy makers should be able to 
use it with very little training. The combination of 
extremely fast graphics, clear menus, windows, and the 
hand held pointer make it very quick to input policy 
changes. Unless the Demonstrator includes data from 
sample surveys it is likely that it will produce answers 
very quickly. Its method of inputting policy questions 
is an ideal which the other tax-benefit models should aim 
for if models are to be usable by non-experts. To 
improve on the Demonstrator it would be necessary to 
produce output tables which are as clear as the method 
for inputting policies. The output should be displayed 
with the full use of windows, bar charts, tree diagrams, 
and sentences in clear English. If the output matches 
the sophistication of the input, then the DHSS 
Demonstrator will be an extremely impressive model.
2.6 TRAP (TAX REFORM ANALYSIS PACKAGE)
2.6.1 Objectives of the Model
The main objective of the Tax Reform Analysis Package is 
to simulate the effect of behavioural responses to tax- 
benefit policy. The other tax-benefit models reviewed 
assume that if there is a tax cut or increase that it 
will not have an effect on how much people work. However
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some economists would argue that some policies will have 
a significant impact on labour supply. For example, it 
is postulated that a massive rise in taxation would cause 
people to work less which in turn would lead to a 
reduction in National Income. As this type of theory 
cannot be simulated by the other models (with the 
exception of CUBS), they implicitly assume that tax- 
benefit policy cannot have an impact on National Income. 
The raison d'etre of TRAP is to simulate the effect of 
tax-benefit policies while incorporating a theory about 
how tax rates affect people's labour participation 
decisions. (The term "tax rate" used here is held to 
include taxes such as Income Tax and National Insurance 
Contributions together with the withdrawal rate of means- 
tested benefits).
It is important to stress that TRAP does not assume that 
any particular theory of behavioural responses applies. 
The user must make an explicit choice to accept a theory. 
If no such choice is made then TRAP will perform like 
all the other models in that it will assume that the 
Gross National Product with not be affected by a tax 
change. The most commonly used example of these theories 
is the effect of alternative treatments of the income of 
husbands and wives. It is thought that the work 
incentives of women with working husbands are 
particularly sensitive to tax rates. In most such cases 
the husband earns more than the wife and it is often 
possible for the wife to choose not to work. Thus the 
wife's labour participation is highly dependent on the 
net income she receives for each hour of work. The output 
from the TRAP model was used for a paper "On the reform 
of the taxation of Husband and Wife: Are Incentives
Important?" (Blundell, Meghir, Symons, and Walker, 1985). 
This paper examined three possible reforms:-
(a) Reducing the Married Man's Allowance to the level of
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the Single Allowance, and using the revenue saved to 
increase Child Benefit;
(b) Reducing the Married Man's Allowance to the level of 
the Single Allowance, and introducing a transferable 
allowance which could either be used by the wife 
(generally this would be used where the wife is working) 
or transferred to the husband (generally this would be 
done where the wife was not working);
(c) Reducing the Married Man's Tax Allowance to the level 
of the Single Allowance and using the revenue saved to 
fund a Home Responsibility Payment to non-working wives 
who care for children.
In each case TRAP was used to predict whether married 
women were more or less likely to work, assuming that a 
user-specified theory of labour supply was true.
2.6.2 Knowledge Base
TRAP itself is designed to allow users to specify their 
own theories about the way people respond to tax-benefit 
policy. It does not include a list of such policies to 
choose from.
Furthermore unlike most of the other models reviewed it 
does not incorporate a specific sample of data. The user 
can configure the program to accept a number of data 
sets. TRAP has been sent abroad to the USA and Belgium 
where it has been operated by researchers using data sets 
from their own countries. The British researchers who 
have used it have done so with the Family Expenditure 
Survey, though it could also be used in conjunction with 
other survey data such as the General Household Survey.
There is almost no knowledge incorporated into TRAP in 
the sense that knowledge has been incorporated into the 
other models. There are no facts and rules about the 
tax-benefit system itself, there are no data about
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individual cases, and there are no theories about 
behavioural responses to tax-benefit policy. TRAP is a 
utility program designed to make it easy for these things 
to be added by the user.
2.6.3 Programming Approach
The source code of the program has not been supplied for 
the purposes of this review. It uses the language 
FORTRAN77 which is an improvement on early versions such 
as FORTRAN66.
The model infers results from the data by calculating the 
marginal tax rate faced by the individual at his or her 
level of income and number of hours worked per week. The 
model then applies to this person an equation which 
attempts to define how many hours of work the person will 
do for a given rate of net pay per hour. Thus when a 
tax-benefit change alters this pay rate the model is able 
to calculate the new number of work hours. The theories 
about behavioural responses to tax-benefit policy 
(referred to as "Labour Supply Functions") may be 
extremely complicated. The theories are based on the 
relative importance the individual places on money and 
leisure time.
The diagram in figure 2.6 shows the hypothetical "trade­
off" between goods and leisure for a range of income 
levels and numbers of work hours. At the top left hand 
corner of the diagram the curved line indicates the 
highest possible income which can be earned (which is 
achieved by having almost no leisure time). At the far 
left of the diagram, the curve dips down to the lowest 
possible level of income (presumably provided by state 
benefits) which is achieved at the maximum number of 
"leisure" hours (i.e. when people are out of work). The 
curved line represents different combinations of income 
and work hours which people find equally satisfactory.
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The relationship is definitely curved, not linear. Thus 
while the point on the curve "H2-G1" might represent 160 
pounds for a forty hour week, the point at the top left 
might represent 500 pounds for an eighty hour week. 
Notice that as the number of leisure hours decreases to 
very small numbers that the pay rate has to rise 
disproportionately in order for people to be equally 
satisfied. This is why the lines are curved - because 
people will require disproportionately high incomes to be
Figure 2.6 An illustrative indifference curve
Goods S Income
C
C
G
—i  Hours
Hm ("leisure")
satisfied with low levels of leisure and 
disproportionately high levels of leisure to be equally 
satisfied with low incomes. When a tax-benefit policy 
changes a person's net income, TRAP in effect takes the
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new net income and plots the new number of work-hours on 
a graph similar to the one shown above. In practice the 
problem is solved mathematically, but the effect is the 
same. Determining the exact shape of these indifference 
curves is extremely difficult, and there is no theory 
which is universally accepted. Therefore TRAP requires
the users to specify their own theories, so that there is 
always an explicit choice about whether or not to include 
a theory of behavioural responses in the simulation.
2.6.4 User Interface Issues
It was not possible to assess the user interface for the 
purposes of the current review as there was no working 
demonstration of the model available. The use of the 
model is explained in a manual (King, M.A., Ramsay, P., 
1983), which is somewhat more technical than the manuals 
of the other models reviewed here because the potential 
user must be instructed about how to feed data into TRAP. 
The use of the model is illustrated in two articles by 
King:- "Welfare analysis of tax reforms using Household 
Data" (King, 1983a), and "An index of inequality: with 
applications to horizontal equity and social mobility" 
(King, 1983).
2.6.5 Output From the Model
The output from the model is badly labelled and cannot be 
interpreted by a user who is not familiar with the 
program. The table shown in figure 2.7 was supplied 
without a key to the abbreviations used for the columns 
and rows. There is also a table used for error checking 
which determines whether there are any households with 
highly improbable numbers of work-hours. (Households 
working zero hours would not be possible for the data set 
using this analysis as the unemployed have been excluded 
from it).
2.6.6 General Merits and Problems
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The main advantage of TRAP is its facility for simulating 
behavioural responses to tax-benefit policy. It must 
however be recognised that there is a genuine debate on 
the question of whether accuracy is enhanced by 
simulating labour supply responses.
Figure 2.7 Sample Output From TRAP
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON REFORM
Min Ave Max Pos Zero Neg SD cv
YO 22.400 407.173 2081.409 2995 0 0 197.598 .485
WO .039 3.231 18.382 2995 0 0 1.712 .530
PCO 1.084 1.084 1.084 2995 0 0 .004 . 004
Sp1 22.400 410.289
2081.409 2995 0 0 199.918 .487
WP .039 3.261 18.382 2995 0 0 1.734 . 532
PCP 1.084 1.084 1.084 2995 0 0 .004 . 004
YEO 221.298 406.211 915.841 2995 0 O 80.231 . 198
YEP 221.298 407.153 915.841 2995 0 0 80.946 . 199
RTP -29.362 3.023 222.765 914 1046 1035 16.027
WG .000 1.020 127.499 1198 845 952 6.877 6.740
LO 24.000 42.271 109.000 2995 0 O 8.085 . 191
LP -7.778 41.080 109.000 2984 0 11 10.070 .245
DL -41.515 -1.191 22.614 91 2709 195 6.044 -5.075
SOS .000 .004 .225 2741 254 0 .014 3.266
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To its credit, TRAP produces indicators of accuracy such 
as standard deviations in its output tables. However 
this only shows the variability of the results, when one 
assumes that the particular behavioural response theory 
is correct. It would be useful if the model was able to 
display indicators of the accuracy of the labour supply 
theory itself - based on the original research which gave 
rise to it. These accuracy indicators would not be 
calculated by the model itself, but would be taken from 
published research findings about the relevant theory. 
Often extremely complex labour supply theories are put 
forward without the backing of convincing empirical 
justification (see chapter 6 below). It is argued that 
one cannot make inferences about behavioural responses 
unless one uses data which has information about the same 
people at different points in time (one could thus 
measure the number of work hours before and after a tax- 
cut for example). However there is little of this 
longitudinal data available. The two exceptions to 
this, the panel element of the Labour Force Survey and 
the matched cases in the New Earnings Survey have not 
been used for the estimation of labour supply responses 
to policy changes. Almost all of the existing British 
research is based on cross-sectional data which gives a 
snap-shot of a population at one point in time. It is 
thus extremely difficult to work out the incentive 
effects of tax-benefit changes, and it is not possible to 
prove that any one of the more popular theories is 
effective in explaining real world events. It is hard to 
prove that small changes in marginal tax rates have any 
effect on work effort. The main disadvantage of TRAP is 
its extreme user-hostility. It is difficult to set up. 
It takes a great deal of time to modify the program. The 
execution is slow and the output almost incomprehensible. 
It is only really suitable for people with expertise in 
both computing and labour supply economics.
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2.7 LSE TAXMOD PACKAGE
2.7.1 Objectives of the Model
TAXMOD is a close relative of TAXEXP described above. 
The same people were involved in designing both packages. 
It was written by A.B.Atkinson and H.Sutherland at the 
International Centre for Economics and Related 
Disciplines (ICERD) at the London School of Economics. 
The package was first produced in 1984 and has been 
continually up-dated since. The difference between 
TAXMOD and TAXEXP is that TAXEXP carries out simulations 
on hypothetical families, whereas TAXMOD uses survey data 
about actual families in order to give some idea of the 
real world effect of policy changes. Such effects might 
include the number of people likely to gain or lose from 
a policy change, the proportion of people whose marginal 
tax rate will increase or decrease, and the overall 
Exchequer costs of a policy for the groups covered in the 
survey. In the "Analysis of Taxation" it was shown that 
the supposedly representative household with a husband 
and wife, two children, without investment income 
occupying a council house accounted for only 4 % of all 
tax units (Atkinson, Sutherland, & King, 1983:64). The 
emphasis on the use of data on actual households is an 
attempt to get round this problem of 
unrepresentativeness.
Another objective of the model is to make policy analysis 
based on large sets of survey data available to non­
expert users. At the time of writing TAXMOD is in use in 
over 20 charitable and academic institutions. Without a 
specially designed package like TAXMOD it is very 
difficult for people without main frame computers and 
specialist computing skills to use surveys like the FES. 
In general extensive training and expensive computers are 
needed. The objective of trying to make the FES easy to
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use on a micro-computer is thus a very important one.
2.7.2 Knowledge Base
There are two types of knowledge which have been 
incorporated in the model. One is a store of knowledge 
about the existing tax and social security system, and 
certain well known proposals for changing it. The other 
is a large array of data about 3276 tax units taken from 
the 1982 FES. Benefits, housing costs, and incomes have 
been scaled up to 1986 levels. The model builders have 
in effect taken the raw data from the FES and have 
created a new data set of transformed and combined 
variables. This work includes calculating grossing up 
factors to adjust for the fact that certain income groups 
and types of family are under-represented in the FES 
sample. Corrections are also made for under-reporting 
(as when people claim they drink and smoke less than they 
do) and non-response (as when people cannot remember what 
their mortgage interest payments are). Where values are 
missing then imputed values are used. These variables 
have been constructed specifically for the purposes of 
modelling the tax and benefit system and are sufficiently 
far removed from the raw FES data for the program to be 
distributed to third parties without specific approval in 
each case from the Department of Employment (though users 
are cautioned not to use the results of the model for 
publication).
The cases included in the model are only those where the 
head of tax unit is under the retirement age and works 
sufficient hours to qualify for Family Credit. The 
designers of TAXMOD have also excluded those families who 
work sufficient hours for Family Credit but are headed by 
a married woman. This means that roughly 45% of tax 
units are excluded by TAXMOD.
The rules dealt with include those defining Income Tax,
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National Insurance, Child Benefit, Family Income 
Supplement, Housing Benefit, the SDP Basic Benefit 
system, and certain features of the Fowler Review System 
such as Family Credit and the new Housing Benefit. With 
some of the benefits the user is allowed to alter 
virtually all the numerical constants which are 
associated with them. For example, if the user elects to 
alter housing benefit then the user may alter over ten 
different parameters which define housing benefit 
entitlements. In general, when dealing with most of the 
menu options the user is only able to alter numerical 
values which describe the existing tax-benefit system. 
However the user is able to make some minor structural 
alterations. For example, in the National Insurance 
Contribution section the user can make the rates of 
contribution more smoothly progressive by stipulating 
that only income above a certain limit should be taxed. 
Under the current system one's NI payments rise from zero 
to 3.20 pounds, when weekly earnings exceed 35.50 pounds 
(this is because the first 3.50 becomes taxable all at 
once). Certain other well known reforms can also be 
explored such as the tax treatment of husbands and wives 
(the model allows the user to select the present system, 
fully independent taxation of husband and wife, and fully 
transferable personal allowances). Furthermore the user 
can simulate the introduction of several features of the 
social security system proposed in the Fowler Social 
Security Reviews such as the new Housing Benefit, and 
Family Credit to replace Family Income Supplement.
The option termed "specify a new benefit" allows the user 
the option to specify a specific benefit reform proposal. 
It should be stressed therefore that this option refers 
to a particular benefit; it does not allow the user to 
create any benefit he or she chooses. The options the 
user is given allow the simulation of a "Basic Benefit" 
system similar to that proposed by the SDP in their
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"Attacking Poverty" paper (SDP, 1981). It would not, for 
example, be able to simulate the Liberal Party's Tax 
Credit system as described in "To Each According ..." 
(Vince, 1983). One of the most distinctive features of 
this part of the program is that the simulated Basic 
Benefits are withdrawn by a single taper (under the 
present system a household could have its FIS withdrawn 
by 50% and its Housing Benefit withdrawn by 26%, leading 
to a cumulative taper of 76%. With this system, the 
basic benefits are all subject to a single taper). The 
combined basic benefit taper may be set at a different 
rate for single people with and without children, and for 
couples with and without children.
2.7.3 Programming Approach
Knowledge representation is difficult to assess due to 
the fact that the model is supplied in the form of a 
compiled BASIC program. The source code is not 
available. It has to be assumed that a relatively simple 
structural equation approach has been used.
Results are inferred from the data by calculating the tax 
liability and benefit entitlement of each case within the 
data set, based on the recorded family circumstances, 
incomes, housing costs, etc. Assumptions about benefit 
take-up rates have been made (the model assumes a take-up 
rate of 50% for those entitled to FIS, and 75% for those 
entitled to Housing Benefit). Extrapolations have been 
made from the test data set to the general population, by 
multiplying each case by a grossing up factor which 
varies according to the type of household. These 
different factors are an attempt to make up for the known 
biasses within the FES. However, it should be remembered 
that even when fully grossed up the sample used by TAXMOD 
represents only 15.5 million out of a possible 27 million 
tax units, because it does not include tax units where 
the head is off work due to sickness, is a part-timer, is
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retired, unemployed, or a married woman.
2.7.4 User Interface Issues
TAXMOD is operated through a series of menus which makes 
it very easy for beginners to use. The user is furnished 
with a 43 page manual. This helps in understanding the 
structure of the program, and warns the user that there 
may be long waiting periods while the program is 
processing individual cases. Someone running the model 
on an Apricot micro-computer will find that the initial 
reading of the FES data takes 27 minutes, the 
calculations for the standard output tables take 7 
minutes, and the optional tables each take 5-8 minutes. 
However the user is able to control the execution time on 
test runs, by specifying that only a fraction of the 
cases will be considered. For example, if the user wants 
to limit the reading in of raw data to 2.7 minutes he or 
she can opt to take a one in ten sample. If the result 
looks interesting the user can then use the full data set 
to achieve greater accuracy. When the user alters the 
parameters for a tax or benefit the screen will show 
which value has been entered, and this value can be 
altered easily after it has been typed in. Unlike the 
CUBS model there is no standard sequence of questions. 
Backtracking to correct mistakes is possible up to the 
moment that the program starts to read in the data. When 
all the tables on a particular policy have been output, 
the user is then given the choice of inputting new 
policies from the starting point of the tax benefit 
system specified in the previous session or go back to 
the original state of the system (based on 1986 tax and 
benefit rates). The interface is in general the most 
usable of any of the models based on survey data.
2.7.5 Output from the Model
The output from the model is based on a number of 
standard formats. For example, whenever the model is run
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Figure 2.8 Output from TAXMOD showing the percentage of 
people in different income bands before and after a 
policy change
Tabl e 1 s ranges of NET INCOME
Before change After change
Upper end X CUMUL 7. CUMUL Average gain
75.00 14.66 14.66 14.24 14.24 5.34
100.00 11.85 26.51 13.01 27.25 0.69
125.00 12.18 38.69 8.31 35.56 6.02
150.00
COrl•N 50.86 11. 16 46.72 8.35
175.00 10.80 61.67 13. SO 60. 53 3.34
200.00 9.73 71.40 13.30 73.82 -1.78
225.00 8.21 79.61 9. 16 82.99 -10.03
250.00 5. 15 84.75 6. 10 89.09 -16.20
275.00 4.08 83.83 3.53 92.67 -26.83
— 11.17 100.00 7.33 100.00 -45.85
Figure 2.9 Output from TAXMOD showing 
people gaining or losing cash amounts by 
by amounts of income gain or loss
the percentage of 
income bands and
Table 2: Percentage in each row with ABSOLUTE changes
<-15 -5/-15 0/-5 0/ 5 5/15 >15
Range
0 0.00 0. 00 6.79 57.39 29.81 5.08
1 0.00 18.36 57.76 7.41 o.5B 11.32
2 2.48 42.95 2.44 3. 16 13.86 35. 11
3 13.84 13.28 8.33 8. 06 17.73 33.53
4 13.60 21.56 5. 03 10. 14 22. 10 27.04
5 24.43 22.73 10. 18 13.05 15. 04 14.58
6 46.99 17. 14 10. 6 * S. 65 10. 68 5.91
7 56.61 22.86 6.51 7.69 3. 11
S 3-. 5 10. 36 0. iD L 0.61 <-i -r rrX, 4 O «J 1 .
9 94.50 3. 20 1. 48 0. 00 0 .55 0. 27
OveraI! X in each rancp:
23. 61 16. 99 4 .-n —•i »:>o -» r-. »n X . * j. 13.92 16.13
Omitted categcry is *'no change'
it shows the number of people covered by the analysis,
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and the yearly revenue cost of the proposal in millions 
of pounds.
Figure 2.10 Output from TAXMOD showing details of an 
individual case
M a rr ie d  co u p le
w ith  4 .0 0  c h i ld r e n
Tenant : h o u s in g  c o s ts  o f  2 0 .4 7
Gross e a rn in g s  o f  head a re  1 0 5 .2 0  
O th e r income o f  7 0 .1 2  
N et income b e fo re  is  1 5 6 .9 4  
A f t e r  i s  1 7 7 .1 2
Change i s  2 0 .1 8
M a rg in a l t a x  r a t e  b e fo re  :-h e a d  3 6 . 8 5  
A f t e r  3 6 . 8 5
This last table also shows the average marginal tax rate 
for all cases before and after the change, and the 
percentage of cases where the rates have 
increased/decreased. For each of these standard tables 
the user has considerable freedom in specifying the 
precise format. For example, when income bands are 
considered the user can stipulate the lowest and highest 
income level to be considered in the analysis, and the 
width of each band in between (e.g. one could select a 
table of incomes from 0 to 500 pounds per week rising by 
20 pound increments). Similarly the cash amounts of
income gains and losses can be determined by the user up 
to cash changes of 20 pounds per week. Because these 
parameters can be varied by the user after the initial 
reading of the FES data, a second pass through the FES 
data is required when the format of the standard tables
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has been chosen (this takes 7 minutes on an Apricot). 
The user may also choose whether the tables are to be 
based on net incomes or net resources (which is net 
income less housing costs). There is a rough method of 
comparing the income of families of different sizes. 
This can be done by dividing income by the number of 
"equivalent adults" (defined as 1 for a single person,
1.6 for a couple, and 0.4 for each child).
Optional tables include:-
(a) Percentages of families in different bands of income 
gain and loss by characteristic of family 
(householder/non-householder; owner-occupier/tenant; head 
married/head single; with children/without children; wife 
working/ wife not working);
(b) Percentage of families in different bands of income 
gain and loss by type of family; average income of 
husband and wife by band of income gain and loss;
(c) Percentage of tax units in different ranges of 
increase/decrease of marginal tax rate by tax unit
characteristic;
(d) display of individual cases with large income gains 
or losses;
(e) display of individual cases with large changes in 
marginal tax rates;
(f) Percentage of total income of all cases by decile
level of income (Lorenz curves).
The last three tables which are unique among tax-benefit 
models are extremely useful. When tables (d) and (e) are 
shown the individual cases are displayed on the screen
with their estimated benefits and tax bills. These
individual calculations are useful in determining whether 
the model is accurate as they allow the user to see some 
of the raw variables in the array. It is very important 
to be able to check these case by case calculations, so 
that the user can have confidence in the overall
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conclusions of the model. The last of the optional 
tables allows the user to gain a reasonably concise 
measure of how the policy change affects the level of 
income equality among the sample group.
2.7.6 General Merits and Problems
When considering the problems of TAXMOD it is necessary 
to stress that the sample on which the model is based 
only includes non-pensionable households where the head 
is a full-time employee. When grossed up this means that 
the model only applies to 15.5 million out of a possible 
27 million tax units. It is not clear why tax units with 
non-working heads are excluded in this way. This may be 
because the research at the LSE has focussed heavily on 
labour supply issues such as whether a policy change will 
cause people to work more or less. For this type of 
analysis the unemployed and retired are irrelevant, but 
to predict the overall number of gainers and losers it is 
very important to have a fully representative sample. 
This is a substantial drawback to the model, but its 
authors have not claimed that TAXMOD is a substitute for 
analyses based on the full FES.
The chief merit of TAXMOD is the contribution it has made 
in increasing the accessibility of a large sample survey 
to tax-benefit policy makers. Policy makers who wish to 
do their own research on the FES normally have to cross a 
mine-field of computer hardware problems, invalid data, 
and unfriendly programming languages. The designers of 
TAXMOD have tamed this unfriendly data into a compact 
form, which can be stored on a micro-computer, and 
analysed by an easily understood computer program.
The main disadvantages of TAXMOD flow from the 
constraints placed on the user to try to make the model 
user-friendly. The user cannot use the model to analyse 
a tax-benefit policy which is not contained in the menus
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which have already been set up. This is due to the 
conflict between usability and flexibility outlined in 
chapter 1. However this should not detract from TAXMOD's 
undeniable achievements. It is undoubtedly the only
model which is sufficiently flexible and user-friendly to 
be used by a wide range of non-experts.
2.8 IFS TAX AND BENEFIT MODEL
2.8.1 Objectives of the Model
The objective of the Institute for Fiscal Studies Tax and 
Benefit Model was to provide a method of simulating the 
effect of the widest possible range of tax and benefit 
policies. It was developed principally by Andrew Dilnot 
and Graham Stark (who has added a menu-driven interface). 
The IFS model has succeeded in using the data from the 
FES more effectively than most of the other models. It 
uses roughly 97 % of the cases from the FES (whereas 
TAXMOD, for example, only uses 52%). Furthermore the IFS 
has made extensive use of the FES to model the indirect 
tax system which is not touched by the other models. The 
authors have constructed a system to measure the spending 
on VAT liable goods. One can not only simulate the 
effect of varying the existing rate of VAT but also model 
the introduction of new sales taxes on up to fifteen 
different categories of spending. The aim of the IFS 
model was to use the full scope of the data within the 
FES, and so maximise the accuracy and variety of the tax- 
benefit policies which could be simulated.
2.8.2 Knowledge Base
The data is derived from the 7,000 households surveyed 
for the 1982 FES. The model can use any FES data tape 
which has been processed by the IFS. 1982 data is used 
by default, though a system based on 1984 data should be 
in use in the near future. The data are attached to tax 
units, though where there are several tax units at the
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same address it is possible to combine the data to
reconstruct data about the entire household. The program 
carries out operations on the data file, and works out 
the tax and benefit entitlement of each case. The 
cumulative values of these tax and benefit amounts can be
used to estimate the Exchequer cost of various policy
options. As a result of recent research the IFS model 
has what is probably the most sophisticated adjustment 
for non-take-up of benefits. The DHSS commissioned
research on take-up rates during the summer of 1986. In 
the course of this research the probability of claiming 
benefits was estimated for a range of family types and 
income levels. These probability factors were estimated 
after a thorough study of data from the FES for the years 
1980-1982, and 1984. For each tax unit there was an 
assessment of the entitlement to benefit, and this was 
compared to data on receipt of benefits to see if the 
benefit was actually claimed. This research has been
incorporated in the model; if the probability factors 
indicate that the chances are less than 50% that a given 
family will claim, then the model assumes that the 
benefit is not claimed. This is particularly important 
because some methods of adjusting for non-take up will 
tend to under-estimate the Exchequer costs of a given
benefit. For example, take the case of a model which
assumes that only 75% of families entitled to Housing 
Benefit will claim it, and which randomly assumes that 
every fourth entitled household will not claim. (75% is 
the housing benefit take-up rate which is assumed by the 
LSE TAXMOD program). This approach ignores the research 
evidence which indicates that those people with a large 
benefit entitlement are more likely to claim than those 
with a small entitlement. A random adjustment will
under-estimate the costs of the benefit because it fails
to recognise that most of those who don't claim a means- 
tested benefit will not be entitled to much anyway.
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2.8.3 Programming Approach
The knowledge about the tax and benefit system has been 
stored in the model in the form of FORTRAN equations. 
There are few equations which include probability factors 
or error terms. The results of the equations are 
conditional on facts which are in almost every case 
included in the model. The unknowns and probability 
factors which are included in some of the other models 
have thus not been needed for the IFS model.
There are good reasons to believe that the results 
inferred from the IFS model are likely to be superior to 
those produced by other models, if one is trying to 
simulate the effects of a change on the population as a 
whole. The fact that only a tiny proportion of cases 
from the FES have been excluded means that the results 
from the IFS model are likely to be more accurate than 
those from TAXMOD. The programming approach used in this 
case implies that there is a straightforward relationship 
between the individual's circumstances and his or her tax 
bill and benefit entitlement.
2.8.4 User Interface Issues
The IFS model has, in effect, two user interfaces. For 
changing simple features of the existing tax-benefit 
regime, such as tax rates, thresholds, amounts of 
benefit, and tapers there is a system of menus which 
invite the user to key in the appropriate values. If a 
more complex change is required then the user must alter 
the FORTRAN code within the program itself. In most 
cases the model is supplied in a compiled form so users 
will not have access to the source code. This helps to 
make the model "idiot-proof11 as far as the end user is 
concerned and helps assure the IFS that the model cannot 
be used to produce invalid results. In at least one case 
the end user has been allowed to alter the source code 
but only in close consultation with the IFS - as when the
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Department of the Environment used it to produce the 
Green Paper on the Abolition of Domestic Rates 
(Department of the Environment, 1986). At the menu- 
driven level the interface is very user-friendly; to 
dispense with the menus a knowledge of FORTRAN is 
required. If the user does have the ability to alter the 
source code then an Aladdin's cave of policy options is 
opened up. This is because each time the model has been 
used for a new piece of research a new section of the 
program has been written for the policy area concerned. 
The routines have been preserved within the program, but 
in most cases cannot be invoked from the menu-driven 
front end of the model. When the model is first invoked 
an "action menu" with seven options appears (see figure 
2.11 ) .
If the user selects option 3 to alter the tax and benefit 
system, a further menu appears, shown in figure 2.14.
If the user decides to alter a complex benefit like 
housing benefit, the user has to adjust a large number of
Figure 2.11 Computer screen display produced by IFS model 
showing initial menu of options
Change default Tax and Benefit system* ?(H/y)— >n
Action Menu 
pick 1 from the folloulr.3 list :
1/ print all tax ♦ benefit parameters to screen
2/ print a subset of tax ♦ benefit parameters
V alter the tax ♦ benefit system
*/ alter the output defaults
5/ alter the run defaults
6/ run the model
7/ abandon the session
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parameters and frequently refer to the manual as the 
labels are far from self-explanatory. The housing 
benefit menu is shown in figure 2.13.
Figure 2.12 Computer Screen Menu produced by IFS model 
showing options for altering tax and benefit system
enter a number (1 ... 7)— >J
piek 1 from the following list :
1/ tsx system
2/ national insurance
J/ fauliy income supplement
4/ lioasin^ benefit
5/ state pensions
6/ supplcMcntii-y benefit
7/ unemployment benefit
;/ chile benefit
V vat
10/ excise duty
11/ upruLe all allowances ♦ ! 
by x5 (system 2 only)
enter a r.unbar (1 .. U)— >4
Figure 2.13 Computer Screen Menu produced by IFS model 
showing housing benefit menu
Housing Dcnefit
xns xnia xnch xnJia xndsw xliu xliue
ays 1 : 47.70 7 0 .2 0 14.50 17.03 5 .0 0 999.99 939.93
ays 2 8 47.70 7 0 .2 0 14.50 17.00 5 .0 0 999.93 933.95
xhbsya xruax xooc libvrl libvr2
ays 1 : 0.00 0.03 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
ays 2 : C.00 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.03 0 .0 0
xr1 xr2 xral xru2 xrpl xrapl xrp2 ’ xrap2
ays 1 : 25.00 25.00 S.00 15.CO 5 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 29.00 13.00p
ays 2 ! 25.00 29.00 6 .0 0 13.00 50.00 2 0 .0 0 29.00 Ij.OOp
xrprp remain ratmin x;jodd xndl xnd2 xnd3
ays 1 : CO.00 0 .2 0 0.25 0.00 6.60 6.60 2.55
ays 2 : 60.00 0 .2 0 0.25 0 .2 0 6.60 6.63 2.55
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The model has been used to simulate the existing direct 
tax-benefit system, the incidence of indirect taxes, the 
SDP Basic Benefit system, the Liberal Tax Credit 
proposals, and the Fowler Review system. If the user 
could call up these options and alter the benefit amount 
and tax rates which are associated with them through the 
menu driven part of the system, then the IFS model would 
have an extremely powerful user interface. However it 
should be stressed that there are also substantial 
advantages in allowing the user to gain access to the raw 
variables through a programming language. The merit is 
that the user retains the freedom to simulate a tax- 
benefit system which the model-builder has not thought 
of. The ideal would be to have a more highly developed 
menu system for the IFS model while allowing the user to 
access the raw variables in the model.
Figure 2.14 Output from IFS model showing number of 
people paying/receiving various taxes and benefits
tu 84 * i of ai t i l s i rent r t i N U /a it t in kbsu?/H fCM w ife* tu
Ssaglt 1 2347. ?»?. 1. 1. 753. 71 44. 1. 11. 4. t . l
OPF I 71. 51. 4. 27. 537. 81. 21 374. 11 (. 8.8
Ce«f!t 8 l i f t . 375. 1 1. 141. ?. 11 4. 7. 151 37.8
C » I t 17?. 354. 4. 28. 447. 51 17. 287. 1. ». f.l
c ♦ : 1 1421 375. 2. 24. 437. 21 B. 441 1. 1. 8.8
C ♦ 3 1 22?. 51 I. ' 1 274. 44. 8. 231. 1 1. 1.8
C » 1 1 85. 34. 1. 7. 417. 1. 1. 244. 1. 1. 1.8
S i* ?t» t 22?. 11 1. 4. 311 248. 83. 1. 53. 2871 4.8
Ca* t'B 1 121 1. 11. 1. 151 17. 57. 1. 31. 3334. <18
Cavf.i 1 234?. 431 341. 1. «. 4. 4. 4. 1. I t . 7311
C ♦ 1 8 117. 424. 127. 1 1. 11. 1 217. 1. 4. 311.8
C ♦ 2 I 1151 378. 41 23. 1. 21. 8. 424. 4. 1. 138.8
C t  } I 473. 117. 24. 21 1. 1. 1 187. 1. «. 57.8
C * 4 I 37. 11 1 1. «. I. 4. 21 1. 1. 11.8
2 iA* H I 1. 1. t. 1. 1. 1. «. 1. 1. 1. 1.8
3 .1 I 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. «. ». t. t. 4. 1.8
3«tS 1 1. 1. t. «. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. I. 4.8
Ic U l I 11471. 3781 441. 144. 3742. 437. 278. 2434. 124. 4871 £54.1
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2.8.5 Output from the Model
The IFS model is designed to show, for a given tax- 
benefit change, the following statistics:-
(a) the number of people paying/receiving various taxes 
and benefits (see figure 2.14).
(b) the number of heads of household, and wives facing 
various marginal tax rates (see figure 2.15).
2.8.6 General Merits and Problems
In terms of the questions which it allows the user to 
answer, the IFS model is the most powerful of the 
existing tax-benefit models. The range of policy options 
which can be simulated and the fullness with which 
different types of family have been represented makes the
Figure 2.15 Output from the IFS model showing number of 
people in different ranges of marginal tax rate
ta b le  I I
t o *  1. Type o f  t u  tw i t
colunt) 2 .Held Ml ob earned, sg s ttn  1
average
.51 .61
range thresho lds 
.71 .61 .71 1.44 over
average 
o f co l
o ld  aev 
net incones (£ p. v.
nun
1 sar.ple
S ia g le 1 76.41 .44 2.77 .61 .11 .11 .46  1 23. S3 X a s ? 67 .2 ) X £ 7 .1 6  X
OPf t B7.54 .11 4.17 .61 4.17 4.17 .11 > 16.74 X 87.63 114.18 X 2 4 .4 ) X
Cooplc 1 '  73.45 2.27 2.27 .11 .11 .11 .11  t 23.11 X 135.36 133.54 X 44.41 X
C M X 75.12 .44 . H  . 2.44 .14 .41 2.44 1 25.38 X 125.68 137.31 X 41.46 X
C ♦ 2 t 73.12 .64 .44 2.33 .41 2.33 2.33 1 27.62 X 146.63 163.53 X 4 3 .I I  :
C 4 3 S 81. E2 .11 7.17 .11 .11 .11 7.4? 1 2 3 .B7 X 147.74 164.67 X 1 1 .4 ) X
C M t 87.31 .44 .14 .41 .11 12.34 .44 X 15.67 X 151.56 162.43 X 8.14 X
S ia Pea X m . e i .11 .11 .11 .61 .11 .41 t 7.15 X 57.62 65.31 X 8 7 .1 ) X
Cob pea t 75.52 1.18 .11 .41 .11 .44 .41 X 4.67 X 87.14 76.34 X 67.14 X
CoopIt t h i . m .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .61 X 35.81 X 2)8 .48 2 4 1  77 X I *  x
C ♦ 1 t 73.55 .44 3.23 .11 .41 .11 3.23 I 33.36 X 212.77 224.72 X 31.44 X
C ♦ 2 X 73.33 .M 6.67 .11 . H .11 .41 X 37.32 X 178.87 234.82 X 34.44 X
C ♦ 3 t B8.B7 . H 11.11 .14 .44 .44 .44 X 42.6? X 234.21 267.32 I 7.41 X
C « 1 I 1 I M I .44 .44 .11 .11 .11 .11 X 36.81 X 218.16 263.77 I 1.14 X
2a#s * - t .11 . H .11 .64 .44 .64 .64 1 .14 X .41 . H  X .4 )  X
3 *ads t .11 . H .61 .14 .44 .44 .44 I .44  I .11 .44 X .44 X
3 t* d i 1 .M .16 . H .11 .41 .44 .44 X .44 X .61 .44 X .44  X
T o ta l t 75.63 .65 1.74 .47 .16 .47 .65 X 22.54 X 114.74 123.17 X 6  s. 44 X
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IFS model the most effective. It is significant that 
when the government introduced its plans for introducing 
a per capita community charge it did not base its 
calculations on one of its own models; it used a copy of 
the IFS model (Department of the Environment, 1986).
In terms of the range of tax and social security policies 
that the package has been used to assess, the IFS model 
is clearly the most successful. To improve on the 
existing version, it would be necessary to create menus 
which gave access to the various routines and modules 
which have been written for research projects in the past 
and which have been retained within the model, such as 
the routines dealing with indirect taxation.
2.9 INLAND REVENUE PERSONAL INCOME TAX MODEL
2.9.1 Objectives of the Model
The objectives of the Personal Income Tax (PIT) model is 
to simulate the effect of changing the Income Tax or 
National Insurance systems. M.P.s have indirect use of 
the model through the tabling of parliamentary 
questions, and the Treasury whose ministers and senior 
civil servants request information about the effect of 
possible tax changes. There is a greater emphasis on 
calculating the global Exchequer costs of a policy than 
there is with any other model. A typical parliamentary 
question might be "Will the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
show the revenue which would be lost if a reduced rate of 
income tax of 20% were levied on the first 3000 pounds 
of taxable income?" The Model is also capable of 
creating tables to show how much tax is paid by people in 
different income groups, and by a limited number of tax 
unit types.
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2.9.2 Knowledge Base
The knowledge incorporated into the model includes a set 
of rules about the Income Tax and National Insurance 
Contribution system. The program allows the modification 
of tax rates, tax bands, tax allowances, the spouse's 
earnings election, and a possible investment income 
surcharge.
The raw data used by the model is the Inland Revenue 
Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI), which is collected 
annually. PIT's data is thus updated annually. The 
Survey of Personal Incomes is a sample of 67,000 Income 
Tax return forms. The tax-payers selected for the survey 
are not required to fill out any extra forms. The Inland 
Revenue requires local tax offices to fill out a survey 
form based on information that has already been collected 
for the preceding tax year. In most cases this involves 
the local tax officials filling out a survey 
questionnaire form by referring to existing PAYE records. 
In the case of those who fill out their own tax returns, 
then these self-completed forms are used. The SPI is 
designed so that there is a higher percentage sample of 
people with large incomes, than there is of people with 
lower incomes. The SPI was designed specifically as a
data source for the PIT model and this model is the only
one which uses it. However during April 1986, the SPI 
started to become available in the form of a public user 
tape available from the ESRC data archive so that other 
bodies could make use of it.
It is important to note that the SPI is purely concerned
with the tax unit and not the household or the
individual. There is no way to aggregate the information 
in the survey to reconstruct entire households as the 
sampling is based on tax units in the first place and not 
on whole households. The SPI omits all persons who are 
not liable for Income Tax. It would be theoretically
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possible to reconstruct data about individuals by 
separating information about husbands and wives.
2.9.3 Programming Approach
Though it was possible to view the output from the 
program and the user interface it has not been possible 
to view the source code of the program itself.
The method of extrapolating from the results based on the 
survey data to the general population involves 
multiplying each case within the sample by the inverse of 
the sampling fraction used when selecting it from the 
population. These multipliers are different for 
different types tax-payer, since the SPI samples a much 
higher proportion of richer tax-payers than it does of 
poorer tax-payers.
2.9.4 User Interface Issues
The Personal Income Tax model's user interface is the 
second most usable interface of any of the Tax-Benefit 
Models, after TAXMOD. The model was intended to be used 
by generalist civil servants and not just by technical 
computer operators. The user is prompted to input new 
policy parameters through a system of easily understood 
menus. There is no need to resort to programming in 
order to answer most parliamentary and ministerial 
questions.
When the user first invokes the model a general menu of 
options is shown (see Figure 2.16).
Some of the options shown in figure 2.16 are not in fact 
connected with the Personal Income Tax model itself. One 
of them, for example, gives the user access to the inter­
departmental model "IGOTM". Another allows the user to 
access the Inland Revenue model which shows how the tax 
system has developed over time. To simulate a change to
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the tax system the user should select the option to set 
up an income change parameter file. The file selection 
panel shown in figure 2.16 is one of the few menus which 
requires the user to have specialist knowledge about the 
tax benefit system.
Figure 2.16 Computer Screen Image produced by Personal 
Income Tax model showing the initial menu of options
I - AMEND TAX PARAMETER FILE
*> - SOSELECT - SELECTION CRITERIA FOR SO? i FILE
3 - SKSELECT - SELECTION CRITERIA FOR CK:-1 FILE
4 - SET UP PARAMETER FOR NIC RUN
5 - SET UP INCOME CHANGE PARAMETER FILE
6 - HOUSEKEEPING
7 - RUN COSTING PROGRAMS <ALL FORMATS)
G - RUN INCOME CHANGE PROGRAM - SQL'.*. OUTPUT
? - RUN SKB1 SELECTION PROGRAM
A - RUN SQ::.1 SELECTION PROGRAM
D - RUN UPDATE PROGRAM
C - RUN NIC PROGRAM
D - RUN HSI SYSTEH
E - RUN UPDATE - STRATIFIED SAMPLING 
F - RUN IGOTM SYSTEM
G - RUN INCOME CHANGE PROGRAM - SKSM OUTPUT
II - UPDATE/PR If IT LIST OF P.Q.S
The first question shown in figure 2.16 asks the user to 
specify a file containing information about the existing 
tax and benefit system. The next question asks the user 
if he or she wishes to over-write the existing file of 
information, or to create a new temporary file of tax 
information. The user is then asked to give a name to 
the new output file to be created. The user then states 
whether the file containing information about the tax 
system is to be an existing system file or one created by 
the user. As the user wishes to model a new tax policy 
the file must be a user-created file. The user in the 
example shown is then asked whether he or she wishes to 
set up a parameter file or to have the parameters printed 
out on to paper. In the example shown in figure 
2.17 neither is requested.
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Figure 2.17 Computer Screen Image produced by Personal 
Income Tax model showing how to select a data file
PLEASE SUPPLY NAME OF OUTPUT PARAHETER FILE
*«*»> s8 6test (MAX. OF 8 CHARACTERS)
PLEASE STATE WHETHER BASE PARAMETER FILE
IS A SYSTEM (S) OR USER (U> CREATED FILE 
■»=> u
DO YOU WISH TO CREATE A HIT PARAHETER FILE 
-=»> N (Y OR H)
DO YOU REQUIRE A PRINT OF THE OUTPUT PARAMETER FILE
==*> N (Y OR N) PRINTER IDENTITY «==> S12P2
The user is then given a menu of four options, each
specifying an area of tax policy which may be modelled. 
The user is invited to type "yes" or "no" to examine or 
change tax allowances, tax rates, investment income
surcharge, and reduced rate tax bands.
The first screen to appear allows the user to change the 
tax rate schedule. The menu in figure 2.18 shows how 
easy it is to understand the options. The existing tax 
rate and the width of the associated tax band is shown 
beside it. The user may specify between one and 24 tax 
rates.
The investment income surcharge schedule may be altered 
in a similar way (see figure 2.19).
Before performing the analysis users are asked if they 
wish to have calculations performed on the full data set,
or whether a fraction of cases should be sampled. As the
model takes only five minutes to run on the full data 
set, this sampling facility is rarely used. (The model 
is run on an extremely powerful main frame based in 
Worthing, Sussex. This computer is linked directly to 
the Inland Revenue as Somerset House.)
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Figure 2.18 Computer Screen Menu produced by the Personal 
Income Tax Model showing the menu to change tax rates and 
tax bands
ENTER/VERIFY PARAMETERS BELOW
NUMBER OF TAX RATES ««■> 7 <1 TO 24 >
1ST RATE »—  > 30 
2ND RATE ■»■> 40 
3RD RATE »— > 45 
4TH RATE =»»> 50 
5TH RATE ««> 55 
6TH RATE »«>.60 
7TH RATE »»»> 70 
• 8TH RATE . «»»> 0
ALL RATES ARE -TWO DIGIT INTEGERS 
THERE MUST BE 1 LESS BAND THAN THERE hti'£ RaTES
2.9.5 Output from the Model
A final screen of information is displayed which allows 
the user to determine the form that the output is to 
take. After specifying the files containing the raw data 
and the tax policy to be modelled, the user is asked to 
state whether the income of husbands and wives should be 
taxed separately or jointly (or whether separate taxation 
should occur only in those cases where the couple can 
reduce their tax burden by opting for separate taxation). 
The user is asked whether tax allowances are to be 
granted at the higher rates of tax. The user may also 
specify a tolerance level which indicates the amount of 
income gains and losses which are significant in the 
production of the output tables. If the tolerance level 
is five pounds, for example, then the output tables will
1ST BAND ■*==> 14600 
2ND BAND 2600
3RD BAND 4600
4TH BAND ===> 7100 
5TH BAND 7100
6TH BAND 6000
7TH BAND «==> C 
8TH BAND *---=> 0
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show the number of people facing tax increases/decreases 
of more
Figure 2.19 Computer Screen Image produced by the PIT 
model showing menu to alter investment income surcharge
ENTER/VERIFY PARAMETERS BELOW
NON-AGED I AGED
EXEMPTION LIMIT — «> 0 I EXEMPTION LIMIT *-==> G
NO. OF RATES BBS) 1
1
1 NO. OF fATES rrssct) 1
RATES BANDS
1
1
1
RATES
1ST b b b ) 15 sas) 0 1 1ST
I
i b b ) 15 BB = ) 0
2ND BBB) 0 Ran) 0 1 2ND ««c) 0 esc) G
3RD ■ ■a) 0 Ban) 0 1 3RD 
1
BBU) 0 e = e> 0
4TH b b c ) 0 b b b ) 0 1 4TH 
1
BBc) 0 » « ) C
5TH 0 1 5TH b b c ) 0
Figure 2.20 Computer Screen Image produced by the 
Personal Income Tax model showing options for reduced 
rate tax bands
ENTER/VERIFY PARAMETERS BELOW
HUSBANDS AND SINGLES 
NO. OF R.aTES *==> G . <0-3) 1 NO.
EARNING WIVES 
OF RATES «=a> 0
RATES BANDS RATES BANDS
1ST "*=> 0 bbb) 0 1 1ST AIIItII 0 bbb) 0
2NO a**) 0 bbb) © 1 2ND BBC) 0 bbb) 0
3RD »ss) 0 bbb> 0 1 3RD Itnit 0 bbb) 0
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than five pounds per week, and the numbers of people 
facing tax changes of more than five pounds per week. 
The user may select the ranges of annual income
incorporated into the existing model. The user may also 
select output tables broken down into aged/non-aged,
single/married, totals for all tax units (or all of
these).
Figure 2.21 Computer Screen Image produced by the
Personal Income Tax model showing options for the tax 
treatment of couples
Ul'FEC ELECTION - ENFORCEMENT =»=> B <B,E,N)
{B--WHENEVER BENEFICIAL, E=ELECTION, N=NON-ELECTION)
DO YOU REQUIRE THE HIGHER RATE RELIEF FACILITY -■«*> y <Y OR N>
.FORMAT 1: TOLERANCE »” > 5 NON STANDARD INCOME RANGES «»«> N
FORMAT 5: BREAKDOWN — > * <T,A,M,S: TOTAL ONLY, NUN-AGED/ASED/TOTAL.
SINGLE/MARRIED/TOTAL, COMPLETE STATUS ANALYSIS) 
SECURITY HEAOING — ■> 1 (1-5)
HEADING (YOU MAY ENTER UP TO 60 CHARS)
The table in figure 2.22 shows a typical output table 
from the model showing the numbers paying more or less 
tax according to their income level and whether their 
income gain/loss was more than the tolerance level of 
five pounds. As is typical of the Personal Income Tax 
model the emphasis is on the total amount of tax raised 
and the number of tax-payers in each income band. There 
is no attempt to show the output so as to assess the 
output in terms of how it will affect different types of 
family. The model does not output the average weekly 
income of different family types, or by the average 
income gain or loss - which would be the easiest way to 
assess such facts.
2.9.6 General Merits and Problems
The main disadvantage of PIT is the exclusion of people
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below the tax threshold. As the majority of the
recipients of state benefits are below the tax threshold, 
this means that the SPI can never be used for the 
analysis of benefit policy. However it would be 
extremely useful to take advantage of the wealth of 
information in the SPI about upper income groups. The 
SPI's one in three sample of incomes over 55,000 pounds 
per year could provide data on upper incomes which is 
very scant in the FES. The ideal data set would be one 
based on the FES but with adjustments so that the
distribution of upper incomes was made to resemble the 
income distribution in the SPI. Though there are dangers 
in using two data sets in this way, it should be possible 
to control for certain variables to make it more likely 
that the results based on one data set can be made 
applicable to another. The fact that the SPI is now 
provided as a public user tape should make it easier for 
this type of research to be undertaken. In its current 
implementation the PIT model is very fast and user- 
friendly. However, it suffers from the same defect as 
all the other friendly menu-driven systems that if the 
user wishes to simulate a policy which was not thought of 
by the designers of the program then it simply cannot be 
done. The other main drawback of the model is its
exclusion of low income groups. Because it is based on 
tax records it automatically excludes people below the 
tax threshold. This means that of a possible twenty- 
seven million tax units (counting husbands and wives as 
one unit) only 20 million are included in the data base 
used by the model. Because all of these excluded cases 
of income are below the threshold it is impossible to 
model benefits with the PIT model - and no attempt has
been made to do so. For the purposes for which it was 
designed it is adequate - as it is usable by a large 
number of non-expert civil servants, and gives easily 
comprehensible answers about the revenue implications of 
changing the tax system.
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Figure 2.22 Output from the Personal Income Tax Model 
showing gainers and losers from a policy change by income 
groups
C A U I PAY1M4 L £S » TAX
O UT!IO C W IT H IN D C C ttA  SX o o t s io e
TOCXAAMCI TOLERANCE IN  TAX
<TOTAL)
t o l e r a n c e
< 230 0 AT7 24 4 A .T 34
2 3 0 0 2442 22 1 1 1 .T 4 31
4 3 0 0 4 30 3 4 .3 174
3 0 0 0 A TO l - 4 4 .4 144
3 3 0 0 T2A 4 4 1 . T 134
4000 1334 1 2 2 .3 262
7000 14 £4 3 1 2 2 .7 21 0
40 0 0 1333 3 1 2 2 .4 173
tOOO 1073 3 1 C 4 .2 131
to o oo 1407 A 1 1 4 .4 2^1
12000 1430 4 1 4 7 .4 263
13000 A 1 A 4 1 4 .2 263
200 0 0 23 4 4 2 4 .1 373
XKXX) 34 1 4 .3 169
< 3000 4 4 10 44 2 1 7 .1 171
3 0 0 0 ♦ 11433 32 1 1 0 7 .1 2 0 7
10000+ 4347 IT 4 1 3 .3 1 3 6 0
1 3 0 0 0 * 1104 1 3 1 .3 44 6
2 0 0 0 0 ♦ 212 3 3 3 .2 3c 2
M-L 14243 40 1 4 0 3 .0 3 J 2 4
CASES PAY1N 6 « 
WITHIN
t o l e r a n c e
13
32
1*
3
11
3
4
• A
4
2
3
A
A
1
*1
32
20
13
A
133
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2.10 POLICY STUDIES INSTITUTE MODEL
2.10.1 Objectives of the Model
The PSI model was developed as part of a program of 
research sponsored by the Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust 
to examine the implications of alternative systems for 
family income and housing support (Berthoud & Ermisch, 
1985). The model has been applied to the analysis of the 
proposed reforms of social security arising out of the 
Fowler Reviews.
2.10.2 Knowledge Base
The model incorporates equations to calculate the 
following taxes and benefits (with variants/alternatives 
to each):-
National Insurance Benefits 
Statutory Sick Pay 
National Insurance Contributions 
Child Benefit
Family Income Supplement/ Family Credit 
Income Tax
Supplementary Benefit/ Income Support 
Housing Benefit 
Free School Meals
The raw data about incomes and expenditures is taken from 
the 1980 FES. There is one major exclusion from the data 
used by the PSI model. Households and family units with 
a head over the pensionable age have been excluded 
(Berthoud, Ermisch, 1985). This meant that of the 
original 8,000 or so households only 5,145 were
incorporated in the model.
The raw data from the 1980 FES has been modified in a 
number of important ways. Inflation between 1980 and
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1984 has been simulated by using four different factors 
to represent increases in:-
(i) incomes;
(ii) rent and rates;
(iii) mortgage interest payments;
(iv) house prices.
The latest version of the model allows differential 
inflation, factors as a function of wage levels. The 
increase in unemployment between 1980 and 1984 was 
represented by separate weighting factors for those who 
had been unemployed for over a year (who were given a 
weighting to increase the factor threefold), and the 
short term unemployed (who were given a weighting of 1.5) 
(Berthoud, & Ermisch, 1985).
2.10.3 Programming Approach
The raw data from the FES is manipulated by a 
hierarchical data management package, Quantum. The data 
is stored in such a way that it is entirely feasible to 
undertake accurate simulations regardless of whether the 
unit of analysis is the household, the tax unit, or the 
individual. The data about individuals (or rather 
adults) is stored as complete and separable records - 
this data is then linked to the appropriate tax unit. 
These tax units are then linked up to the appropriate 
household unit. The distinction between the head of 
household and other household members is preserved. In 
cases where there are more than one family unit within 
the household the head of household's family is recorded 
within the household. This allows the head of 
household's benefit entitlements to be calculated on the 
basis of the "non-dependent" contributions of the other 
tax units (which is important in the modelling of such 
things as the non-dependants contributions towards rent).
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Figure 2.23 Example of Output from Policy Studies Model
FAMILY COMPOSITION
Cou Cou All Sin
All pie pie Lone uith gle
ALL uith 1 -2 3+ par no per
FAMILIES kids kids kids ent kids son
SGURCE AND AMOUNT Or INCOME UNDER NEU SCHEME
ALL FAMILIES 18343 7503 5220 1356 927 1083? 636?
Nunbers of fanilies
NI benefits or SSP 2869 909 575 2 0 2 132 I960 1191
16 % 12% 1 1% 15% 14% 13% 19%
Child benefit 7503 7503 5220 1356 927 - -
41% 100% 1 0 0% 1 0 0% 1 0 0% - -
FIS 554 554 209 150 196 - -
3% 71 4% 1 1% 2 1% - -
Housing benefit 2919 1630 782 371 473 1239 759
167. 2 2% 15% 27% 52% 12% 12%
Supplenentary benefit 2269 1129 411 2 77 441 1140 963
1 2% 15% 8% 2 0% 48% 11% 15%
Any Means test 2951 2091 899 479 714 1860 1324
28% 17% 35% 77% 17% 2 1%
Incone tax 15051 6235 4739 1047 450 8814 4674
82% 03% 91% 77% 48% 81% 73%
Average amounts
NI benefits + SSP 6. 43 5.90 5. 16 8. 04 6.93 6.33 6.36
Child benefit 5. 64 13. 79 10.73 23. 43 16. 87 - -
F. I. S. 0. 453 1. 120 0.502 1.635 3.768 - -
Housing benefit 2.06 ' 3. 0fl 1.77 4. 01 8.49 1.41 1.49
Supplenentary benefit 3.71 6.05 2. 65 11.50 17.21 2.09 2. 87
Incone tax ' 35. 39 41. 07 46. 04 41.62 12. 30 31.45 18. 68
Gainer fanilies 1437 904 325 177 402 533 385
8% 12% 6% 13% 43% 5% 6%
Loser fanilies 978 416 136 69 2 11 562 326
5% 6% 3% 5% 23% 5% 5%
Mean gain anong 0. 21 0. 54 0. 17 0. 68 2.46 -0 . 02 0. 08
fanilies
2.10.4 User Interface Issues
When the Policy Studies Institute model was designed it 
was not intended to be a model for general distribution. 
Understandably the interface is not suitable for non­
expert users. The Quantum analysis package has, in 
effect, its own programming language. Users have to 
familiarise themselves with this language in order to be 
able to modify the program; they would also have to be 
very familiar with the program itself.
There is no interactive mode for the program. It
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operates in batch mode. A complete run of simulations 
and tables takes four hours to execute on the Policy 
Studies Institute mini-computer system.
2.10.5 Output from the Model
The features built into the Quantum Analysis Package 
allow a wide range of user-friendly output to be 
produced. The tables produced by the model are well 
labelled. One distinctive feature of the tables is that 
the categories on a table need not be mutually exclusive. 
It would thus be possible to have a table which included 
the category "single pensioner householders", who would 
in turn be included in a larger category of "single 
householders". Several different output parameters and 
alternative analyses can all be summarised clearly on one 
page, as is shown in figure 2.23.
2.10.6 General Merits and Problems
The main problem of the Policy Studies Institute model is 
one it shares with the LSE TAXMOD program - namely that 
it excludes a large proportion of the population (though 
while TAXMOD excludes tax units where the head is a 
pensioner or unemployed, the PSI model only excludes 
those where the head is a pensioner). Because of the 
exclusion of pensioner tax units the model is therefore 
better at predicting the effect of policy changes on 
specific types of household than it is at forecasting the 
Exchequer costs of a policy.
The programming is not particularly user-friendly. 
However, the output tables are very clear, and there are 
numerous options for output. Many different tax-benefit 
systems can be tested on the same run, which makes it 
easier to compare different policies.
The way that the data have been set up means that it is 
possible to analyse relationships between household
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members more effectively than with any of the other 
models. For example, with the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies Model, it is not possible to distinguish between 
a head of household and adult non-dependants in the same 
home. (The IFS Model is based on tax units, which can, 
if necessary, be linked together to re-construct the 
original households. However there is then no way to 
discern which of the various heads of tax unit is the 
head of household). The method adopted by the Policy 
Studies Institute allows the head of the household to be 
identified - as well as preserving the identity of all 
the family units within the household. This feature of 
the model means that there are a number of policies which 
it simulates more accurately than any of the other 
models. A recent change to the benefit system has 
concerned the levels of rent which it is assumed that 
non-dependent adults contribute to the household. The 
effect of this kind of policy clearly cannot be modelled 
unless the non-dependants can be identified. Similarly 
the income gains and losses which will be caused by the 
replacement of local rates by the community charge cannot 
be adequately modelled unless the head of household can 
be clearly distinguished from other members. Without 
this facility Housing Benefit cannot be accurately 
modelled where there are several unrelated adults in the 
household. These advantages all flow from the way the 
cases have been arranged within the data set, and from 
the hierarchical nature of the data file structure.
2.11 The IGOTM Model
2.11.1 Objectives of the Model
IGOTM is an acronym for the Inter-GOvernmental working 
group on Tax Modelling. This group is chaired by 
representatives of the Treasury and includes civil 
servants from the Inland Revenue, the Customs and Excise,
107
2. EXISTING TAX-BENEFIT MODELS
the Department of Health and Social Security, the 
Department of Employment and the Central Statistical 
Office. The objective has been to produce a broad model 
covering indirect taxes as well as direct taxes and 
benefits, which can be used by a wide range of officials 
from different departments. There was also a need to 
assess policies more accurately than is possible with the 
aid of hypothetical families. The IGOTM model produces 
tables based on nearly all of the households within the 
FES and is thus potentially a very representative model.
One of the reasons for the development of IGOTM was that 
the only other model capable of simulating both the tax 
and benefit systems was the DHSS's Policy Simulation 
Model (PSM) which is discussed below in section 2.12. 
The Inland Revenue's Personal Income Tax Model excludes 
low incomes, and therefore cannot simulate the benefit 
system. This meant that departments other than the DHSS 
were required to submit their policy proposals to the 
DHSS which would undertake the research on their behalf. 
This process was becoming unacceptably slow to the other 
departments and it was impractical for ministries 
other then the DHSS to use the PSM themselves, because 
the PSM has to be used by technical programming staff who 
have a thorough knowledge of it. Therefore one of the 
main objectives of the IGOTM model was to provide a 
program simple enough to be used by a wide range of civil 
servants from various departments.
2.11.2 Domain Knowledge
The knowledge incorporated in the model includes data 
about the tax and benefit system. There are routines 
which simulate Child Benefit, One Parent Benefit, Family 
Income Supplement, Housing Benefit, Supplementary 
Benefit, Income Tax (including optional transferable 
allowances and lower rate bands), National Insurance 
Contributions, and some of the Fowler Benefit proposals
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(including Income Support and Family Credit).
The model includes a broad brush treatment of indirect 
taxes, though this is an area where further development 
work is planned. The raw data for the IGOTM model is 
taken from the FES. In 1984 this covered 7081 
households; of these a small number have been excluded. 
Specifically the exclusions were:-
34 households containing a married adult whose spouse is 
absent;
16 households containing a foster child;
and 11 households containing more than 5 children.
Therefore over 99% of the households from the Family 
Expenditure Survey are included in the model. This means 
that IGOTM has the fullest coverage of the FES of any of 
the models which use it.
2.11.3 Programming Approach
The model is written in FORTRAN77. However, the source 
code was not available for the purposes of undertaking 
the current review so it is not possible to comment in 
detail on the equations which describe the tax-benefit 
system.
However, it is possible to comment on the method of 
storing the data from the FES. The storage has been done 
in a very sophisticated and effective way. The array of 
variables from the FES has been altered so that instead 
of reading into the computer's memory the information 
about an entire household, it reads in the data about an 
entire variable. Thus the data does not consist of 
information stored case by case but rather variable by 
variable. The array has thus been turned on its side, 
which gives rise to the term "inverted" or "transposed" 
matrix. By storing the data in this form it is possible
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to save storage space by summarising the data about a 
particular variable. The CSO estimate that this process 
reduces the requisite disk storage space by 60-65 %. To 
illustrate how this reduction in storage space is 
achieved take the example of an income variable where the 
first 22 values are:
0 0 0 0 0 0 89.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0 0 122.10 0 0 .
One could store the information as:
0 x 6 ,  89.92, 0 x 12, 122.1, 0 x 2 .
It is possible to avoid recording long sequences of the 
same value by storing them as a "run mark". This 
consists of a number representing a sequence of values 
(i.e. a run marker), a number representing how many.times 
a value is repeated, and a third number showing the value 
itself. In this way storage space can be dramatically 
reduced. The IGOTM model demonstrated at the Central 
Statistical Office on a Sperry main frame was able to 
produce tables almost instantaneously, even when they 
were based on an entire year of FES data. The variables 
first had to be read into a "work-file". The time 
required to read the data into the workfile can be up to 
fifteen minutes (depending on the number of variables 
required and the number of the other users on the same 
computer system). The program which accesses the 
variables from the transposed matrix is called the 
"Tabulator", an in-house package within the Central 
Statistical Office, which was originally written in the 
late 1970s by Geoff Stevenson.
The IGOTM model itself has been written as part of the 
Tabulator, and cannot be run independently of it. To 
summarise, the most distinctive feature of knowledge
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representation within the IGOTM model is the transposed 
matrix concept which allows for such large savings of 
storage space and execution speed.
2.11.4 User Interface Issues
IGOTM's interface takes the user through a series of 
questions about the tax-benefit system. The questions 
are arranged in sections according to types of benefit 
and tax. When the model is first invoked the first 
question asked is "Do you wish to call National Insurance 
Contributions?" (which gives the user the opportunity to 
answer the 12 questions about National Insurance 
Contributions). If the user responds by typing "Y", the 
series of questions in figure 2.24 is asked.
Figure 2.24 Computer Screen Image produced by IGOTM 
showing questions about National Insurance Contributions
Ln ! t  r I n  g N a t i o n a l  I m u n n c t  t o n l f  U a t l o n  m o d u l i  
b o  y ou  w i t h  ( o change  CLASS 1 c o n t r i b u t i o n  s t r u c t u r e ?
>Y
Uo you  w i s h  t o  c h ange  t h c  l o w e r  end u p p e r  e a r n i n g s  l i m i t ?
>11
bo  y ou  w i t h  t o  c h e n x * t h e  n u mh e r  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n  r e t e t o r  t h e i r  c u t  o f f  p o i n t i ?  
>11
bo  y ou  w i s h  t o  c h a n * e t h e  c o n t r a c t e d  I n  r a t e s ?
>11
bo you  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  c o n t r a c t e d  o u t  r e b a t e ?
>n
bo you  w i s h  t o  change  t h e  r e d u c e d  r a t e  f o r  m a r r i e d  women?
>11
u o y ou  w | » h  t o c h an g e  any !1!C p a r a m e t e r s  f o r  s e l f - e m p l o y m e n t  I n c o me ?
If the user types in "N" (indicating that National 
Insurance questions should not be asked) then the program 
will skip on to questions about Child Benefit, Family 
Income Supplement, Housing Benefit, Supplementary 
Benefit, and Income Tax (see figure 2.25).
This part of the interface is friendly enough. However 
when the user wants to extract information through the
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tabulator then a less understandable series of prompts is 
shown. The tabulator has a set of command names such as 
2FR (for a frequency distribution), 2BR (for a breakdown 
of average values), and 2XT (for a two-way frequency 
table).
Figure 2.25 Questions posed by IGOTM model
E n t e r i n g  C h i l d  b e n e f i t  m o d u l e
Do y ou  w i s h  t o  a l t e r  Cl i  ? C u r r e n t  l e v e l  *  £ 7 , 1 0  p e r  we e k  
>Y
E n t e r  new b e n e f i t  i n  £ p e r  week  
>10,0
Do y ou  w i s h  t o  a f t e r  UP0 ? C u r r e n t  l e v e l  *  £ - 4 . 0 0 / w e e k  
>Y
E n t e r  new one p a r e n t  b e n e f i t  i n  £ p e r  w e e k  
>b . U
Vo  y ou  w i s h  t o  t nodef  f u r t h e r  v e r s i o n s  o f  c h i l d  b e n e f i t ?
>H
Do y o u  w i s h  t o  c a l l  F a m i l y  I n c o me  S u p p l e m e n t ?
> Y
E n t e r i n g  F . I . S .  m o d u l e
Do y ou  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  i n c o me  l i m i t s ?
>N
Do y o u  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  max i mum a m o u n t s  p a y a b l e ?
>N
Do y ou  w i s h  to* c h a n g e  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  r a t e ?
->rt
Do you  w i s h  t o  ino de I . f  u r t h e r v e r s i o n s  o f  f a m i l y  i n c o m e  s u p p l e m e n t  
>H
E n t e r i n g  h o u s i n g  b e n e f i t  m o d u l e  V-
Do y ou  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  any  p a r a m e t e r s ?
>Y
Dp y ou  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  nee ds  a l l o w a n c e s ?
>N
Do y ou  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  e a r n i n g s  d i s r e g a r d s ?
>H
Do y o u  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  s t a r t i n g  r a t e ?
>U
Do you  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  p e n s i p n e r  w i t h d r a w a l  r a t e ?
>N
Do y o u  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  n o n - p e n s  l o n e r  w i t h d r a w a l  r a t e ?
. >n #
‘ Do y ou  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  n on * - d e p e n d a n  t d e d u c t i o n  ( r e n t ) ?
• >11
Do y o u  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  n o n - d e p e n d a n t  d e d u c t i o n  ( r a t e ) ?
>»<
E n t e r i n g  S u p p l e m e n t a r y  b e n e f i t  ( p a r t  1)
Uo y o u  w i s h  t o  c h a n g e  any p a r a m e t e r s ?
> Y
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2.11.5 Output from the Model
The output available from the model is dependent on the 
capabilities of the C.S.O. Tabulator, rather than IGOTM. 
IGOTM has calculation routines, so any output tables are 
a feature of the tabulator rather than IGOTM itself. The 
statistics available through the tabulator include 
frequency tables, cross-tabulations, breakdowns, 
breakdowns and cross-tabulations by quantile groups, gini 
co-efficients, and the regression of two variables. At 
the time this review was undertaken an expanded version 
of the tabulator was being developed which would display 
full variable labels. An example of the output from 
IGOTM is produced below in figure 2.26.
2.11.6 General Merits and Problems
The IGOTM model can be used relatively easily by non­
expert staff. The interface which requires the user to 
input changes to the tax-benefit system is user-friendly 
(however as is the case with all such menu systems, there 
is no way of modelling major changes to the tax-benefit 
system not represented by the menus without altering the 
program itself). However the tabulator commands
Figure 2.26 Output table produced by IGOTM Model
E n t e r  t h e  v a l u e  and i t s  l a b e l  In a f o r m a t  o f  I 2 , A 6 0
> 0 1 , SI NGLE NON-PENSIONERS
> 0 2 , MARRIED COUPLES
>03 ,LONE PARENTS
> 0 4 TPENS!ONERS
FREQUENCY D I S T R I B U T I O N  OF T A X - U N I T  TYPE
Code DHSSTU C o u n t P e r c e n t Cumsum CUM %
SINGLE NON-PENSIONERS 28 83 3 2 . 1 4 2883 3 2 . 1 4
MARRIED COUPLES 3 7 7 9 4 2 . 1 2 6662 7 4 .  26
LONE PARENTS 3 60 4 . 0 1 7022 7 8 . 2 7
PENS I ONERS 1 9 4 9 2 1 . 73 8971 1 0 0 . 0 0
T o t a l 8971 1 0 0 . 0 0 8971 1 0 0 . 0 0
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take slightly longer to learn. The output mechanisms 
could not be considered easily comprehensible. They are 
however extremely fast. Speed of execution is one of the 
great merits of IGOTM.
The main disadvantage of IGOTM is its lack of 
portability. It cannot be used independently of the 
tabulator program, (which is itself not available outside 
the CSO). The output from the program makes it difficult 
to compare one tax-benefit system with another (though 
changes in net income between two systems can be stored). 
This problem is handled much better by the IFS model 
which is based on the comparison of one type of system 
with another (generally the existing system is compared 
to some proposed reform).
2.12 DHSS POLICY SIMULATION MODEL
2.12.1 Objectives of the Model
The main objective of the DHSS Policy Simulation Model 
(PSM) was to provide a way of analysing tax-benefit 
policy in a more sophisticated way than was possible with 
an analysis of hypothetical families. Policy-makers 
needed to know statistics such as the overall number of 
gainers and losers from a particular policy change. It 
was, of course, possible for the DHSS to produce such 
statistics by using the FES in conjunction with a 
statistical analysis package such as SPSS (which is still 
used by the DHSS for tax-benefit modelling). The 
advantage of producing an integrated tax-benefit model is 
that a number of different tax-benefit policies can be 
analysed using the same model. The first version of PSM 
was written in 1978 by Nick Morris who was then working 
in the Economic Advisers Office of the DHSS. Nick Morris 
later moved to the IFS. The PSM was used extensively for 
research connected with the Fowler Social Security
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Reviews, and has also been used to simulate some of the 
effects of the proposals in the Green Paper on Personal 
Taxation - though the main thrust of the PSM is to
simulate the social security system rather than the tax 
system.
2.12.2 Domain Knowledge
The PSM operates using a database which includes nearly
all the cases from the FES. Of the 7,081 households from
the 1984 FES only 200 were rejected. The reasons for
rejecting a household were as follows:-
(i) that it had more than three tax units (77 cases);
(ii) that it has a young dependent adult (84 cases);
(iii) that there was a husband or wife who was not 
present in the household;
(iv) that it had a child as the head of the tax unit (12 
cases).
As with most of the models based on survey data the 
computer files are held in a simple rectangularised 
(rather than hierarchical format). All the main features 
of the tax and benefit system are incorporated in the 
model. The Income Support rules are described in 
considerable detail within the model - reflecting the 
DHSS's specific policy concerns.
2.12.3 Programming Approach
The model is a collection of 5 different programs each of 
which is concerned with different stages of processing 
the FES data, validating it, and applying tax-benefit 
policies to the resulting data. Of the five programs in 
the suite, four are written in Algol-68R. The command 
module which provides the only user-friendly features of 
the PSM is written in FORTRAN. The variable names in 
Algol are anything but self-explanatory and it is 
necessary to refer back frequently to a set of coding
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notes in order to interpret a particular tax-benefit 
formula.
The method of calculating results within the PSM is 
relatively simple. Unlike TAXMOD and the IFS model,
Figure 2.27 Computer Screen Image produced by the DHSS 
Policy Simulation Model showing commands for using the 
model
PLEASE TYPE : -
A TO I  \)P l'T  A nEw ^ I l E  
B TO UPDATE AN EX I  ST I.mG F I l E  
C TO AMEND Am OLD F I l £  TO A n£w  F I l £  
Q TO .TERM INATE THE PROGRAM r u:\.
p l e a s e  i n p u t  f i l e - t y p e  c o d e
DO YOU w is h  TO SEE a  L IS T  OF F I l E -T Y P E S ?  
f iL E  TYPES
1 n A I n ( n a t io n a l  in s u r a n c e  -  p u s t
2 F IS Y (F A M IL Y  INCOME SUPPLEM ENT)
3 c h i b (C H IL D  B E N E F IT )
& RENT (REBATE)
5 RATE ( REBATE)
6 M IL K (F R tE  WEL~ARE M Il K)
7 MEAl (FREE SCHOOL MEAl S)
a TAXY (INCOME TAX)
9 NTAX (TRANSFER TA X)
10 GECB (G ENERALISED C ^ I l D B E N E F IT )
PROPORTION r e n t  ALLOWED i n  H . B FORMULA (P E N S )?#
PRB <.MMMM>
REDUCTION TAPER USED I F  I n C > h G U S In G NEEDS A l l Ow 
PRC <. m m m m )
in c r e a s e  t a p e r  u s e d  i f  h o u s in g  n e e d s  a l l o w  > i n c
D IS R h <n n . m m m >
EARn I n GS DISREGARD : HEAD OF h / h Ol D?
D IS R S  (NN.MMM)
EARN IN G S DISREGARD * SPOUSE?
DSB <n m .MMM>
B E N E F IT  DEDUCTION FOR PERSON On  S3?
OPENS <NN. MMM>
B E N E F IT  DEDUCTIO N FOR A PEN SIO N ER ?
D 18 2 0  <w v. mptm)
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there is no correction for response bias within the PSM 
so to some extent there will be an under-representation 
of upper income groups and some family types in its 
calculations. The model incorporates certain internal 
DHSS data on the take-up of benefits. The model is 
"calibrated" by comparing its predictions of the 
Exchequer cost of certain benefits to the actual data on 
benefit costs. This is an excellent way of testing the 
accuracy of the model because it makes use of data on 
benefit costs which is collected separately from the FES. 
However as there is no correction for response bias 
within the model, this method may have unforeseen 
consequences. For example, if the model predicted that 
the Exchequer cost of Family Income Supplement was higher 
than the administrative data suggests, this may either be 
because the data on take-up rates is faulty or because 
there is a higher proportion of families with children in 
the FES than there is in the population.
2.12.4 User Interface Issues
Of the five programs which make up the PSM four are 
mainly concerned with file manipulation. If the user had 
to grapple with these programs on their own, the PSM 
would be extremely difficult to use. Fortunately there 
has been an attempt to provide a more readily usable 
interface which prompts the user to key in the names of 
appropriate files and make other responses in the correct 
sequence. A sample of the type of prompt displayed by the 
command module is shown in figure 2.27.
Though there is some terminology which is specific to the 
PSM, this command module makes it moderately user- 
friendly. The user may select a verbose interface in 
which a self-explanatory prompt is displayed such as: 
"Housing Needs Allowance for a Single Adult?" If the 
user does not select the verbose mode a cryptic variable 
label is shown such as "WEA" (Wife's Earned Income
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Allowance). While these prompts are not quite as good as 
those of the Personal Income Tax model - they are better 
than those of the IFS model (which prompt with variable 
names only and not with an English Language description). 
The PSM is still not as user-friendly as the IGOTM model 
which does not require the user to learn the PSM's 
complex file manipulation commands.
2.12.5 Output from the Model
The tables produced by the PSM have extremely obscure 
value labels. For example one is meant to refer to a 
legend on a table to translate "[197]=1" into "single 
person, non pensioner head working". Some of the tables 
seem to be labelled entirely with Algol array 
descriptions. For example the table showing the receipt 
of benefits by family type is labelled entirely by code 
numbers and no legend was produced to show which number 
corresponded to housing benefit, FIS, etc. One of the 
more intelligible tables is produced in figure 2.28 which 
shows total income support by ranges of annual gross 
income.
2.12.6 General Merits and Problems
The PSM meets its main objectives, in that it provides a 
way of analysing the FES to show statistics such as the 
overall number of gainers and losers, changes in the 
total amount of income support, and the average amounts 
of benefits received. The PSM incorporates over 97% of 
the households from the FES, so it has a very high 
coverage of the real world population.
On the debit side however, the structure of the program 
must make it very difficult for newcomers to update and 
alter the PSM. The Algol program lines are full of array 
descriptions like "[193]=2", which are less likely to be 
understood than mnemonic variable labels like "CHBEN" 
(which is IGOTM's variable name for Child Benefit). This
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must make it more difficult to re-program the PSM to 
incorporate new taxes and benefits. It also increases 
the risk that errors will go undetected within the 
program. The failure to try to correct for response bias 
within the PSM is a significant drawback.
The "verbose" prompts given by the command module help to 
make the PSM moderately user-friendly. However, if the 
user wishes to model a completely new policy it would be 
necessary to grapple with the extremely user-hostile 
Algol source code. Any program like the PSM which has to 
be used and modified by a number of different people, 
should be based on a programming approach which is as
Figure 2.28 Sample of the output from the PSM
TA&m_A7I On 1 I FREOUtNCV TODlE PART 1 OF 1
TIS IN Z PER WEEK. CO.S ARE rouo uf annual GROSS iNCOf.c
. 0-3 3-5 5-7.3 7.5-10 10-15 15-20 20* TuTAl
•»»•*.•*«»*« —**—**. •«»»••»»*< ♦***.*•*.**•
0  372*1 • 346 icia 1606 10: i 666 131 86 4864
0375-2 •» 16 22 131 326 397 144 eG 1123
C1375-3 * 3 6 96 221 906 790 573 2595
0975-4 * 10 54 246 £21 1149 502 330 2? 12
0973*5 * 0 3 70 288 1280 832 579 3053
0  973-6 • 0 32 109 90 61 3 10 304
0573)0 * 374 i:36 2259 2557 4453 2403 1664 14851
0363*1 i::a 214 74 45 35 3 ' 6 24v6
0963-2 * 266 186 125 74 77 22 35 784
11563-3 32 40 115 106 86 19 29 435
0363-4 * 502 123 64 3 19 0 13 730
0523=5 * 56 32 54 54 32 3 6 240
0962=6 * 602 106 51 3 16 0 C 764
ose:- >0 * 3564 714 463 265 266 48 90 546?
0993 = 1 • 255? 630 346 128 102 £4 19 4066
0  555 = 2 - 6 1200 576 275 224 103 66 2477
0353 >>:> * 2595 2036 922 403 326 173 106 6563
0902 = : * 554. 326 70 54 42 16 6 1069
0902*2 2255 1694 1104 675 640 307 193 7078
Z1503=2 * 157 134 102 54 54 19 0 5 22
0903=4 • 0 32 109 90 61 3 10 304
0902=5 • 605 63 46 3 16 0 0 755
£1903*6 - 10 64 346 950 2445 1328 899 6042
0902 = 7 • 544 1 18 55 10 22 0 16 746
O903-S - 353 1043 1789 1370 1718 947 714 7939
0903-9 * 2067 152 61 36 51 3 16 2429
£13)0 • 6.547 3666 3664 3245 5050 2624 Id'? 26877
TOTAL » 26208 15552 14656 12979 20198 10496 7437 107526
NOTE
£i973*nQn PENSIONERS m£AD WORKING 
Cl96i-NQN PENSIONER m£M) nOT WORKING
1 SInGlS
2  C C u P l E  N O  C n I l D R E n  W I P E  N O T  W O R K I N G
z c o u p u e  n o  c h i l d r e n  w i f e  w o r k i n g  
4 C 3u * u £  W I T -  C h i l d r e n  w i f e  n o t  w o r k i n g
3  C O u P l E  w ; T m  C - I w D R E n  w i f e  w o r k i n g  £ WOnE parent
£i993-P£nSI0nER3. I SINGLE. 2 COUPES 
C1903- Dh SS Cl ie nt GROUP
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simple and self-explanatory as possible. The complexity 
of the PSM must make it very expensive to use in terms of 
staff time. This is doubtless what has given rise to the 
development of IGOTM so that there would be a more usable 
facility which could be employed by a number of different 
departments.
2.13 Conclusion
Have any of the eleven models described above achieved an 
effective combination of usability and flexibility? This 
combination is crucial if a model is to succeed as a 
pluralist model. A pluralist model must be sufficiently 
easy to understand that it can be used by a layman, 
without restricted the user to a narrow range of 
predetermined policy options selected by the model- 
builder.
In general those models which are most accessible to non­
experts are those which feature a well designed menu 
system. Ideally such menu systems display an English 
language question on the screen and invite the user to 
type in the answer at the computer keyboard. For 
example, the IGOTM model displays the question:- "Do you 
wish to change CB [Child Benefit]? Current Level = 7.10 
pounds per week." Of the eleven models described above, 
TRAP and the PSI model have no interface of this type. 
To use these models the user would have to edit the 
source code, in the case of TRAP, or a file of Quantum 
commands in the case of the PSI model. The Alvey DHSS 
Demonstrator has no standard template of questions - the 
user is invited to build up a question from a series of 
standard terms. The quality of the menu systems varies 
greatly in the other eight models. The IFS model and 
the DHSS Policy Simulation Model have menu prompts which 
are based on variable names rather than English language 
terms - as such they are more difficult to use than the 
menu systems in other six models (DHSS Tax-Benefit Model,
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CUBS, TAXEXP, TAXMOD, Inland Revenue PIT, and IGOTM). Of 
the six menu systems with good English prompts, the 
usability varies according to how easy it is to move the 
cursor around the menus to change specific parameters. 
Ideally the user should not have to type in a long series 
of answers in order to change a single policy parameter. 
The user should be able to move forwards and backwards 
easily to find and alter a constant. The DHSS Tax- 
Benefit Model, CUBS, and IGOTM have rather rigid menu 
systems, because the user works through a standard series 
of questions, a process which can be annoyingly slow. 
TAXEXP and TAXMOD have menu systems which are very easy 
to use as their menu systems make it very easy to move to 
different sections of the interface to alter different 
parameters. TAXMOD also has the widest selection of 
output tables.
Though it is important to recognise the enormous amount 
of work which has been done in order to improve and 
extend these menu systems, it should still be stressed 
policies which they cannot simulate. Here are a 
selection of policies which all these menu systems would 
exclude: the Tory Reform Group's Tax Credit plans (Tory 
Reform Group, 1979); the SDP's 1988 proposal for the 
reform of National Insurance Contributions (SDP, 1988); 
Micheal Meacher's idea to replace mortgage interest tax 
relief with a regionally varied housing allowance (The 
Times, 1985a); and the tax credit scheme set out in the 
Liberal document "... To Each According" (Vince, 1983). 
Not one of the existing menu systems would allow the user 
to simulate any of these policies. (Here the discussion 
is confined to the models in their compiled object code 
form. Clearly any of these policies could be simulated 
by altering a model's source code, which would in effect 
create a new program.) No matter how hard tax-benefit 
modellers try to create detailed menu systems, pressure 
groups and political parties will always manage to devise
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policies these menus cannot simulate. The only way of
providing this kind of flexibility would be to allow the 
user access to source code of the model. This would mean 
that the user would in effect "re-program" part of the 
model in order to simulate the new policy.
However, it should be possible to achieve this without 
writing an entirely new model. The section of the source 
code the user would have to deal with would be limited to 
those program equations which defined the tax benefit
system. There are many other parts of the program which 
would not need to be altered. These standard routines
would include the procedures for making tables,
correcting for response bias and non-take up of benefits. 
However even if the user only had to alter the tax- 
benefit definition statements this would still pose 
serious problems. If a new user was to try to alter the 
source code of one of the existing models (even in a 
limited part of the program) this could not be done 
without an enormous investment of time and energy. A 
whole vocabulary of variable names would have to be
learned. To alter the program without doing so would be
to invite serious errors. The only alternative would be 
to define the tax-benefit statements in such a way that 
they were comprehensible both to a computer and to a 
human being. This would require a new language. The 
construction of such a new language is one of the aims of 
the current thesis.
This could not be the English language as it is spoken
naturally. It is not currently possible for a computer
system to interpret human language as it is used in 
everyday situations (such as in conversation). The new 
language would have to be restricted in certain ways. It 
would have to be free from many of the ambiguties and 
inexactitudes of English. However it should be possible 
to develop a hybrid between English and the existing
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computer languages which would be understandable to the 
layman. It would then be possible for a non-expert to 
use a set of tax-benefit equations and alter them 
relatively safely because the users would understand what 
they were altering. This would provide an effective 
combination of usability and flexibility. A computer 
language has been developed for this thesis which 
attempts to achieve this combination. It is described 
below in section three of this thesis. Only this 
approach can allow the full power of computer technology 
to be devolved from the expert to the generalist policy 
maker. If the user is only given access to programs 
which answer specific pre-determined questions, then 
power resides in the hand of the people who ask the 
predetermined questions. Tax-benefit models which only 
simulate specified policy options are an apt illustration 
of the concept of the mobilisation of bias. "Some issues 
are organised into politics and other issues are 
organised out" (Schattschneider, 1960:34). The menu 
questions in a tax-benefit model organise some policies 
into consideration, and organise other policies out. In 
a pluralist society, it should be a wide range of parties 
and pressure groups which decide which tax-benefit 
policies are to be considered, not a small group of 
experts.
The existing tax-benefit models also constrain the user's 
options in other ways. All of the models shown above 
allow the user to analyse a policy by producing one or 
more standard tables. A typical table would show the 
effects of a policy change by showing the average 
increase/decrease in income for a set of different family 
types (e.g. single parent, single childless, couple etc). 
These assumptions about the way the data are analysed 
contain their own subtle biasses. This issue is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.
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Some of those who work in the field of tax-benefit 
modelling, argue that the business of carrying out policy 
simulations is so serious and difficult that non-experts 
should only be allowed to use the compiled version of a 
tax-benefit program. This type of attitude highlights 
some of the basic philosophical questions about the role 
of computers in society. Will they cause the formation 
of yet another elite in society, an elite dominated by 
computer specialists, or will they contribute to the 
dispersal of power by opening new opportunities to the 
common man? This thesis attempts to answer the question 
of whether it is possible to create a computer system 
which will make tax-benefit modelling accurate, flexible, 
and above all accessible to ordinary people. The answer 
to this question, has wider implications about how 
computers will shape the future of our society.
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3.1 Introduction
The task of creating a tax-benefit model which will be 
flexible and accessible to non-experts not only concerns 
the options which can be fed into a tax-benefit model. 
It also concerns the way answers come out of the model. 
If a model only allows the user to analyse a policy 
according to some criteria but not others then there is 
theoretically a "mobilisation of bias" within the model. 
There are various different theories about what makes for 
a good tax-benefit system. For example, all of the 
models based on sample surveys produce some form of table 
which indicates changes in net income before and after a 
policy change. Not all of them show the proportion of 
people on different marginal tax rates.
To include one type of table but not the other shows a 
greater interest in the impact of policy on incomes than 
in its effect on incentives. Generally speaking those on 
the political right tend to be more concerned with the 
possible impact of tax rates on incentives than those on 
the political left. An optimum tax-benefit model should 
be neutral between such preferences. It should not 
constrain the user to analyse policy according to any 
particular set of ideological prejudices. Thus the model 
builder should not constrain the user by limiting the 
output to a single set of standard tables. Users should 
be able to analyse policies according to their own 
criteria.
No matter how politically neutral the model builder tries 
to be, any set of tables will tend to exclude methods of 
analysing policy which will be important to certain 
users. For example, a user like Age Concern might wish 
to limit the analysis of a policy to people of 
pensionable age. The Low Pay Unit might wish to show the 
increase/decrease in net incomes according to ranges of 
earnings per hour. This would be impossible with any of
125
3. PRINCIPLES OF TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
the existing models. In the discussion below the Alvey 
DHSS Demonstrator will not be included as it is not 
intended to produce quantitative answers and is therefore 
in a different category to the other models.
In order to indicate the different criteria by which tax- 
benefit models should be measured this chapter examines a 
number of abstract principles which may be used as 
yardsticks by which to judge tax-benefit policy. Any 
selection of such principles must inevitably be 
subjective. These principles have been drawn from a 
number of famous writers on political economy. It is not 
claimed that this list of principles is exhaustive or 
exclusive. It is intended to be a useful summary which 
highlights the range and diversity of such principles. 
It will be seen that some of the existing tax-benefit 
models allow policies to be analysed according to these 
criteria while other do not. In chapter six an optimum 
system is examined which allows the user far greater 
flexibility in the analysis of policy. The range and 
diversity of tax-benefit principles shown below makes it 
clear how important it is to provide this diversity.
3.2 The Proportionality Principle
The proportionality principle was the first of Adam 
Smith's four great principles of taxation. In 1776 he 
wrote that citizens "ought to contribute ... in 
proportion to their respective abilities." (Smith, 1776: 
Vol.V, Sec.2, Para.3) This idea is distinct from the 
concept of progressive taxes (which take a higher 
proportion from people with greater ability to 
contribute) and from regressive taxes (which take a 
higher proportion from those less able to pay). If the 
proportionality principle were to be achieved through 
direct taxation, an income tax with no allowances and a 
single percentage rate on all tax-payers would be its 
best illustration. In the field of indirect taxation the
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proportionality principle could best be achieved by a tax 
levied at the same rate on all goods with no special 
exemptions for food and basic necessities, and with no 
higher rates of tax on luxury goods. Because so much of 
the taxation of the 18th century was regressive, such as 
import duties on food, the principle of proportionality 
was often supported by those on the political left. 
Since Adam Smith's day the field of fiscal battle has 
moved and the political right often argue for 
proportional taxes (as an alternative to progressive 
taxes).
To measure how far a tax-benefit policy conforms to the 
proportionality principle it is necessary for a model to 
be able to assess both marginal and average tax rates. 
To illustrate the difference between these tax rates 
consider the following hypothetical worker. The worker 
earns 20,000 pounds per annum, and has no tax allowances. 
He or she pays 25 per cent on the first 10,000 pounds of 
income and 75 per cent on income between 10,000 and 
20,000 pounds. The worker pays 10,000 pounds in tax out 
of his 20,000 pound income. Therefore his average rate 
of tax is 50 per cent, while the rate of tax paid on the 
next pound of income is 75 per cent - the marginal rate. 
The average rate is calculated by taking the total value 
of any transfers from the state (taxes paid or benefits 
received) and dividing this figure by the tax unit's 
original income (income derived from sources other than 
state benefits). Thus the average tax rate will be a 
negative percentage if the individual receives more in 
benefits than is paid in taxes.
Of the existing models, the DHSS Tax-Benefit model, CUBS, 
TAXMOD, TAXEXP, and the IFS model produce tables which 
show how far a tax-benefit system conformed to the 
proportionality principle. The graph produced by TAXEXP 
which plots net income against gross income gives a vivid
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illustration of changes in average tax rates as one moves 
up the income scale. None of the existing model show 
original income and net income in a form which would make 
it easy to calculate average tax rates.
3.3 The Egalitarian Principle
The egalitarian principle is based on the view that an 
equal distribution of resources is a desirable goal for 
society. Therefore the tax-benefit system should be used 
to promote the most equal spread of income and wealth 
which is practically possible. This view is partly based 
on the belief that people are created equal, and that 
this natural equality should not be undermined by the 
luck of inheritance and divisive social institutions 
which produce differences in income and wealth. Thus 
taxes which take progressively more money from people the 
richer they are, and benefits which raise the net income 
of the poorest, are good because they help "narrow the 
space between valley and peak" in society (Tawney, 
1931:108). The French Utopian socialist Saint-Simon 
argued that the state should transfer resources "from 
each according to his abilities, to each according to his 
needs" (cit. Wilczynski, 1981:506) an aphorism which was 
later attributed to Marx.
Some supporters of the equality principle argue that all 
wealth is based on resources such as land and minerals 
which were not created by individuals, and should 
therefore belong to the community as a whole. This was a 
crucial argument behind George's concept of land value 
taxation (George, 1879).
It has also been argued that an unequal distribution of 
resources is wrong because private wealth is maintained 
by conditions which are created by the community as a 
whole.
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No individual can create by his isolated 
action a healthy environment, or establish an 
educational system with a wide range of 
facilities, or organise an industry in such a 
way as to diminish economic insecurity ... Yet 
these are all conditions which make the 
difference between happiness and misery ... In 
so far as they exist, they are the source of a 
social income, received in the form, not of 
money, but of increased wellbeing. (Tawney, 
1931:127)
There is an important distinction between those favouring 
equality of opportunity, and equality of outcome. While 
writers like Mill (1848) supported the use of inheritance 
taxes to promote equality of opportunity, they opposed 
deliberate measures to limit the acquisition of resources 
during the individual's lifetime. On the other hand 
Tawney, for example, would have had no hesitation in
using fiscal devices in promoting a greater equality of 
outcomes.
If one is trying to assess the extent to which a tax- 
benefit system promotes equality it is necessary to
measure the number of people at different levels of net
income. Thus the models which are based on hypothetical 
cases (the DHSS Tax-Benefit Model, CUBS, and TAXEXP) 
could not be used for this. TRAP produces tables which 
are mainly concerned with incentive effects, which would 
not be very easy to interpret in order to assess the
impact of a policy on equality. The Inland Revenue 
Personal Income Tax Model would not be very useful either 
because it excludes people with incomes below the income 
tax threshold which is roughly a fifth of all tax units. 
TAXMOD, the IFS model, the PSI model, IGOTM, and the DHSS 
Policy Simulation Model all produce tables which help to 
assess the number of people at different income levels.
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IGOTM is frequently used to produce tables showing 
average incomes and the number of people in each decile 
level of income. TAXMOD also produces a table which is 
specifically intended to give a profile of a society's 
income distribution. This shows the total amount of 
income below each decile level of income (which is form 
of Lorenz curve).
3.4 The Protection of Property rights
The protection of property rights can lead to policies 
which are the opposite of egalitarian policies. Friedman 
has proposed a direct negative to the maxim "To each 
according to his needs". According to Friedman the state 
should secure a distribution of resources "to each 
according to what he and the instruments he owns 
produces" (Friedman, 1962:161). But if all wealth is 
ultimately based on resources to be found in nature, how 
can one justify the ownership of wealth which people have 
not created themselves? The 17th century philosopher, 
Locke (1690) justified private wealth holding with the 
following argument:-
Though the earth ... be common to all men, yet 
every man has a property in his own person: 
this nobody has a right to but himself. The 
labour of his body, and the work of his hands 
are properly his. Whatsoever he removes out 
of the state that nature has provided, and 
left it in, he hath mixed his labour with and 
joined to it something which is his own, and 
thereby make it his property....
(2nd Treatise, Para 27)
God gave the world to men in common, but since 
he gave it to them for their benefit... it 
cannot be supposed that he meant it should, 
always remain common and uncultivated.
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(2nd Treatise, Para 34)
While this argument may justify the holding of wealth 
acquired during one's own lifetime, it does not follow 
that the labour of a father to create wealth, justifies 
the transfer of the same wealth by his son. In 
Friedman's view, however, there is little practical 
difference between inequalities which are caused by 
inheritance and those due to skills which people display 
in their own lifetime. Is there any real difference 
between someone who is bequeathed a million pounds and 
someone who earns the same amount because his parents 
have passed on to him a beautiful singing voice which 
enables him to earn it? Many writers would disagree with 
such statements on the grounds that many individuals 
display abilities which can only partially be explained 
by inheritance (Jencks, 1972). Luck also plays its part.
None of the existing tax-benefit models allows the user 
to examine the distribution of wealth as well as the 
distribution of income. The data source most commonly 
used for tax-benefit modelling, the FES, records the 
amount of income received from various forms of 
investment which would make it possible to estimate the 
value of the assets which yield this income. The FES 
information on payments for house purchase and rateable 
values would make it possible to estimate wealth held in 
the form of housing. In theory it would be possible tp 
devise a tax-benefit model which would show the 
distribution of wealth and estimate the effect on this 
distribution of different fiscal policies. This would 
make it possible to estimate the effects of such policies 
as the taxation of wealth, and various types of tax on 
gifts and legacies.
3.5 The Prevention of Poverty
There is a sharp contrast between the policies advocated
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by those who would promote greater equality, and those 
who believe that the state's primary role is to protect 
property rights. In between these two extremes stands a 
body of opinion which holds that the state should not 
necessarily promote equality, but should undertake to 
provide a safety net so that all people have at least 
enough resources for basic subsistence. Preventing 
poverty may be concerned solely with redistributing 
resources to the poor, not necessarily with taking money 
from the rich.
Reformers like Beveridge would have been entirely 
satisfied with an unequal distribution of resources 
provided that enough money was raised from general 
taxation and insurance contributions to prevent poverty. 
Indeed the financing of Beveridge's National Insurance 
system did not even adhere to the proportionality 
principle; it was funded by a regressive system of flat 
rate contributions.
Linked to the prevention of poverty is the concept that 
poverty can be measured objectively. One of the most 
famous attempts to do this was made by Rowntree who 
attempted to measure what
"income is required by families of different 
sizes to provide the minimum food, clothing, 
and shelter needful for the maintenance of 
merely physical health... Expenditure needful 
for the maintenance of the mental, moral, and 
social sides of human nature would not be 
taken into account at this stage of the 
enquiry."
(Rowntree, 1902:87)
Later Beveridge argued that the state should "fix rates 
of ... benefit and pension on a scientific basis with
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regard to subsistence needs" (Beveridge, 1943:29). Other 
writers have disputed that poverty should be measured in 
this way. For example, Townsend has argued that people 
are in poverty if they are excluded from social and 
cultural activities which may be regarded as normal for a 
given society (Townsend, 1979). Such a method would 
start to take account of the "mental, moral, and social" 
aspects which Rowntree referred to above.
Probably the most graphic way to demonstrate how 
effective a tax-benefit system is in preventing poverty 
would be to show how many families are above and below 
the official poverty line. The Income Support level for 
each family could be calculated and the tax-benefit model 
could then show the percentage by which each family
exceeded or fell short of this level. The Supplementary 
Benefit level would be a useful yardstick to use because 
it is intended to be an estimate of how much a given 
family needs to live. Whether the current levels of
Income Support are fair or accurate is inevitably a 
matter of debate, they have the virtue of being 
officially recognised and widely known. None of the 
existing models allow the user to produce tables in
relation to income support levels.
3.6 Maintenance of Incentives
The requirement to maintain work incentives, which
requires low tax rates, is often claimed to be in 
conflict with the concept of vertical equity in the tax 
system. Vertical equity is concerned with the relative 
fairness of the tax burden on people at different income 
levels (in almost all cases the debate over vertical 
equity centres on how progressive the tax system should 
be).
For as long as there have been calls to introduce 
progressive taxation, it has been argued that applying
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higher rates of taxation to people who earn more would 
reduce work effort. John Stuart Mill wrote
To tax the larger incomes at a higher 
percentage than the smaller, is to lay a tax 
on industry and economy; to impose a penalty 
on people for having worked harder and saved 
more than their neighbours... Its [the 
state's] impartiality between competitors 
would consist in endeavouring that they should 
all start fair, not in hanging a weight on the 
swift to diminish the distance between them 
and the slow. (Mill, 1848:811).
While Mill strongly supported the progressive taxation of 
legacies, in order to promote greater equality of 
opportunity, he had no interest in equality of outcome, 
and opposed the progressive taxation of income.
Tables showing marginal tax rates are produced by all 
three of the models based on hypothetical cases: TAXEXP, 
CUBS, and the DHSS Tax Benefit Model. In contrast not 
all of the models based on sample surveys have been 
designed to show marginal tax rates clearly. The 
Personal Income Tax model does not show marginal tax 
rates. The PSI model, the DHSS Policy Simulation Model, 
and IGOTM are not used to show marginal tax rates. 
TAXMOD and the IFS model produce output tables which show 
marginal tax rates very clearly.
The CUBS model and TRAP go further than this by allowing 
the user to simulate the effect of theories about labour 
supply. Thus the user could predict that for a given 
change in tax rates, an individual would change his or 
her hours of work by a certain amount. It is argued in 
chapter five, that while such theories are useful, they 
should be used cautiously. Ideally models should display
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indicators of how well such theories have been 
empirically justified - such as the proportion of the 
variance of work hours, which has been explained by a 
given model in a regression.
3.7 Administrative Efficiency
Adam Smith stated that certainty was an essential 
property of a good tax. "The time, manner, and amount of 
payment ought to be clear to the contributor... Every tax 
ought to be levied at the time or in the manner, in which 
it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to 
pay" (Smith, 1776: Vol.V, - Sec.2, Para. 5). In the early 
Roman empire, taxation was collected by private citizens 
for profit (which was derived by extorting money from the 
tax-payer over and above the tax due to the state). This 
element of unpredictability was diminished as taxes came 
to be collected by salaried civil servants. In modern 
times there has also been a move away from large lump sum 
payments towards taxes which are collected regularly in 
small amounts. Thus property taxes and poll taxes have 
declined in importance as income and sales taxes have 
produced increasing proportions of government revenue. 
General taxes on consumption, which people pay in small 
amounts as they shop, and income taxes, which are 
deducted from the wage packet automatically, have become 
more significant. Though deduction at source arouses 
little protest from tax-payers at large (and particularly 
low income tax-payers who are often faced with difficult 
budgeting problems by lump sum payments), it has been the 
focus of some political criticism because it makes the 
tax burden less perceptible and so may distort electoral 
choices between political parties which favour more or 
less public spending. "Public authorities should be 
accountable to their electorates for what they spend and 
for the revenue they raise. ... electors need to be aware 
of decisions about expenditure and revenue and the 
effects of those decisions on the level of ... taxes that
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they pay" (DOE, 1981:6).
Adam Smith also stated that taxation ought "to take out 
of ... the pockets of the people as little as possible 
over and above what it brings into the public treasury" 
(Smith, 1776: Vol.V, Sec.2, Para.6). This concept might 
be termed "administrative efficiency". The efficiency of 
a tax can be measured in terms of the cost of collecting
a tax as a proportion of the total amount of money raised
by that tax. For example, the Meade Committee estimated 
that the administrative cost of income tax was equal to 
0.55% of tax collected in the U.S.A. in 1974, and was 
1.75% in the U.K. in 1974-75 (IFS, 1978:485).
A similar concept is to be found in the distribution of
benefits. The administrative efficiency of various 
benefits can be assessed by calculating the cost of 
paying them out as a proportion of the total public 
spending on the benefit concerned. The Meade Committee 
produced estimates of the administrative efficiency of 
several benefits based on the year 1971-72 (IFS, 1978) :
Family Allowances 3.5 %
Supplementary Benefit 10.8 %
Family Income Supplement 9.0 %
Rent Rebates 5.2 %
Rent Allowances 11.1 %
Rate Rebates 15.4 %
In theory administrative efficiency could be demonstrated 
by computer models, if the information about the costs of 
administering existing taxes and benefits was included in 
its knowledge based. This would allow changes in 
administrative costs to be measured in line with changes 
in policy. For example, if the rate of Child Benefit was 
to be doubled without changing the rules of entitlement
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or the number of beneficiaries it would be reasonable to 
assume that the administrative costs would be reduced by 
half as a proportion of benefits paid. The data could be 
used to calculate the administrative cost per claimant. 
Thus if a policy increased the number of claimants the 
model would predict a proportionate increase in absolute 
(rather than proportionate) administrative costs. Of 
course measuring the changes in administrative costs 
should ideally be more complex than this. In theory they 
should take into account the economies and diseconomies 
of scale, for example.
3.8 Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity is concerned with giving the same 
treatment to people with similar circumstances. To 
illustrate this concept take the example of two single 
people with no dependants and incomes of 6,000 pounds per 
annum. One of them derives the entire income from 
working as an employee; the other receives it as interest 
from investments. The employee will pay 25% in income 
tax on his or her taxable income, and a further 9% in 
National Insurance contributions on the entire amount. 
The person living on investments will pay the same income 
tax, but will escape the National Insurance 
contributions. It is true that the person living on 
investment income is not entitled to National Insurance 
Benefits but these are not markedly superior to the 
Income Support benefits which are available to those who 
have paid no National Insurance Contributions. In some 
cases National Insurance Benefits are even worth less 
than equivalent non-contributory benefits. If the person 
earning 6,000 pounds were to become unemployed he or she 
would be entitled to an Unemployment Benefit of 32.75 
pounds per week (1988 rates). However if the person with 
the 6,000 pound investment income were to lose his 
savings he or she would be entitled to 33.40 pounds per 
week in Income Support (1988 rate for over 25 year olds).
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It could thus be argued that this breaks the principle of 
horizontal equity because people in similar circumstances 
are being treated differently.
Problems of horizontal equity are also raised by the 
social welfare system. Just as there are taxes which 
overlap in their treatment of different forms of income 
and wealth, there are benefits which overlap and even 
benefit systems which overlap. The different systems 
include the benefits paid in cash through the social 
security system, the benefits paid in the form of 
allowances of tax-free income before Income Tax is paid, 
and benefits organised through the work-place such as 
occupational pensions. In 1958 Richard Titmuss 
declared:-
Considered as a whole, all collective 
interventions to meet certain needs of the 
individual... may now be broadly grouped into 
three categories of welfare: social welfare,
fiscal welfare, and occupational welfare. 
(Titmuss, 1958:42).
In general, the social welfare system covers benefits 
distributed by the state. The fiscal welfare system 
refers to tax relief like personal tax allowances and 
mortgage interest tax relief. The occupational welfare 
system refers to benefits provided by companies such as 
occupational pensions and sick pay schemes. The 
conflicting effects of the different systems can cause 
major injustices. A single person with no employment may 
receive 30.65 pounds per week in support through 
Unemployment Benefit (1985-86). However some one working 
ten hours per week and earning 15 pounds (who is not a 
parent or a householder) would not be entitled to any 
state benefit. Such a part time worker would be outside
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the social welfare system, would probably not be in a job 
with occupational benefits, and would be ignored by the 
fiscal welfare system because he or she is below the tax 
threshold. One could thus argue that this is a case of 
horizontal inequity.
None of the existing models illustrate tax-benefit 
policies so as to illustrate how far they conform to the 
principle of horizontal equity. Theoretically it would 
be possible to do so by comparing people with similar 
gross incomes and family circumstances, and showing where 
the tax-benefit system produced significant differences 
in net income.
3.9 Influencing Behaviour
Taxes and benefits have frequently been used in an
attempt to influence people to behave in ways which 
accord with government policy. Governments sometimes 
claim that they are using the tax-benefit system to 
encourage "socially desirable" behaviour. For example, 
taxes on tobacco have often been justified on the grounds 
that they discourage smoking. Whether the intended 
behaviour is, in fact, desirable, is a matter of
judgement. The definition of socially desirable 
behaviour changes from place to place, and over time. In 
the Soviet Union the tax-benefit system is used to try to 
increase the birth rate in Siberia and the European
republics (Keesings, 1981:33472). In 1935, Hitler 
introduced a universal child benefit payable in respect 
of the fifth and subsequent children "in order to 
encourage an increase in the number of births" (Kaim-
Caudle, 1973:272) (probably for military reasons). In Red 
China, tax benefit policy aims to reduce the birth rate. 
(Family Allowance is only payable in respect of the first 
child, and on the birth of the second child the pay of 
the father is reduced by 15% until the child reaches the 
age of seven) (Keesings, 1979:32509).
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Influencing behaviour was the primary stated 
consideration in the Thatcher government's choice of a 
Poll Tax to replace rates. There was a concern to ensure 
that "a substantial proportion of electors have a direct 
financial interest in the decisions of their authority” 
(DOE, 1986:21). The Thatcher government had had several 
disputes with local councils over their level of 
spending. Rather than limit local spending by central 
government diktat, it was argued that if more local 
government electors suffered adverse consequences due to 
higher spending then fewer high-spending councils would 
be elected in the first place. Under the domestic rating 
system there are roughly 36 million people who are 
potential electors, while only roughly 20 million pay 
rates. Under the proposed system nearly all voters would 
be poll tax payers. Thus the government's Green Paper 
proposed that 100% of any increased spending by an 
authority would be financed from the Poll Tax (DOE, 
1986:35).
The only way of allowing a policy maker to predict the 
behavioural responses to a policy, would be to give the 
user of a model the option to simulate changes in 
behaviour. Such simulations would have to be based on 
theories derived from previous research into behavioural 
responses. TRAP and the CUBS model have used such labour 
supply theories to predict labour supply responses to 
policy. Model builders must be careful to avoid giving 
their programs a bias towards any set of theories. In 
order to avoid this the user should be required to make 
an explicit choice to include a given theory in a policy 
simulation. In the absence of such a choice the model 
should assume that there are no behavioural responses. 
As mentioned above, the model should also display 
information indicating the "goodness of fit" which the 
original theory achieved.
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3.10 Conclusion
These principles of tax-benefit policy may often be in 
conflict with each other. The desire to promote equality 
may have adverse consequences for work incentives and the 
protection of property rights. The prevention of poverty 
may conflict with a government's desire to link taxation 
and voting, as in the case of the current debate over the 
poll tax. A tax which is equitable may not be 
administratively efficient. Tax-benefit policy-makers 
have to balance different ideologies and administrative 
requirements.
There are doubtless other policy objectives which could 
be promoted by tax-benefit policy which have not been
discussed in this chapter. An advocate of pure
capitalism might argue that fiscal policy should do as 
little as possible to distort the operation of the 
market. An environmentalist might argue that tax-benefit 
policy should discourage pollution and the consumption of 
finite resources. A socialist might urge that fiscal 
policy should favour workers' co-operatives and publicly 
owned industries. It is not necessary to favour any one 
of these views. It is necessary to give enough latitude 
in the design of a tax-benefit model so that the user can 
simulate a wide range of policies, and assess their 
effects in the most flexible way possible. To impose a 
narrow range of output tables unavoidably imposes a set 
of ideological assumptions on the potential user. 
Therefore a special model has been developed for this
thesis, the Policy Option Model, which does not limit the
user to a narrow set of output tables.
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4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, tax benefit policy was discussed 
in terms of abstract principles. However it should be 
stressed that tax-benefit policies are never carried out 
in an atmosphere of rarefied altruism. Practical 
considerations and baser motives play their part. In 
public, politicians will justify a tax-benefit reform in 
terms of moral principles. In private, the appeasement 
of political factions are often more important. This 
dichotomy of public and private motives has given rise to 
the aphorism "Laws are like sausages. Your confidence in 
them is not enhanced by an intimate knowledge of how they 
are made" (Origin Unknown).
It is a safe bet that whenever a politician proposes a 
radical change to the tax-benefit system there will be 
influential pressure groups opposed to it. Like the 
vipers which gathered around the crib of the infant 
Hercules, a brood of vested interests spring up, intent 
on strangling the idea at birth.
Any major reform is likely to cause a redistribution of 
resources between different income groups. The political 
party and pressure groups representing the losers in this 
redistribution can be expected to oppose it. Britain's 
highly partisan press often takes a hostile position. 
More subtly civil servants opposed to radical change per 
se, may try to undermine the policy by masterly 
inactivity (Hurd, 1979). There should be little wonder 
that tax-benefit reforms have such a high infant 
mortality rate!
The tax-benefit model-builder should not be totally 
innocent of the more pragmatic considerations of policy. 
The model should be able to show the gainers and losers 
from a policy clearly - and according to a number of 
different criteria. For example, in considering whether
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to abolish Mortgage Tax Relief it would be useful to see 
the average gains and losses not only by income groups 
but also by tenure groups. Four case studies of tax- 
benefit policy are given below. They have been chosen 
because they give a detailed picture of the ideological 
and pragmatic influences which led to certain major 
changes in the tax-benefit system. In nearly every case,
the policy started as a relatively simple idea which
gradually became more complicated and had serious 
repercussions for other policies. Thus the
implementation of sickness and unemployment benefits 
caused National Insurance contributions to be introduced, 
and the 1979 tax cuts caused a sharp increase in VAT. It 
is instructive to note the relative contributions that
principles and politics made in each case. Tax-benefit
models clearly need to be designed with both factors in 
mind.
In each case there is a discussion of contribution a tax- 
benefit model could have made. In the case of the 1911 
reforms and the Beveridge Plan, these discussions are 
somewhat fanciful because the relevant computer 
technology did not exist (if one discounts the early main 
frame computers which existed in the 1940s). However the 
possible contribution which computers could have made is 
still useful in assessing the features which should 
ideally be built into a future tax-benefit model.
4.2 The 1911 National Insurance Act
In 1911 there was great public awareness of the extent of 
poverty in Britain. Evidence like Rowntree's (1902) 
study of poverty in York and the Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws (1909) had pricked the 
national conscience. A change in benefit policy was 
because of the inadequacy of the Poor Law, which was so 
despised by the working classes that many preferred to go 
without any help whatsoever than resort to it.
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Applicants for Poor Law relief were often forced to live 
in work-houses where residents had to conform to a daily 
routine similar to that of a penal institution. Indeed, 
the work-houses were sometimes called "Poor Law 
Bastilles". Even when people were paid in cash and were 
not compelled to live in the work-house, the payments 
were "practically never adequate to the requirements of 
healthy subsistence" (Webb, 1909: 38). This concern was
felt, not only by humanitarians who cared for the 
wellbeing of the individual, but also by nationalists who 
felt that Britain's industrial and military supremacy 
depended on a healthy and growing population. Lloyd 
George played on these sentiments in advocating social 
insurance when he said - "when a man is below par neither 
the quantity nor the quality of his work is very good" 
(Grigg, 1978: 328).
There were also more subtle motives for social reform. 
In the Edwardian era the Labour Party was beginning to 
flex its electoral muscles, and to pose a threat to the 
Liberals. Some Liberal politicians supported the adoption 
of social insurance as a deliberate device to halt the 
advance of socialism, and to meet working class demands 
through reform rather than revolution (Gilbert, 
1966:247). Very similar motives had led to the setting up 
of the first system of social insurance in Germany in 
1889, by Otto von Bismarck (whose other achievements show 
little of the altruism embodied by his scheme of social 
insurance) (MacManners, 1977:336).
However, the main protagonist for social insurance, Lloyd 
George, was a genuine radical - having offended the 
Establishment through his "People's Budget" and earlier 
by his opposition to the Boer War. The 1908 Old Age 
Pensions Act had provided small pensions for those over 
the age of 70, but there was still no adequate provision 
for people who suffered a loss of earnings due to
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sickness or unemployment (other than relief through the 
hated Poor Law). The challenge of social insurance was 
to tackle these problems without offending the basic 
values of the age. These values included a belief in the 
Victorian ideal of self-help, and a deep distrust of 
hand-outs which might make people dependent on the state.
The simplest way would have been to have provided a 
national system of cash benefits, financed out of general 
taxation. The old age pensions introduced three years 
before had been based on this approach. Pensions funded 
by the national Treasury had also been introduced in 
Denmark (1892), New Zealand (1898), and Australia (1900) 
(Kaim-Caudle, 1972). To have financed the benefits by 
increasing the rates of direct taxation would have been a 
radically egalitarian measure. Most of the beneficiaries 
of sickness and unemployment benefits would have been 
people with below average incomes (and thus under the 
income tax threshold) , while the people financing the 
scheme would have had incomes above the average. Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb argued strongly that the relief of 
poverty should be financed out of general taxation.
However this conflicted with the concept of self-help, 
and the Poor Law had given direct public assistance an 
extremely bad name. Ramsay MacDonald opposed the Webbs' 
position, saying that a system financed out of general 
taxation would be state charity "of the most vicious 
kind" (Grigg, 1978: 331). (His use of the word "vicious" 
is illustrative of working class hatred for any reform 
proposal which resembled an extension of the Poor Law). 
Moreover the introduction of state pensions in 1908 had 
given Lloyd George first hand experience of the problems 
of non-contributory benefits. "The need to refuse 
desirable improvements in the pensions bill, due to the 
financial constraint, convinced him that more effective 
future legislation would need the other sources of
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finance available to a national insurance scheme" (Thane, 
1978:104).
Lloyd George circumvented the objections to "state 
charity" by proposing to finance his scheme, partly
through a system of compulsory insurance contributions to 
be paid by the working classes themselves. Direct 
taxation of people with incomes below the average was
unknown in 1911, so these contributions were a major 
departure from existing fiscal policy. A further 
justification for these contributions was the logic of 
levying a separate charge specifically on those
categories of people who were entitled to receive the 
benefits. Part I of the Act provided coverage for 
sickness benefit and access to a doctor for 15 million 
people, while part II of the Act provided Unemployment 
Benefit for people in industries prone to cyclical 
unemployment. However from the outset there were major 
departures from the insurance principle. The benefits 
were not to be financed fully by contributions from the 
beneficiaries. Each working man was to pay 4d, his 
employer was to pay 3d, and the state was to pay 2d -
Lloyd George's famous "Ninepence for Fourpence" formula. 
The insurance basis of the scheme should be seen more as 
a political accommodation of the ideal of self-help 
rather than as enthusiasm for strict insurance 
principles.
The extent to which the scheme was to be a truly national 
system of insurance was further undermined by 
considerations of practical politics. The National 
Insurance scheme posed a serious threat to the voluntary 
Friendly Societies, which provided similar benefits, and, 
more importantly, to the Industrial Insurance companies. 
The Industrial Insurance companies formed a pressure 
group of enormous power - opposing Lloyd George's 
original scheme. The twelve main companies sold nearly
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ten million policies per annum, for a sum roughly equal 
to half the national budget (Grigg, 1978). Not only did 
the Friendly Societies and Insurance Companies have 
massive vested interests at stake but they also had 
roughly 70,000 collectors who made weekly visits to 
nearly every working class home in the country. It was 
assumed that any scheme which threatened the collectors' 
employment would raise up an army of canvassers opposed 
to the Liberal Party.
The pressure applied by the Insurance Companies had 
several important effects. The provision of a death 
benefit was immediately ruled out as this was one of the 
Insurance Companies' main products. Lloyd George also 
considered providing orphans' and widows' benefits 
through National Insurance, but these too were abandoned 
due to the opposition of the insurance companies. Lloyd 
George was also forced to allow the Friendly Societies 
and Insurance Companies to administer the scheme provided 
they fulfilled basic conditions and thus became "Approved 
Societies". People who refused to join one of these 
societies were required to pay their contributions 
through a local post office. In 1943, the Beveridge 
Report sharply criticised the role of these Approved 
Societies because it led to variations in the quality of 
administration and even in some cases in rates of benefit 
(Beveridge, 1943).
In comparison with the opposition of the Insurance 
Companies, the resistance of the Tory Party was virtually 
negligible. At the first reading of the bill, the scheme 
was complimented by MPs from all parties. Throughout the 
debate, the Conservatives confined themselves to attacks 
on the details of the scheme rather than the concept of 
National Insurance itself. They would probably have 
liked to prevent the Liberal Party from gaining any kudos 
from the introduction of social insurance, but they did
147
4. FOUR CASE STUDIES IN TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
not want to suffer the unpopularity of defeating the 
measure themselves. For the Labour Party, Ramsay 
MacDonald expressed doubts about the details of the 
scheme, such as the regressive nature of the 
contributions "Fourpence a week, taken from a man's 
income of 15/- is a very substantial part of that income" 
(Hansard, 6-12-1911). However, he stated his intention 
to vote for the scheme as a base upon which to build for 
the future.
How did the scheme measure up to the broad principles of 
tax-benefit policy? The measure certainly did little to 
equalise the distribution of income. The male 
contribution rate of 4d was clearly regressive. The only 
people exempt were those with incomes of 2 shillings or 
less. Most of the employers' contribution could be 
expected to be passed on to the consumer in increased 
prices. Only the two ninths of the contributions paid by 
the state could be expected to come from taxation of a 
proportionate or progressive kind. The flat rate 
contributions could hardly have had any adverse effect on 
incentives, except for the tiny number of people who 
faced an increase in tax by moving above the two shilling 
barrier.
The scheme did not provide horizontal equity in its 
treatment of the sexes. Men were entitled to a Sickness 
Benefit of 10/-, while women were to be paid 7/6, 
although they were only required to pay a proportionately 
lower contribution (3d rather than 4d). This 
discrimination was based on the view that women were less 
often the sole breadwinner within the household.
Though the scheme may have done little to advance the 
egalitarian principle, it did accord with the concept of 
preventing poverty. The scheme was primarily intended to 
make up for lost income, rather than to cure disease
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(though it gave the insured population access to general 
practitioners and tuberculosis clinics). It provided 
Sickness Benefits, and Maternity Allowances. It 
maintained the incomes of people facing short-term 
problems, and did not provide universal benefits which 
might have resulted in a more general redistribution to 
low income groups. Winston Churchill introduced the 
Unemployment Insurance part of the Act. This only 
affected 2.5 million workers, in industries where 
employment rates fluctuated regularly with the trade 
cycle. Because the scheme dealt with cyclical rather 
than long term unemployment it was genuinely expected 
that the contributions paid during years of high 
employment would build up a fund big enough to finance 
Unemployment Benefits in years of recession. The Act did 
not prevent poverty as effectively as a system of 
universal benefits would have done, but it did provide a 
means of providing help which was free of the stigma of 
the hated Poor Law. Though Churchill became interested 
in social welfare because of the example of Germany's 
national insurance scheme, the unemployment insurance 
system he created had no parallel in Germany or in any 
other country. Walley (1972:33) pointed out that 
Churchill pioneered "state unemployment insurance on the 
world stage".
The full impact of political considerations can be gauged 
from the fact that Lloyd George himself had no personal 
attachment to the insurance principle. Shortly after the 
introduction of the scheme Lloyd George wrote:-
Insurance [is] necessarily a temporary
expedient. At no distant date [sic] hope 
state will acknowledge full responsibility in 
matter of making provision for sickness,
breakdown, and unemployment. It really does 
so now through the Poor Law, but conditions
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under which this has ... worked so harsh and 
humiliating that working class pride revolts 
against accepting so degrading and doubtful a 
boon. (Braithwaite, 1957: 121-2).
Thus Lloyd George's ideal scheme, would have been based 
on a far simpler concept of nationally administered 
benefits, financed through general taxation. Instead, 
Britain ended up with a privately administered system, 
financed by a complex system of separate contributions 
which still exists in a modified form today.
Thus it is clear that the political process had a marked 
effect on the development of the National Insurance 
scheme. The abandonment of orphans, widows, and death 
benefits, was a major concession to vested interests. 
The administration of the scheme through the Approved 
Societies, can only be regarded as a direct bribe to a 
vested interest to circumvent opposition - similar to 
Aneurin Bevan's stuffing the medical profession's mouth 
with gold to bring in the National Health Service (Foot, 
1973). The Beveridge Report (1943: Appendix E) pointed
out the wasteful nature of private insurance for work 
injury benefits - "the employers have had to pay 100 
pounds for every 48 pounds paid in benefits".
Lloyd George should not be blamed for making these 
concessions; if he had not made them National Insurance 
would probably have stayed on the drawing board. However, 
the 1911 National Insurance Act should give salutory 
warnings about the political process.
How might a computer model of tax-benefit policy (had one 
existed at that time) have helped to shape the 1911 
National Insurance Act? Hopefully an optimum tax-benefit 
model would have indicated the high administrative costs 
inherent in distributing benefits through a number of
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separate approved societies. An analysis by one of the 
models based on sample surveys would probably have shown 
that a scheme funded from general taxation would have had 
a more equalising effect on the income distribution, than 
the contributory scheme actually adopted (because the 
employee contributions were flat rate and thus 
regressive).
The Beveridge Plan
William Beveridge once declared "the object of 
government, in peace or war, is not the glory of rulers 
or races, but the happiness of the common man" (Green, 
1982). With this sentiment in mind Beveridge set about 
the task of chairing a committee during the second world 
war to try to co-ordinate the various organs of 
government which dealt with welfare and social insurance. 
He operated in a climate of public opinion which was 
favourable to schemes of social reform. The war had led 
to greater social mixing between social classes, making 
poverty perceptible to people who had been oblivious to 
it before. Just as Lloyd George had declared at the end 
of the First World War that the state should build "homes 
fit for heroes", there was a feeling that post-war 
Britain should offer new hope rather than a return to the 
depression of the 1930s.
When Beveridge was asked to chair a committee on "Social 
Insurance and Allied Services", its terms of reference 
were narrow. It was expected that the committee would 
focus on such technical matters as the relative values of 
sickness and unemployment benefit, and the details of the 
workman's compensation scheme (Peden, 1985: 137).
Beveridge acted as though he had a far wider remit and 
set out to tackle several major problems. The Poor Law 
with its Dickensian work-houses, was increasingly 
anachronistic. During the 1930s many working class 
people had been forced to claim assistance from the Poor
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Law, when their entitlement to National Insurance 
benefits ran out, and had detested submitting themselves 
to the indignities of the means test. Family Allowances 
had been introduced in Germany and France in the interwar 
years, and there was a growing demand for them in
Britain. The administration of benefit by the Approved 
Societies had come under attack, and there were calls for 
the system to be run directly by the state.
The Beveridge Report embraced a number of important
concepts which are still reflected in Britain's tax- 
benefit system today. The most crucial decision was to 
maintain the contributory principle. The evidence the 
Committee received showed that there was widespread 
support for contributory benefits among the working 
population - particularly because of recent experiences 
of Poor Law means testing. Beveridge was adamant that a 
significant part of the funds should be "met from monies 
contributed by citizens as insured persons" (Beveridge, 
1943:273). However the logic of insurance depended on 
maintaining a real distinction between the treatment of 
the insured and the uninsured - "assistance must be felt 
to be something less desirable than insurance benefit; 
otherwise the insured persons get nothing for their 
contributions" (Walley, 1972: 74). But a major feature 
of the Beveridge Report was the abolition of the Poor 
Law. It proposed that the work-houses and the local 
authority administered benefits should all be swept away 
and replaced by a system of national assistance run by a 
central government department. Moreover the Report 
recommended that National Insurance benefits should be 
run by a central government department as well, which 
would thus replace the function of the approved
societies. As both National Assistance and National
Insurance were to be run by central government 
departments the only method of maintaining a meaningful 
distinction between them would be to set the rates of
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Insurance Benefits at a substantially higher level than 
National Assistance benefits. However from the outset, 
there was almost no distinction between the two. When 
both systems were set up under the Attlee government the 
weekly benefit for a single unemployed person was 26/- 
under National Insurance and 24/- under National 
Assistance. The rates as of November 1985 were 30.45 
pounds for unemployment benefit and 29.50 pounds for 
Supplementary Benefit (the successor to National 
Assistance). Walley (1972) has pointed out that 
Beveridge never expressed a logical procedure for setting 
the rates of National Assistance and National Insurance 
benefits differently. The concept of subsistence incomes 
was to guide the setting of both types of benefit. The 
token differentiation in benefit rates which this has 
caused raises the question of whether it makes sense to 
maintain the two separate benefit systems.
Beveridge also believed that "the state in organising 
security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, 
responsibility" (Beveridge, 1943:9). From Beveridge's 
point of view it was important to avoid benefits or 
contributions which left people little better off if they 
earned an extra pound of income. Thus National Insurance 
was organised "on the basis of each individual paying the 
same contribution for the same rate of benefit" 
(Beveridge, 1943:273). The flat rate contribution system 
meant that there was no extra percentage to add to the 
individual's marginal tax rate (as there is with the 
current National Insurance system which adds between 5% 
and 9% to the individual's rate). More importantly, flat 
rate benefits avoid the need for benefits which taper 
away as income rises which further add to the 
disincentive effect of taxation. Beveridge's original 
scheme would have drastically reduced the reliance on 
means-tested benefits because it proposed the abolition 
of the time limit for the receipt of National Insurance
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benefits:- "All the principal cash payments - for 
unemployment, disability, and retirement will continue so 
long as the need lasts" (Beveridge, 1943:20). Under the 
pre-Beveridge system National Insurance benefits were 
only payable for 26 weeks, after which the individual had 
to resort to the Poor Law.
What effect did the political process have on the 
Beveridge Plan? The impact of the Beveridge Report was 
certainly a surprise to the Coalition government. 
Beveridge, had been frustrated in his attempts to secure 
a worthwhile ministerial post. Many of his parliamentary 
colleagues considered him to be egotistical and difficult 
to work with - particularly because of his overt 
criticisms of the government. Offering him the 
chairmanship of the social insurance committee probably 
had as much to do with getting him out of the way, as it 
did with finding an appropriate use for his talents. 
When the Report was published Beveridge worked vigorously 
to publicise it. Beveridge seemed to give the impression 
to some of his colleagues that the war should stop while 
his plan was put into effect. He further annoyed Clement 
Attlee, the next Prime Minister, and Hugh Dalton, the 
future Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had both worked 
under him before the war "by treating them as though they 
were both junior lecturers and he still the Director of 
the LSE" (Burridge, 1985: 150). When the Beveridge
report was discussed in Cabinet the Labour Ministers in 
the Coalition government expressed support for its basic 
aims but did not insist that it should be introduced 
while the war was actually in progress. Attlee had to 
weather a backbench revolt over this stance. Labour 
backbenchers attacked the failure to implement the Report 
and called a debate on it. All but two of the Labour MPs 
not in the government voted against the government's 
decision not to act on the Report. This spurred the 
government to accept the plan in principle (Peden, 1985).
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The Conservative position was ambivalent. A majority of 
conservatives opposed the report initially, though 
Churchill's own attitude was sympathetic. When it was 
discussed in Cabinet Churchill was absent due to illness, 
which gave greater weight to critics of National 
Insurance like the Tory Chancellor Kingsley Wood. (By a 
great coincidence Kingsley Wood had been the chief 
lobbyist against the 1911 National Insurance Act, when he 
had been employed by the Industrial Insurance Combine). 
This initial failure to support the Beveridge Plan proved 
costly during the 1945 election. In 1943, Churchill made 
a famous broadcast in which he tried to associate the 
government more closely with it. He said in 1943 that he 
and his colleagues were "strong partisans of national 
compulsory insurance for all classes for all purposes 
from the cradle to the grave" (Burridge, 1985:149). By
1945, there was strong bipartisan support for the 
Beveridge Plan. Legislation for the introduction of 
Family Allowances was already under way when the
coalition broke up. In 1946 the National Insurance Act
was passed. It was a striking feature of public opinion 
in the 1940s that welfare reform was justified, not only 
in humanitarian terms, but also in the language of
patriotism and economics. (The same had been true in the 
years up to 1914). Attlee expressed this mood while 
speaking in a parliamentary debate on the National 
Insurance Bill :-
This and the National Health Service will stop 
the deterioration of the human capital of this 
country. So it is a true economy and addition 
to the national wealth in the long term. 
Experience has shown that unmerited misfortune 
is not a spur to effort. (Hansard, 2-7-1946)
This could not be more different from the intellectual
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climate of the 1970s when many influential commentators 
attacked welfare as a barrier to economic growth 
(Tyrrell, 1977). This post-war acceptance of welfare did 
much to explain the relatively easy passage of the Attlee 
government's welfare reforms. Even the 1947 National 
Assistance Act, which was designed to help the uninsured, 
was passed "with all-party concurrance, if not 
enthusiasm" (Foot, 1973: 103). As with the 1911 National 
Insurance Act, the debate focused on the details rather 
than on the basic principles of the Beveridge Plan.
One significant aspect of the Beveridge Plan was not 
implemented. In the debate on the National Insurance Act 
R.A. Butler had argued:-
This is really an impossible position. The 
government take the line that it is possible 
to ... extend the period of ... benefit ... 
which will pose an unknown cost on the
Exchequer. (Hansard, 2-11-1946).
These financial arguments won the day and the time limit 
was retained. This had a crucial effect on the future 
development of the post-Beveridge welfare state. Because 
the entitlement to National Insurance was only temporary, 
this meant that there would be greater reliance on
National Assistance. Beveridge had predicted that 
National Assistance would become a smaller and smaller 
scheme as the years progressed. The opposite has
occurred. Non-contributory benefits now support far more 
people under the retirement age, than do contributory 
benefits.
How consistent were the Beveridge reforms in terms of the 
principles of tax-benefit policy stated above? The
National Insurance Act was merely an extension of the 
system which had been created in 1911. The provision of
156
4. FOUR CASE STUDIES IN TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
more generous benefits might have redistributed more 
resources to low income groups. However this was 
balanced by the levying of regressive flat rate 
contributions. Public assistance was no longer to be a 
burden on the rates, a regressive local tax, and was 
henceforward to be funded by central taxation which was 
far more progressive. In that the benefits provided by 
the post-Beveridge welfare state were generous enough to 
meet subsistence needs, the reforms did much to prevent 
poverty. The principle of flat rate contributions meant 
that the Beveridge Plan did little to reduce incentives.
The payment of the contributions was not generally a 
cause for complaint - national insurance contributions 
were generally deducted from pay by the employer so the 
individual had little awareness of the tax. The 
administrative efficiency of the scheme depends on one's 
assessment of the desirability of maintaining separate 
benefit systems for the insured and uninsured population. 
By this time Australia and New Zealand had both developed 
welfare systems funded by general taxation, dispensing 
with the need for separate taxes and benefits for the 
insured and the uninsured. However Britain had the 
legacy of the 1911 Act and the Poor Law to contend with, 
so it is hardly surprising that Beveridge chose to adhere 
to the insurance principle. The insurance concept has 
awkward implications for horizontal equity. The 
insurance contributions are levied only on earned incomes 
which effectively means that those with unearned 
incomes face a lower rate of tax (particularly since the 
abolition of investment income surcharge). However, 
because non-contributory benefit rates are so similar to 
National Insurance Benefits, workers have little to show 
for the extra taxes they have to pay.
Thane (1982: 254) has commented that greatest advantages 
of Beveridge's work was the "rationalisation of social
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insurance and its universalisation, to the real advantage 
... of women and those of the lower middle classes who 
had previously been excluded from most social insurance 
benefits.11
What light does the Beveridge plan show on the process of 
making tax-benefit policy? Abstract principles of tax- 
benefit policy only seem to have played a small part. 
The impact of the welfare arrangements already in place 
was very significant, as it had been in 1911. The 
opprobrium surrounding the Poor Law and the Unemployment 
Assistance Board meant that a unified welfare scheme 
funded out of general taxation was not politically 
practicable. Lloyd George's 'temporary expedient' of 
National Insurance contributions had become an entrenched 
part of the system.
Speculating on the possible impact of computer models on 
the Beveridge Plan, must be done with the unfair benefit 
of hindsight. However, careful mathematical modelling at 
the time would certainly have had a beneficial effect on 
the determination of benefit rates. Attempting to fix 
the value of National Insurance and National Assistance 
benefits might have highlighted the inconsistency of 
keeping these schemes separate. Though when the two
schemes were set up there was a small differentiation in 
the rates of benefit (in favour of National Insurance), 
the distinction between the two sets of benefits is far 
from clear now. Currently the rate of National Insurance 
pension is 41.15 pounds (1988 rate). However if the 
individual above the retirement age has paid no
contributions and applies for Income Support (the current 
version of National Assistance) he or she will be
entitled to 44.05 pounds per week. So much for
Beveridge's plan that National Insurance benefits should 
be worth more so that contributors should get something 
for their contributions. It is not surprising that this
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confusion should have arisen over benefit rates, given 
that the principles on which the rates of benefit were to 
be determined were so vague. It is to be hoped that 
mathematical modelling would also have highlighted the 
fact that income related benefits paid in respect of 
children would have produced a more equal distribution of 
income than flat rate family allowances.
4.4 Child Benefit
Between 1945 and 1977 the state had two primary methods 
of supporting the incomes of people with children. There 
were child tax allowances which gave a relief against 
Income Tax for each child, and there were Family 
Allowances which were a cash payment for the second and 
subsequent children in a family. There were also child 
dependency additions for state benefits, but these were 
not applicable unless one was receiving certain benefits. 
During the 1970s there were increasing calls for the 
amalgamation of Family Allowances and Child Tax
Allowances. For varying reasons this concept was
supported by feminists, conservatives, the poverty lobby, 
and those favouring simplicity in the tax-benefit system.
This idea came to be known as the Child Benefit scheme 
and it represented a major simplification of the tax- 
benefit system. This was prompted partly by the Heath 
government's attempts to bring in a tax credit system, 
which proposed a child tax credit. This would have been 
similar to a universal benefit (Sandford, Pond, & Walker, 
1980). The Labour Party fought the 1974 General Elections 
supporting the concept of Child Benefit (which then was 
referred to as the Family Endowment Scheme). Thus both 
the Labour and Conservative parties fought the 1974 
elections with a pledge to introduce a universal payment 
in respect of children. Moreover there was a recognition 
of the fact that the level of Family Allowances had
declined in recent years (Brown, 1984). In 1948 the
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Family Allowance payable in respect of two children was 
equal to 3.6 % of average male manual earnings; by 1974 
this had declined to 1.8% (Field & Townsend, 1975). The 
proposed Benefit was to be paid in respect of all 
children in the family unlike Family Allowance which did 
not take the first child into account.
Some supported the scheme because it represented an 
advance for the rights of women because Child Benefit was 
to be paid direct to the mother, whereas the Child Tax 
Allowance increased the take home pay of the father (and 
there was thus no guarantee that it increased what the 
caring parent could spend on the child).
Bodies like the Child Poverty Action Group favoured it 
because it could be guaranteed to bring relief to 
families who are entitled to means-tested benefits but do 
not claim them. Whereas Family Allowance (and currently 
Child Benefit) are claimed by nearly 100% of those 
entitled to them, means-tested benefits like Family 
Income Supplement are only claimed by roughly half of 
those with an entitlement (Atkinson & Sutherland, 1985). 
Though Child Tax Allowances automatically benefitted 
those above the tax threshold they did nothing for people 
below it - the working poor who often fell into a gap 
between the social and fiscal welfare systems.
It was Child Benefit's effectiveness in reaching lower 
paid workers which caused some conservatives to support 
it. They were concerned about the "why work" problem 
(which sprung from the fact that some unemployed people 
could be worse off in a low paid job than if they stayed 
on benefit). The child additions for Supplementary and 
Unemployment Benefits were much more generous than Family 
Allowances and therefore someone moving from unemployment 
to a low-paid job would suffer a cut in income which 
would increase with the number of children in the family.
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By providing a substantial payment for each child, which 
would not be taken away if the individual found work, it 
was hoped that unemployed men would be able to accept a 
low paid job without suffering a cut in income.
The major objection to the scheme was on the grounds of 
cost. Barbara Castle fought for the introduction of 
Child Benefit as Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Security during the second Wilson Government. Her 
diaries give an interesting insight into the kind of 
battle waged between the Treasury and a spending minister 
wishing to change the benefit system. She writes how 
Denis Healey attempted to defer the introduction of child 
benefit on the grounds of cost. In turn she pointed out 
"that the commitment to a child endowment scheme was in 
the Manifesto, which he had helped draw up. ...If he now 
wanted to repudiate the commitment he had better tell 
Cabinet. He climbed down somewhat at that..." (Castle, 
1980:140).
It is interesting to note that a Manifesto commitment is 
actually cited in this way to argue for a policy. Though 
the manifesto could be used to support the basic 
principle of child benefit, it could not be used to 
further the case for setting the benefit at a particular 
rate. In arguing over the rate for the proposed benefit, 
Ministers were influenced by the need to prevent any 
families (particularly those on low incomes) from being 
worse off. When the Treasury and DHSS argued over the 
initial rate of child benefit, the argument was 
influenced by mathematical modelling of the effects of 
the proposed change. It was fortunate for the Child 
Benefit proponents that both the DHSS and the Treasury 
both had the resources to do the modelling. If the 
Treasury alone had had the relevant facts it would 
probably have won the argument over the rate of Child 
Benefit. Barbara Castle proposed a rate of 2.85 pounds
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per child which would have prevented any low income 
families from losing under the scheme while preserving 
the concept of a simple unified benefit (Castle, 1980). 
Joel Barnett for the Treasury proposed a rate of 2.40 
pounds plus a premium of 22 pence per week for one parent 
and large families to ensure that they did not actually 
lose (Castle, 1980). To have paid out the tiny premium 
of only 22 pence would have flown in the face of the 
concept of administrative efficiency. The administrative 
costs as a proportion of benefits paid would have been 
very high.
The economic climate of the mid 1970s made it a bad time 
to introduce expensive reforms to the benefit system. 
When Cabinet debated the introduction of child benefit a 
majority of the ministers who spoke were in favour of 
deferring the scheme, but Harold Wilson kept the idea 
alive by referring it to a committee separate from the 
Cabinet. In addition to the arguments about cost, the 
child benefit advocates had to counter worries about the 
effect of transferring resources from fathers to mothers. 
During the late 1970s the Wilson and Callaghan 
governments made strenuous efforts to secure the 
cooperation of the trade unions in keeping wage demands 
down. There was understandable anxiety when it was 
realised that child benefit would reduce the money in 
fathers' pay packets and that they might try to 
compensate by asking for higher pay rises. "... it had 
not been appreciated that our child benefit policy meant 
a reduction in the father's net take-home pay, to the 
extent of the reduction in child tax allowances. Neither 
Jim Callaghan, the Prime Minister, nor Denis Healey, had 
fully taken this point on board. When they did, they 
became nervous" (Barnett, 1982:54). The fear of 
upsetting the government's incomes policy caused the 
introduction of child benefit to be delayed until 1977. 
Even then it was phased in over three years. It was not
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fully in place until June 1979 when it was paid at a rate 
of 4.00 pounds per child.
Child Benefit represented the first (and only) attempt in 
Britain to replace a tax allowance by a universal cash 
benefit. It thus represents an interesting case study in 
the application of tax-benefit principles. Did Child 
Benefit accord with the egalitarian principle? Universal 
benefits conflict with the goal of achieving a more equal 
distribution of income. To equalise incomes it would be 
necessary to supply benefits only to those with incomes 
below the average, whereas child benefit is supplied to 
all. However the picture is confused because the Child 
Tax Allowance which was replaced was, in effect, a 
regressive benefit. It was worth more to people the 
higher their income. For example the tax allowance for a 
dependent child age 16 was 6.02 pounds per week in July 
1977. This was deducted from taxable income, before 
calculating how much tax the individual was liable to 
pay. Thus, it was worth 1.98 pounds per week to some 
one on the then 33 per cent standard rate of tax. It was 
worth 4.99 pounds to some one on the top rate of 83%. 
Moreover it was worth nothing to someone whose income was 
below the tax threshold. By replacing these
inegalitarian aspects of the fiscal welfare system, child 
benefit helped to make the system more equal even though 
it did not appear to discriminate in favour of those on 
low incomes.
On the debit side, however, it has been pointed out that 
the rate of Child Benefit was not set in relation to any 
objective research into the spending needs of children. 
The primary influences on the rate of benefit were the 
need to ensure that families on the standard rate of tax 
would not be worse off because of the abolition of Family 
and Child Tax Allowances and the need to control public 
spending. According to Brown "the unsatisfactory base for
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the benefit rate was compounded by the decision not to 
index it to inflation" (1984:66).
The universal nature of Child Benefit meant that it was 
more comprehensive in its impact on poverty than a means- 
tested benefit would have been. The principal mean- 
tested benefit for working families, Family Income
Supplement (now replaced by Family Credit), having a
take-up rate of only 50% (Atkinson & Sutherland, 1985),
shows the typical problem associated with selective 
benefits. While they may be more efficient in theory, 
because they concentrate more resources on the poor, they 
are often less effective in practice, because fewer
people claim them and administration costs are higher as 
a proportion of benefits disbursed. In general, people 
do not feel they have to sacrifice any dignity to claim 
Child Benefit because the claiming procedure is in effect 
an automatic part of the registration of births. 
Benefits which are only for "the poor" and require the 
claimant to submit to complex administrative procedures 
and means tests do cause people frustration and 
embarrassment. It is the same kind of distinction, 
though in a much milder form, which people used to make 
between the Poor Law and National Insurance Benefits. 
The universal nature of child benefit also gives it the 
advantage that the administration costs are a very small 
proportion of total expenditure. Prior to the 
introduction of child benefit, the administration costs 
of family allowance were only 3.5% of benefit 
expenditure, while they were 9% for Family Income 
Supplement (IFS, 1978:305). As the methods of claiming 
and paying out child benefit are identical to those for 
family allowance, it is probable that its administration 
costs are also close to 3.5%.
Child Benefit helped to increase the attractiveness of 
low paid work, to people on benefit. Because it did not
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involve a system of withdrawing the value of benefit in 
proportion to the claimant's income, it cannot be said to 
have damaged incentives in the same way as selective 
benefits would have done.
Child benefit was a useful simplification of the tax- 
benefit system, which was of particular help to families 
with heads in lower paid work (who would otherwise have 
faced a sharp loss of income compared to families with an 
unemployed head on Supplementary benefit). It is 
significant that Child Benefit was implemented, despite 
the expected opposition of male wage-earners (Brown, 
1984:64) and Treasury officials intent on reducing public 
expenditure. It illustrates the necessity for a radical 
reform to be simple and fully worked out if it is to 
succeed during the lifetime of a four or five year 
parliament. The Heath government's tax credit scheme 
had not been worked out in detail in opposition so could 
not be implemented before Heath fell from power.
In this episode it is obvious from the accounts of the 
struggle to implement child benefit that computer 
modelling had begun to play a significant role in policy 
discussions. Different government departments had 
clearly used mathematical modelling to put forward
alternative polices (the DHSS proposing its 2.85 flat 
rate benefit, and the Treasury advocating 2.40 pounds 
with its 22 pence supplement).
Clearly predictions of the reductions of father's take
home pay had also had an impact. This shows the
importance of the unit of analysis in tax-benefit policy. 
If a tax-benefit model can only demonstrate the effect of 
policies on entire tax units the model would be unable 
to demonstrate this kind of effect because transfers 
within tax units would be invisible in the resulting 
tables. It is thus important to be able to simulate
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policy effects at the individual level as well as at the 
household and tax unit level. A similar issue is raised 
in simulating the effects of the Thatcher government's 
community charge. This is to be levied on all adults in 
place of rates which are levied on heads of household. 
Thus there will be large increases in the local tax
burden for those who are not heads of household. The
government's Green Paper Paving for Local Government 
published numerous tables to show the distributional 
consequences of the community charge (DOE, 1986). 
Because these tables were based on the IFS model which 
does not allow the data to be analysed at the individual 
level, not one of these tables indicated in full the 
income losses which would be suffered by 
people who are not heads of household.
4.5 The 1979 Tax Changes
June 1979 saw a radical change in Britain's taxation
policy. The rates of income tax were dramatically
reduced. At the same time the principal indirect tax, 
VAT, was nearly doubled. Such radical departures from 
the status quo are rare in tax-benefit policy. What 
principles and pressures caused it?
Enormous pressures to cut income tax rates built up in 
the months leading up to the 1979 budget. Mrs Thatcher 
made income tax cuts the centrepiece of her election 
campaign. She said "To make it worthwhile to get on in 
this country again, we have to cut taxes - the taxes on 
earnings, the taxes on savings, the tax on talent" (Daily 
Telegraph, 3-4-1979). Mrs Thatcher was particularly 
concerned about the disincentive effects of the very
L
highest rates of income tax (83% on earned income, and 
98% on investment income). She even accepted the argument 
of the American economist Arthur Laffer that a cut in the 
rate of Income Tax would increase the revenue it raised. 
In 1979 Mrs Thatcher said that tax cuts could sometimes
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be self-financing because they would cause people to work 
harder which would thus produce a larger tax base
(Stephenson, 1980:49).
In order to make it acceptable to reduce tax rates on the 
richest tax-payers, the Conservatives thought it
necessary to offer some reductions in the lower rates of 
tax. Thus Mrs Thatcher committed herself to reductions 
for all income tax payers (though without stating by how 
much). The Labour Party was aware of the popular appeal 
of this move and James Callaghan made an election
promise to reduce the standard rate of income tax by 
three per cent. Even the Liberal Party entered into the 
Dutch auction with similar promises, including a
reduction of the top rate to 50%.
Though Mrs Thatcher had studiously avoided committing 
herself to any specific figure for cutting the standard 
rate of income tax, the Labour Party's offer of a 3 per 
cent cut must have limited her room for manoeuver. 
Furthermore a cut of less than 3 per cent would not have 
seemed like a credible quid pro quo for reducing the top
rate from 83% to 60%. These cuts in Income Tax were only
to be expected given the statements which had been made
during the preceding election campaign. What took
commentators by surprise was the increase in the rate of 
Value Added Tax (VAT). Prior to 1979 VAT was charged at 
a standard rate of 8% and a 12.5 % rate for luxury goods. 
The 1979 budget brought in a unified rate of 15%.
The government would have preferred to have avoided such 
a dramatic rise, but they were effectively painted into a 
corner by their own election promises. The combined cost 
of the proposed tax cuts was £4.5 billion. To make 
matters worse Mrs Thatcher had promised to implement the 
findings of the Clegg commission on public sector pay, 
which led to a major increase in the public sector wage
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bill within a year. One option would have been increased 
public borrowing, but the new administration had made the 
control of public borrowing and the money supply the 
cornerstone of their counter-inflation policy. The new 
government was in favour of public spending cuts, but 
during the election campaign Mrs Thatcher had stated that 
these cuts would not affect large areas of the public 
sector such as pensions and the national health service. 
In June 1979 the government planned to cut public 
spending by 3%, but this was not enough to compensate for 
the tax cuts and the Clegg awards. A further problem was 
caused by the administrative complexities of VAT and 
income tax. The income tax year starts in April, and 
because the election delayed Mrs Thatcher's first budget 
until July, any income tax cuts had to be back-dated to 
April. However, VAT increases could not be back-dated. 
Shop-keepers and other businessmen would only start 
charging the higher rate of VAT from the time when the 
Chancellor made the announcement. Thus a full year of 
income tax cuts had to be funded by nine months of 
increased VAT.
Sir Geoffrey Howe thus had to go to Mrs Thatcher after 
the election and explain that if the election promises 
were to be kept then VAT would have to rise to 15%. Mrs 
Thatcher "wanted 3p off standard income tax to please the 
average voter; but she did not want a 15 per cent VAT 
rate. Sir Geoffrey was despatched back to the Treasury" 
(Keegan, 1984). Back at the Treasury, Sir Geoffrey 
consulted John Biffen. John Biffen's motivations were 
unusual and may have made him one of the few people in 
the whole of Britain who had a positive reason to favour 
a 15 per cent VAT rate. He supported an increase in VAT 
on the grounds that it would be an added inducement for 
people to save, rather than consume, their income. 
Moreover Biffen was the Treasury minister in charge of 
spending cuts. His colleagues found that he was
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unenthusiastic about this work, and would have found it 
difficult to deliver more than the 3 per cent cuts which 
had been budgeted for. He must have known that if the 15 
per cent VAT rate was not implemented, he would have been 
asked to make even greater cuts. As Peden observed 
(1985: 226) "The Conservatives came to power committed to 
reductions in taxation and public expenditure. However 
the government set about the first of these objectives 
before the second had been achieved."
He [Sir Geoffrey] returned to no. 10 with 
Biffen, and Biffen delivered a powerful 
lecture to Mrs Thatcher on the regrets 
previous administrations had had over not 
seizing their chances straightaway. He argued 
that they would find it politically difficult 
to be so bold later, but in the wake of the 
election victory they had the public behind 
them.... Biffen's sermon had a powerful
impact. (Keegan, 1984:120).
The decision to increase VAT to 15 per cent was the 
product of many factors, not the least of which was Mrs 
Thatcher's own political style. Her own political 
speeches had stressed the need for strong, decisive 
leadership which did not fear to make tough choices. She 
called herself a "conviction politician" rather than a 
"consensus politician".
During the parliamentary debate over the budget there was 
much criticism of the regressive nature of the tax 
changes. Figure 4.1 shows only a slight change in the 
distribution of the income tax burden in the years before 
and after the 1979 budget. Figure 4.2 shows that the 
overall burden of VAT increased substantially for all 
income groups. The implication of these two tables taken 
together is that tax-payers gained only slightly from the
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Income Tax changes, but paid roughly twice as much in VAT 
because of the indirect tax changes. This had a 
significant effect on inflation, which rose by 4 per cent 
because of the VAT increase alone.
Figure 4.1 Income Tax As a Proportion of Gross Income by 
Quintile Groups
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The main policy objective of the 1979 budget was to 
improve incentives. It is very difficult to measure 
whether this objective was met because of the paucity of 
appropriate data. In order to assess whether people 
worked more hours per week after the tax cuts, one would 
need a longitudinal survey which showed the number of 
hours worked both before and after the cuts. 
Unfortunately the major British surveys only show the 
position at a single point in time. It is a significant 
weakness of fiscal policy-making that there is no model 
of behavioural responses which is generally accepted. As 
will be shown in chapter 5, there are serious problems 
with all of the existing methods of measuring labour 
supply responses to tax-benefit policy.
In the absence of longitudinal data about labour supply 
one can only guess at the effectiveness of the 1979 tax 
cuts in increasing incentives. It may be possible to 
believe that the reduction in the top rate of income tax 
from 83% to 60% may have had a significant impact on the 
work incentives of those affected by it.
It is not so easy to believe that the decrease in the 
standard rate from 33% to 30% would have had a 
significant effect on work incentives. There is no 
evidence that even the conservatives believed that it 
would. Mrs Thatcher and her Treasury ministers advocated 
it purely as a means of assuring political acceptability 
for the cuts in the higher rates. The decision to cut 
the standard rate in turn led to the 15 per cent VAT 
rate. The reductions in tax rates above the standard 
rate could easily have been financed by a one per cent 
rise in VAT, because so few people were involved. It was 
the standard rate cuts which represented the really 
massive fall in revenue. The near doubling of VAT to 
make possible the relatively cheap policy of cutting 
higher rates of income tax, represents a tiny tail
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wagging an enormous dog.
The tax cuts for those on the standard rate of income tax 
were short-lived; "by 1982 most workers were paying a 
higher percentage of their earnings in Income Tax and 
National Insurance Contributions than in 1979" (Peden, 
1985:227). This was because increased National Insurance 
Contributions were used to pay for the costs of a larger 
public sector wage bill and higher unemployment.
The results of the 1979 budget prompted a conservative 
Treasury Minister to remark some time later that "all 
Chancellors should be legally barred from introducing a 
budget within six months of coming to office. They 
should be forced to pause and think." (Riddell, 1985:62) 
If there had been a more accessible method of tax-benefit 
modelling available to the conservatives in opposition it 
is to be hoped that they would have put forward a budget 
in 1979 with less serious consequences for the rate of 
VAT. An estimate of the incentive effects of the tax 
cuts, based on an empirically justifiable labour supply 
theory, would also have been useful. The 1979 budget 
should give a salutory warning about the perversity of 
the political process in its effect on fiscal policy.
4.6 Conclusion
The four episodes described above show how important the 
status quo is in policy-making. Abstract principles were 
sometimes important. However short-term political 
motives and the effect of the existing tax-benefit 
structure often prevent the implementation of a policy in 
the simplest and most effective way. The maintenance of 
the division between contributory and non-contributory 
benefits under Attlee was a good example of this. Policy 
makers need to be able to balance a number of conflicting 
political pressures and goals. The tax-benefit models
which are used to supply information to these policy­
172
4. FOUR CASE STUDIES IN TAX-BENEFIT POLICY
makers should be as sensitive to these political 
pressures as possible.
It is possible that tax-benefit models could have made a 
significant difference to the formulation of policies in 
the four case histories given above. It is possible, but 
unlikely. Unlikely, because there were very strong 
pragmatic and ideological reasons why these specific 
policies were pursued by the government of the day. 
However, it is reasonable to claim that the debate about 
these policies would have been improved if alternative 
policy options had been argued for with greater 
authority. Such authority could have been achieved if 
the opposition had had access to official data and a 
mechanism for assessing the quantitative effects of 
different policies. It would have been interesting and 
useful if the Webbs had been able to work out their 
proposed alternative to the 1911 National Insurance 
system with benefits funded by general taxation rather 
than separate contributions. In 1943 when the first 
major proposal for a Basic Income scheme was advocated 
(Rhys-Williams, 1943) it would have been useful if an 
authoritative and well costed scheme based on this idea 
had been debated as an alternative to Beveridge. 
Clearly, for the policy process to work well in a 
pluralist society it should be possible to choose between 
several possible reforms, rather than between one reform 
proposal and the status quo.
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5.1 Introduction
As was shown in chapter 3, tax-benefit policies are 
sometimes initiated by governments with the intention of 
influencing people to alter their behaviour. The 
most common form of behaviour which governments try to 
influence is the extent to which people participate in 
the labour force. The following case study examines the 
extent to which research into labour supply can be used 
to predict how work decisions will be influenced by tax- 
benefit policy.
Ideally computer models of the tax-benefit system should 
not ignore the issue of behavioural responses to policy 
changes. In some cases a tax or benefit may have 
important (and quantifiable) effects. Consider the case
of an income tax increase which discouraged people from 
working. This would have a first round effect that 
increased government revenue (from the increased tax), 
but it would also have a second round effect which 
reduced state revenues (as the total amount of income to 
tax would decrease). Suppose that the government 
introduced a form of Child Benefit which encouraged large 
families.like the French system which gives higher 
payments for the second and subsequent children in the 
family than for the first child. If this policy 
increased the birth rate then there would be long term 
effects in the form of increased benefit expenditure. 
Changing the inheritance tax to one based on the
recipient rather than the donor of bequests might cause 
people to leave their possessions to a wider number of 
people to reduce the tax.
Thus in order to make accurate predictions about tax- 
benefit policies one must be able to assess how such
policies might affect peoples' behaviour. In order to
explore the problems of predicting behavioural responses,
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a case study of one form of behavioural response is given 
below. The case study centres on work incentives. This 
is intended to be illustrative of the problems of 
assessing possible responses; it is not to imply that 
other responses are unimportant. Decisions about child­
bearing, whether or not to co-habit or marry, and 
investment are also important areas which can be affected 
by fiscal policy.
Work incentives have probably been the focus of more 
research than other possible responses to tax-benefit 
policy. All but two of the existing tax-benefit models 
assume that people do not alter their work behaviour in 
response to tax-benefit policy changes. The two 
exceptions are TRAP (the Tax Reform Analysis Package) and 
CUBS (the City University Business School model). 
However including formulae to predict behavioural 
responses creates as many problems as it solves. Which 
theories about behavioural responses should be used? To 
what extent can such theories be proven through empirical 
research? Should such theories be based on individual
motivations alone, or should they take into account
inter-action between different members of the household?
In the past bold assertions have been made about the 
effect of tax-benefit policy on behaviour patterns. In 
1979 Mrs Thatcher said that tax cuts could be so
effective in raising production that they could be self-r
financing:
People assume that if you cut rates, you've 
got to recoup it elsewhere. But this is not 
necessarily true, as a cut in taxes will lead 
to larger incentives and therefore larger 
output and a larger tax take. (Stephenson,
1980: 49)
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In the same year the Chancellor of the Exchequer said 
that increasing work incentives was the rationale for his 
income tax cuts (Brown, 1983). There are several macro- 
economic models of the economy which assume that the 
level of state benefits has an effect on unemployment 
(Wallis, 1986) namely those developed at the London 
Business School, Liverpool University, and the City 
University Business School. Some of these models have 
been used to make precise predictions about the effect of 
changes in benefit levels:
simulations on several macroeconomic models 
of the UK economy indicate that changes in 
social security benefits affect the level of 
unemployment in the expected direction ... 
According to the model at Liverpool
University a 10% real cut in Unemployment 
Benefit would reduce unemployment by 342,000 
in four years (Beenstock, 1986: 263).
What is the basis for these assumptions? It would 
clearly be unwise to base tax-benefit policy simulations 
on theories which cannot be justified in terms of 
empirical research. For example, economic theory might 
suggest that if a husband becomes unemployed that his 
wife would work longer hours to make up for the loss of 
income. However some empirical research suggests that 
the opposite is true; when men become unemployed, their 
wives often leave the labour force as well (Cooke, 1987).
The focus of economic research has not been to explain 
labour force participation in terms of wage rates alone. 
Economists have been concerned to explain it in terms of 
two concepts which have opposite effects on the extent of 
labour force participation: the income effect and the
substitution effect. The income effect suggests that in
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certain situations work effort is inversely related to 
the net wage rate. For example, if Income Tax is reduced 
people may work less because they can enjoy the same 
level of income while working for fewer hours per week. 
The substitution effect is derived from the economic 
concept of the "marginal rate of substitution of consumer 
goods for leisure" (Killingsworth, 1983:3). Thus if 
income tax is cut people might work harder because of the 
substitution effect (i.e. it becomes more attractive for 
them to substitute consumer goods for leisure).
If an accurate predictor of behavioural responses is to 
be built into a tax-benefit model then it is important to 
assess whether there is a theory of labour supply which 
can be empirically justified. This chapter examines that 
question. It is not so much concerned with what the 
different theories are as with the question of whether 
any of them can be justified empirically. Studies which 
do not include adequate measurements of statistical 
significance are not considered. The section 5.2 deals 
with research into behavioural responses which is based 
on the economy as a whole. The section 5.3 deals with 
attempts to prove theories about individual labour supply 
based on cross-sectional data. The section 5.4 concerns 
household labour supply theories based on similar data. 
The section 5.5 deals with the limited number of studies 
which have been based on examining a sample of the same 
people at two or more points in time.
5.2 Macro-Economic Studies
Three major models of the UK economy include welfare 
benefit levels in their predictive equations for real 
wage levels: the Liverpool Model, the City University 
Business School Model, and the London Business School 
Model. In all three, benefit levels are assumed to have 
an upward pressure on wage levels which in turn have an 
upward pressure on unemployment. The accuracy of these
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equations has been explored by the ESRC Macroeconomic 
Modelling Bureau (Wallis, 1984). The bureau attempted to 
estimate the accuracy of the models with similar methods 
in each case. The Modelling Bureau used quarterly time 
series data about the UK economy to estimate each model.
Figure 5.1 Model to Predict Real Wages
Real Wages Predicted by:-
Variable:
Constant 
Dummy 1 
Dummy 2 
Dummy 3
Log Unemploymentt
(Log Weighted Average of Benefits)
+ (Direct Taxes / Average Earnings)
Unionisation Ratet 
Log Working Population 
Log Real Wages ^
Number of Observations 60
Goodness of Fit R^ 0.47
* Indicates coefficient was significant at the 5 per cent level.
The subscript t denotes time period (i.e. the quarter, t 
denotes the previous quarter, etc.).
Source: Minford, 1983
Coefficient:
0.34 
- 0.00162 * 
0.0024 
0.0044
- 0.024 *
0 . 1 1  * 
0.45 *
- 0.016 
0.77 *
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In each of the three equations estimated by the bureau 
the benefit level was significant at the 5 per cent 
level. However there was no evidence that these models 
predicted wage levels more accurately than other economic 
models which did not take benefits into account (the 
Treasury model, the Bank of England Model, the Cambridge 
Growth Project model, and the National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research model).
Specific research into the effect of benefits on
unemployment has been done by Minford (1983). He
demonstrated statistically significant relationships 
between tax/benefit levels and real wages using time 
series data about the UK economy. As with the three 
economic models cited above, real wages and unemployment 
are linked in this research, Minford's model was 
estimated with quarterly data about the UK over a period 
of 15 years starting at the second quarter of 1964. The 
results of the simulation are shown in figure 5.1.
In this model the coefficient labelled "(Log Weighted 
Average of Benefits) + (Direct Taxes / Average Earnings)" 
which is based on taxes and benefits, is shown to be
significant at the five per cent level. The benefit
element of this coefficient is a complex weighted average 
based on a number of variables including the flat rate 
unemployment benefit, the earnings related supplement 
(based on average earnings) and free school meals. The 
tax element of the coefficient is the percentage of 
national gross average earnings taken in taxes and 
national insurance contributions for a married man with 
two children. It would seem very risky to make 
assertions about the effect a cut in unemployment benefit 
would be likely to have on the basis of such a 
calculation because unemployment benefit is only a part 
of the coefficient. If it could be shown that there was 
a significant relationship between real wages and
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unemployment benefit on its own, one could have more 
confidence in such predictions. Nickell and Andrews
(1983) tried to simulate the effect of the benefit rate 
on employment using the concept of the "replacement 
ratio", which is typically taken to be the ratio of the 
income an unemployed person receives compared to average 
earnings. Economic theory would suggest that a high 
replacement ratio would mean higher unemployment. 
However Nickell and Andrews (1983) were unable to find 
any such replacement ratio effects which were 
significant. Furthermore Moylan, Millar, and Davies
(1984) used a large longitudinal studies of the 
employment histories and wage expectations of unemployed 
men. They attempted to discover how easy it was to 
predict whether a man would accept a job based on whether 
the wage was above or below the level which the 
individual considered was a reasonable minimum, the 
reservation wage. They found that "self-reported 
reservation wages appear to be a poor guide to behaviour 
in the face of actual job offers" (Moylan, Millar, 
Davies, 1984: 113).
However even if one proved a strong relationship between 
unemployment and real wages, one would not have proved 
the direction of causality. Do benefit levels push up 
wages or vice versa? Some National Insurance benefits 
were deliberately linked to average earnings. If benefit 
levels had both risen and fallen during the post-war 
period with cuts in benefit preceding cuts in wages, the 
direction of causality would be easier to assess. In 
reality both benefits and wages have been on an upward 
trend. The main exceptions to this occurred in 1980 when 
National Insurance benefits were uprated by 5 per cent 
less than inflation, and in 1982 the Earnings Related 
Supplement to Unemployment and Sickness Benefit was 
abolished. In theory these cuts should have led to a 
reduction in unemployment, but this did not happen.
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There is no clear cut example in the post-war period of 
cuts in benefit causing wages to fall.
Given that there is conflicting research about the effect 
of benefit levels, and that the direction of causality 
has not been established, the macro-economic data does 
not seem to offer conclusive evidence about behavioural 
responses to changes in benefit levels.
Figure 5.2 Model to Predict Employment Status
Employment Status Predicted by :- 
(Employment Status = 1 if in work 
& 0 if unemployed)
Dependant Variable: Coefficient: Standard Error:
Constant 0.6805 7.6
AO (Unemployment Benefit+Wifes Wages) 0.0002 0.7
A1 (Work Hours needed to exceed 
Unemployment income)
W1 (Wage Rate for earnings to exceed 
Unemployment Income)
Age of Head of Household 
Age of Head of Household Squared 
Number of Children 
Industry Unemployment Rate 
Mortgage (Has Mortgage=1,
(No Mortgage=0)
Number of Observations 1014
Goodness of Fit R-Squared 0.04
Source: Beenstock, 1983
0.0020 2.2
0.0216 1.8
0.0107 2.4
-0.0001 2.4
-0.0174 2.7
-0.5436 2.7
0.0450 3.1
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5.3 Cross-Sectional Individual Studies
There have been several attempts to assess the impact of 
benefit levels on the employment status of individuals. 
Beenstock (1986) and Dalziel constructed a model to 
determine the probability of being employed based on the 
net wage rate an unemployed person would be likely to 
receive in work and the benefit income a worker would be 
likely to receive if unemployed. The data were taken 
from the 1978 and the 1981 FES. The calculation of net 
wages and unemployment incomes was carried out to a high 
degree of specificity using a model representing the 
major benefits and direct taxes. The model used several 
special variables to predict the probability of 
employment. The result of one of Beenstock's analyses is 
shown in figure 5.2. The variable shown as AO is the 
unemployment benefit rate plus the wife's earnings. A1 
is the number of hours which the individual would need to 
work for his employment income to exceed his unemployment 
income. W1 is the wage rate which applies where earnings 
exceed the level of unemployment income. The unemployed 
were allocated an imputed wage based on average earnings.
As can be seen from figure 5.2 several other variables 
were included in order to improve the fit of the model. 
The dependent variable was employment status which took 
the value '1' if the individual was in work and '0' if he 
was unemployed. In order to constrain the choices to '0' 
and '1', three different modelling approaches were used: 
a linear probability model, a logit model and a probit 
model. Figure 5.2 shows the results of estimating the 
linear probability model. The coefficients were 
estimated through ordinary least squares regression. The 
model only explains 4 per cent of the variation of 
employment status, in spite of the inclusion of five 
variables which are unrelated to Dalziel and Beenstock's 
theory of work incentives. The incentive variables A1 
and W1 had coefficients which were not significantly
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different from zero. Dalziel and Beenstock use a number
of other specifications for their model, but in each case
the "incentive variables" have a weak and statistically 
insignificant effect on employment status. As Beenstock 
himself puts it:-
It can be seen that the overall fit of the
model is poor. The contribution of the
incentive variables is generally weak ...
The only persistently strong effects seem 
to come from the industry and unemployment 
term and the age variables which suggests 
that demand has a stronger influence than 
supply considerations. (Beenstock,
1986:179).
The inconclusive nature of these results caused Beenstock 
to make the unusual criticism that the data from the FES 
are not accurate enough (Beenstock, 1986). Though 
Beenstock's research failed to show any conclusive link 
between benefits and employment status it is interesting 
to note that the labour demand variables were so much 
more significant than the labour supply variables. This 
would imply that the availability of work for an 
individual is much more important than work incentives. 
This analysis by Beenstock was a rare attempt to try to 
measure the impact of work incentives through a 
dichotomised employment status variable. The lack of a 
conclusive result may indicate that using this approach 
is inappropriate; alternatively it may also indicate that 
the underlying theory is wrong and that the tax-benefit 
system does not have a significant impact on employment 
status. The more common approach is to use hours of work 
to measure labour force participation.
One of the simplest, and crudest, attempts to assess the 
impact of wage rates on hours of work was conducted by
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Egginton (Beenstock, 1986), whose approach was to 
categorised people according to various criteria which 
might affect their labour force participation and then to 
assign them to one of a further set of categories based 
on the range of hours for which they worked. The data 
were taken from the 1977 and 1981 Family Expenditure 
Survey. If the individual was out of work then an 
imputed wage rate based on average earnings was assigned 
to him. Based on these wage rates men were allocated to 
one of two groups according to whether their wages were 
above or below the national average. The sample was 
further stratified according to number of children, 
marital status, and housing tenure.
Egginton then attempted to use the Chi-square procedure 
to determine if the people in the categories which were 
thought to have strong incentives worked for longer hours 
than would be expected if the distribution was random. 
Egginton found that it was not possible to find any 
relationships which were significant on a consistent 
basis. In ten out of the twelve comparisons of low and 
high wages, the cells contained numbers which were 
significantly different from the numbers which would be 
expected from a random distribution, indicating that 
people with below average wages tend to work for longer 
hours than people with higher wages. However when the 
unemployed were excluded (who had had an artificial wage 
rate imputed to them) then number of significantly 
different categories dropped to seven out of twelve. The 
comparisons based on housing tenure groups were also 
inconclusive. The only useful predictor seemed to be the 
number of children, with people tending to work longer 
hours the more children they had.
It is far more common to use continuous variables rather 
than categorical or dichotomised variables. In fact the 
most common method of assessing the impact of tax-benefit
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policy on work incentives has been to construct a model 
of responses to changes in tax-benefit rates and to 
estimate it using regression analysis. A typical 
regression equation would be:
Work__Hours = alWage_Rate + a2Non__Employment__Income + 
a3Preference_Variable . . . anPreference__Variable + Error
The wage rate variable is normally assumed to have a 
positive effect on the number of hours worked (on the 
grounds that the more people are paid the greater their 
incentive to work). Non-employment income is generally 
assumed to depress the number of work hours because the 
larger the income the person can enjoy without working 
the less will be his or her incentive to work. The taste 
variables are other factors which influence the
individual's propensity to work. For example, if the
individual is a parent or supports a non-working spouse
then they will often prefer to work more because of their 
increased family commitments. These assumptions are
common in the literature of labour supply economics.
However the measurement of the net wage rate poses a 
difficult problem. In general the data on which studies 
are based do not include the hourly pay rate. In
practice, the wage rate is determined by taking net 
earnings and dividing it by the number of hours worked. 
The early attempts to define a labour supply function 
involved taking hours of work as the dependent variable, 
and using earnings divided by hours of work as one of the
the independent variables. This means that if there are
measurement errors in the hours of work variable, this 
will also affect the dependent variable so the error will 
be endogenous to the regression equation. Labour supply 
economists have termed this problem "endogeneity bias".
Brown, Levin, and Ulph (1976) had the advantage of using
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a specially commissioned survey which obviated the need 
to use work hours to calculate the wage rate in the main 
job. The survey was conducted in 1971 by the British 
Market Research Bureau and provided data on 2000 
respondents.
The equation used by Brown, Levin, and Ulph took the form
Work_Hours = Constant - a1Marginal^Wage 
+ a2Marginal_Wage2 - 
a3Intercept + a4lntercept2 +
a5(Marginal_Wage * Intercept) - a60ther_Income.
Figure 5.3 Hours of Work of Married Men
Hours of Work Predicted by:-
Variable: Coefficient: Standard Error
Constant 55.3
Marginal_Wage 14.3 * 4.8
Marginal_Wage Squared 3.63 2.05
Intercept 0.959 * 0.143
Intercept Squared 0.0105 * 0.00212
Marginal_Wage x Intercept 0.644 * 0.118
Other__Income 0.114 * 0.048
Number of Cases = 434
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.104
* Significant at the 5 per cent level
Source : Brown, Levin, and Ulph, 1976
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The "intercept" refers to a point on a graph of net 
incomes plotted against hours of work. When the 
individual does not work at all he or she will have zero 
hours of work but will have some net income (from 
unemployment benefit, investments, etc). The "intercept" 
is thus the point at which the budget line "intercepts" 
the hours of work axis. It is useful to examine how well 
this particular equation fitted the data as this formula 
includes only income variables (unlike the equation 
estimated in figure 5.2 which includes labour demand 
variables like the industry unemployment rate). The 
result of estimating Brown, Levin & Ulph model is shown 
below in figure 5.3. It will be seen from the figure for 
R2 that the model explains roughly ten per cent of the 
variance of hours of work. All but one of the 
coefficients are significant at the 5 per cent level. It 
is possible that labour demand factors such as the 
industry unemployment rate, and household preference 
factors such as the presence of pre-school children would 
have increased the R2.
Brown, Levin and Ulph tried to improve the fit of their 
model by excluding various groups from the sample. By 
removing those who said that they were restricted in 
their options to work overtime the R2 increased from 
0.104 to 0.128. When those on piece rate or bonus 
schemes (who could theoretically increase work effort 
without increasing work hours) were excluded the R2 
increased further to 0.17. The exclusion of husbands 
with working wives increased the R2 from 0.104 to 0.134. 
The only exercise which caused a dramatic increase in the 
R2 was the exclusion of men with restricted overtime 
options, men on bonus payments, and men with children 
under 11, which produced an R2 of 0.367.
Brown, Levin, and Ulph (1976) confined their analysis to 
married men. Glaister, McGlone, and Ruffell (1981) used a
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Figure 5.4 Hours of Work of Married Women
Hours of Work Predicted by:- 
Variable: Coefficient:
Constant 
Marginal_Wage 
Marginal_Wage Squared 
Intercept 
Intercept Squared 
Marginal__Wage *
Intercept 
Presence of children 
Under 11 
Spending on Children 
Ownership of time-saving 
Assets 
Travel to work time 
Committed Income 
Wealth
Unemployment of Main 
Earner 
Job Satisfaction 
Reported Fitness for more 
Work
Education beyond official 
School Leaving Age 
Age
29.6
16.1
38.2
0.486
- 0 . 0 0 1 2
-1.95 *
-5.79 * 
-0.318
-1 .28 
0.0679 
-0.0335 
0.545
3.545
0.0335
0.946
-2.74 * 
-0.0625
Standard Error:
33.3
32.2
0.346
0.00239
0.894
2.56
0.390
1 .39 
0.0676 
0.0843 
0.370
0.370 
0.0954 
1 .03
1 .34 
0.0996
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.12
Number of Cases = 129
Source : Glaister, McGlone, and Ruffell, 1981
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similar approach to construct a model which would apply 
to a wider variety of family types (Brown, 1981). 
Glaister, McGlone and Ruffell were also concerned with 
simulating the effect of variables which would be likely 
to alter the individual's work preferences. In one such 
study they used the same survey data as Brown, Levin, and
Ulph (1976) but extracted from it the married women. Of
these a sub-sample of 129 remained which contained women 
who were below the retirement age, had no major 
constraints on their hours of work (i.e. had the 
possibility of working overtime), and who were not paid 
on a piece rate system. They estimated a model very 
similar to that used for men in figure 5.3, but none of 
the coefficients were significant at the five per cent 
level and the adjusted R2 was only 0.03. This could
indicate that the factors which influence married men are 
different from the factors which affect married women.
It was then decided to add some variables which would
simulate circumstances which would alter the women's 
preference to work longer hours. For example, it was 
assumed that the presence of young children would lower a 
married woman's preference to work more. Conversely
having a large amount of committed income (such as
mortgage payments) would increase the preference to work 
more. So a set of these "preference variables" was then 
added. The result of this model is set out below in 
figure 5.4. Two preference variables stand out as 
having a significant effect: the presence of young
children under 11, and years of full-time education over 
and above the school leaving age. Variables which were 
not significant at the 5 per cent level included the 
ownership of time saving assets such as a refrigerator or 
washing machine, job satisfaction, and a dichotomised 
variable showing whether the main earner is unemployed.
With all the preference variables included in the model
it explained 0.12 of the variance in work hours.
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Glaister, McGlone, and Ruffell (1981) made a similar 
study of married men. Again a sub-sample of men were 
selected who were below the retirement age and were paid 
on the basis of an hourly rate without any reported 
restrictions on hours. The "basic model" without any 
preference variables explained 0.05 of the variance of 
work hours (this is was result of testing the same model 
as in figure 5.3 on a different set of data). When the 
preference variables were included the R2 increased to 
0.16. One of the preference variables was the notional 
expenditure on children which was taken to be the 
Supplementary Benefit child additions which would have 
been payable in respect of the number and ages of the 
man's children. This was found to be significant at the 
five per cent level indicating that married men will tend 
to work longer hours the more children they have to 
provide for.
A similar model was estimated using a sample of single 
people. The basic model employed by Brown, Levin, and 
Ulph (1976) which attempted to predict hourly wages by 
variables based on marginal wages and theoretical non­
employment income (the intercept), explained only 0.07 of 
the variance in work hours. When preference variables 
were added the R2 increased from 0.07 to 0.10. Two 
preference variables proved to be significant at the 5 
per cent level - job satisfaction (which tended to 
increase work hours) and the number of years of education 
beyond the school leaving age (which tended to reduce 
it).
It is difficult to be overly sanguine about the 
effectiveness of assessing work incentives through cross- 
sectional data. The data only appears to explain a small 
proportion of the variance - generally under 15 per cent. 
The modelling approaches which have been used all have
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serious drawbacks. The most popular approach, involving 
the construction of regression equations to predict work 
hours, suffers from the serious problem of endogeneity 
bias. If one accepts the efficacy of the devices which 
have been used to compensate for this bias, then it is 
possible to assert that the cross-sectional data does
Figure 5.5 A Household Model of Labour Supply
Hours of Work predicted by:-
Wife's Hours Husband's Hours 
Coefficient of Work: of Work:
Constant 1428.96 * 2273.78 *
Own Disposable Wage 54.30 * -137.87 *
Spouse's Disposable Wage -33.05 * - 81.94 *
After-tax Property Income 0.006 0.029 *
Age 7.67 - 27.76
Education 11.94 39.05 *
Children Less than 1 -385.17 50.26
Children 1-2 Years old -480.23 * 19.40
Children 3-5 Years old -152.11 * 28.91
Children 6-13 Years old - 75.48 * -2.39
Children 14-17 Years old -2.48 57.27
Health 13.52
Homeowner - 60.48 83.77
Unemployment Rate - 14.40 -8.72
R2 0.079 0.164
* Indicates coefficient significant at 5 % level.
Source: Leuthold, 1979
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give a limited picture of work incentives. However 
caution should still be used as there is still far more 
variation in work hours that cannot be explained by the 
labour supply models than can be explained by them.
5.4 Cross-Sectional Household Studies
The effect of a spouse's incoome may make it difficult to 
predict the labour supply response of the individual on 
his or her own. If a person's spouse receives a large 
pay rise it is reasonable to assume that their own 
behaviour will be affected. It has been claimed that the 
higher the income of the husband, the less likely it is 
that the wife will be in employment. Though by contrast 
jobless married men tend to have wives who are also 
unemployed (Cooke, 1987), a dichotomy which is probably 
influenced by cultural perceptions of the role of men as 
breadwinners and by social security rules which in some 
situations reduce benefit entitlement by the amount of 
the spouses earnings. Some individual models of labour 
supply include the income of the wife as one of the 
variables (Brown, Levin, and Ulph, 1976).
How should one model the interaction between the income 
of husbands and wives? Two different types of household 
model have been used. Both models assume that there is a 
family budget constraint which describes the trade-off 
between earnings and leisure for the entire family. 
However the two types of model differ in the way they 
determine how husbands and wives will maximise their 
satisfaction under this set of options.
One type of model (usually termed neo-classical) assumes 
that the effect of one's spouse's income on the other 
will be equal whether the change is the husband's or the 
wife's income. Therefore if (for the sake of argument) 
such a model implied that a 10 per cent increase in the 
income of the husband would produce a 2 per cent decrease
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in the wife's work hours, it would also mean that a 10 
per cent increase in the wife's income would have a 
similar effect on the husband's labour supply.
The other type of model assumes that there are different 
functions which describe the interaction of husbands and 
wives income. It is often assumed that a change in the
earnings of the husband will have a greater impact on the
wife's earnings than vice versa. Leuthold (1976) 
provides the most famous example of such models. The 
estimation of a Leuthold model is shown in figure 5.5. 
The results are derived from data on 940 couples from the 
USA's 1970 National Longitudinal Survey. It shows that 
there are statistically significant effects caused by the
income of one spouse on the other. For the wife it shows
that the presence of children is a disincentive to seek 
paid employment. This effect appears to be stronger the 
younger the children. The magnitude of the husband's 
income also appears to reduce the wife's hours of work 
while the wife's own disposable wage appears to increase 
it. For the husband the strongest effect reducing hours 
of work is the amount of disposable wage income and 
wife's wage income. Education also appears to have a 
positive effect on the number of hours the husband 
works.
Ashworth and Ulph (1981) have attempted to compare the 
Leuthold approach with the neo-classical method, by using 
different models to estimate work hours for the same data 
set. They found that the Leuthold model achieved a 
better fit.
5.5 Longitudinal Studies
Brown has summarised the rationale for conducting labour 
supply research with cross-sectional data as follows:-
If the control variables hold preferences
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constant, then the variations in hours 
will depend on differences between 
individuals in their budget constraints.
Thus if the only difference between 
individuals was in their wage rate, 
differences in labour supply would be 
attributed to this difference. It is 
then inferred that it is possible to . 
predict how individuals will behave over 
time from a single point in time. (Brown 
1983: 53)
This reasoning may be flawed. Some of the existing 
research suggests that labour demand factors account for 
more of the variation in work hours than marginal wages 
or preferences. The ability to control for
characteristics which influence work behaviour can only 
ever be partially successful. It would be far better to 
examine the same group of people at different points in 
time in order to observe how they responded to changes in 
their marginal wage. This would be a vastly superior 
method of controlling for preferences. Often it would be 
possible to control for preferences (e.g. by examining
only those families where the number of children had 
stayed the same). If the preference variables could be 
controlled in this way it would be possible to examine 
the effect of post-tax wage rates and benefit levels in 
isolation.
Alas there is no publicly available data which would 
allow this research to be carried out in Britain. The 
few longitudinal data sets tend to have serious 
restrictions on their sample size or the characteristics 
of the respondents. The DHSS cohort study has been used
(Daniel and Stilgoe, 1977) to examine the phenomenon of
women leaving employment when their husbands are out of 
work. However the selection of respondents is limited to
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benefit recipients so the resulting data can only have a 
limited usefulness in predicting the labour supply 
responses of the population as a whole. The largest 
potential source of longitudinal data is the New Earnings 
Survey. However the government restricts access to this 
by researchers. The only files which are available from 
it do not have data on individual cases.
One minor exception to this was a study carried out by 
Weale (1984) on single parents to determine whether they 
altered their labour supply in response to the 
introduction of the tapered earnings disregard for 
supplementary benefit. He found no significant 
alteration in their work behaviour. This was predictable 
in view of other research which indicates that the 
responsibilities of single parenthood has a very powerful 
negative effect on labour participation (Joshi, 1984).
Clearly, if longitudinal data is to be useful it must 
have a large sample size and must be applicable to a 
wider range of family types than just single parents. In 
the USA such data was provided by a major social 
experiment in the late 1960s and early 1970s which 
involved measuring responses to a Negative Income Tax 
system (NIT).
To illustrate the NIT we will take the example of the New 
Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment (Watts and Rees, 
1977) - though there were also experiments in Gary 
Indiana, Denver Colorada, and Seattle Washington. The 
system worked by setting an income guarantee level, and 
paying the participants in the experiment a proportion of 
the amount by which their actual incomes fell short of 
this guarantee level. The income guarantee level varied 
in proportion to the number of adults and children in the 
family. The income guarantee level was calculated as a 
proportion of the US government's official poverty line
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for the different types of household. Four income 
guarantee levels were used (they were set at 50, 75, 100, 
and 125% of the poverty line). There was also variation 
in the rate at which NIT payments were tapered away. 
There were three withdrawal rates - 30%, 50% and 70%. A
private research company Mathematica Inc, was employed to 
administer and monitor the schemes which selected a 
sample of 725 families to receive the NIT payments. The 
experimental families were required to fill out a 
statement of their income every 28 days, which was in 
turn used to calculate their NIT payments. NIT payments 
cheques were then posted to the families at fortnightly 
intervals. The research team monitoring the experiment 
conducted quarterly interviews of both control and 
experimental families to assess how their behaviour 
altered over the three years of the experiment. This 
provided a rich source of longitudinal data.
Watts and Rees (1977) used the data produced by the New 
Jersey experiment to construct a model of the factors 
influencing hours of work. They were able to measure the 
change in the hours of work in the second full year of 
the experiment compared to the hours of work before the 
experiment began. They used the change in hours of work 
between these two periods as the dependent variable. A 
regression equation was specified to predict the change 
in hours of work. The effect of the NIT payments was 
expressed as the ratio of the family's income guarantee 
level to their actual net income. The income guarantee 
level varied according to the composition of the 
household, so expressing the NIT in this way allowed the 
effect of NIT payments to be measured for families of 
different sizes.
Figure 5.6 shows that there was a statistically 
significant relationship between the NIT variable and 
hours of work - with the NIT tending to reduce work
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effort. This is in accord with prevailing economic
theory. In the case of this kind of NIT both the income
effect and the substitution effect work to reduce
incentives. The NIT raises net income so people can
enjoy the same income while working less. This income 
effect is compounded by a substitution effect. As the 
experimental families were often below the tax threshold
Figure 5.6 Labour Supply Responses to the 
New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiments
Change in Hours of Work Predicted by:-
Variable: Coefficient:
Constant -5.8725
NIT Guarantee Level/
(Income net of Withdrawal) -1.11952
Work Hours Before Experiment -0.80394
1/Normal Wage Rate 3.1835
Age 0.95020
Age2 -0.011792
Health Problem which limits work -5.7097
Completed High School 1.8514
Weeks worked in year before Experiment 0.28171 
Site 1 0.4983
Site 2 2.0367
Site 3 1.2470
R2 = 0.48
* Coefficient significant at 5 per cent level
(Watts and Rees, 1977)
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before the experiment began many of them faced a marginal 
tax rate of zero. The NIT imposed a withdrawal rate of 
between 30% and 70%, thus the NIT recipients received 
substantially less benefit from working for an extra 
hour. Watts and Rees (1977) concluded that the 
disincentive effects of the NIT were not substantial. 
However this finding has been disputed by later 
researchers who have reanalysed the data such as Hall
(1975) and Cogan (1978). The evidence of reduced work 
effort in response to NIT payments is supported by the 
evidence of the Seattle and Denver NIT experiments 
(Robins, Spiegelman, Weiner, Bell, 1980). It should be 
noted that the Seattle and Denver experiments had a 
larger sample than did the New Jersey Experiments (725). 
Economists have attempted to use the American NIT 
experiments to make general statements about the effect 
of tax-benefit policy such as the size of the income and 
substitution effects. However it is useful to examine 
the dangers of drawing such conclusions from a single 
policy experiment and applying the results to other 
policies. The administrative aspects of the NIT scheme 
may have had a special impact because the participants 
were required to fill out a special income statement to 
receive a special payment through the post. One should 
not assume that a similar scheme with a different method 
of payment would have had the same effect. For example, 
if there had been no monthly income statement and the 
payments had been added to the wage packet by the 
employer, the effects might have been different because 
it would not have been so obvious to the participants 
that they could increase the NIT payments by reducing 
their earnings. It would certainly be unsound to compare 
Britain and the USA because of the differences in the two 
benefit systems. The lack of benefits for the uninsured 
population in the USA meant that often the NIT scheme was 
offering state benefits to people who had had no 
entitlement before. In Britain however the Supplementary
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Benefit system provides a safety net to those not covered 
by National Insurance benefits, so an NIT in Britain 
would tend to increase the net incomes of people in lower 
paid work rather than the unemployed.
The NIT experiments do show the value of longitudinal 
data. The model shown in figure 5.6 explains a far 
higher proportion of the variance of the change in work 
hours, than the models based on cross-sectional data. In 
studies of the Seattle and Denver experiments the 
estimates of the effects of the scheme were frequently 
significant at the 1 per cent level (Robins, Spiegelman, 
Weiner, Bell, 1980). It is unfortunate that there is no 
publicly available set of panel data on British hours and 
earnings.
5.6 Conclusion
If non-governmental groups are to be able to participate 
with government in the policy debate on equal terms it is 
important that they should be able to assess the 
behavioural responses a tax-benefit change is likely to 
cause. The most important ideological influence on 
British fiscal policy since 1979 has been the belief that 
reductions in tax rates will increase work incentives and 
therefore national wealth. It is important to be able to 
assess whether this type of theory is true. Generally 
this kind of debate is conducted in an atmosphere of 
anecdote and supposition.
How should a pluralist tax-benefit model deal with the 
various theories concerning behavioural responses? Such 
models should seek to be as value-neutral as possible. 
They should certainly not "build in" any particular set 
of theories. Unless the user specifically chooses to 
base a simulation on a particular theory, then the model 
should produce results on the assumption that policy 
changes do not influence behaviour. If a labour supply
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theory is to be used in a simulation then the authors of 
the relevant research must be named. Measures of the 
explanatory power and significance level of their model 
must be shown.
Intellectual honesty demands this kind of rigour. The 
policy debate would be the better for it. Even if one 
accepts these caveats, however, it is important to stress 
that policy simulations may be more accurate if they are 
not based on theories which assume that behaviour is
altered. Because it has been so difficult to prove the
validity of labour supply theories, the assumption that 
there are no behavioural responses is often the best one.
To what extent has the empirical research reviewed in
this chapter demonstrated the effect of tax-benefit 
policy on work incentives? The existing research has
failed to show conclusively that higher benefit 
entitlements mean higher unemployment. The British 
research on the effect of tax-benefit policy on work 
hours is difficult to assess because of the unpredictable 
effects of endogeneity bias. If one accepts the efficacy 
of the measures that have been taken to compensate for 
endogeneity bias, then there is a body of research which 
sometimes shows significant relationships between 
marginal wages, preference variables and work hours.
For example, the research of Brown, Levin, and Ulph
(1976) and Glaister, McGlone, and Ruffell (1981) indicate 
that changes in marginal wages may explain up to 10-15 per
cent of the variation in work hours. This is an
important finding because a substantial change in work 
hours will affect tax revenues. Increased work hours 
will boost revenue. A reduction in labour participation 
will cut revenues and increase the expenditure on
benefits. Variables which attempt to simulate the labour 
participation 'preferences' of different groups such as 
the desire to provide financially for children can be
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used to explain a higher proportion of the variance in 
work hours than models based on income and marginal wages 
alone according to research of Glaister, McGlone, and 
Ruffell (1981). In the case of married men the R2 
increased from 0.07 to 0.16; for married women it
increased from 0.03 to 0.12; for single people it
increased from 0.07 to 0.10. The Household models have 
not helped to explain the variation in work hours to a 
significantly greater extent than research based on 
individual theories of labour supply. The experimental 
data from the American NIT experiments shows the
potential value to be gained from the use of
longitudinal data. Unfortunately researchers do not have 
access to longitudinal data on incomes and work hours for 
the U.K. population.
Apart from the impact of wage rates on work hours, the 
other main question relating to the impact of tax-benefit 
policy on labour supply is whether benefit levels 
contribute to unemployment. The research of Beenstock 
(1986) applied a great deal of energy to the task of 
showing a relationship between benefits and the decision 
of whether to work or not. However this failed to show a 
result which was statistically significant. 
Macroeconomic data about benefit levels has been used by 
Wallis (1984) and Minford (1983). This has been used in 
equations to determine the real wage level. Economic 
models like the Liverpool model have equations which 
assume that real wages have an upward pressure on 
unemployment. Wallis's (1984) research showed that 
benefit levels could be a statistically significant 
coefficient in regression equations to predict the real 
wage level, but those models which used benefit levels in 
their real wage equations were no more accurate than the 
equations in other economic models which did not use 
them. Minford's (1983) research indicated that there was 
a significant relationship between benefit levels and
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unemployment, whereas Nickell and Andrews' (1983) 
research using microeconomic data came to a different 
conclusion. A review of the existing research indicates 
that the jury is still out on this question.
At best one can say that the question of how tax-benefit 
policy affects incentives has only been partially
answered. Certainly it would be extremely useful to know 
the relationship between changes in the after-tax wage 
rate and the supply of labour, in order to evaluate 
policies. There is a wealth of data about incomes and 
taxation in surveys like the Family Expenditure Survey 
and the General Household Survey. It would be useful to 
have a more robust theory about how labour supply is 
affected by tax-benefit policy. It would be possible to 
make credible predictions about how unemployment and 
average work hours would change in response to policy. 
Even though some labour supply economists have built tax- 
benefit models which make labour supply predictions, the 
confidence of their forecasts should not obscure the fact 
that more research is needed on the underlying theory of 
labour supply responses. The lack of a credible labour 
supply formula to use leaves social researchers 
floundering around like a group of people in a life-boat 
starving because they do not have a tin-opener to use on 
their supply of canned food. In this situation the 
labour supply economist seems to stand up and declare 
confidently - "The first step in solving our problems is 
to assume that we have a tin-opener".
202
6. FEATURES OF A PLURALIST MODEL
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a prototype tax-benefit program 
which embodies flexibility and usability to an extent 
that it could be used by non-governmental groups as well 
as government. As this dispersal of power is necessary 
for the functioning of a pluralist society, it is hoped 
that this tax-benefit program will be a pluralist tax- 
benefit program. Though the model is simple to use it 
does not constrain the user to a narrow set of menus. 
There is thus no inherent limit to the number of policy 
options which can be simulated. For this reason it will 
be referred to as the Policy Option Model (POM). A new 
computer language has been designed for use with POM 
which is intended to make it particularly easy to specify 
new policies. For this reason it is referred to as the 
Policy Simulation Language (PSL).
This chapter summarises the features which have been 
built into POM. It suggests an approach which might solve 
the usability/flexibility dilemma outlined in chapter 1. 
It draws on the experience of the existing tax-benefit 
models reviewed in chapter 2 so that some of the best 
features of these are included in the pluralist model. 
It puts forward a solution to the problem posed in 
chapter 3 of constraining the user to a narrow range of 
output tables. It describes a mechanism for carrying out 
some behavioural simulations.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 
describes the method of inputting policies into POM. 6.3 
outlines the method of producing output tables. 6.4 sets 
out the equipment needed to use POM. 6.5 describes the 
characteristics of the data.
6.2 Policy Input
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6.2.1 Programming Language vs Menus
As explained in chapter 1 non-experts who try to do tax- 
benefit modelling are faced with two major problems. If 
they try to carry out simulations on an easy to use
Figure 6.1 Pascal Procedure to Compute Total Household 
Income
1 Procedure Total_Household;
2 const
3 Missing = -999999;
4
5 Type
6 Household_Record = Record
7 Sex,
8 Earnings,
9 Investment_Income : Integer;
10 End;
11 Var
12 Household_Vars : Household_Record;
13 Household_Array : Array [1 .. 25] of Household_Record;
14 Counter,
15 Total_Income : Integer;
16
17 Begin
18 Counter := 1;
19 Repeat
20 Household_Vars := Household_Array[counter];
21 with Household_Vars do
22 begin
23 Total_Income := Earnings + Investment_Income;
24 end;
25 Counter := Counter + 1;
26 Until Household_Vars.sex = Missing;
27 End;
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program based on menus then there will be many policies 
which they cannot simulate because the menus only allow 
them to alter mathematical constants associated with 
existing or proposed policies. They cannot simulate 
policies that the program-maker did not allow for at the 
time when the program was created.
A way out of this dilemma would be use a programming
language which would allow the user to alter the
structure of a package rather than alter a set of
constants. However this faces the user with the problem 
of learning a new language. It can be
Figure 6.2 PSL Procedure to Compute Total Household 
Income
1 Total_Income =
2 Total_Household(Earnings + Investment_Income).
enormously difficult for a novice to learn a language. 
Even once the large investments of time have been made in 
learning a language the user is faced with the mammoth 
task of redefining the existing tax-benefit system from 
scratch in the new language which has been selected. To 
give an impression of the scale of this task it should be 
borne in mind that the IFS model is over 8,000 lines 
long. An alternative to this would be for a novice 
programmer to have, access to the source code of one of 
the existing models. Thus the user would be able to make 
small modifications to the source code to define a new 
tax or benefit without having to redefine the whole 
system. However this approach carries with it 
substantial problems. Large tax-benefit models are 
normally defined with short variable names which cannot 
be understood by the unfamiliar reader. Concepts like
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"Child Benefit" may be expressed by cryptic names like 
"CB1". When a program has many hundreds of these 
variable names it becomes almost impossible for a 
newcomer to alter part of the program without running the 
risk of making serious mistakes. Unless the user 
understands the whole program from beginning to end, the 
alteration of parts v of it , maly cause unforseen and 
sometimes unexpected mistakes. One hears comments from 
some of the existing model-builders such as "the program 
is absolutely vast I don't think there is any one who 
understands the whole thing all the way through". Some 
one else operating one of the major models said "the 
problem with the way we define our language statements at 
the moment is that they are uncheckable".
In order to solve the usability/flexibility dilemma it 
was necessary for a new language to be written which 
would be specifically adapted to the requirements of tax- 
benefit modelling. This language is much closer to 
natural language than any of the programming languages 
used in the model described in chapter two (with the 
exception of the language used for entering policies into 
the DHSS Policy Simulation Model). POM is sufficiently 
close to English for some one to read a policy definition 
which they have never seen before and understand it 
without reference to a specialist manual. To illustrate 
this point compare the fragment of the pascal program in 
figure 6.1 to the PSL statement in figure 6.2. POM is 
supplied with a set of definitions of all the major taxes 
and benefits in the British system. These definitions 
are sufficiently comprehensible to the new user so that 
the dangers of causing unexpected mistakes by altering 
them are small enough to be acceptable.
POM is in effect a synthesis of the source code and 
object code approaches. The user is required to enter 
new equations in source code (or to adapt old ones) but
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many of the features of POM never need to be altered. 
The procedures which produce output tables and handle the 
data, for example, never need to be altered by the user 
and cannot be as these are supplied in the form of object 
code. In fact the entire program is supplied in the form 
of object code, and although the user is required to 
enter policy definitions in the form of source code this 
source code is not transformed into object code through 
the use of a compiler. POM uses an alternative procedure 
which is described below.
6.2.2 Interpreted Code vs Compiled Code
With the existing object code programs the user's policy 
choices are severely restricted by the menu system. For 
example, the user may enter a new number to alter a 
benefit or tax rate. With POM the user can define a new 
policy by typing in a statement such as that shown in 
figure 6.2. POM has a built in screen editor to allow 
the user to do this. This editor has the normal features 
of a word processing program. The user can move the 
cursor about the screen, search for words, delete lines, 
and save information to a file and read the file at a 
later date. In addition it has a series of pop-up menus 
containing the names of all the variables and their 
associated value labels. This is described more fully in 
the "User Interface" chapter. When the user has written
a given statement it is not translated into object code
to become a separate program. Instead a two stage 
process takes place.
First the statement is "parsed". This term is derived 
from the concept of parsing in English literature: the 
analysis of a sentence's grammar. The parser checks that 
the statement is correct in terms of the grammar accepted 
by PSL. If it is an acceptable statement in PSL then it
can be used as a mathematical equation.
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If the statement is not correct then an error message 
will be shown on the screen. Schneiderman's (1982) 
research on error messages indicates that several design 
choices should be taken with respect to error messages in 
order to make them acceptable to the novice programmer. 
The error messages should be shown in upper and lower 
case to aid legibility. If there is a problem with a 
user-created variable name then this should be displayed 
as part of the error message. For example, if the user 
writes the statement "Income = Savings + Consumption" and 
the term consumption has not been defined previously, 
some parsers would simply say something like "Unknown 
Symbol". Ideally it should say "Error: 'Consumption' is 
an unknown symbol." POM's error messages have both these 
features. In addition POM's error handling has copied 
one helpful aspect of the computer language Turbo Pascal 
(Borland, 1987). When the user presses a key to remove 
the error message from the screen the cursor is placed in 
the user's text at the point where the error occurred.
As the user's statement is parsed each of the terms in 
the equation is transformed into a number which is stored 
in an array. The numbers in this array form a set of 
computer instructions called pseudo-code. The pseudo­
code is then passed to a mechanism within the program 
which operates on this pseudo-code to calculate the 
result of statement for each case within the data set. 
As the interpreter operates on each case (be it an 
individual, a tax unit, or household) it writes the 
result of the equation to a file so that for each case 
there is an answer which is saved on the disk.
The advantage of using a parser and an interpreter was 
that it was possible to construct a mechanism for 
checking the syntax of the PSL statements and computing 
their results entirely within POM. There was no need to 
exit from POM and transform the PSL statements into
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object code using a separate compiler program.
6.2.3 Iteration
Several steps have been taken to avoid some of the 
aspects of computer languages which make them difficult 
for novices to learn. Consider the problem of iteration 
(the performance of repetitive tasks). In a computer 
language one needs to use some kind of control structure 
to achieve this. Figure 6.1 shows a fragment of Pascal 
which could be used to calculate a household's total 
household income (this fragment of code has been written 
specifically for this illustration).
It is no exaggeration to assert that even this small 
procedure would seem very threatening to some one who is 
not familiar with computer languages. In lines 2 to 15 
of figure 6.1 the constants, variables and data 
structures to be used in the procedure are declared. The 
information about incomes is stored in a record called 
household_variables. In lines 18 to 26 the control 
structure for iteration is defined. The "Repeat" word in 
line 18 begins the iteration and everything between it 
and the the "Until" word is repeated until the last 
member of the household is found. In line 26 there is a 
test to see if the last member of the household has been 
reached. It is assumed for the purposes of this 
procedure that every member of the household has a valid 
value recorded for the variable "sex" and that if this 
variable is missing then the last person in the household 
has been reached.
Figure 6.2 shows an equivalent procedure in PSL to 
compute total household income. No variable declarations 
are necessary in PSL. The new variable "Total_Income" on 
line 1 does not need to be declared on a separate line as 
it does on line 15 of Figure 6.1. However once it has 
been assigned a value as in line 2 it cannot be re­
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assigned a value in a later equation. If the user 
attempts to create a variable and inadvertently gives it 
the same name as one which has already been created, the 
program will display an error message indicating that 
this variable name has already been used. This prevents 
a common type of error in programming. Solway, Ehrlich, 
Bonar, and Greenspan (1982) found that of a sample of 
novice programmers some 27 per cent "mushed" variables 
(i.e. they used the same variable incorrectly in two 
roles). It is of course possible to use a variable once 
it has been created in PSL. However it can only be used 
to help assign a value to another new variable; it cannot 
acquire a new value itself. The income variables 
"Earnings" and "lnvestment_Income" are displayed in 
special "pop-up" windows by POM. Thus they are do not 
need to be declared in a formal way as they are in line 6 
to 14 of figure 6.1. The term "Total_Household" is a 
function which has been specifically designed for PSL. 
The term "Total_Household" is always followed by a pair 
of brackets which contain a mathematical expression. The 
result of this expression is calculated for each member 
of the household and then the sum of these results is 
then returned as the answer. (The total income equations 
in figures 6.1 and 6.2 are purely illustrative. In 
practice pensions, annuities, and benefits would have to 
be included in a total income calculation).
The use of various functions of this type makes it 
possible to avoid the use of any control structures in 
PSL for the purposes of iteration. This saves the 
potential user a great deal of confusion. In the 
language Pascal, for example, there are three different 
control structures to perform iteration : the "While ... 
Do" construct, the "Repeat ... Until" construct, and the 
"For X := Y to Z do" construct. Studies of the 
experiences of people learning computer programming for 
the first time indicate that control structures are a
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major problem for them. Solway, Ehrlich, Bonar and 
Greenspan (1982 : 29) conducted a study of programming 
students and found that
The errors in the students programs stemmed 
from two main sources: students had
difficulty with the syntax and semantics of 
various programming language constructs, and 
they had difficulty determining which
constructs to use and how to coordinate them 
into a unified whole.
The approach used by PSL avoids any need for the user of 
POM to deal with control structures when defining a tax 
or benefit.
The abolition of control structures for iteration means 
that PSL programs are linear in form. Someone reading a 
series of PSL statements would see a series of sentences 
which follow each other in a logical sequence down the 
page as if one were reading a book. This is entirely 
different from a program with loops or other iterative 
control structures. In this case the reader must 
frequently go back to the beginning of a loop in order to 
understand the flow of execution of the program. With 
PSL however, the reading and comprehension is likely to 
be much closer to the user's experiences of reading 
normal literature, with statements following each other 
in a sequential linear order. Research by Allen (1982) 
indicates that this may well accelerate the learning 
process for novice users of PSL. Allen conducted an 
experiment which involved a sample of students defining a 
computer task in their own natural language. He found 
that
"the natural language solutions almost never 
included variable declarations, data type
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specifications, or dimensioning of arrays. 
Moreover natural language almost always 
followed a linear structure."
(Allen, 1982: 10).
6.2.4 Branching
The ability of a computer program to perform different 
operations in different circumstances may be referred to 
as "branching". This is one of the most powerful aspects 
of computer programming and can be performed in a number 
of different ways. PSL's approach is to use an "if ... 
then" construct. In English this might be used as 
follows. "If taxable income is less than 15,000 pounds 
per annum then Income Tax equals 25 % of Taxable Income". 
In PSL this could be expressed as follows
If Taxable_Income > £ 15000 per_annum then
Income_Tax = 25% of Taxable_Income. [ 1 3
This is not so far from English as to be too threatening 
to the novice user. To perform multiple branching the 
construct is extended to "If...Then...Else", with a 
further expression following the else. The user can 
places as many "Else If"s (with corresponding expressions 
and conditions) as are desired. An alternative method of 
branching are constructs which resemble the Pascal Case 
construct. Figure 6.3 gives an example of this which 
assigns political party colours according to party 
affiliation. There is a similar construct known as a 
"switch" in the language C (Allan, 1985).
Research evidence exists to support the view that 
branching is best performed by the "If...Then...Else" 
construct rather than by programming devices like the 
case statement shown in figure 6.3. Allen (1982) 
conducted a series of tests to find out how a sample of 
people would specify a computing task in their own
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natural language (rather than a computing language). A 
survey of these specifications showed that "... natural 
language ... follows a ... structure with branching only 
by if-then statements" (Allen, 1982: 10). PSL achieves
this object.
Figure 6.3 Example of a Pascal Case Statement
Case Party_Affiliation of
Conservative : Colour := Blue;
6.3 Policy Output
Chapter 3 outlined a problem which is common to all 
computer models of tax-benefit policy except the PSI 
model which is based on a statistical analysis package. 
This is the problem of constraining the user to a narrow 
range of output tables. Any specific set of output
tables will embody a set of value judgements by the 
person who selected them. This presents a flexibility 
problem similar to the dilemma of entering policies 
through a menu system. Just as the menus will exclude 
certain policies, a system of predetermined output tables 
will exclude the possibility of examining policies 
according to certain criteria.
POM allows the user to analyse policies according to any 
of the variables contained in the data set. A typical 
table produced by one of the existing models would be to 
show the average income before and after a policy change 
for a set of family types. In POM however one could 
analyse the policy change according to family types or by 
region, housing tenure, or any other variable. The
Labour
Democrat
: Colour := Red;
: Colour := Orange;
end;
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variables which make up the row or column headings can be 
selected by the user. Continuous variables (that is 
those which do not have a small number of named 
categories like regions) can also be used as row or 
column headings if they are first transformed into a new 
variable with a small number of categories.
POM thus solves the flexibility of output problem by 
giving the user a tabulator which allows the standard 
forms of output but also allows the user to go beyond
these by specifying tables with any combination of row
and column variables which exist within the data.
The variables which are to be displayed in each of the 
cells of the table may also be chosen. These can be
shown as averages, cell counts, column percentages, row
percentages, or percentages of all cases. The user may
also request to see the averages of two different 
variables shown in the same cell. This is useful for 
comparing the income of cases before and after a policy 
change.
The flexibility of POM's tabulator is just as important
as its policy input mechanisms in making POM a model 
which is suitable for a pluralist society.
6.4 Equipment
Chapter one indicated the problems which would arise for 
a small pressure group attempting to use the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES). One of the most important of 
these would be the the FES is supplied in a format which 
is suitable for expensive main frame computers rather 
than small micro-computers. If POM was designed to work 
on a main frame computer this would militate against its 
effectiveness as a pluralist tax-benefit model. The
computer resources of opposition parties and pressure
groups would make a main frame based program relatively
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useless as they tend to have nothing more expensive than 
micro-computers at their disposal.
Once the decision to make POM compatible with a micro­
computer was accepted, it was still necessary to select a 
type of micro-computer to use. When the current project 
started in 1985 two types of micro-computer were clearly 
more numerous than their rivals. In worldwide terms 
there were over three million each of the IBM personal 
computer and the Commodore 64. Their nearest rivals 
among the other micro-computers all existed in quantities 
of less than a million. The Commodore 64 had to be ruled 
out on the grounds that it was primarily designed to be 
used for entertainment in the home. Its Random Access 
Memory was only 64 Kilobytes and it was rarely used in 
conjunction with hard disk drives (which were necessary 
for storing a sufficient quantity of data from the FES). 
The IBM personal computer (PC) are owned by many pressure 
groups and academic institutions micro-computers made by 
other companies which were sufficiently close in design 
to be able to run the same software.
One other computer equipment choice flowed from a 
decision to give the user a quick and flexible method of 
communicating with the computer, in addition to its 
keyboard. POM has been designed so that it can be used 
in conjunction with a Mouse (a hand held pointer which 
can be rolled around a desktop to move a corresponding 
pointer around the computer screen). The decision to 
include a mouse was to encourage the users of POM to 
create variable names sufficiently long that they can 
fully describe the concept that they represent. The 
requirement to use self-explanatory variable labels is 
crucial in creating an environment in which the user will 
create programs which will be comprehensible by other 
people. The mouse allows the user to point at a term 
like "Self_Employment_Income" and insert it into the text
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by pressing a button on the mouse rather than typing each 
letter in at the keyboard.
It was found that the Family Expenditure Survey data (see 
below) used by POM occupied between 1 to 1.5 megabytes of 
disk space. This exceeds the capacity of floppy disk 
drives so it was decided to use POM in conjunction with a 
hard disk.
The most economical method of acquiring such hardware 
which was consistent with these decisions was through the 
purchase of an Amstrad 1512 computer. This comes with a 
Microsoft compatible mouse. To this a 20 megabyte 
Seagate Hard Disk Drive was added. The Amstrad's 512 
Kilobytes of Random Access Memory were increased to 640 
Kilobytes by the addition of sixteen memory chips.
POM was created using the version of Pascal produced by 
Borland International: Turbo Pascal. There are currently 
over 400,000 Turbo Pascal users worldwide (Borland, 1987) 
which may make it the most widely used compiler in 
existence. Turbo Pascal provides a quick and efficient 
compiler. The source code for a full screen text editor 
is available with Turbo Pascal which was used for the 
construction of POM's text editor (though many new
features were added to this, such as pop-up windows of
variable names).
6.5 The Data
The data which POM performs its analyses on is taken from 
the Family Expenditure Survey. This is the data set used 
in all of the existing tax-benefit models based on survey 
data with the exception of the Inland Revenue Personal 
Income Tax Model which uses the Inland Revenue Survey of 
Personal Incomes. The Survey of Personal Incomes would
have been unsuitable because it excludes people whose
taxable incomes are below the tax threshold (which
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includes nearly all of the unemployed and many people in 
receipt of in-work benefits). The FES was selected in 
preference to other surveys which include income data 
such as the General Household Survey because it is the 
only survey which has both expenditure data and income 
data. Excluding expenditure data would have precluded 
the possibility of modelling the effects of indirect 
taxes like VAT.
6.5.1 Structure of FES
The households included in the FES are selected by a
complicated method which combines elements of random 
selection and stratification to ensure that different 
regions and types of area within the country are 
selected.
Selecting households from the FES is a four stage
process. The first stage is to select Primary Sampling 
Units (PSUs) from among the "administrative areas" of 
Great Britain. For the purposes of the FES these areas 
are taken to be the district councils in Wales and 
Scotland (but excluding Scottish islands), and the 
district and London borough councils in England. This 
gives a total of 455 areas (Kelmsley, W.F.F., Redpath, 
R.U., Holmes, M. , 1980).
In each three month period 168 PSUs are selected from
these areas. In order to make the selection the areas
are allocated to a number of categories according to two 
criteria. The first is a definition of region which is 
taken to be the eight standard regions of England, three 
subdivisions of Wales, and four subdivisions of Scotland. 
Within these geographical regions the areas are further 
subdivided according to a categorisation of area type. 
One category consists of Metropolitan Districts, London 
Boroughs, and the Strathclyde Region. A further three 
categories are defined as the remaining councils
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separated into those with a population density under 0.9 
people per acre, those with a density higher than 3.2 
people per acre, and those areas with densities between 
these two levels.
Once the administrative areas have been divided into 
these secondary categories a calculation is done which 
estimates the proportion of the British population which 
resides in each secondary category. The 168 Primary 
Sampling Units are then allocated to these secondary 
categories according to the proportions of the population 
in each. Inevitably, the number of PSUs does not exactly 
match the number which would result from multiplying 168 
by the population proportion for a particular secondary 
category. In these cases the nearest whole number is 
selected. For example, the theoretical number of PSUs in 
the Metropolitan District category of the Northern Region 
of England would be 3.71, whereas it is in fact allocated 
4 PSUs. It is admitted that these differences entail 
"slight distortions in the selection probabilities" . 
Some of these secondary categories have a population so 
small that they can be represented in the sample by one 
PSU, then there is no further categorisation. Where 
there is more than one PSU in a secondary category then 
the secondary category is further stratified according to 
the proportion of residences with a rateable value over 
400 pounds. So the aforesaid Metropolitan District 
Category of England's Northern Region (with four PSUs) 
would have its district councils subdivided into 
different groups based on the rateable value criterion. 
The bands of the proportion of rateable value would be 
determined so that there should be roughly equal numbers 
of councils in each of the four PSUs.
The result of this process is to divide the 455 
administrative areas into 168 categories. In each 
quarter one area is chosen from each of these 168
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categories using random numbers. Each selection from a 
category is independent of any previous selections.
When the PSU has been selected four Secondary Sampling 
Units (SSUs) are selected. Thus there are 672 SSUs. 
These a local government wards. They are selected 
randomly within a process which ensure that the chance of 
selection is proportional to the ward's size.
The next stage is to select 16 addresses from each SSU. 
This gives a quarterly total sample of 2,668 addresses. 
The sampling frame is the electoral register. Selection 
at this stage is truly random. The number of electors is 
divided by 16 to give a sampling interval. A number is 
chosen at random to select the first address. The 
remaining households are selected by adding multiples of 
the sampling interval to the original random number.
This sampling process produces a yearly total of 10,752 
addresses. Roughly 5-6 per cent of these addresses are 
then excluded due to the impracticability of obtaining 
meaningful data from them. There are a variety of 
reasons why addresses are so excluded. Some have no full 
time residents as they are holiday homes. Some are 
empty. Some represent a mixed domestic and commercial 
use such that it would not be possible to separate normal 
household spending from its business spending.
6.5.2 Standard Errors and Design Factors
The usual standard error equation for sample surveys may 
not be appropriate for the FES because it is not a simple 
random sample. In order to take account of the 
stratified and clustered nature of the FES a more complex 
measure of accuracy needs to be used. Figure 6.4 gives a 
selection of the percentage standard errors of the FES 
measured by both the usual standard deviation equation 
and by a formula which takes into account the complex
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sample design. The difference between these two sets of 
figures is not so great as to indicate that POM should 
not illustrate the significance of results by the use of 
simple standard deviation equations.
Figure 6.4 Measures of Accuracy for the Family 
Expenditure Survey
Percentage Percentage
Standard Error Standard Error
Standard Formula Stratified Formula
Housing 1.1 1.5
Fuel 1.1 1.5
Food 0.7 0.8
Alcohol 1.8 2.0
Tobacco 1.5 1.8
Clothing 2.0 2.2
Durable Goods 3.7 3.7
Other Goods 1.4 1.7
Transport 1.8 2.0
Services 2.2 2.4
Miscellaneous 4.5 4.8
Total 0.8 1.0
Source: Dept of Environment, 1978
6.5.3 Response Rates
The FES requires income and demographic data about the
entire household and requires each person over 16 to keep 
a diary for two weeks of their personal expenditure.
Given the essentially private nature of much of this 
information it is not surprising that a substantial
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proportion of the sample refuse to cooperate. A payment 
of five pounds is offered to each person who keeps a 
diary of spending. However it is not thought that the 
size of this incentive payment is the crucial factor in
maintaining the response rate. It is also thought to be
difficult to motivate individuals to comply in order to 
support its general aims. Many informants probably agree 
to keep and maintain records more to please the 
interviewer personally than in pursuit of some ideal 
statistical purpose (Kelmsley, W.F.F., Redpath, R.U., 
Holmes, M., 1980).
Of those households which failed to provide usable data 
the overwhelming cause was refusal to cooperate with the 
Survey. A much smaller proportion promised to comply 
with the survey but did not do so, an even smaller
proportion could not be contacted at all. For 
illustrative purposes consider the 1978 figures:- 27.1 % 
refused to cooperate with the survey, 3.8 % promised to 
cooperate but did not do so, and 1.2 % could not be
contacted. This resulted in a response rate of 67.8 %. 
Most of the response rates in the decade of the 1970s 
varied in the range 68% - 70%.
Much attention has been paid to the problem of 
differential response within the FES. This is important 
because a bias enters the survey results if specific 
types of household are under-represented. Some early 
studies based on data from 1964 to 1966 showed that the 
response rate to the FES tends to fall as rateable values 
rise, but tends to increase the more people there are in 
the household.
The most thorough examination of response bias was based 
on the 1971 Census returns. This meant that it was 
possible to examine the census returns of all the 
households sampled for the 1971 FES whether they
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cooperated with the survey or not (Kelmsley, W.F.F., 
Redpath, R.U., Holmes, M., 1980). In 97 per cent of
cases the Census Offices were able to identify the
addresses provided by those in charge of the FES. The
most significant results of this comparison were as
follows: -
Much the most striking result was the 
variation in response with the age of Head of 
Household or of the housewife; there was a 
regular decline in response of about 2 per 
cent for each increase of 5 years of age, 
ranging from a response over 80 per cent for
persons under 30 years to below 65 per cent
for those above 70 years. Households without 
children produced a response rate of about 66 
per cent while those with children had a rate 
of 75 per cent or more. Another breakdown 
displaying considerable variation was that of 
employment status of Head of Household;
employees other than managers showed a
response of 72 per cent or over, while for
self-employed those with employees produced 
an average rate of only 56 per cent, and 
those working on their own rate of 63 per
cent.
(Kelmsley, W.F.F., Redpath, R.U.,
Holmes, M., 1980:30-31)
These differences in response rates were thought to be
sufficiently important for the DHSS to adjust for them in
its tax-benefit simulations. When predictions of the 
effects of a tax-benefit change are produced by the DHSS, 
households are multiplied by differing factors which take 
into account their over or under-representation within 
the FES. A similar, though more complex, procedure is
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used to adjust for response bias within the LSE's TAXMOD 
package.
Ideally, a future version of POM should have facilities 
for correcting for response bias. Due to constraints of 
time, it has not been possible to include these in the 
current prototype version.
6.5.4 Reliability of the FES
A number of research projects have been undertaken in 
order to assess the reliability of the FES.
One of the approaches has been to measure how many of the 
answers to the FES could be given exactly as opposed to 
answers which could not be remembered, had to be
estimated from memory, or had to be altered by the
surveyor after the event (for example, when the 
respondent gave the wrong value for some item of standard 
cost such as the television licence). A study based on 
this technique was done in the fourth quarter of 1978. 
1,648 households from that year's FES were used. In each 
case the interview schedule was marked to indicate if the
respondent did not know an amount, needed to estimate it,
or it had to be corrected after the event. On average 
the respondents were able to determine exactly 93 per 
cent of the questions on the household schedule. However 
there was difficulty with particular forms of payments 
which were not straightforward. Gas and electricity 
payments were complicated by standing order payments, 
special budgeting schemes, and slot meter rebates. Only 
83 per cent of electricity and gas payment questions 
could be answered exactly. A similar problem arises with 
credit card transactions because of the complexity of 
measuring the balance brought forward from a previous 
account, the interest charged, and the amount 
outstanding. Only 87 per cent of credit card questions 
yielded exact determinations from the respondent.
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Similar problems arise with some of the income 
categories. 19 per cent of the self-employed said they 
did not know the amount of their profit and another 15 
per cent had to estimate it. Investment income was 
similarly problematic. In only 60 per cent of cases was 
there a direct answer about the amount of annual 
interest. Of the remainder 11 per cent estimated the 
amount and 29 per cent said they did not know.
The other main approach has been to multiply the FES 
information so as to provide national estimates for the 
different categories of income and spending and then 
compare these results to macroeconomic data collected for 
the National Income Blue Book (NIBB). This data is 
collected by entirely different techniques as described 
in the United Kingdom National Accounts Sources and 
Methods. HMSO, London (CSO, 1985). To the extent that 
the National Accounts data is collected separately it is 
useful for cross-checking. The estimates of individual 
categories of spending makes use of surveys of the 
turnover of retailers and other traders. It also uses 
figures on the supply of specific commodities such as the 
estimates of gas and electricity supplied by the gas
board and the electricity board. However to some extent 
the National Accounts estimates make use of sample 
surveys like the FES, so to this extent comparing the FES 
to another set of statistics which are partly based on 
the FES may be of doubtful value. The national accounts 
income data are also based on a variety of sources. Here 
is an illustrative, rather than exhaustive list of
sources. A one per cent sample of PAYE returns and
other Income Tax records is used to estimate the income 
from wages, salaries, and self-employment. However for
incomes below the tax threshold the National Accounts 
rely on the FES. Income received by groups which are 
badly covered by the Income Tax system like farm workers
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is estimated by separate surveys of income by the
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food. Armed Forces 
pay estimates are supplied by the Ministry of Defence.
This comparison with National Accounts indicates that 
certain commodities are under-recorded in the FES such as 
alcohol spending where the grossed up FES figure is only 
58 per cent of the NIBB total, tobacco which is 21 per 
cent less, and durable goods which are also 21 per cent
less (Kelmsley, Redpath, Holmes, 1980). Several theories
have been advanced to explain these discrepancies.
It is possible that the respondents falsify the reports 
of their spending on tobacco and alcohol because of the 
social stigma attached to such spending. There is some 
evidence to contradict this view. In 1976 a project 
called the Family Budget Survey Experiment was carried 
out which required the respondents to record their 
spending, but also to balance their income and 
expenditure over the period. The process of matching 
income and outgoings would have made it impossible for 
the respondents to conceal alcohol and tobacco spending 
(without some complex action to under-record other 
items). The results of this survey did not show 
significantly different spending patterns from the FES.
Another explanation of the discrepancy between the FES 
national estimates and the NIBB figures may be that in 
making the comparison there has been an underestimate of 
the proportion of NIBB alcohol and tobacco spending which 
is due to business and institutional spending rather than 
personal spending. As the NIBB figures cover all 
expenditure an adjustment has to be made to identify the 
quantity of spending which is due to the personal sector.
It is also possible that the process of keeping a diary 
of spending makes respondents think more carefully about
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their budgeting and alter their behaviour by spending 
less on alcohol and tobacco.
Under-reporting of investment income data may occur 
because the respondents feel that this is too 
confidential a subject to give information about. About 
20 respondents per year refuse to answer all the 
questions on investment income on the grounds of privacy.
Much of the discrepancy between NIBB figures and the 
grossed up FES estimates is probably due to response 
bias, the difficulty of adjusting the National Accounts 
Totals so that they represent only the domestic sector 
the problems of research design (such as the failure to 
include major capital purchases in the 14 day survey 
period). Ideally, POM should also include facilities to 
adjust the data for these imperfections in the FES.
6.5.5 Data Storage by POM
POM operates on the 7081 households drawn from the 1984 
FES, which was the latest year that FES data was 
available at the time of POM's construction. A selection 
of the most important variables was taken from the 
survey. The values for each of these variables is 
attached to records for each individual within the 
household. This means that benefits or taxes which 
affect individuals can be analysed as well as those which 
affect households. This would allow, for example, a 
thorough analysis of the Community Charge as well as the 
existing local tax rates.
The data is stored in the inverted matrix format 
described in the section on the IGOTM model in chapter 2. 
The main reason for this is that the data may be stored 
in a far more compact form by "run-coding" the data so 
that sequences of identical values are compressed. This 
has meant that the data for the 7081 households has been
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compressed from four megabytes to roughly one megabyte.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the broad design decisions that 
were taken in the construction of POM. In the following 
chapter the structure of POM is described in more detail.
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7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explained in general terms the 
reasoning behind the design of the Policy Option Model. 
This chapter gives a detailed explanation of the features 
of POM which enable it to combine flexibility and
usability. In so far as this chapter gives a technical
description of the workings of POM it will inevitably be
heavy going for the non-specialist reader. However there 
has been a strenuous effort to explain technical terms 
where they are used. While the non-expert reader may find 
the meaning of the text hazy in places it should never be 
opaque.
The sections in this chapter follow the steps a user 
would go through to simulate a policy, starting with the 
initialisation of the data when POM is first invoked from 
the computer's operating system. It continues through 
the process of specifying a policy, calculating the
effects on each case, and finally producing a table to 
show the effects of that policy. The specific 
arrangement is as follows. Section 7.2 gives a general 
overview of the structure of the program. Section 7.3 
Explains the way the data is stored and section 7.4 shows 
how this data is prepared for use when the program is 
first started. Section 7.5 describes the editor. 7.6 
outlines the features of the computer language which has 
been designed for POM, the Policy Simulation Language 
(PSL). Section 7.7 describes the Lexical Analyser, POM's 
mechanism to read the words and numbers which the user 
enters on the screen. Section 7.8 describes the Parser 
which checks that the user supplied statements are 
correct and translates them into a numerical format which 
POM can use to perform calculations using the 
interpreter, which is explained in section 7.9. Section 
7.10 describes the mechanism for producing output tables, 
the Tabulator. Section 7.11 concludes the chapter.
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7.2 Overall Structure
Here is a brief overview of the mechanisms within POM 
which allow the simulation of policies. They are shown 
in the order in which they would be needed to simulate a 
policy.
Firstly, there is a full screen text-editor which allows 
the user to type in a set of tax-benefit equations at a 
computer keyboard with the aid of a mouse to enter long 
variable names.
Secondly, there is a parser and interpreter which 
translates these equations into a form which is 
comprehensible by the computer, calculates the answer to 
each equation, and writes the resulting answers to a 
file.
Thirdly, there is a tabulator which constructs tables to 
show statistics about selected variables.
An overall impression of POM's structure can be seen in 
Figure 7.1 below. Figure 7.1 follows the conventions of 
a "Warnier-Orr Diagram” as defined by Higgins (1979). 
Describing any large program in diagrammatic form is 
necessarily complex. The Warnier-Orr diagram attempts to 
preserve as much detail as possible while presenting the 
concepts in an understandable way. As one reads from the 
top to the bottom of Figure 8.1 one sees the order in 
which the tasks must be completed. As one moves from the 
left to the right one goes from the more general to the 
more specific descriptions of each task. The left hand 
side of figure 8.1 shows that the beginning of the task 
is to enter the tax-benefit rules through the editor. 
The second stage is parsing and interpreting these rules, 
and the third stage is making a table or tables. Each of 
these stages is described in a separate section below.
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First it is necessary to consider the information which 
POM is based on.
7.3 Data Storage
POM uses a method of data storage similar to that 
employed by the IGOTM model. Each variable is stored in a 
separate data file. The data is stored in such a way 
that long sequences of the same value are compressed, in 
the manner described above in the section about the 
IGOTM model in chapter 3.
To understand how this compression is achieved consider 
the following series of numbers:-
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,75,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 .
Clearly there is much wasteful repetition. POM could 
store this series as follows
255,18,0,75,255,11,0
The number 255 is an example of a "run marker", which 
means that the following two numbers have a special 
significance. The number immediately following a run 
marker shows the number of times a given value is 
repeated. The following number is the value itself. 
This is particularly useful in the case of benefits such 
as the mobility allowance which are only received by a 
small proportion of the population. Although there is a 
separate value for each of the 18,558 individuals in the 
sample, the mobility allowance data file is less than a 
tenth of the size of the larger files for variables like 
age because there are very few cases where two
consecutive people have the same age.
The individuals within the file have been sorted into
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order so as to preserve the relationships between 
different family and household members. All of the cases 
within the same household are stored together. Within 
this grouping the cases are sorted into different tax 
units, with the head of household's tax unit at the 
beginning. To illustrate this consider the case of a 
married man with three school age children and two older 
children in employment who count as separate tax units.
The married man, his wife and three younger children
would be the first five cases, and the two working 
children would be the last two cases in the household. 
Within each tax unit, people are sorted into order with
the head of tax unit the first case, the wife as the
second case, and dependants under the age of 25 coming 
afterwards.
7.4 Data Initialisation
Though the process of initialising the data is not 
intended to be noticeable by the user, it is important to 
understand how this is done, if one is to comprehend the 
structure of the program. When POM is first invoked from 
the computer's operating system, a message will appear 
at the top of the screen requesting the user to wait 
while the essential information about the data is read 
into the computer's memory.
What is happening at this stage is that a series of lists 
of file names is read into the computer's memory. Each 
of these file names refers to a separate variable. For 
example, the file "RELHOH.BYR" contains the data about 
the relationship to the head of household for each 
individual in the data set. At the beginning of each file 
there is a "header" in which salient details about each 
variable are stored. When POM is first invoked the 
header of each variable is read into POM's array of 
variable information. POM stores three important pieces 
of information.
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Firstly, a long descriptive variable label is read in 
(e.g. Relationship_To__Head_Of_Household). This will be 
the name that will appear in pop-up windows which are 
described in the user interface chapter.
Secondly POM will read the file header to see if there is
a set of value labels which apply to the variable. In 
the case of "Relationship_To_Head_Of_Household" this is 
true, so each of the value labels and the number they 
represent will be stored in POM's memory. For example, 
the number "0" refers to "Head Of Household", within 
"Relationship_To_Head_Of_Household". Each value label 
and the number which corresponds to it is read into 
memory until POM reaches the end of the list of value 
labels.
The third crucial fact about each variable is the number 
of cases which have been written to the file. The number 
does not vary for the raw data variables from the Family
Expenditure Survey. Each of the raw data files has
information about 18558 individuals. However, the user 
has the ability to experiment with a smaller number of 
cases. This means that a user-created variable might 
only contain information about the first 100 people in 
the data set. Obviously, it would be a serious mistake 
for the user to create a variable which needed to access 
other data files with a smaller number of cases. 
Therefore POM will check to ensure that this does not 
occur - by looking at the case number which is stored in 
the header block, each time a variable is used. After 
the case number the file stores the data itself.
The final stage of data initialisation involves creating 
the pop-up menus for each type of variable. The 
individual level variables, tax unit variables, and 
household variables are all stored in separate arrays.
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Once they have been stored in an array, they are sorted 
into alphabetical order.
This data initialisation sequence means that the user has 
access to all of the variable names and value labels from 
the outset. Not only are the names and labels of the 
original data variables available, but also any variables 
created during a previous session of using POM.
In addition to the variable array, POM also creates a 
file array which can hold the values of data which are
being read from the disk. When POM is first invoked the
file array is empty. It is like a set of folders ready 
to have files placed in them. When the first file is
opened its information is stored in the first element of 
the file array, when the second data file is opened it is 
stored in the second element, and so on.
7.5 The Editor
The users of POM are given a facility for writing a set 
of rules to define their policies. This takes the form 
of a full screen editor which is based on a standard set 
of editor routines produced by the company Borland 
International. For further technical details about these 
refer to Borland (1985).
Refinements have been added to the standard editor to 
allow the user to consult lists of variable names and
value labels. These names and labels are read into the
computer's memory during the data initialisation process 
described above. Variable names and value labels may be 
inserted into the text through the use of a mouse or the 
cursor and return keys. The editor part of the program 
is described at greater length in the user interface 
chapter and in the user manual (Annex A). Reference 
should also be made to chapter 10 or the user manual for 
information about how commands are invoked from the
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keyboard.
7.6 Policy Simulation Language
This section will not attempt to provide a full technical 
specification of the Policy Simulation Language (PSL). A 
full account is given in the user manual in Annex A. 
Chapter six outlined the broad strategy of PSL, which 
allows the user to undertake computer programming without 
any complex structures for branching ("if ... Then" 
decisions) and abolishes all need for iteration 
constructs. This section describes some of the features 
of PSL which no other languages have in layman's terms 
without attempting an esoteric description of the 
computer programming which was necessary to achieve them.
7.6.1 Policy Simulation Functions
PSL has six functions which perform actions on entire 
households or tax units. They consist of three pairs of 
functions. Each pair of functions performs the same 
action at two different levels of analysis - the 
Household Level and the Tax Unit Level. In the following 
discussion the term "case" is taken to be a generic term 
for the unit of analysis and may refer both to households 
and tax units.
The "Any" functions ("Any_In_Household" and
"Any_In_Tax_Unit") process each person within a case 
until a specific set of conditions is true for any 
person. For example, the following statement would be 
acceptable in PSL:-
Single_Parent = True if Head__Of_Household' s
Marital_Status = Single and Any_In_Tax_Unit(Age > 18).
In this case POM will examine each person within the tax 
unit to find if any of them are under 18. If none of 
them are it will return the value false. If one of them
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is it will return the value true, if the head of the tax 
unit is single. After one person has been found who 
matches the appropriate characteristics the function will 
stop executing.
The "Total" functions ("Total_Household",
"Total__Tax_Unit") must be followed by an equation 
enclosed in brackets. POM will calculate the result of 
the equation for each person in the case and add the 
value of these results together across the entire case.
For example the following:-
Household_Income = Total_Household
(Earnings + Investment_Income +
Pensions + Self_Employment_Income + Benefits)
would calculate the total income for every member of the 
household.
The "number" functions ("Number_In_Household",
"Number_In_Tax_Unit") are followed by a pair of brackets 
containing a set of conditions. These functions will 
keep examining the circumstances of every person in the 
case until the last person has been found. Unlike the 
"any" functions they will not stop when one person 
matches the given conditions. This can be very useful in 
counting people who match a given set of complicated 
conditions, such as those people who are considered to be 
adult non-dependants for the purposes of Housing Benefit.
The following statement attempts to identify adult non­
dependants by counting those who are not the head of 
household but are heads of their own (different) tax 
unit.
Adult_Non_Dependants = Number__In_Household 
((Relationship_To_Head_of_Household<>Head_Of_Household) and 
(Relationship_To_Head_of_Tax_Unit=Head_0f_Tax_Unit) ) .
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7.6.2 Policy Simulation Operators
PSL supplies various operators which carry out 
mathematical tasks in such a way as to make PSL
statements closer to English descriptions of tax benefit 
policy.
For example, there is a "Per_Annum" operator which 
divides the number preceding it by 52. The resulting 
value can be used in conjunction with the Family 
Expenditure Survey (where monetary values are weekly 
amounts) without the need to perform a division in the 
statement supplied by the user. This helps to preserve 
readability. For example, in most computer languages 
one would need to assign a value to the single person's 
tax allowance as follows
Single_Persons_Allowance = 50.09
whereas in PSL it can be written as
Single_Persons_Allowance = £ 2605 Per_Annum.
It should be stressed that the division by 52 is 
performed by POM once at the start of processing the 
data; the use of "Per_Annum" does not lead to the 
computing inefficiency of performing the division for 
each case in data set.
It is also useful to note the pound sign in front of 
2605. This indicates that the following value is a 
figure in pounds. As the FES stores monetary values in 
tenths of a penny the concept of 2605 pounds would 
otherwise have to be written as ”2605000”, which is 
obviously less readable.
The pound sign and the "Per_Annum" are examples of
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"unary" operators because they only carry out actions on 
one number unlike, for example, the addition operator "+" 
which must have two values to calculate the total of. In 
the sense of being unary operators the pound sign and 
"Per_Annum" are similar. In terms of the order in which 
they are placed within an equation they are totally 
different. The pound sign precedes the value it operates 
on, and is therefore a "pre-fix" operator. "Per_Annum" 
follows the value it operates on and is therefore a 
"post-fix" operator.
PSL has a further post-fix operator the percentage sign 
"%". This operator checks to see if the number preceding 
it is between 1 and 100, and if so it divides the result 
by a hundred (so 96% would become 0.96). This device has 
been included within PSL purely in order to preserve the 
readability of PSL to non-experts. Though the programmer 
saves little time by typing in 25% rather than 0.25, 
there can be little doubt that most people think of the 
basic rate of tax, for example, as 25% as opposed to
0.25.
In addition to these post-fix and pre-fix operators, PSL 
also has the more usual operators which operate on two 
values and are placed between them such as "+", "-", "*" 
(multiplication), and "/" (Division). "Of" may be used as 
an alternative to the multiplication operator more 
familiar to programmers Such operators are termed
"in__fix" operators. One special operator which has been 
developed for PSL is "Less". "Less" is like the 
subtraction operator except that it cannot return a value 
less than zero. This is useful in many situations. Take 
the case of an equation to define the taxable income of a 
single person. One might use the following equation:-
Taxable Income = Income - £ 2605 Per Annum.
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This would often produce the wrong answer because those 
people with incomes less than £ 2605 would end up with a
negative taxable income. In order to avoid this most 
programming languages would force the programmer to 
resort to clumsy solutions such as:-
If Income > £ 2605 then
Taxable_Income = Income - £ 2605 Per__Annum 
Else Taxable_Income = 0.
Within PSL however it is possible to express the same 
concept with the following equation
Taxable_Income = Income Less £ 2605 Per_Annum.
PSL also offers a special operator to be used with 
benefits which are tapered away as income rises. Take 
the example of a form of Housing Benefit which paid the 
claimant a benefit equal to 80 % of rent which would be
withdrawn by 20 pence for each pound of the claimant's 
income. Like the "Less" operator "Withdrawn_By" cannot 
produce an answer less than zero. In PSL it would be 
possible to write this as:-
Benefit = 80% of Rent Withdrawn_By 20% of (Income).
In a language like PASCAL, for example, one would have to 
define this as:-
If ((Income * 0.2) - (Rent * 0.8)) >= 0 then 
Benefit := (Rent * 0.8) - (Income * 0.2)
Else
Benefit := 0.
The effect of these operators is to speed up the 
programming of the PSL. The improvement of readability 
of PSL makes it easier for PSL statements to be checked,
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and for non-experts to read and comprehend statements 
which have been written by other people.
7.6.3 Policy Simulation Variable Names
PSL's variable names can be long enough to accommodate a 
combination of several words.
"Relationship_To_Head_Of__Household", "Pensions_-
And_Annuities", for example, are both acceptable. 
Arguably it would be better to shorten these names to 
"Relation" and "Pension" and the user would have the 
facility to do this. However in their present form they 
do illustrate the use of long variable names. In the 
case of variables which express a complicated concept and 
which are only seldom used it would often be right to use 
a very long variable name to express the concept clearly 
so that some one reading them several months after they 
are first written would be able to understand them and 
the context in which they are used.
When using long variable names users of the Policy Option 
Model have a major advantage over other computer 
programmers. POM gives the user easily accessible lists 
of variable names. Furthermore it gives the user a 
mechanism for inserting long variable names in the text 
without the necessity to type it in at the computer 
keyboard.
In order to inspect a list of variable names all the user 
has to do is use the "mouse". The mouse is a device 
which rolls around a flat surface such as a desktop. As 
the computer user moves the mouse in a given direction 
the computer screen's cursor moves in the same direction. 
While POM is operating the upper part of the computer 
screen displays three options for displaying variable 
names: "Household Variables", "Tax Unit Variables", and 
"Individual Variables". If the user points the mouse at 
one of these options and presses the return key an image
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appears in the middle of the computer screen displaying a 
list of variables of the appropriate type (either 
household, tax unit, or individual). These suddenly 
appearing images are called "pop-up windows" because they 
appear to pop up out of nowhere and when they are 
finished with they disappear without altering the 
appearance of the computer screen. Thus if the user was 
working on a series of rules and wanted to inspect the 
list of variable names it would be possible to access the 
pop-up window with the minimum of difficulty. Although 
the window would cover the user's text temporarily it 
would disappear completely and the user would be able to 
continue writing as if nothing had happened.
In order to use a variable name without typing it in all 
the user has to do is to point to it with the mouse and 
press the return key. The variable name will appear in 
the line of text the user is writing at the cursor 
position. Any text to the right of the cursor will be 
pushed forward. In this way insertions using POM's pop­
up windows are similar to insertions of text using a 
word-processing program.
7.6.4 Policy Simulation Pointer's
PSL supplies the user with an automatic facility for 
finding certain member's within a case namely the Head, 
the wife and the husband. . The four terms used are 
"Head_Of_Household's", "Head_of_Tax_Unit's", "Wife's", 
and "Husband's". When one of these pointers is used then 
the value of the variable immediately following the 
pointer is the value that applies to the person 
concerned. An example of the use of this concept would 
be as follows:-
If Head_Of_Household's Earnings > 0 and
Head__Of_Household's Wife's Earnings then 
Dual_Earner_Couple=True.
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Note that in the second line of this equation two
pointers are used after each other "Head_Of_Household' s 
Wife's". This is perfectly acceptable in PSL. To find
the wife of the head of tax unit one would say
"Head_Of_Tax_Unit's Wife's".
7.6.5 Policy Simulation Value Labels
The value labels in PSL are a very simple concept. They 
are used with variables which represent categories rather 
than quantities. When such variables are used it is 
possible to use them with an English Language term rather 
than a number to specify a particular category. For
example one could use the phrase "If Sex=Male" rather 
than "if Sex=1". Similar examples would be
"Region=Yorkshire" and "Tenure=Council".
As well as supplying such value labels with the raw data 
used by PSL it is also possible for the user to create 
new categorical variables and then use them with value 
labels. If the user wants to create a typology of 
families it would be possible to use statements such as:-
If Head_of_Household's Marital_Status = Single and 
Any_In_Tax_Unit(Age < 18) then 
Family_Type IS Single_Parent.
Note that in PSL the user is required to use the operator 
"IS" rather than an equals sign in order to assign a 
categorical value label rather than a numerical value. 
This will create a permanent set of such value labels 
which can be used by future equations which refer to the 
variable "Family_Type" (or whatever the user chooses to 
call it).
This facility should also have the effect of increasing
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Figure 7.2 POM Program Language Expressed 
In Backus-Naur Form
IDE:TIFIERS, OPERATORS, & MODIFIERS
<lc: i;er> ::= a ! b ! c ! d ! e ! f ! g  ! h ! 1 ! j ! k ! 1 ! m ! n ! o 
! p ! q ! r I s ! t ! u ! v I w ! x ! y ! z ! A ! B ! C ! D ! £ ! F ! G  
I li ! I ! j ! k ! L ! N ! 0 ! P ! Q  ! R ! S ! T ! U ! V ! W ! X ! Y ! Z
::= 0 ! 1 ! 2 ! 3 ! 4 ! 5 ! 6 ! 7 ! 8 1 9
<loji.caI value> ::= true 1 false 
<lo;i.cal operator> ::= and ! not ! cr
<ro' -iticnal operatcr> : : = > ! < !  >= I <= ! *
<ar'itmetic operator> ::= Withdravo_By ! + ! - ! * ! /
<TA'n:orlc modiflers> ::= h ! ! Per_Amzn I .
<ic!i:-etifier> ::= ( <letter> ! <dicit I _ >
<brackets> ::= ( 1 )
<rav/ variable name> :: = identifier 
<croated variable name> ::= identifier 
Cvalue label> ::= identifier
NUMBERS
<unsicned integer> ::= { <digit>
<deciiral point> .
<integer> ::= { + I - ]A  ^unsrgr.c-c integer >
<real nirrber > :: = <ir.tecer> <cecirai pcir.t> <integer>
<nurrber> ::= { } <integer> ! <real number > ( Per_Annum }
<percentage> ::= <digit>\ %
OPERATOR GROUPS AND FUNCTIONS
<analysis level indicators> ::= Individual's ! TaxJUnit's ! Household's 
< analysis level opera tors > ::= Any_In_Tax_Unit ! Rrnber_In_Tax_Unit ! Total_Tax_Uni t !
Any_In_Household ! Number_In_Household ! Total_Household 
<relaticnship pointers> ::= Husband's ! Wife's ! Head_Of_Household's ! Head_Of_Tax_Unit
<addition operator> ::= + ! - ! less 
<multiplication operator> ::= * ! /
<withdrawal operator> ::= Withdrawn_By
STATEMENTS AND EXPRESSIONS 
<model> ::= { <definiticn> )?
<definiticn> : := <Inflation Factor Statement> ! <Rule Definition>
<inflation factor statement> :: = Inflation_Factor of <variable name> = <real mmber> ! 
<rule definition> <analysis level indicator> <created variable name>
= <statement> .
<statement> : := <expressicn> ! if <expressicn> then < express ion >
{ else if <expression^ then <expression> }*
<expressicn> ::= <and expressicn> ! < expression > or <and expression>
<and expressicn> ::*= <relational expressicn> ! <and expression> and 
<relational expression>
<relational expressJcn> : := <addition expresslon> ] <relational expression>
<relational operator> <addition expressicn>
<addition expresslcn> ::«= <multiplication expression ! <addition express!cn>
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Figure 7.2 Continued POM Program Language Expressed
Backus-Naur Form
<addition operator> <multiplication expression} 
Cnultiplicatian expression} ::= <withdrawal expressicn> ! <multiplicaticn expression}
<nultiplication operator> <withdrawal expression} 
<withdrawal> : := <factor> withdrawn_by <percentage> * ( <expression> )
<withdrawal expressicn> ::= <factor> I <withdrawal> <factor>
<analysis level expression} := <analysis level cperatcr> ( < statement'} )
<value label assignment> ::= IS <identifier>
<variable> ::= <raw variable name> ! <created variable name>
<constant> <integer> ! <real number> ! <value label> ! <logical value>
<factor> ::= <analysis level expression> ! <value label assignment> !
( <statement> ) ! not <factor> ! <variable> I < constant >
! <relationship pointer> <factor>
Notes
In the table above the exclamation mark "!" is used to denote the vertical line 
in Backus-Naur Form.
the usability of PSL programs.
7.6.5 Miscellaneous Features of PSL
One very useful feature of PSL which does not quite fall 
into any of the categories above in PSL's 
"lnflation_Factor" statement. This gives the user a very 
convenient way of adjusting variables to take account of 
general movements of value over time. It is assumed that 
the most common situation in which such movements will be 
adjusted for will be in the case of correcting monetary 
values for inflation, which is why the term 
"Inflation Factor" has been used.
Inflation_Factor statements can be used as follows. 
Suppose that there is a variable containing the value of 
earnings and that the users knows that earnings have 
risen 15 per cent in money terms since the survey data 
they are using was collected. In this case all the user 
needs to do is to define an inflation factor once at the
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beginning of a set of PSL equations. For example one 
could specify:-
Inflation_Factor of Earnings = 15%.
If this statement was used it would mean that when POM 
came to evaluate any equations using earnings that the 
appropriate value would be multiplied by 1.15. This 
means that the inflation factor only needs to be 
specified once at the beginning of a set of equations and 
need not be included each time an equation using earnings 
is written. It also adds to the readability of PSL 
programs because frequent references to the expression 
(Earnings * 1.15) would prove confusing to the reader.
7.6.6 Technical Description of the Policy Simulation 
Language
Figure 7.2 gives a technical description of PSL according 
to the conventions of the Backus-Naur Form which is a 
special technique for defining different computer 
languages according to a common format. The symbols
within Backus-Naur Form can be understood as follows
Words enclosed within a greater than and less than sign 
(e.g. <Identifier>) are elements created within the
language being defined. The exclamation mark means "or". 
Two colons followed by an equals sign (::=) should be 
understood to mean "consists of". Items within curly
brackets can be repeated any number of times. The number 
of times values within curly brackets may be repeated are 
defined by numeric values to the right of the closing 
curly bracket. These values are either in the form of 
subscripts (written below the level of the preceding 
line) or superscripts (written above the level of the 
preceding line). A subscripted value to the right of the 
closing curly bracket indicates the minimum number of 
repetitions that are allowed. For example, an unsigned
245
7. STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAM
integer is defined as follows:-
*
<unsigned integer> { <digit> }1
The subscripted one indicates that an unsigned integer 
must have at least one digit. The value above the 1 
shows the maximum number of repetitions. This can be 
useful when defining such concepts as percentages (where 
the number must be between one and a hundred and thus has 
a maximum of three repetitions for the three digits in 
100). In the case of the unsigned integer definition 
there is no specified maximum number of digits which an 
unsigned integer can take. Therefore an asterisk is used 
to represent the concept of an undefined value.
A fuller explanation of the Backus-Naur Form is given in 
Galler and Perlis (1970). The language definition below 
is to be understood in conjunction with the following 
eleven rules:
1. The logical values true and false shall have their 
obvious meanings, as in ordinary usage.
2. The blank space between different symbols, and the 
space created by starting a printed line, has no effect 
on the calculations.
3. A set of <identifier>s is supplied with POM which 
refer to a set of variables taken from the Family 
Expenditure Survey 1984 - these are referred to above as 
<raw variable names>. Those variables which refer to a 
set of named categories such as "Type of Housing Tenure", 
have had a set of category labels supplied as well. New 
identifiers must be given in order to create new 
variables. These new identifiers must not be the same as 
any existing <raw variable name> or a previously defined 
<created variable name> (unless the user wishes to
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replace the old one).
4. Numbers have their conventional meanings. Numbers 
preceded by a pound sign are multiplied by one thousand 
(because money variables in the FES are recorded as 
thousandths of a pound). Numbers followed by the term 
"Per_Annum" are divided by 52 (as all FES values are 
weekly). Numbers followed by a "%" must be between 1 and 
100, and are converted to a proportion of 1 (for example 
66 % is converted to 0.66).
5. Logical values (true or false) and numbers may be used 
inter-changeably. For example the expressions "married = 
true" and "married = 1 "  are equivalent.
6. The value of an expression is obtained by executing 
the indicated operations. The evaluation will be left to 
right for operators of equal precedence. The order of 
precedence is given below
first
second
third
fourth
fifth
sixth
seventh
or
and
>, <, =/ >=, <= 
+, less
*, / 
wi thdrawn_by 
not
7. The <operator>s +, /, and * have their conventional
meanings. The operator "less" is the same as "-" (minus) 
except that if the result of the subtraction is less than 
zero it is taken to be zero. "Withdrawn_By" is a binary 
operator. The value preceding it is reduced by a 
proportion of the value of the expression following it 
(e.g. Family_Credit_Level Withdrawn_By 25 per cent of 
Earnings). "Withdrawn_by" forces the expression 
following it to be evaluated before the expression 
immediately preceding it. (This is a departure from
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normal left to right evaluation). As with "Less" the 
result of a withdrawn__by operation cannot be a negative 
value.
8 . An expression enclosed in matching parentheses is 
always evaluated by itself, and the resulting values are 
then used in subsequent calculations.
9. Where a variable has a set of category labels, these 
labels may be used in expressions in the same way as 
numbers. For example, "Sex = Male" is equivalent to "Sex 
= 1 ".
10. When a relationship pointer> is encountered the 
factor following it refers to a specific member of the 
the household or tax unit. For example
"Head_of_Household's Age" would return the age of the 
head of household even if the current case is not the 
head of household's case. Relationship pointers> may 
follow each other. Therefore the factor
"Head_of_Household's Wife's Age" would be acceptable. If 
there is no person with the specified relationship (for 
example there is no wife in the household) then a missing 
value is returned.
11. <Analysis level operator>s must be followed by a pair 
of brackets containing a statement. <Analysis level 
operators> have one of two domains. Operators containing 
the term "household" act on the household and those 
containing the term "tax unit" act on the tax unit. 
<Analysis level operators> act on all the cases within 
their domain, unless they contain the word "any". In 
this case a boolean expression must follow the operator. 
If this is true for any of the cases in the domain then 
execution will stop and the value TRUE will be returned. 
Operators containing the word "number" must also be 
followed by a boolean expression. The operator will
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evaluate the expression for all the cases within the 
domain and return the number for whom the value of the 
expression was true. An example of this would be 
"Adult_Non_Dependants = Number_In__Household
(Taxunit_Number > 1)". Operators containing the word
"total" will add together the value of the expression for 
all the cases in the domain (e.g. Household_Earnings = 
Total_Household(Earnings).
7.7 The Lexical Analyser
The first stage in processing the rules entered through 
the editor is lexical analysis. This involves sorting 
the characters of the source definitions into separate 
words or "symbols". Symbols in this context can mean 
words such as "if", "then", or "Total_Household". 
Symbols can also be numbers such as "12", or "22.4". 
They can also be single character symbols such as ">", 
"+", or the pound sign. Consider the following string of 
characters "Children_Under_11". Clearly it makes a 
significant difference if this in interpreted as one 
symbol as opposed to two separate symbols (namely 
"Children_Under_" followed by the number 11).
The rules of the system of lexical analysis within POM 
are as follows. Characters are divided up into six basic 
starting types and six corresponding successor types. 
The lexical analyser will keep on reading characters and 
adding to the symbol while the current character belongs 
to the successor type corresponding to the first 
character's starting type. For example a symbol starting 
with a digit must be a number and can only be followed by 
other digits or a single decimal point according to the 
rules below. As soon as a character of the wrong type 
for a number is encountered (such as a blank space or a 
letter) the lexical analyser stops reading in characters 
and passes the symbol to the parser. The starting types
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and corresponding successor types for POM are given 
below.
1. Any non-printing character such as a blank or a return 
code. Encountering this type marks the end of a symbol, 
starting with any other type.
2. A letter. A symbol starting with a letter must be an 
identifier and may only be followed by other letters, or 
by digits, an apostrophe, an underscore, or a pound 
sign.
3. A digit. A digit must be followed by other digits or 
by a single decimal point.
4. A '<' sign or a '>' sign. These may only be followed
by the character ' = ' to make '> = ' or '< = ', otherwise the
symbol terminates.
5. One of the following '.
or the pound sign. These are all single
character symbols so no successor characters are
required.
Once a symbol has been read from the set of definitions, 
the lexical analyser determines what type of symbol it is 
from among the following categories
(a) numbers (e.g. '22', '100.4')
(b) variable names (e.g. 'Age', 'Sex')
(c) value labels ('Male','Female')
(d) special symbols (e.g. ' + ', 'if', 
'Total_Household' )
When it has determined which category the symbol belongs 
to it is translated from a string of characters to a 
number with special significance which will be referred 
to as a "token". If the symbol represents a numerical 
value then the token is set to a value which represents 
numbers in general. A separate variable is used to store 
the actual value of the number represented by the symbol. 
In understanding POM's lexical analysis it is important
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to recognise the distinction between the two elements
which make up these pairs of numbers. On the one hand
the token represents the type which the symbol belongs 
to, a separate variable represents its numerical value. 
In the case of numbers there is a "number" token, and a 
"value" variable which stores the number itself. In the 
case of a variable, the token is set to "variable", and 
the value variable stores the variable's position within 
the array of variables. In the case of value labels the 
token is set to "number" and the "value" variable stores 
the quantity which the value label represents. In the 
case of special symbols such as "if" and "+" only the
token is stored. Within POM there is a look-up table of
special symbols, which allows them to be converted from a 
string of characters into their corresponding token 
number. If the lexical analyser encounters a string of 
letters which does not represent a number, a variable 
name, a value label, or one of the entries in the look-up 
tables of special symbols then an error message will be 
displayed.
Some lexical analysers write their output to a file as 
they execute, and this file is then read by the parser. 
This arrangement is called a "two pass" approach because 
two passes are made through the file. POM, on the other 
hand, has a single pass process for parsing and lexical 
analysis. Lexical analysis is performed one symbol at a 
time. As each symbol is analysed it is passed to the 
parser.
7.8 The Parser
The parser takes the tokens produced by the lexical 
analyser and performs two operations on them. Firstly, 
it checks them to ensure that they are syntactically 
correct in the context of their position in the current 
rule. Secondly, it sorts them into an order which the 
interpreter can act upon.
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When the parser has sorted the tokens into the correct 
order it places them into an array, which will be 
referred to as "the heap". The order in which the tokens 
are stored on the heap is different to the original
ordering - even for an expression as simple as "2 + 2".
POM stores these values with the operator after the 
operands - " 2  2 + "  - a system known as reverse polish
notation. (The advantage of this is that it is possible
to define an unambiguous ordering of operators and
operands, in cases where there would be considerable 
ambiguity in the case of traditional infix operators. 
Take the example of the expression "2 + 4 * 5". Unless a 
computer program was designed to recognise that "4 * 5" 
should be evaluated first "2 + 4" would be added first,
and the resulting 6 would be multiplied by 5 to give 30 
(using standard left to right evaluation). This could be 
avoided using brackets. However in reverse polish 
notation it is possible to remove this ambiguity without 
brackets. Instead of writing "2 + 4 * 5" one would write 
"2 4 5 * +". This ensures that the "4 5 *" is to be
evaluated first and that 2 is to be added to the result.)
Several types of parser might have been chosen for POM. 
Probably the simplest form of parser is the "operator 
precedence" parser as described by Brown (1979). In 
this method operands are read directly in to an array of 
values according the reverse Polish conventions. 
Operators are transferred to an array according to strict 
rules of operator precedence. If the operator at the end 
of this array has an equal or greater precedence than the 
current operator, then the operators within the array are 
re-ordered. Unfortunately this system has a number of 
disadvantages:-
It is hard to handle operators like the
minus sign which has two different
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precedences (depending on whether it is 
unary or binary). Worse, since the 
relationship between the grammar being 
parsed and the operator-precedence parser 
itself is tenuous, one cannot be sure the 
parser accepts exactly the desired language.
(Aho and Ullman, 1978:158)
Another important category of parsers is referred to as 
"predictive11 parsers. Predictive parsers employ a 
"parsing table" - a two dimensional array. This table is 
used to determine if the current combination of tokens is 
allowable - by taking the current token and the last 
token placed on the heap to see if they are a valid 
combination. Unfortunately it is difficult to write such 
parsers without a special program for generating parsing 
tables.
The type of parser used by POM avoids these pitfalls. 
POM's parser falls into the category of "recursive 
descent" parsers. Recursive descent parsers are defined 
as those which "use a set of recursive procedures to 
recognise input without backtracking" (Aho and Ullman, 
1978). POM's parser has several procedures which are 
recursive, that is, they call themselves (either 
indirectly or directly). In Figure 8.2 below procedures 
are shown which try to illustrate the concept of POM's 
parser. These procedures are simplified versions of 
procedures in POM itself.
To illustrate how the parser works consider what happens 
if the user enters the expression "8 + 4 * 5". The
lexical analyser would return the "number" token first 
(and store the quantity "8" in a separate value 
variable). The parsing in Figure 7.3 would start on line 
47 inside the procedure "PlusExpression". This would 
immediately call the procedure "MultExpression" (this is
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because the parser must test for the multiplication 
operator before the addition operator, because it has a 
higher order of precedence). On line 31 "Multexpression" 
calls the procedure "Factor11. "Factor" then tests to see 
if the token is a bracket. The condition on line 19 is 
true (the token is a number) so the parser puts the token 
on the heap, and gets the next token (which is a "+" 
sign). The parser exits from procedure "factor" and 
returns to line 33 in "MultExpression" (just after the 
point where "Factor" was called). The current token is 
neither a multiplication or division sign so the 
condition on line 33 is false, and the parser returns to 
the procedure "PlusExpression" on line 48. The current 
token is a plus so the execution continues to line 50. 
Line 50 saves the value of the token in a temporary 
variable because it is necessary that the next value on 
the heap should be the next operand with the relevant 
operator at the end (according to the conventions of 
reverse Polish notation). On line 51 the next token is 
requested from the lexical analyser which is a number 
token with the value 4. "MultExpression" is now called 
on line 52, which in turn calls "Factor" on line 31 . 
"Factor" puts the number token on to the heap and calls 
the next token which is a multiplication sign. The
parser then returns to the condition in "Multexpression" 
on line 33 which is true. The multiplication sign 
operator is also stored as a temporary variable within 
"MultExpression" and the lexical analyser is asked for 
the next token which is the number 5. "Factor" is
invoked again which stores the number 5 on the heap. The 
parser now returns to "MultExpression" on line 38. The 
multiplication sign is stored on the heap. The parser 
returns to line 53 in "PlusExpression" and the plus sign 
is placed on the heap. The heap now stores the values "8
4 5 * + " .  When this comes to be evaluated 4 will be
multiplied by 5, and 8 will be added to the result.
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Figure 7.3 Recursive Parser Procedures
Procedure PlusExpression; { Declare PlusExpression so that) 1
Forward { it can be used in factor } 2
Procedure Accept(intoken); 3
begin { If the current token is the } 4
If Token = Intoken then { same as the one passed as a ) 5
NextToken { parameter to accept then get) 6
Else { the next token otherwise print) 7
PrintAnError; { an error message ) 8
end; 9
10
Procedure Factor; 11
begin 12
if (token = Left_Bracket) then 13
Begin { in the case of a left bracket ) 14
Accept(token); { then parse the expression) 15
PlusExpression; { inside the brackets before) 16
Accept(RBRACK); { continuing ) 17
end; 18
else if token = number then 19
begin 20
PutTokenOnHeap(Token); {otherwise put a ) 21
NextToken; { number on the heap } 22
end; 23
else PrintAnErrorMessage; 24
end; 25
26
Procedure MultExpression; {Multexpression gets called from } 27
var { inside plusexpression before any}28
op : tokentype; { of plusexpression is evaluated )29
begin 30
Factor; { if there is a number then put on heap first) 31 
while token in [DIVIDE,TIMES] do 32
begin 33
op:=token; { save the operator token ) 34
NextToken; 35
Factor; { find the second factor } 36
PutTokenOnHeap(op); { put operator on heap after } 37
end; { the two operands } 38
end; 39
40
Procedure PlusExpression; 41
var 42
op : tokentype; { compile and add or subtract expression) 43 
begin 44
MultExpression; { call multexpression first ) 45
while token in [plus, minus, less] do 46
begin 47
op:=token; { save the operator token ) 48
nextToken; 49
MultExpression; { get second operand ) 50
PutTokenOnHeap(op); { put operator on heap ) 51
end; 52
end; 53
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Though none of these procedures call themselves directly, 
recursion does takes place if a bracket is encountered in 
"Factor" on line 13. This causes "PlusExpression" to be 
called from within "Factor". "PlusExpression" will call 
"MultExpression" which will call "Factor". This is 
typical of the mutually recursive nature of the 
procedures within the parser. The recursions within the 
parser are far more complex in POM than in the small
subset of procedures shown in Figure 7.2. The source 
code listing shows the full set of procedures.
Suppose that the user entered the definition "2 +"
instead of "2 + 2". In this case the parser would store
the number 2 on the heap using the procedure "Factor". 
It would store the plus sign as a temporary variable and 
look for the second factor. Within "factor" the parser 
would fail to find a valid operand and would print an
error message. Thus the parser not only succeeds in 
storing the tokens on the heap in the correct order, it 
also detects errors and reports them to the user.
7.9 The Interpreter
Interpreters and compilers take as their input a program 
and then carry out the operations which that program 
specifies. However compilers translate the program into 
the computer's own language (a series of binary numbers 
known as machine code), whereas interpreters carry out 
the same operations without doing a complete translation 
into machine code.
Bornat (1979) separates interpreters into two main 
categories. One form of interpreter makes heavy use of 
two major compiler tools - symbol tables and parse trees. 
The second form of interpreter is based on a linear 
series of instructions like the heap produced by the 
parser above. Bornat (1979) calls these "linearising" or 
"virtual machine" interpreters. (The term "virtual
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machine" applies because the computer itself operates on 
a series of numbers similar to the heap used by these 
interpreters).
To understand how POM's interpreter works consider how it 
would evaluate the expression given above which produced 
the following values on the heap "8 4 5 * +". In
fact, this is an over-simplification. These values are 
more accurately represented on the heap by the table 
shown in Figure 7.4 below. The operands on the heap are 
stored as pairs of numbers (with the first value 
declaring its type and the second one storing its value). 
The operators are stored as single numbers. The 
interpreter can tell the difference between numbers which 
represent types and those which represent values by their 
context. To illustrate how POM's interpreter works 
consider how it would execute the instructions in the 
heap shown in Figure 7.4. This is demonstrated with the 
help of Figure 7.5 which shows a simplified portion of 
the POM's "Interpret" procedure. This procedure uses two 
arrays, namely the heap which stores the tokens produced 
by the parser, and the "stack" which stores the operands 
in the correct order for evaluation. The interpreter 
uses a variable called "index" to mark its position on 
the heap, and another variable "stacktop" to mark its 
position on the stack.
When evaluating the heap contents shown in Figure 7.4 POM 
will keep calling the procedure "Interpret" until it has 
reached the end of the heap (which is marked by the 
parser with a special token). When "interpret" is first 
called it assigns a temporary variable called "op" to the 
value of the first item in the heap. Figure 7.4 shows 
that this is a "Number" token, so the execution moves to 
line 6. The top of the stack marker is increased by one. 
The heap index is increased by one so it is pointing to 
the number "8". This value is copied from the heap and
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placed as the first item on the stack. This process of 
copying values into the stack and incrementing stacktop 
and index, is repeated until all three numbers have been 
copied into the stack. At this point the stack contains 
M8" as its first element, "4" as its second element, and 
"5" as its third element. Stacktop is pointing to the 
third element
Figure 7.4 Example of Heap Contents
Heap Position Value Meaning Type or Value
1 91 Number Type
2 8 8 Value
3 91 Number Type
4 4 4 Value
5 91 Number Type
6 5 5 Value
7 120 Multiply Type
8 102 Add Type
on the stack. When the "Interpret" is called for the 
fourth time the operator is not a number so execution 
jumps to line 12. Here a temporary variable temp2 is 
assigned to the value on the top of the stack - "5". The 
stacktop is then decremented and a second temporary 
variable is assigned the value on the top of the stack - 
"4". The current operator is a multiplication sign so the 
next line to be executed is line 18. Here the value on 
top of the stack is assigned to (4 * 5). The result - 20 
is kept as the top value on the stack. When 
"Interpret" is called again line 16 is executed which 
adds the operand in the first element of the stack "8" to 
"20".
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Figure 7.5 Simplified Interpreter Procedure
Procedure Interpret; 1
begin 2
operator:=heap[index]; 3
case operator of 4
NUMBER : begin 5
StackTop:=StackTop+1; 6
index:=index+1; 7
stack[StackTop]:=heap[index]; 8
end; 9
else 1 o
begin 11
temp2:=Stack[StackTop]; 12
StackTop:=StackTop-1; 13
tempi:=Stack[StackTop]; 14
case operator of 15
PLUS : Stack[StackTop]:=Temp1+Temp2; 16
MINUS : Stack[Stacktop]:=Temp1-Temp2; 17
TIMES : Stack[Stacktop]:=Temp1*Temp2; 18
else PrintAnError; 19
end; 2 0
end; 21
end; 2 2
end; 23
Figure 7.5 shows only a small subset of the operators 
which can be handled by the "Interpret" procedure. Not 
only are there further mathematical operators, but there 
are operators like "then" which manage the heap index so 
as to control which parts of the heap are executed. The 
operator "then" will be stored along with a number which 
marks a specific place on the heap. If "then" is
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encountered and the value on the top of the stack is not 
"true" (indicating that the condition preceding "then" 
was false) the "interpret" procedure skips over all the 
elements in the heap until it reaches the position 
indicated by "then"'s heap marker. Similar procedures 
are used for skipping over sections of the heap when the 
operators "and", "or", and "else" are evaluated.
This linearised form of interpreting holds for all 
commands that can be stored on the heap, with two 
exceptions. The first exception is in the case of 
analysis level operators such as "Total_Household" (which 
require a special form of iteration) and relationship 
pointers such as "husband's" (which necessitate 
evaluating an equation about one household member while 
utilising information about another). Figure 7.6 shows a 
flowchart of the execution which occurs when analysis 
level operators are encountered on the heap. The 
conventions of the flowchart are those outlined by Galler 
and Perlis (1970). The flowchart shows that there is a 
straightforward iteration of the Interpret procedure from 
point A to point B, unless the program meets an analysis 
level operator. This causes the program to jump to point 
C. At point C a variable is assigned to point to the 
first person in the household. At point D a variable is 
assigned to the value of heap index at the start of the 
analysis level expression. The "interpret" procedure is 
called repeatedly until the temporary heap index points 
to a marker showing the end of the analysis level 
expression. At this point the household pointer is 
incremented to indicate the next person in the household. 
When the expression has been evaluated for the last 
person in the household control is passed to point E 
which returns to the main interpreter loop.
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Figure 7.5 Flowchart of Analysis Level Interpretation
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7.10 The Tabulator
The tabulator is intended to produce tables which 
illustrate certain characteristics of the original data 
or any variables which have been created by the user.
For the purpose of tax-benefit modelling a typical table
might have rows indicating different types of Family, 
columns showing different ranges of gross income, and 
each cell containing the average net incomes before and 
after a policy change.
Tabulating the data involves a three stage process. 
Firstly, the user is invited to answer a series of
questions to describe the table to be produced.
Secondly, the data set is read case by case and the 
relevant data is added to the appropriate cell of the
table. Thirdly, a table is constructed and printed to a 
file.
During the first stage the user is asked to state which 
variables are to define the columns and rows of the
table. These variables must have a set of category
labels so, for example, it would be acceptable to choose 
"Employment_Status" as the column variable but not 
"Investment_Income". This ensures that when the table is 
printed POM is able to write labels for the column 
headings, and prevents a vast number of columns from
being required. To make "Investment^ncome" a column 
variable one would have first to create a variable which 
allocates individuals to different bands of 
"Investment_Income". Within each cell of the table the 
user has a choice of five options: cell counts, column 
percentages, row percentages, averages of one variable, 
or averages of two variables. The process of specifying a 
table is outlined in chapter 10 and in the user manual. 
Therefore it will not be described in detail here.
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The process of analysing the data to construct the table 
is shown in the form of a Warnier-Orr diagram in Figure 
7.6. Line 1 of Figure 7.6 refers to a "cell array". 
This is an array of records which will store the values 
that will eventually be printed out in each cell of the 
table. Each of the elements of the array has two running 
total variables (to store the sum of any variable which 
is to be averaged) and two counter variables. At the 
beginning of the analysis all these variables are set to 
zero. There is also a data array, which holds the values 
of the data as it is read off the disk. The data array 
holds the values of between two and four variables:- the 
column variable, the row variable, and if necessary the 
values of one or two contents variables to be averaged.
Figure 7.6 Data Analysis for Table Construction
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Find Relevant Place in Cell Array
The Cell already Cxist3 
(1,05
The Cell dees not exist yet 
(1 .0 )
Averages to be shown in Cells 
(1,03
Fill the first element of the Coordinates 
array with the colum value 
Fill the second element of the Coordinates 
array with the row value 
Use "hash" procedure to fine the position in 
the cell array for this set of Coordinates
If this is a new column value 
then add to list to columns 
If this is a new rcw value then 
add to list of rows 
Increment counter of occupied cellr
If the variable to be averaged is 
not zero then add its value to 
the running total for the cell 
and increment the cell's counter
No averages to be shown in Cells T  Increment the counter for relevant cell 
Read Data for next case into data array
The process of finding which cell in the table each case 
belongs to is shown in lines 6 to 11. POM finds the 
relevant place in the cell array through a procedure
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known as "hashing” or "hash addressing". Hash addressing 
involves trying to find an object's position in an array. 
This necessitates calculating an index number to the 
array based on some characteristic of the object. When 
"hashing" a string of characters such a number might be 
calculated by multiplying together the ASCII values of 
the first three letters. Within the tabulator the hash 
value is calculated as a function of the column and row 
values. A mathematical formula is applied to the column 
and row values which produces an index number between one 
and the maximum number of cells in the cell array. It 
is still possible, though, that two different cells of 
the table will have the same hash value. If this occurs 
POM will search for an empty cell in the cell array which 
is closest to the index position produced by hashing.
If the tabulator finds that the current case belongs to a 
cell of the table which is currently empty then the 
tabulator will increment a counter which stores the 
number of currently occupied cells. If the case belongs 
to a row or column which is currently unoccupied then the 
value of the row or column variable is added to a list of 
occupied column and row values.
If the user has decided to display only cell counts, 
column percentages or row percentages in each cell then 
the tabulator will merely increment the counter once it 
has found the correct place in the cell array. If the 
user has chosen to display means in each cell then as 
each case is examined the tabulator will increment the 
counter variable and will add the value of the contents 
variable to the running total for the cell concerned. 
This process is duplicated for the second contents 
variable if the averages of two variables are to be shown 
in each cell. If the cells are to contain average values 
then the tabulator will take no action if the contents 
variable is zero and the user has specified that zero is
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to be treated as a missing value. After storing the 
information from the case in this way the information 
from the next case is read into the data array.
This process is repeated until one of three things 
happens. Firstly, the user may interrupt the procedure. 
Secondly, the tabulator may find that a table with more 
than 100 cells is required (which is too large for it to 
handle). Thirdly, the tabulator may reach the last case. 
If the variables requested include any user-created 
variables with a smaller number of cases than the raw 
data then the tabulator will stop after it has reached 
the end of the variable with the fewest cases.
When POM has finished analysing the data it has to 
organise the contents of the cell array so as to produce 
an easily understandable table. As the table is built 
up, the tabulator stores the different elements of the 
table as a series of special printing data structures. 
These structures store a string of characters, together 
with coordinates of the position where the string is to 
be shown on the screen. These printing records are 
organised as a linked list within the computer's memory 
(that is each record has two pointers one of which 
indicates the printing record which precedes it on the 
table, and the second of which indicates the following 
printing record). In the discussion below, the term 
"printing" is used to describe the process of creating 
one of these data structures.
The first action the tabulator performs when constructing 
the table is to print a title for the table as a whole. 
The title lists the column and row variables and explains 
the meaning of the cell contents.
The tabulation procedure iterates through each row and 
column of the table to calculate the number of valid
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cases in each row and column, and for the table as a 
whole.
If the table is too wide or long to fit on one page it is 
printed on a series of different pages. For each page 
the tabulation procedure shows the name of the row 
variable and the name of the column variable. A series 
of column labels is shown for each column of the table. 
The column label is forced to fit within the width of the 
column, and so may be printed on several successive 
lines. The tabulation procedure calculates the number of 
lines which the longest column label takes up, and it 
uses this figure to ensure that the actual data starts 
below the lowest column heading. It also prints a row 
label for each row of the table. The cell contents vary 
according to user's choice. If the user selects "cell 
counts", the cell count is printed together with this 
count as a percentage of all the valid values in the 
table. With averages the mean value of the contents 
variable is shown together with the number of cases where 
the contents variable was not missing. If the mean of 
two variables is requested then only these two averages 
are shown; no cell counts are displayed.
At the end of the final page the column totals are 
printed. If the tabulation involves all the cases in the 
data set then the total national value of the contents 
variable(s) is shown. This involves multiplying the 
number of cases in the FES to equal the population of the 
UK as a whole. Such extrapolations must be treated 
cautiously, because of the differential response rates by 
different types of family to the FES. After the last 
item of the table has been printed, the printing data 
structures are saved to a file. This file is displayed 
on the screen and may be saved by the user for future 
reference.
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7.11 Conclusion
POM links and refines many existing concepts in computer 
programming. It draws on existing experience of word 
processors, computer languages, and statistical analysis 
programs. In synthesising these concepts, POM attempts 
to allow the user to minimise the complexity involved in 
tax-benefit modelling without sacrificing the ability to 
model the full range of tax-benefit policies.
POM's method of data storage makes it possible to store 
information about all the people in an entire year's FES 
(some 18,500 people) using roughly one megabyte of disk 
space. As the smallest hard disk drives have a capacity 
of ten megabytes, this makes POM easily accessible to 
micro-computer owners. POM's data initialisation 
procedures give the user instant access to self- 
explanatory variable names and fully descriptive value 
labels. There is no necessity to consult codebooks to 
determine which numbers refer to which categories of 
nominal variables. POM's pop up menus show the category 
names instantly, and the Policy Simulation Language 
allows these names to be used directly in programming.
POM provides the user with a full screen text editor with 
exceptional access to variable names and value labels. 
The mouse and highlighting procedure avoids the need to 
type in long terms at the keyboard. The Policy 
Simulation Language itself helps to make tax-benefit 
programming both faster and more comprehensible.
POM's lexical analyser and parser allows for a quick 
single pass process for detecting errors and storing 
values on the heap. Error messages are given 
explanations on screen and the cursor is placed in the 
user's text at the point where the error was detected.
Finally, POM's tabulator produces clear illustrations of
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the meaning of different policies. Most importantly, the 
process of tabulation is simple enough for a non-expect 
to specify a table, and yet flexible enough so that the 
choice of tables are not constrained by a set of 
ideological prejudices.
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8.1 Introduction
The existing tax-benefit models have user interfaces 
which are based on two approaches. The two methods might 
be termed the menu-driven approach and the programming 
language approach.
Both have major advantages and disadvantages. The menu- 
driven models (such as TAX-MOD, IGOTM, and the Personal 
Income Tax Model) have clearly defined questions which 
prompt the user to enter numerical values which define 
those aspects of the tax-benefit system which the user is 
allowed to change. However users cannot simulate a 
policy which the menu system does not allow for. This 
approach means that the models concerned are easily 
understandable by the non-expert. It also means that 
they are highly inflexible.
The programming language approach presents the user with 
the opposite balance of advantages and disadvantages. 
Models like the IFS Model and the DHSS Policy Simulation 
Model are examples of this approach. Although both have 
limited menu driven interfaces, most of the detailed 
policy simulation is done by altering the source code of 
the program itself. If researchers wish to alter the 
source code of these models then they must invest a great 
deal of time learning about them to arrive at a point 
where they can do any tax-benefit modelling at all. For 
most potential users the difficulty of mastering a 
programming language makes such models unusable in 
practice. However if they master the language, almost 
the only limits are those inherent in the data set the 
model is based on.
8.2 The Policy Option Model Approach
The Policy Option Model (POM) attempts to combine the 
flexibility of the programming approach with the
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comprehensibility of a menu driven system. If non­
experts are to feel able to attempt computer programming 
then they must perceive that the required effort is less 
than is the case with existing methods. DiSessa (1986: 
128) has described it thus:-
The challenge for the future is to make 
programming into something that is simple 
enough and useful enough that everybody will 
want and be able to learn how to grasp and 
stroke with this new pencil. ... In contrast 
to battling large programs, if we can allow 
a broad range of simple but useful things to 
be done transparently, we will have won more 
than half the battle.
POM attempts to reduce the effort expended in learning to 
use a tax-benefit model. It tries to achieve this by 
providing the user with a programming environment which 
is so close to English language concepts that the new 
user will feel confident in working with it.
The menu-driven approach has been rejected on the grounds 
that however comprehensive the menu system, there will 
always be policy options which will be excluded because 
menu questions were not written for such policies.
Users of the Policy Option Model are invited to type in 
statements about the tax-benefit system with fully 
descriptive variable labels in an English language 
format. For example, a traditional programming language 
might well include a statement such as
TI = GI - TR. [ 1 ]
Most non-experts find such terminology threatening, and 
could easily be discouraged from trying to learn a
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language because of the presence of terms which they find 
meaningless.
In POM the same statement would be written as
Taxable_Income = Gross_Income - Tax_Reliefs. [ 2 ]
Such a statement is more comprehensible to the non­
expert, making it possible to overcome the psychological 
barriers to computer programming. It is also probable 
that the resulting models will contain fewer errors 
because the variable names are inherently meaningful. It 
is much easier for mistakes to creep in with abbreviated 
variable names. Suppose, for example, that in equation 
[1] above the term "TI" stood for "Total Income" when the 
user had intended to use the label for "Taxable Income". 
Because the label is not fully descriptive, it is much
more likely that a mistake about the meaning of "TI"
could creep into the model and go undetected.
Figure 8.1 Computer Screen Image Produced by POM showing
the initial screen
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Some programming languages such as early versions of 
FORTRAN and BASIC place restrictions on the size of 
variable names (such as a six or eight letter limit). 
The problem with long variable labels, however, is that 
programmers try to avoid spending the time necessary to 
type them in.
8.3 Programming with a Mouse and Menu System
POM attempts to overcome this problem by obviating the 
need to type in most variable names. The user is invited 
to employ a system of pop-up menus which can be operated 
through a mouse. (The term "pop-up" is used because the 
menus appear on the screen over the other text which is 
being displayed. When the user wishes to dispense with a 
given menu it will "pop down" again leaving the screen in 
the state it was before the menu appeared). In order to 
select a particular option the user only has to point to 
it with the mouse and press a mouse button. The item 
selected will appear in the current line of text as 
though it had been typed in from the keyboard. This 
facility is available for all of the raw data variables. 
Furthermore if the user creates a new variable, and POM 
checks that the sentence defining this variable is 
correct, then this it will appear in a pop-up window and 
the user can insert it in the text without typing it in 
each time it is required.
The purpose of having long variable names and the mouse 
system is to try to combine the advantages of quick 
programming with program statements which are meaningful.
8.4 Pop-up windows for Categorical Variables
Much of the time when researchers are using statistical 
data with computer programs, they find themselves writing 
statements which involve nominal variables which 
represent categories rather than numbers. This is in 
contrast to interval or scalar data. When categories are
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involved it is preferable to use the name of the category 
rather than a number. For example, with a program like 
SPSS if one wanted to identify people who were married 
men one might write a statement such as:-
IF (SEX = 1) AND (MARITAL =1) [ 3 ]
However, in POM, an English language term could be used. 
The same statement would be:-
If (Sex = Male) and (Marital = Married). [ 4 ]
POM will understand the terms "Male” and "Married", just 
as if the appropriate numerical value had been entered. 
It is still acceptable to enter the numerical value, but 
there are advantages in using the English label for the 
sake of keeping the program readable. The user must type 
in the correctly spelled label (upper and lower case are 
immaterial). In order to make this easier a further set 
of pop-up windows has been created to allow the user to 
enter the label using the mouse (though it can be typed 
in directly from the keyboard as well).
In order to obtain a list of all the valid categories for 
a nominal level variable, the user points to a part of 
the screen labelled "VALUE LABELS", and presses the mouse 
button. A pop-up window appears on the screen which 
gives a list of all the variables with labels, and the 
user is then invited to point to it with the mouse and 
press the mouse button. A further pop-up window appears 
with all of the labels for that variable. If the user 
presses the return key while pointing at the appropriate 
label, then the label will appear in the line of text 
which is being built up.
Again it should be stressed that one of the likely 
effects of this approach is that accidental errors will
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be reduced. Because the number 1 is so much less 
meaningful than the term "Married" it would be much 
easier for the wrong number to slip into a line of text, 
and then for this mistake to go unnoticed.
8.5 Pull-Down Command Menu
In addition to the pop-up menus which contain the lists 
of value labels and variable names, there is also a 
pulldown command menu. (The term "pulldown" arises from 
the fact that each of the sets of options pops downward 
from a heading at the top of the screen). When the user 
presses function key 10, or points to the term EDITING 
COMMANDS with the mouse, the command menu will appear at 
the top of the screen. The command menu contains a list 
of groups of command options, such as file commands, 
block commands etc. The pulldown menu means that in most 
cases it should be possible for a novice user of POM to 
find a command on the pulldown screen without the 
necessity to refer back to a manual. Constantly 
referring back to the manual increases the length of time 
taken to learn a new program and discourages the new 
user.
8.6 Quick Keyboard Commands
In addition to the pulldown menu the user can also give 
commands directly from the keyboard. For example, 
instead of calling up the pulldown command menu to go to 
the bottom of the current file, the user could hold down 
the Control Key and press "Q" and then "C". This would 
have the same effect. This procedure is quicker than 
using the pulldown menu, but may take longer to learn.
Giving access to both the pulldown menu and the quick 
keystroke commands, gives two major advantages. It means 
that for newcomers there is a metaphorical pair of water 
wings which allows them to swim through the first few 
hours of using the program without having to master a set
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of complex commands. It also means that more experienced 
users who are familiar with the quick keystroke commands 
in the more common text editors are not held back.
Figure 8.2 Computer Screen Image produced by POM 
displaying an error message shown when a mistake is found 
during parsing
TAX-BENEFIT RULE EDITOR By Philip Truscott VERSION 1
VALUE LABELS
CREATED VARIABLES
The symbol THEN was expected 
not "IS” Check Your 
Statement Carefully for errors
process All rules 
Number of cases 18550 
Redo old rules YES 
View raw data NO
n 1
n_Factor Household'
ead_Cf_Tax_Un;t's w';fe 
num
) [ ] , EDITING COMMAS:
Free Memory: 310896 File: <None.' Line 2 Col 32 Insert ON
Household's Country =
If Standard_Region= Wales IS Wales
Else if Standard_Region = Scotland then IS Scotland
Else if Standard_Region = Nor thern_Ireiand then IS Northern_Ire 1 and 
Else IS England.
8.7 Error-Detection on Screen
The method of error detection in POM should also add to 
the user's confidence. With most models based on the 
common programming languages, the entire program would 
need to be compiled each time the source code is altered 
- a process which takes several minutes for a large
model. During this process the user can no longer see
the last piece of the program which he or she had been 
writing, as the screen is often changed during the 
compilation process.
In contrast, POM allows one statement to be checked at a 
time. If there is an error, the cursor is placed at the 
point where the error has been detected. A temporary
pop-up message appears to tell the user the nature of the 
error. Once the error has been detected the user can
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correct it and carry straight on. There is no need to 
send the user's set of commands to a file and then 
compile them separately (this would be the procedure with 
a programming language or a statistical package such as 
SPSS). An example of how POM prompts the user to correct 
an error is display in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.3 Computer Screen Image Produced by POM showing 
how POM indicates the characteristics of a table to be 
displayed
TAX-3ENEFIT RULE EDITOR By trul.p Truscott VERSION 1
Block Search Go to Text format Muuol File ESC to exit menu ELP
TAX UNIT VARIABLES Is Nought a Missing Value ? SPACE BAR
HOUSEHOLD VARIABLES
------ --- End of Liot -------------
--RETURN to Cnocse, ESCAPE to Exit----
H |Redo old rule- iES In urn 
1 IView raw data NO 1 ) [ ] ,
oer.in_iax.unu 
it Individual‘r 
Household’ s 
nit's Wife'sVALUE LABELS
CREATED VARIABLES EDITING COMMANDS
Free Memory: 310896 File: <None .• Line 3 Col 27 Insert ON
HousehoId
if Stan Creating a Table of Households Witfi Slandard_Region as
Else if the Row variable and Type_0f_Housing Tenure as the
Else if Column Variable, and aver agos of Nor tgaqe_Interest and
Else IS Gross.Rent In Each Cell Of the Table
8.8 Conclusion
The rationale behind the user interface which has been 
devised for the Policy Option Model, is that the closer 
one keeps to natural English language concepts, the 
easier the system will be for non-experts to use. Ease 
of use should cut down on the amount of time needed to 
learn the package. English language style terminology 
should make it much easier for several members of the 
same staff team to use the same model. Moreover, as 
different people would be able to understand the same 
piece of programming, different people will be able to 
check each others' work and reduce errors. This is an 
important issue in departments such as the DHSS, the
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Treasury and the Central Statistical Office where several 
different members of staff might be working on the same 
project.
The reason why a user interface similar to POM has not 
been developed before is probably due to the assumption 
that this type of programming would be done by computer 
specialists. However even if tax benefit modelling is 
restricted to full time computer programmers there would 
still be good reason to use a POM style user interface 
for computer programming. This is because of the 
problems while arise when trying to modify and adapt huge 
programs. The problems of understanding variable names 
which are not self-explanatory and comprehending the 
structure of a complex program become almost 
insupportable with a very large program. With POM on the 
other hand the use of simple declarative statements 
(without iteration structures) and self-explanatory 
variable names mean that it would be much easier to 
support very large programs.
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9.1 Introduction
POM is intended to provide a flexible method of producing 
output tables. Some of the existing programs like the 
CUBS model only allow the user to produce a set of 
standard tables which have been pre-specified by the 
designer of the model. If the user wishes to produced a 
table based on unusual criteria the object code models 
would not be able to cope. Suppose for example that the 
user wanted to produce a table showing the effect of 
abolishing Mortgage Interest Tax relief by regions, or 
the effect of abolishing rates by tenure groups. The 
models which produce standard tables would not allow the 
information to be output in this way.
In chapter three a selection of principles of tax-benefit 
policy were examined. This examination showed that the 
principles by which policies are judged are a matter of 
subjective choice. It is therefore preferable to avoid 
building any ideological prejudices into a model, by 
restricting the user to a given set of standard tables 
when assessing a policy. POM avoids this by allowing 
the user to examine a policy using any of the variables 
which can be calculated from the data.
With the more common simulations such as the incomes of 
families before and after a policy change, or the changes 
in their marginal tax rates, then the existing models 
will generally be adequate. There follows a description 
of three examples of the output from POM, to illustrate 
its method of displaying data.
The first example is a simulation of a change in income 
tax rates with a table showing how this would affect 
different types of tax unit over a range of income bands.
The second example is a simulation of the Exchequer costs
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of Family Income Supplement.
The third example is a simulation of the effect of 
changing rates of tax on the number of hours worked by a 
sample of married men.
These three examples give a perspective on several of the 
most distinctive features of POM:- its ability to give a 
detailed breakdown of policy effects by different types 
of household and tax unit (or any other criterion the 
user selects), its ability to predict the Exchequer costs 
of a policy, and its ability to assess the labour supply 
effects of a policy.
9.2 EXAMPLE 1 - Illustrative Effect of Income Tax Changes 
The first illustration of the use of POM shows the effect 
of a change in Income Tax. (The "existing” Income Tax 
system is taken to be that which existed in April 1984. 
POM is based on the 1984 FES). The changes to income 
tax simulated in the first example, are similar to the 
reforms introduced in the 1988 budget. The standard rate 
of income tax is cut to 25 per cent (from 30 per cent in
1984), and all the higher rates of tax are removed
except for a 40 per cent rate of tax which applies to all 
income above 300 pounds per week. The effect of these 
changes are shown in figure 9.1. The columns of the 
table represent different types of tax unit and the rows 
show ranges of gross income. Within each cell of the
table the upper value shows the net income of the tax
unit before the change while the lower value shows the 
net income after reducing the tax rates.
For comparative purposes a similar table produced by the 
IFS model is shown in figure 9.2 below. The IFS table 
does not simulate the same policy - it is used purely to 
show an alternative method of presenting information on 
changes in tax unit income. The rows of Figure 9.2 show
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Figure 9.1 Net Incomes Before and After a Tax Reduction 
by Income Range and Tax Unit Type Produced by POM
Table Of: Gross Income Band
By Type Of Tax Unit 
Mean of Net Income is the top Value in Each cell 
& Mean of Net Income After is bottom Value
Gross Income Band Type Of Tax Unit
Lone
Parent
1
Single
Person
Childles 
s Couple
Couple 
1 Child
Under 50 53.90
53.51
I
29.87 
29. 44
1
86. 41 
85. 09
76.27 
75. 12
From 50 to 75 102.03 
101.16
69.54 
67. 79
128.28 
125.82
147.92 
145.42
From 75 to 100 118.53
116.36
1
88.82
85.77
153.70 
149.64
138.66 
135.64
From 100 to 125 148.66 
145.11
102.02 
97. 89
165.73 
160.80
153.33 
149.15
From 125 to 150 166.57 
161.21
123.26
117.75
185.47
178.98
175.68
170.15
From 150 to 175 170.37
163.96
134.90
128.41
200.58
192.98
188.35 
181.76
From 175 to 200 147.91 
141.98
160.95
152.88
214.68 
206.01
209.54 
201.57
From 200 to 250 179.67 
171.92
184.59
174.82
244.44
233.55
228.89
219.59
From 250 to 300 253.71 
241.40
218.26
205.97
283.98
270.46
271.58 
259.16
Over 300 251.01 
238.14
312.20
320.54
390.54
397.72
367.98 
379.71
Tot. Cases 362 2807 1592 852
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different types of tax unit. The columns to the left of 
figure 9.2 ranges of marginal tax rates. The column with 
the heading "over’' indicates those with marginal tax 
rates over 100 per cent (i.e. those who are both paying 
tax and facing high benefit taper rates). The items in 
the cells indicate the proportion of cases in that row 
which fall into each cell. The leftmost column of figure
9.2 shows the proportions of different family types with 
marginal tax rates of under 50 per cent. The rightmost 
column of figure 9.2 shows the number of cases from the 
FES which fall into the relevant row. To the left of 
this column the average net income after the given policy 
change is shown. To the left of this the average net 
income before the policy change is shown. To the left of 
this is a column marked "average of column" which shows 
the average marginal tax rate of the cases in each row.
Figure 9.2 Net Incomes by Income Range - IFS Model
l u bd s i m f  is Sb r t n t  rcb r a t e / a i l cb ta bbsup/bb p m t i f t t  t u
S is c l t  1 2349. 919. I . 1. 753. 75. 44. 1. 11. 1 . l . l
O ff 1 7». 54. 1. 27. 537. 84. 2 1 374. 1 1 4 . 4 . 1
Coup 1 c I 1199. 375. 5. 1. 141. 7. 13. 4. 7 . 153. 3 7 . 8
C * 1 1 879. 354. f . 23. 447. 53. 17. 287. «. f . 4 . 1
C ♦ 2 1 1123. 375. 2. 24. 457. 2 1 8. 442. 1. 1 . 4 . 8
C ♦ 3 t 229. 54. 1. 3. 274. 44. 1 231. 3. t . 4 . 1
C M  1 85. 34. 1. 7. 417. 4. 4. 244. t . I . 4 . 8
S is  f t *  1 229. 13. 1. 1. 313. 243. 88. 4 . 55. 2 8 7 1 4 . 8
Ccu pti 1 123. 1. 11. 4. 155. 77. 57. 1. 31. 3834. 4 2 .8
Coup I t  t 2349. 434. 349. 1. I . 1 . 4. 4. 4 . 11. 7 5 2 .1
C M  4 1327. 424. 127. 2. 1. 11. 1 217. 1 . 1 . 3 1 1 .8
C M  1 1154. 378. 45. 25. «. 21. 4. 424. 1. 1 . 1 3 3 .8
C M  I 495. 119. 24. 23. 4. 1. 3 . 187. 1 . 1 . 5 7 .8
C M  » 39. 11 5. 1. 4. 4. 1 . 28. 1 . 1 . 1 1 .8
*- I 1. 1. 1. t . 1. 4 . 1. 4 . I . 1 . 4 . 8
3 J  1 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 4. 4 . 4. t . 1 . 4 . 8
3 « *c i t 1. 1. 4. 1. 1. 4. 1. 4. 1. 1 . 4 .8
Isul » 11471. 3725. 411. 141. 3942. 437. 278. 2434. 124. 4872. £ 5 4 .8
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Figure 9.3 Net Incomes by type of Family - IFS Model
*c- I. cf lix unit
2. H ud AS cn t im e d , S',•>»«
.14 .44
t ir .$ {  t 
.74
f .r ts A o l is
.54 .24 1.14 over
i v t r i j t  
o f  co l
o ld  neu 
n e t incones (£ ;.w .
nun 
) s jn p le
S i r. 31 e 24.41 .14 12? 7 I i .44 .44  t 23.83 1 58.82 52.24 X i 7 . i i  *
CPF 87.54 .13 4.17 .34 .4.17 4.17 .11  X 15.24 X 87.53 111.18 X 24 .41  t
C c ip ls '  25.45 2.27 2.27 .40 .14 .14 .11  t 28.11 ) 135.35 138.51 t 44 .4 4  X
C ♦ 1 25.12 .11 .11 2.44 .11 .31 2.44 1 25.58 X 125.58 137.31 * 4 1 .4 4  X
C ♦ 2 23.12 .11 .14 2.33 .44 2.33 2.33  I 27.52 * 145.58 153.59 < 43 .4 1  t
C ♦ 3 E1.E2 .11 2.4? .11 .11 .11 2.17 t 23.87 8 147.71 154.52 X 11 .44  X
C ♦ { £7.51 .11 .11 .14 .41 12.54 .1 1  1 15.52 8 151.55 152.43 8 8 .4 4  «
Sin ?en l t e . H .11 .13 .11 .13 .13 .11 t 7 .15  X 52.52 55.31 t 8 7 .4 4  t
C iJ pen 25.52 4.43 .11 .14 .14 .11 . 1 1 X 4.57 1 82,14 25.34 X 5 7 .4 4  t
LcvpU 1(4. M .11 .13 .44 .14 .11 .41  X 35.81 I 218.48 243.22 I 55 .4 4  X
C < 1 23.55 . H 3.23 .14 .41 .11 3.23  t 38.35 1 212.22 224.72 1 31. H  *
C « 2 23.33 .11 4.47 .11 .13 .1 ) .11  t 32.32 * 128.87 234.82  X 34 .4 4  t
C ♦ 3 83.52 .11 11.11 .14 .11 .43 .44  1 42.52 1 231.21 257.32 1 2 .4 4  X
i  ♦ 4 1 1 1 .I I .11 .11 .1 ! .11 .11 .11  t 35.81 X 218.15 2 5 1  77 I 1 .4 4  S
24:s *- .11 . H .14 .14 .11 .44 .11  1 .11 1 .41 .4 4  t .4 4  t
3 * id s .11 .11 .11 .14 .31 .11 .11  t .11  X .1 1 .4 4  t .4 4  t
3**c5 .11 .11 .11 .14 .11 .M .44  1 .44  X .4 4 .1 4  X .4 4  S
lo ’. i l  » 25.43 .45 1.24 .4? .14 .4? .55 : 22.54 I 114.24 1 2 1 4 7  t 4 8 .4 4  I
Figure 9.3 shows the average amount of taxes paid or 
benefits received by different types of tax unit. The 
type of tax unit is shown on the left. The top row shows 
different types of tax/benefit. From left to right the 
columns show the average amounts of the head of tax 
unit's Income Tax, National Insurance contributions of 
the head, National Insurance Contributions of the wife, 
Family Income Supplement, Supplementary Benefit, Rent 
Rebate, Rate rebate, Child Benefit, Housing Benefit 
Supplement, National Insurance Pension and the wife's 
Income Tax.
It seems probable that the strength of the IFS approach 
is that it provides useful information in a standardised 
way for any particular policy. In contrast, POM's output 
routines create tables which are probably more easily 
understood by a non-expert. However they require the
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Figure 9.4 Equations for Family Income Supplement
Individual's Dependant__Child =
if ((age <= 16) or ((age <= 19) and
(Education_Level = State_Secondary__School)) then 
TRUE else FALSE.
Tax_Unit's Number_Of_Dependants =
Number_In_Tax_Unit (Dependant_Child).
Individual's Prescribed_Amount = 
if (If_Getting_Fis = true) then
( £ 7 6 +  ( £9.50 * Number_Of_Dependants)) 
else 0.
Individual's FISJMax =
if (Getting_Fis = true) then
(£ 22 + ( £ 2 * Number_Of_Dependants)) 
else 0.
Individual's FIS_Amount =
if (If_Getting_Fis = True) then
(if ((Prescribed_Amount Less Original_Income)
* 0.5) > FIS_Max
then FIS_Max 
else ((Prescribed_Amount Less Original_Income)
* 0.5))
else 0.
user to create clear column and row variables (or to use 
standard variables which are stored within POM).
At the bottom of figure 9.1 average tax unit income 
before and after the change is shown. Below this figures 
the estimated national total for net tax unit income is
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shown. The net tax unit income before the change was 126 
bn, and 123 bn after it. From this it can be deduced 
that the cost of this policy to the exchequer would be 3 
bn.
9.3 EXAMPLE 2 - Simulation of Family Income Supplement 
In the second example entitlement to Family Income 
Supplement (FIS) has been simulated by calculating the 
amount of benefit each family would be eligible for, 
based on the characteristics of the family recorded in 
the FES. Some of the respondents to the FES state that 
they receive FIS but do not know how much.
For the second simulation the amount of FIS was 
calculated by POM. This was done by using the 
information in the FES on gross incomes, dependent 
children, and whether FIS is claimed. The equations used 
to calculate FIS entitlement are shown in figure 9.4 
below. It should be noted that several of the user- 
defined variables in figure 9.4 are defined to be
individual variables. It is important to attach the 
amount of FIS to the data of the one person in the tax 
unit (i.e. the person who actually receives the payments) 
otherwise the amount of the FIS payment would be deemed 
to be received by each member of the tax unit. This
would cause errors if at a later stage the user wished to 
calculate the total benefit income of the tax unit.
FIS is predicted - £ 114 million. This compares to an
official estimate of £ 123 million (DHSS, 1986). The
figure for the cost of FIS is different if one calculates 
it by the simpler method of adding together all the 
recorded amounts of FIS. This method produces an
estimate of 111 million pounds. It is hardly surprising 
that the estimate produced by this method is lower than
114 million pounds because of missing values where the 
claimant did not know much he or she received in benefit.
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Figure 9.5 shows the average FIS payment by income band 
to head of tax unit. At the bottom of the table a 
prediction for the total cost of
Figure 9.5 Family Income Supplement
Table Of: Net Income Band
By All Individuals l 
The Mean of Predicted FIS Amount is the top Value in Each Cell 
The Number of cases is the bottom value
Net Income Band All Individuals 1
All
Under 50
|!—
24 .45 
42
j from 50 to 100
i i
5.25
3
j Over 100
i i 0
Tot.Cases 45
Average Across All Cases of Predicted_FIS_Amount 23.17
Est. National Total of Predicted_FIS_Amount 114 Million Per Annum
Table Excludes 18468 Cases with Missing Data
The apparently large number of missing values is because 
all those people who did not claim Family Income 
Supplement are shown as missing. The forty-five cases 
where individuals did claim FIS represents 0.24 per cent 
of the total FES sample, which is in line with the total 
number of people who claim FIS as a proportion of the
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total UK population. The FES variable which shows 
whether or not Family Income Supplement was claimed 
records a "1" if it is claimed, and a "O" if the person 
did not claim or the information was missing. It is 
therefore not possible to distinguish between non­
claimants and missing values for this particular 
simulation.
9.4 EXAMPLE 3 - Simulation of Labour Supply Responses 
The simulation in the third example is based on the work 
of Brown, Levin, and Ulph (1976). Their research 
attempts to predict number of hours people work based on 
their marginal wages and an estimate of the income they 
would receive if they were out of work (see chapter 5). 
The equations used to produce this estimate are shown in 
figure 9.6 below.
Figure 9.6 Equations to Predict Work Hours
Individual's Net_Employment_Income =
Net_Earnings - Earned_Income_Tax.
Individual's Net_Original_Income =
Original_Income - (Tax_bill + NIContribution).
Individual's Household_Net_Income =
Total_Household (Original_Income
- (Tax_Bill + NIContribution)) + 
State_Benefits_In_Household.
Household's Other_Income =
Household_Net_Income -
Total_Household(Net_EmploymentJEncome).
Individual's Tax_Rate =
NIRate + Income Tax Rate.
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Figure 9.6 Continued - Equations to Predict Work Hours
Individual's Hourly_Wage =
Normal_Gross_Wage / Usual_Hours_Worked_Per_Week.
Individual's Marginal_Wage »
(100 - Tax_Rate) * (Hourly_Wage / 100).
Individual's Marg_Wage_Squared =
(Marginal_Wage * Marginal_Wage).
Individual's Intercept—
((Tax_Threshold / 100) * Income_Tax_Rate).
Individual's 01d_Work_Hours =
if (Married and Usual__Hours_Worked_Per_Week > 8 
and sex = male and 
Overtime_Hours_Worked <= 0) then 
Usual__Hours_Worked_Per_Week.
Individual's Inter_Wage =
Intercept * Marginal_Wage.
Individual's New_Work_Hours =
if (Married and Usual_Hours_Worked_Per_Week > 8
and sex = male and Overtime__Hours_Worked <= 0) then 
(( 2.376 * Marginal_Wage) + (2.253 * Intercept) - 
(0.000018557 * Inter_Wage) - (0.00160733 * OtherJEncome) - 
(0.0000133021 * Marg_Wage__Squared) + 7746.261 ) 
else 0.
This is based on a regression analysis of married male 
workers from the FES 1984. The theory on which this 
simulation is based is explained more fully in chapter 6 
above. The model explained 0.1146 of the variation in
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work hours, which is similar to the original results
achieved by Brown, Levin and Ulph (1976). The results of
this regression are shown in figure 9.7 below.
Figure 9.8 is a table produced by POM to show the effect
of a cut in income tax on work hours. The cut in tax
rates is the same as that described above for example 
one. It shows the predicted number of work hours by 
income range. The lower value in each cell of the table 
is the actual number of hours that people within the 
sample said that they worked. The upper value is the 
prediction of the number of hours
Figure 9.7 Model to Predict Work Hours 
Work Hours predicted by Marginal Wage, the Square of 
Marginal Wage, the Intercept, Intercept multiplied by 
marginal wage, and other income.
R Square 0.11463
Adjusted R Square 0.11241
Standard Error 8.13982
Marginal_Wage 2.376
Intercept 2.253
Intercept * Marginal Wage - 0.000018557
Other Income - 0.00160733
Marginal Wage Squared - 0.0000133021
Constant 7746.261
they would have worked as a result of the income tax 
cuts. The simulation shows that for all ranges of gross 
income, the response to the tax cut is a fall in the 
number of work hours. This would indicate that for the 
sampled population the income effect is stronger than the 
substitution effect. People are able to earn the same 
amount of money in exchange for less work. (In this
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particular simulation this effect is stronger than the 
incentive effect of allowing people to receive more 
income for a given hour of work).
Figure 9.9 shows an example of output from the TRAP 
model (King, M.A., Ramsay, P., 1983), which is intended
to simulate the effect of behavioural responses to tax- 
benefit policy. The output shown in figure 9.9 would 
probably be more difficult for a non-expert to interpret 
than the table in figure 9.8. It should be stressed that 
figure 9.8 only refers to married men working more than 8 
hours per week. Therefore it is only to be expected that 
the table shows a large number of missing values.
Figure 9.8 Predicted Work Hours before and after 
A Policy Change - output from POM
Table Of: All Individuals 1
By All Individuals 2 
Mean of Old Work Hours is the top Value in Each cell 
& Mean of New Work Hours is bottom Value
All All Individuals 2
Individuals 1
I All ALL
I All i U . 36 
3 6 . 24
1937 
1987
Tot.Cases 1987
Average Across All Cases of 01d_Uork_Hours AO.36 
Average Across All Cases of New Work Hours 36.24
Table Excludes 16570 Cases with Missing Data
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9.5 Conclusion
The tables shown above are solely intended to be 
illustrative of the type of output which can be produced 
by POM. Different researchers have used different 
methods of producing each type of table. POM does not 
constrain the user to choose one method rather than 
another. For example, in example two the user would be 
free to estimate the cost of FIS based on the recorded
amounts of FIS or on the amounts calculated within POM.
Example 3 is not intended to be a contribution to labour
supply theory, but rather an illustration of how such 
theory can be used by POM. A comparison with alternative 
methods of displaying such data indicates that POM's 
methods may produce output which is easier to interpret 
than the output produced by the existing models which
simulate behavioural responses.
The user interface chapter shows that POM provides the 
user with a handy and comprehensible system for 
specifying the contents of tables. This makes POM's 
output procedures both usable and flexible.
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10. POTENTIAL USER REACTIONS
10.1 Introduction
In order to assess how far POM has succeeded in its aims 
POM was demonstrated to a number of potential users and 
their reactions to it were collected. It was important 
to gain an impression of the strengths and weaknesses of 
POM from those who have had experience of using other 
tax-benefit models. If POM was in no significant 
respects different from the existing models then clearly 
it had failed. Ultimately it is intended that POM should 
be usable by a wide range of people who do not currently 
use tax-benefit models such as people in pressure groups, 
opposition parties, intra-party factions, academics and 
people in the media. However it would not have been 
possible to get a critical assessment of POM by 
demonstrating it to people who have never had any 
experience of tax-benefit modelling. The potential users 
selected for the purpose of this review had in each case 
some existing experience of tax-benefit modelling. In 
some cases those who were asked to comment on POM had 
invested considerable energy in developing their own 
models, and so had no predisposition to lavish praise on 
a rival package. Nevertheless it was necessary to gain 
potential user reactions to POM from people who has some 
basis for comparison.
The POM is intended to provide a facility for analysing 
tax-benefit policy which is sufficiently easy to use so 
that it is accessible to non-experts, and which does not 
restrict the user to a narrow range of policy options. 
In order to determine how far POM had succeeded in these 
aims the opinions of several potential users of the model 
were sought. Demonstrations of POM were given to staff 
at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Low Pay Unit, 
the London School of Economics, the Policy Studies 
Institute, the Department of Health and Social Security, 
and the Central Statistical Office. These people were
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selected because they cover a range of experience of tax- 
benefit modelling - from technical experts in the field 
of computer programming to people who merely use programs 
written by others. Nevertheless all of the people 
interviewed were involved in work which required them to 
analyse tax-benefit policy. Their analysis took a number 
of forms from civil servants advising ministers on 
options for changing policy to pressure group workers who 
respond to government policy. It should be stressed that 
the opinions expressed during these interviews were 
personal observations by individuals and should not be 
attributed to the organisations which employed them.
The individuals who were interviewed are listed below 
together with a summary of their particular area of 
expertise in tax-benefit policy modelling.
1. Graham Stark (Institute for Fiscal Studies) has 
probably done more work on the IFS model than anyone 
else. He has an unusual degree of expertise in the 
technical computer programming aspects of tax-benefit 
modelling.
2. Robin Smail (Low Pay Unit) commented as an end user of 
an existing tax benefit package, TAXMOD, which he uses to 
produce the Low Pay Unit's post budget briefing. He 
comments as a user of a tax-benefit model rather than as 
a computer programmer.
3. Holly Sutherland (London School of Economics) is the 
main computer programmer responsible for current versions 
of TAXMOD, and also has a special expertise in the matter 
of adjusting the FES for the under-representation of 
certain family types and income groups.
4. Richard Berthoud (Policy Studies Institute) has been 
responsible for a number of research projects 
commissioned by government on social security. His 
research has been undertaken with the aid of an existing 
statistical package, "Quantime", rather than with an ’'in-
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house" program.
5. David Ramsden and Richard d'Souza (Department of 
Health and Social Security) commented as researchers in 
the DHSS Economic Adviser's Office(EAO). They both had 
experience of coming into the EAO and learning about the 
DHSS Policy Simulation Model from scratch, and so had had 
to interpret program statements written by other people.
6. Ian Scotter (Treasury) worked as a user of IGOTM to 
produce Treasury forecasts of tax revenues and benefit 
expenditures.
7. Deirdre Ross (Central Statistical Office) was a user 
of IGOTM.
8. Ian Wilkinson (Central Statistical Office) supervised 
projects which required tax-benefit policy analysis, but 
did not normally use IGOTM directly.
Before seeking the opinions of these potential users 
there was a demonstration of the program - normally with 
a hands-on session. Information was gathered through a 
focussed interview. The potential users were asked to 
assess POM's strengths and weaknesses in a number of 
different areas, and were also asked for general remarks 
not covered by the questions asked during the interview. 
In each case the potential user was asked to give an 
opinion of the model according to several criteria: the
comprehensibility of the Policy Simulation Language, 
general usability, data representation, flexibility, and 
POM's overall strengths and weaknesses.
The preliminary impressions of the users are given below.
10.2 Readability & Comprehensibility
In general, the respondents considered that the 
statements used by POM were more readable than languages 
such as FORTRAN and BASIC. Graham Stark (IFS) said POM 
was more readable than FORTRAN, and about equal to 
Pascal. Holly Sutherland (LSE) concurred saying that it
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would probably be easier to read a program fragment 
written with POM, than with another computer language.
Ian Scotter (Treasury) commented that the tax-benefit 
statements supplied as examples with POM were more 
readable than similar ones in other programming 
languages. However in his view the readability of the 
statements depended on the discipline of the person using 
POM. If the user was careful to write long self- 
explanatory variable names, then POM would be readable. 
Otherwise POM's statements would be similar to those of 
other programming languages.
Deirdre Ross (CSO) said that POM's statements were 
probably more understandable. The removal of control 
loop structures and the use of long variable names was 
very important in making POM's statements more readable. 
However it would not be possible for a user to alter 
something in a long series of rules without carefully 
reading all preceding rules to understand what had gone 
before.
David Ramsden of DHSS stated that the rules produced by 
POM were certainly more readable than statements produced 
by other languages. In the context of tax-benefit 
modelling within the DHSS Economic Advisers Office (where 
there are a large number of people doing tax-benefit 
modelling as a team) this would be extremely useful. 
With a program like POM different staff members would be 
able to understand and re-edit each others program files 
and that this was very difficult with their present 
system. However Richard d'Souza pointed out that these 
comments only applied to the DHSS Policy Simulation Model 
as it existed in mid 1988, at the time of writing the PSM 
was being altered so that fuller use could be made of 
long variable names.
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Graham Stark (IFS) stated that it was hard to say whether 
POM would be more comprehensible in practice than the IFS 
model, which is based on FORTRAN. His experience of 
highly readable program languages such as COBOL was that 
it was often harder to see what these were intended to 
do, than with FORTRAN. Thus it was often much more 
difficult to detect errors in such programs. POM 
probably had similar strengths and weaknesses to COBOL. 
However, even with the IFS model's structure, alterations 
to the program were often difficult. Sometimes a change 
could be made to source code and the IFS model would run 
within 20 minutes, at other times one or two days would 
have to be spent searching for bugs when a change was 
made.
Richard Berthoud (PSI) said that for a small model the 
long variable names would be acceptable. However in a 
long model the long variables names might be begin to 
confuse rather than enlighten.
Ian Scotter (Treasury) commented that though the package 
is aimed at non-experts, some people in this category 
would still find it difficult to understand concepts such 
as the "If .... Then ... Else" statement. However 
Deirdre Ross (C.S.O.) felt that many non-programmers 
could comprehend such concepts and that a program like 
POM would be necessary if the ability to do tax-benefit 
modelling is to be extended to a larger number of people. 
In her view POM only required the learning of a few 
conditional statements. Ian Wilkinson (CSO) commented as 
a non-programer that POM definitely seemed more 
understandable.
Richard d'Souza (DHSS) praised the comprehensibility of 
POM saying that it would cut out errors. The existing 
DHSS system required numbers to be used in place of 
meaningful names which made it impossible to read the
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program without the help of a codebook. The statements 
produced by POM would be readable enough to send to some 
one from a local benefit office for checking. "The 
problem with our existing statements is that they are 
very difficult for any one to check.” The English 
language nature of PSL would also reduce the time needed 
to learn tax-benefit modelling in comparison with the 
DHSS Policy Simulation Model. The current model required 
an “immense” learning process.
10.3 Usability
Holly Sutherland (LSE) stated that for her it would have 
been quicker to have written a BASIC program, than to 
have learned to use POM. However the advantage of having 
ready-labelled data through POM was significant.
Graham Stark (IFS) remarked that learning to use POM was 
probably easier than learning a programming language, 
but was not easier than using a menu-driven model. If 
the user was to be denied access to the raw data, then 
this would be a substantial disadvantage. He felt that 
it would perhaps be quicker to get a model up and running 
with POM, but it would be longer before he believed in 
the accuracy of the results. He would believe in the 
accuracy of his own model sooner. Respondents in general 
felt it would be quicker to write a large module in POM 
than in another language.
Ian Scotter (Treasury) considered that the English 
language style format made POM easier than using the 
existing programming languages. However he also felt 
that skilled users (i.e. computer programmers) would find 
PSL restrictive and prevent them from achieving tasks 
which would be possible with a programming language with 
the full range of control structures. For a non- 
programer, however, he felt that POM would definitely be 
easier. Switching from the upper to the lower screen was
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a problem. It was difficult to use the pop-up menus 
initially but the user would probably get used to these.
Ian Scotter (Treasury) also observed that POM does not 
easily allow for comparative runs with different
tax/benefit structures, or even with a different
parameter for the same structure. This occurs because
variables are overwritten on the disk if their 
calculation is changed in any way. Thus, for instance,
tax liabilities are overwritten each time the basic rate
of tax is changed. It would be possible to change a 
parameter by creating a variable with a different name, 
but this might involve re-processing a series of rules 
and having variables re-written to disk.
Richard Berthoud (PSI) observed that POM would be an 
advantage for a novice who was willing to rely on it and 
did not mind the absence of the flexibility of a 
programming language.
David Ramsden (DHSS) considered that the pop-up variable 
windows were a good feature. A novice user would rely on 
these windows initially but would be able to type the 
variable labels from the keyboard directly as the became 
more familiar with the system.
Robin Smail (Low Pay Unit) found it difficult to see POM 
replacing TAX-MOD, for such things as the Low Pay Unit's 
post-budget briefing. The learning required to use POM 
to write a full representation of the tax-benefit system 
was such that a non-specialist researcher would be 
unlikely to have the time to write a large scale model 
with POM. However there were situations where having 
access to the raw data would be very useful, such as the 
ability to find out whether low wage earners were 
predominantly from low income households. Data on wage 
levels and household incomes exists in the data set for
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TAX-MOD but the menu structure of TAX-MOD means that one 
simply cannot get the data out in the correct form.
10.4 Data Representation
Holly Sutherland felt that the data was represented in a 
clear way, but warned that the data had to be 
unambiguous. For example, the mortgage interest variable 
as supplied by the Department of Employment has a large 
number of missing values. In the LSE Tax-Mod package the 
mortgage interest variable has been adjusted to take 
account of missing answers by supplying the average 
amount of mortgage interest where necessary. As with all 
of the tax-benefit models the accuracy of the results 
depends on such background work to make up for 
deficiencies in the data.
Graham Stark (IFS) commented that for those people who 
already have experience of using the Family Expenditure 
Survey POM's variable names might be a hindrance, as they 
already had experience of the Department of Employment's 
code numbers for each variable, for other users the
labels would probably be a help. Thus the data
representation would probably be clearer for novices but 
not for experts.
Richard Berthoud (PSI) said that the use of English
language labels for categorical variables like
"Type__Of_Housing_Tenuren, and "StandardJRegion", was a 
definite improvement in that it avoided the need to look 
up the value in a codebook.
10.5 Flexibility
Graham Stark commented that is was more flexible than a 
menu driven system, but less so than using a programming 
language and having access to the raw data. Ian Scotter 
(Treasury) commented that defining a new benefit would be 
quicker with POM than with the Tabulator (an in-house
298
10. POTENTIAL USER REACTIONS
package used at the Central Statistical Office) but not 
faster than with a case-oriented model written in a high 
level language like FORTRAN.
Ian Scotter (Treasury) observed that POM needed a 
facility for the user to define constants. Such values 
as the Single Person's Tax Allowance would be referred
to in several places in a tax-benefit system. It would
be useful to be able to make one alteration of a
constant, which would thus obviate the need to make 
changes to numerous different tax-benefit statements. 
This would improve the user interface for changing the 
parameters of a given tax-benefit structure. It appeared 
that changing a tax-benefit constant was more difficult 
in POM than in the other tax-benefit models, whereas 
changing the tax-benefit structure was easier than with 
the other models.
10.6 Speed
Ian Scotter (Treasury) said that a tax-benefit model
which would be acceptable to his department would have to 
execute in at most 30 minutes, but the target elapsed 
time should be much shorter than this. POM would not 
meet this requirement if were to be used to process a 
large set of rules from scratch. However in many cases, 
policy changes would only be made in incremental stages. 
If only one or two rules needed to be altered for a 
particular simulation then this would only take a few 
minutes.
10.7 General Strengths and Weaknesses
Ian Scotter (Treasury) summarised POM as follows. Its 
main strength was that it was easy to understand. The 
accessibility of the tax-benefit structure to non-experts 
was good. Its tabulation procedures were good, though it 
would be preferable to be able to examine the 
hierarchical relationships between different household
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members more easily. The drawbacks of POM were 
principally its lack of speed, the lack of an easy method 
of changing the parameters of the tax-benefit system, the 
difficulty of comparing two different tax-benefit 
systems, and the lack of more sensitive procedures for 
grossing up to population totals.
Richard Berthoud (PSI) commented that POM was user- 
friendly in a superficial way. However he stressed that 
tax-benefit modelling is an extremely complex process and 
that a user must be extremely careful in carrying out 
simulations. POM's ease of use might be a disadvantage 
if it encouraged novice users to experiment with tax- 
benefit policy without adequate care.
David Ramsden and Richard d'Souza (DHSS) thought the 
speed of POM might be adequate for their purposes. The 
readability of the statements would be an excellent 
advantage for them as they had three or four members of 
staff doing tax-benefit modelling at any one time. The 
advantage of being able to understand and alter each 
other's work easily would be a major gain. The prospect 
of being able to work entirely in a micro-computer 
environment rather than rely on the main frame would also 
be an attraction. They concurred with Ian Scotter about 
the lack of features to cope with differential benefit 
take-up rates, and grossing-up for different types of 
household. There was also a fear that the process of 
writing a file for each new variable might use too much 
disk space. To detect other drawbacks it would be 
necessary to have extensive operational experience.
There was a general consensus that POM's user interface 
was an improvement on the existing methods. However it 
was felt that further work was needed to improve the 
POM's execution speed.
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11 Introduction
This research question which this thesis addresses is 
whether it is possible to construct a computer model of 
tax-benefit policy which is flexible enough to simulate 
novel ideas but is usable enough to be operated by people 
who are not experts. This twin problem of flexibility 
and usability concerns both the mechanisms for inputting 
policies and those for getting meaningful data out of the 
model. The non-expert user must be able to conceive a 
completely new policy and define it in a way which the 
user finds reasonably natural and comprehensible. 
Moreover the method of defining the policy must produce a 
specification which is accurate enough for the computer 
to interpret. Similarly the output mechanisms must be a 
handy enough tool for the non-expert to wield, but must 
not restrict the user to a narrow range of standard 
output tables.
This conclusion will examine in turn the issues of POM's 
usability, flexibility, and its output mechanisms. In 
light of this some possible future developments of POM 
will be discussed. Finally there will be an assessment 
of the impact POM might have, both in terms of it short 
and long term effects.
11.1 Usability
The success of any computer program can be assessed most 
accurately by a detailed survey of a large number of 
users. This has not been possible in the case of POM. 
The survey of potential users is no more than a
collection of first impressions, mainly by people who 
have already invested time and energy in developing their 
own tax-benefit models (and who have little incentive to 
be adulatory about a new entrant into the field). The
minority of respondents who were obliged to work with
tax-benefit models designed by other people were
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extremely favourable. One official at the DHSS commented 
that he was "gob-smacked" by the quality of POM's user 
interface. Praise also came from a civil servant in the 
Central Statistical Office who was a user, rather than a 
designer, of the IGOTM model. What linked the experience 
of the people who were most favourable to POM, was not 
only that they had not designed their own models, but 
that they were not primarily computer programmers. They 
were generalists who had been forced to assume the role 
of programmers as non-experts.
The ease with which such generalists can learn the Policy 
Simulation Language (PSL) flows from the fact that it is 
anchored in their existing knowledge to a greater extent 
than other programming languages. The structure of PSL 
statements is not quite English, but anyone with a 
knowledge of English and elementary mathematics should 
have little trouble in grasping it. The building blocks 
of PSL are all in everyday conversational use: "If", "%", 
"Per_Annum", "Then", etc. In just the same way phonetic 
alphabets which link written characters to commonly 
produced sounds are easier to learn because they are 
linked to elements of speech in everyday use. Chinese 
pictograms which give no indication of pronunciation are 
much more difficult to learn. In general information 
transfer technologies have often made their greatest 
impact, not when they first made a thing possible, but 
when they became accessible to the majority of a 
population. Thus the original inventer of the light 
bulb, Dr Swan, is almost totally eclipsed in public 
memory by Thomas Edison whose tungsten filament made the 
lightbulb practical for general use. In a similar way 
computer programming may have yet to make its greatest 
impact, because the technicalities of existing 
programming languages still make it relatively 
inaccessible to the lay person.
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The most impressive accolade for the usability and 
comprehensibility of PSL came from the civil servant who 
said that the problem with the program statements in the 
model he was using were more or less "uncheckable", 
whereas it would be possible for PSL statements to be 
understood and checked by staff in local benefit offices.
11.2 Flexibility
Though model users like Stark, of the IFS, said that they 
would regret not having access to the raw data or the 
full features of a programming language, at no time 
during the interviews with potential users did any one 
point out a tax-benefit policy which could not be
simulated with POM. The building blocks exist to 
simulate any tax or benefit, so long as the assessment of 
the benefit payable or tax due is based on a variable 
included in the data set. However this limitation 
applies to all tax-benefit models. An example of a 
policy which could not be simulated with POM would be a 
National Disability Income, because the data on
disability in the FES is incomplete. (Disabled people can 
only be identified through the receipt of an existing 
disability benefit in the FES. As one of the main aims 
of a Disability Income would be to reach people excluded 
by the existing benefits it would thus be pointless to 
base an analysis which excludes people who are disabled 
but are not helped by the existing system.)
The way the data is stored makes POM more flexible than 
the IFS model, for example. This is because POM's data 
is stored on an individual basis (the individuals are 
organised into tax units, which are in turn organised 
into households). In contrast, the IFS model cannot be 
used to analyse taxes or benefits at the level of the 
individual because its data is aggregated at the level of
the tax unit. Thus the IFS model could not show the
income losses which would be suffered by adult non­
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householders under the community charge. As a result the 
government's Green Paper Paving for Local Government 
showed numerous analytical tables of the effects of the 
community charge on tax units and households, but not a 
single table demonstrated the effect of the community 
charge on the unit which is to be the basis for the tax: 
the individual.
POM's main claim to achieve a high degree of flexibility
rests on the fact that it gives the user access to a
programming language rather than a series of menus. Even 
the best of the menu driven models, TAXMOD, in the form 
it is distributed to pressure groups, would be incapable 
of simulating the most significant tax-benefit reform 
proposals which have been put forward in recent years. 
It did not include menu options for the Vince (1983) tax 
credits. Even though the authors of TAXMOD had done 
detailed research on the Vince scheme (Atkinson, 1984: 
28), there was no way that a user of the TAXMOD program 
could have simulated both the flat rate personal tax 
credits and the scheme's withdrawable low income credits.
TAXMOD included several menu options for the form of
Basic Benefit system specified by Taverne (1986), but any 
user of TAXMOD would be required to be content with an
inexact simulation of the Taverne proposals because
TAXMOD did not allow for the system of earnings 
disregards which were to be allowed before Taverne's 
Basic Benefits were to be withdrawn. It should be 
stressed that these references to TAXMOD should not be 
taken to mean that TAXMOD is particularly inflexible.
TAXMOD is used in these instances to illustrate that 
there are important policies which cannot be simulated by 
even the most flexible of the existing models.
None of the existing models would have been able to 
simulate Meacher's (Times, 1985) tax-benefit proposals
which included a new form of housing support to replace 
mortgage interest tax relief. This new payment was to be
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based on average housing costs in each region. This 
element of regional variation is not provided for in any 
of the existing tax-benefit models. It is exactly the 
type of option which policy-makers should be able to 
experiment with, but which cannot be simulated by a menu 
driven system. Since no one had previously suggested a 
regionally varied system, no menu system has been 
constructed to accommodate this option.
With PSL, however, it would not only be possible to gain 
access to the "Region" variable, but the user would be 
able to use self-explanatory values when using the region 
variable. For example, the user could use a condition 
such as "If Region = Yorkshire" instead of "if Region = 
4".
11.3 Output
The chapter on the principles of tax-benefit policy 
attempted to provide a summary of the most commonly used 
criteria for judging fiscal policies. This chapter 
showed the sheer variety of yardsticks which can be used 
to assess tax-benefit policies. This variety should make 
clear the dangers inherent in choosing a small set of 
standard output tables, because the selection of these 
standards involves selecting an ideological bias. For 
example, the CUBS model shows the marginal tax rate and 
net income by the number of hours per week worked by the 
individual but does not show net incomes by family type. 
Nor does it give an assessment of the effect of a policy 
on income equality as would a statistic like a Gini co­
efficient. "Value-Neutrality" is a utopian concept in 
choosing a list of criteria by which to assess political 
policies. Any such list will reflect political 
preferences and prejudices, even if one conducted a 
representative sample survey of an entire population to 
ascertain what standards should be used to judge a fiscal 
policy (a project which would assume an optimistic
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assessment of the public's grasp of political economy), 
the result would be no more than a summation of the 
prejudices and preferences of a group.
This presumption of value-neutrality is a defect of the 
existing tax-benefit models because they all offer the 
user a pre-determined set of standard tables and charts. 
POM allows the user to produce tables based on any 
variable within the data set. In addition, to the 
commoner types of table such as those which show income 
gains and losses by family type and income group, and 
those which illustrate changes in marginal tax rates, the 
user could simulate a vast range of other tables. An 
ardent Scottish Nationalist might wish to determine the 
average net incomes in different regions before and after 
a policy. This would be entirely possible by using the 
region variable. It would be possible to go further than 
this by creating a new variable based on the standard 
region to include only two categories: Scotland, and the 
rest of the UK. This could be used to assess more 
clearly how a particular policy would affect the 
transfer of resources to Scotland.
In some cases the standard tables are restrictive even 
though they seem to a number of salient aspects of policy 
analysis. The existing models concentrate on "marginal11 
tax rates almost to the exclusion of "average" tax rates. 
Someone concerned to assess whether a tax conformed to 
the proportionality principle would be more concerned 
with the total tax charged as a percentage of total 
income rather than the percentage which is levied on the 
individual's highest unit of income. If the tax as a 
proportion of all income was roughly the same across 
different income levels then it would be possible to 
state that a tax was fairly consistent with the 
proportionality principle. This assessment would be 
impossible simply by examining marginal tax rates.
306
11. CONCLUSION
Assessing the extent to which a policy prevents people 
from falling into poverty makes it necessary to assess 
what a given household needs to live on. This might 
require that some measure of minimum income such as the 
Income Support level for each household should be worked 
out in order to assess the extent to which people fell 
below this level. (Though the Income Support level is not 
universally accepted as a measure of minimum income it is 
useful to have it as a possible yardstick.) None of the 
existing models show household incomes in relation to 
Income Support levels (though TAXMOD comes closest by 
dividing the number of family members by the number of 
equivalent adults). The existing models exclude the 
possibility of making an important assessment of the 
poverty-preventing aspects of a policy by preventing the 
user from determining how many households fall below 
their Income Support level. By giving the user access to 
the data to calculate Income Support levels, POM leaves 
this option open. If the user went further than the 
"minimum needs" concept of poverty which is implicit in 
using Income Support levels, and attempted to define 
poverty in a relative way, then the access to the data 
would be even more important.
Chapter nine showed how it would be possible to use POM 
to make an assessment of the behavioural responses to a 
policy. Like TRAP, POM forces the user to make an 
explicit choice to include a theory of behavioural 
responses. POM leaves open the possibility of simulating 
theories which relate to behavioural responses other than 
labour supply responses, so long as the data needed to 
make predictions about other forms of behaviour exists in 
the data set.
In summary, POM attempts to produce a "value-neutral" 
system for analysing policies by leaving the choice of
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assessment criteria in the hands of the user. POM's 
tabulator prompts the user with a series of easily 
understandable questions to allow for the construction of 
a table tailor-made to the user's ideological 
specifications.
11.4 Future Developments of POM
As it has only been possible to develop POM to the 
prototype stage it is only possible to guess at its full 
potential. Speed is likely to be a drawback of POM in its 
current form. Ironically, this is mainly due to one of 
the features of POM which was intended to increase its 
speed of execution. The "run-coding" of the data which 
requires them to be stored in a separate file for each 
variable actually appears to be slower than a system 
based on a simple case-based file structure. Currently 
POM has (roughly) 40 different data files (one for each 
variable).
In order to test the speed of a case-based system a data 
file with records containing forty variables for each of 
the c. 17000 individuals was constructed. This occupied 
over 4,000,000 bytes of storage space in contrast to the 
run-coded data which needed less than 1,000,000 bytes. 
However it was possible to read the entire data file with 
all forty variables in under a minute, whereas reading 
only ten run-coded variables (and without performing any 
calculations or writing results to disk) takes over 
twenty minutes. The use of run-coding in POM certainly 
met its objective of saving storage space. In certain 
applications it might be preferable to dispense with this 
advantage in order to achieve greater execution speed.
Another impediment to the speed of POM is its reliance on 
interpreted rather than compiled code. There could be 
major gains in execution time if POM produced compiled 
code rather than code to be used by an interpreter. This
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could be achieved by transforming POM into a language 
translator which would write out PSL statements in the 
source code of another language such as Pascal or C. A
compiler could then transform this source code into
object code.
These possible improvements in POM's execution speed do 
not detract from the usability of POM as seen by 
potential users because the comprehensibility of the 
language was something they could assess from the hands- 
on sessions which they were given.
One doubt which was raised about POM was that people 
using it under considerable pressures of time would tend
to shorten the variable names to a point where they would
become incomprehensible. The extent
to which this would undermine the usefulness of POM 
depends to a certain extent on the way in which it is to 
be used. If one person only is to alter the program 
statements over a long period of time as is the case with 
in the IFS, where one researcher does the vast majority 
of the work of altering the model, then the damage is 
limited. If, as in the case of the DHSS Economic 
Advisers' Office several members of staff work on the 
same model and staff are frequently transferred to new 
posts, then it would be particularly important for users 
of POM to write full self-explanatory variable names 
(e.q. "Number_of_Kids" rather than "XCH"). It would be 
technically possible to constrain rather than encourage 
users to do this, if it were felt to be sufficiently 
important. One could, for example, link the parser to a 
computer dictionary of the type used to check spelling in 
word-processing programs. The parser could be instructed 
not to accept any variable names which do not consist of 
elements which are full English words. In the example 
above, nNumber_of_KidsM would be accepted because each of 
the three elements are English words (though as far as
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the dictionary would be concerned "kid” would refer to 
the offspring of goats rather than humans), whereas "XCH" 
would not be accepted. Such constraints are not as 
bizarre as they might at first seem. Supporting very 
large programs is a very serious problem. Sometimes 
programs grow to such enormous sizes that it becomes 
almost impossible to maintain and adapt them when their 
original creator departs to another job. Enforcing a 
self-documenting programming style may be a practical 
solution to this problem.
If POM required full English words to be used in its 
variable names, then the use of the pop-up window and 
mouse method of entering long variable names would become 
even more important. It would also be possible to design 
a routine which would insert a variable name by typing in 
the shortest combination of letters which uniquely 
identifies it.
One minor improvement to POM would be to provide a series 
of standard tables to be used as a quick alternative to 
the process of requiring users to specify tables 
themselves. This would not detract from the open choice 
of assessment criteria described above, but would provide 
means for new users to produce tables quickly.
Another extension to POM which was recommended by one of 
the potential users was the provision of user-defined 
constants. This would take the form of a short statement 
linking a name to a numerical value such as 
"Single_Persons_Tax_Allowance = £ 2605 Per_Annum". Thus
if this tax allowance were referred to in several places 
in a model, the user could alter all of the occurences of 
the value £2605 simply by altering one line. This would 
also make it possible to design an automatic menu- 
generator for POM. It would be possible to construct a 
program which would search for all of the constants in a
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model and then form them into a series of menus. This 
would have two major advantages. Firstly, for a novice 
user who did not want to go through the process of 
learning from POM's instruction manual the menu-generator 
could be used to create a program like TAXMOD for any 
particular set of statements defined in PSL. Secondly, 
altering these constants through a menu system might be a 
faster way of experimenting with minor changes of a 
policy than by re-parsing and reinterpreting (or if POM 
is transformed into a program which uses compiled code 
then changing constants while the program is running 
would be faster than recompilation).
POM and its associated language, PSL, have explored a 
number of possibilities in the field of opening up 
access to computer programming. The refinements which 
could be made to add to its speed and usability could 
make it an extremely effective program, possibly with 
general statistical analysis uses, and not only in the 
area of tax-benefit modelling.
11.5 Practical Effects of POM on government 
A modified version of POM of the type described above 
could be a very useful resource for political parties, 
intra-party groups, and pressure groups. It would 
hopefully make it much more difficult for situations to 
arise such as Meacher's presentation of a new social 
security policy (The Times, 1985a) without being able to 
provide any predictions of the likely effects of his 
policy on actual families or any estimate of the 
exchequer costs or savings. Similarly, the wrong 
estimation of the cost of the Vince tax credit proposals 
(1983) should be more difficult if a model such as POM 
were in general use. The SDP in 1986 would have been 
able to discover for themselves the point at which most 
people would have been net losers under their tax-benefit 
system, rather than wait for the IFS to publish the
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results which the SDP then repudiated in an embarrassing 
public row.
More detailed work should be possible from pressure 
groups such as the Low Pay Unit, which expressed an 
interest in knowing the number of low wage earners who 
were also in low income households. It would be entirely 
possible to do such analyses with POM, whereas they are 
not possible with a program such as TAXMOD, unless the 
menu systems have been set up to allow for them. It is 
inconceivable that if a highly effective and quick method 
of analysing policies were to be used by opposition 
parties and pressure groups that the government would 
allow itself to be at a disadvantage in terms of 
research. It would either seek to acquire POM itself, or 
design a similar alternative. This could have important 
effects on the access to tax-benefit modelling because 
the capabilities of generalist civil servants would be 
enhanced.
Yet even if the generalist official became more powerful, 
it would be much more difficult for civil servants to 
manage the supply of information to ministers because 
intra-party pressure groups could produce their own 
analyses of new policies directly to the minister 
concerned. The monopoly or oligopoly control over the 
supply of tax-benefit policy information would be broken.
This is a hopeful scenario for the effects of POM, or a 
successor version of POM, on the policy making process. 
None of these effects can be proved. In this sense, the 
conceptual arguments about the effect of the dispersal of 
information are more useful. Though one cannot prove 
that any particular method of transmitting information 
will have a specific effect, political and social history 
does indicate that the dispersal of information has 
contributed to the dispersal of power.
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11.6 Conceptual arguments of POM's effect on the Policy 
Process
To appreciate the possible impact of POM on the policy 
process it is necessary to return to the discussion on 
the nature of power in the first chapter.
One of the concepts used to define power is pluralism. If 
one were to assess contemporary Britain in terms of 
Dahl's methodology of observing power conflicts, it would 
be difficult to be sanguine about the view that Britain 
is a pluralist society. In terms of the conflict of 
political parties power seems to be concentrated rather 
than dispersed, with the same party winning three 
elections in succession and seemingly no prospect of an 
early alternation of power. The balance of power between 
central and local government is continually being shifted 
in the direction of centralisation. Britain's local 
government is so far from the concept of federalism that 
councils are regarded merely as "creatures of parliament" 
to be controlled, modified, or even abolished at the whim 
of the legislature. In contrast to presidential systems, 
which hold out the possibility of executives and 
legislatures of different parties, Britain's synthesis of 
legislative and executive power make for a marked 
concentration of power. The dependence of ambitious MPs 
on ministerial posts for their advancement give them an 
enormous incentive to conform to the wishes of the Prime 
Minister. Similarly the judiciary seems heavily 
influenced by the executive. Judicial appointments are 
entirely in the hands of the executive. There is no 
concept of cross-party approval in the appointment of 
judges, as exists in the USA. Even where judges 
occasionally establish a legal precedent against the 
wishes of the executive as in the case of the Ponting 
trial, the government can legislate to change it. The 
government's 1989 Secrecy legislation will effectively
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abolish the principle of legal disclosure of information 
when it is in the public interest, thus abolishing the 
effect of the decision in the Ponting trial.
One does not get an impression of Britain's power 
structure being any more dispersed if one accepts 
Bachrach and Baratz' (1962) view that the power 
relationships can be assessed by observing the 
suppression of issues from the political agenda. Even if 
conflicts do appear on the political agenda, one group 
appears to win all the political conflicts anyway. There 
is no need to look at subtler levels of analysis to find 
a concentration of power.
If Lukes' three dimensional view of power is correct then 
it is difficult to see how such a small enterprise as a 
new tax-benefit model could make any impact. If the 
determinants of power-wielding are so vast and immutable 
as the structure of society, a structure which in 
contemporary Britain seems to give almost unlimited power 
to the dominant faction of the governing party, then how 
could so small a thing as providing an information 
resource make a difference? Such an information resource 
might allow alternative ideas to be promulgated in the 
media and to be spoken about in public meetings, but if 
the power to quash such them is still firmly in the grip 
of the governing faction what use are they? If Crenson's 
view that the power reputations of dominant elites are 
enough to prevent alternative views coming forward, then 
those in opposition would not even bother to switch on 
their computer, let alone use it to devise a well 
thought-out policy, because they would naturally assume 
that their policy would never be implemented.
Is the three dimensional view of power potent enough to 
justify this view? The problem with the three 
dimensional view of power is that it does not provide a
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plausible explanation for the way power relationships 
change over time. Though radical critics of the status 
quo may complain about the unequal distribution of power 
in contemporary Britain, it would be foolish to deny that 
over the centuries there has been a major process of 
power dispersal. Power was more concentrated in the 
hands of the Tudor monarchs than it was when the 
propertied classes dominated parliament in the eighteenth 
century. Similarly, power was more concentrated during 
this period than in the twentieth century when universal 
suffrage helped force the propertied classes submit to 
progressive taxation and the welfare state. In all of 
the countries of the European Community there has been a 
similar transition from monarchy to oligarchy and then to 
democracy. If, as the three dimensional view suggests, 
those in power can prevent alternative policies from even 
being put forward, how can one explain these massive 
changes in the structure of power?
An essential precondition for an attempt at political 
change is a consciousness that circumstances might be 
better and different. Such consciousness depends on 
generally accessible methods of information transfer. 
History provides few examples of peoples which have won 
democratic freedoms for themselves without mass literacy. 
It is difficult to imagine Britain's American colonists 
seeking their independence in the eighteenth century 
without printed polemics against the injustices of 
British rule, and books questioning the foundations of 
monarchical government like Thomas Paine's "The Rights of 
Man". It is significant that the major democracies 
which have illiteracy rates of over 50 per cent, such as 
India, became so as a result of decolonisation rather 
than through internal struggle. It is significant that 
China, whose language is based on pictograms rather than 
on a phonetic alphabet, has never had a strong democratic 
movement. This is in spite of a high level of
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civilisation dating from at least the third century B.C. 
when China was united under Shi Hwang-ti and when the 
construction of the Great Wall commenced. The importance 
of writing was grasped by the novelist Ray Bradbury in 
Fahrenheit 451 in which he envisaged a society where 
books were outlawed in order to make dictatorship 
possible.
The cause of democracy has been strengthened each time 
another rung has been climbed on the ladder of knowledge. 
The invention of a phonetic alphabetic, paper, moveable 
type printing, and mass education, have all made it 
harder to suppress freedoms. It cannot be proven that 
any of these inventions actually caused a revolution, a 
rebellion, or even a legislative proposal, but it would 
be difficult to conceive of any of the modern democracies 
having come into being without them. The invention of 
cheap micro-computers able to manipulate large quantities 
of information about entire societies is also an
important episode in the history of data transfer.
The great problem which seems to underlie the thinking of 
the academic debate about power is the concentration on 
the power structure of entire societies, to the seeming 
exclusion of examining the motivation of individuals. A 
theory which allowed for the impact of individual 
motivations would probably have a better chance of 
explaining changes in power relationships over the
centuries, than the structuralist approaches of Lukes 
(1974) and Poulantzas (1986). A methodological defect
which seems common to both the pluralists and the
elitists is the choice of a relatively narrow time frame 
as a basis for research. For example, it is undoubtedly 
true that Crenson uncovered cases where the power
reputation of large corporations had prevented or 
postponed measures to deal with air pollution. However, 
there can be little doubt that if he had compared the
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politics of air pollution in the 1860s with his own 
research in the 1960s that the popular will for clean air 
was being asserted far more vigorously in his own period.
It would be too narrow to assert that power reputations,
class structures, and agenda management were the only 
reasons why clean air laws were enacted in the twentieth 
rather than the nineteenth century. The dissemination 
of knowledge clearly played its part. Greater 
consciousness of the effect of air pollution on 
respiratory diseases like lung cancer and tuberculosis 
were undoubtedly significant. Knowledge of pollution 
controls in other parts of world must have planted in 
peoples' minds the thought that similar reforms could be 
introduced in their own localities.
To understand the potential impact of a tax-benefit 
model, it is necessary to gain a proper understanding of 
the relative importance of individual motivations on the
one hand and structures of power on the other. If the
case for a pluralist tax-benefit model rested purely on 
the contention that it could alter the structure of power 
as a mechanistic device, then it would be an extremely 
weak case. Devices for the transmission of information 
can have consequences far more momentous than their 
inventors can ever have imagined. They are a channel 
through which the power of ideas can flow. Though it is 
the ideas themselves that effect historical change, the 
information channel is a necessary precondition. The 
originators of the latinate phonetic alphabet can have 
had no idea of the impact that "Das Kapital" or the 
American "Declaration of Independence" would make, yet 
one can still make a strong case that these ideas would 
not have had such an impact if they had been recorded in 
Chinese pictograms because pictogram-based languages are 
so much more difficult to learn.
Research devices such as tax-benefit models must be set
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in a different category from instruments to effect 
changes in tax-benefit policy such as private members 
bills, budgets, publicity campaigns, and public 
inquiries. Judging their importance involves grasping 
the difference between inspiration and implementation. 
Is it the chisels and the marble which make a great 
statue, or is it the mental image which first forms in 
the mind of the sculptor? Archimedes once said that if 
he had a lever long enough and a place to stand that he 
could move the world, yet what use would any of this be 
without the will to apply pressure to the lever?
The ultimate importance of any method of transmitting 
ideas can only be assessed in light of the use which is 
made of it. The computer, as Evans put it, can extend 
the power of the human brain in the same way that the 
steam engine extended the strength of the human arm at 
the outset of the industrial revolution. It may be that 
some future Beveridge will use a tax-benefit model in 
order to work out some great social reform. There is no 
way of knowing. Whatever the success or failure of a 
device for extending knowledge, it should not be judged 
purely as a mechanical device which will have a 
demonstrable effect on society or which will alter the 
material advantage of one section of society. In the 
words of Keynes "In the long run it is ideas, and not 
vested interests, which will be powerful, either for good 
or for evil."
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About the Policy Option Model
The Policy Option Model (POM) of the Tax-Benefit system 
is designed to provide the best possible environment in 
which to test out different tax and social security 
policies. It supplies you with a full screen editor to 
set out your ideas. It gives you access to a set of 
information from the Family Expenditure Survey.
English Not Computerese
One of the major differences between the Policy Option 
Model and other tax-benefit models and statistical 
packages, is that it expects you to think in English, not 
in mathematical symbols or in a computer programming 
language. For example, suppose that you wanted to 
express the statement
Taxable Income = Total Income - Tax Allowances
In a typical computer language this might look like 
this:-
TI1 = TI2 - TA .
This version is more confusing. If you come back and 
look at this line several months after you first wrote it 
you could easily have forgotten what it means. Using the 
POM you would write it like this:-
Taxable__Income = Total_Income - Tax_Allowances.
It is the same as the English language statement above, 
except for the fact that terms which go together like 
"Tax" and "Allowances" are linked by the underscore 
character This is so that POM will be able to see
where one term starts and another one stops. POM goes 
out of its way to make sure that you can speak in English 
and not in specialist jargon. If you have a long term 
like "Self_Employment__Income" POM saves you the time it 
takes to type it in at the keyboard by allowing you to 
point to it with your mouse. At the touch of a button 
the term "Self_Employment_Income" will appear in your 
line of text, without the need to key in each character. .
Names not Numbers
Most of the information you will be dealing with will be 
represented as numbers such as income, housing costs, 
etc. However, some information refers to a set of 
categories like Marital Status ("Single", "Married") etc. 
POM allows you to enter these values as words rather than 
numbers. For example the line
if sex = female
is perfectly valid in POM, whereas in other languages one 
might probably write a statement like
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if sex = 2.
However you must be careful to use exactly the right
label recognised by POM, or else you will be told you
have made an error. The tutorial on page 4 shows you how 
to use the exact label you need simply by guiding the
mouse to the label you want and pressing the mouse 
button.
Handy Tools for Modelling
A special set of tools have been devised so that you can 
cut down on the time you take to set out your ideas. 
Suppose that you wanted to find out the total investment 
income in the household. With a programming language you 
would probably have to write several lines of commands in 
order to achieve this. With POM all you have to do is
write
Total__Household (Investment_Income) .
- All you have to remember is to enclose the items to be 
totalled within brackets. You could include a full 
expression within the brackets such as
Net_Business_Income =
Total_Household (Business_Income - Business_Losses).
In this case the losses would be subtracted from the 
Business Income for each member of the household, and the 
total net business income of the household would be 
worked out.
The various special procedures for tax-benefit modelling 
are set out below in the Command Reference Section below. 
It is worthwhile to read through these before you start 
modelling to find out what procedures are there to help 
speed up your work.
Family Relationships
Frequently in tax and social security policy it is 
necessary to express a rule in terms of the relationship 
between different household members. For example, if a 
benefit for the whole household refers to the head of 
household's income then POM allows you a number of tools 
so that you can use data about some one with a specific 
status within the household. You could express the rule 
as : -
Head_Of_Household's Income.
These pointers always consist of a person within the 
household followed by an apostrophe (') and an 's', 
implying the possessive form of the word. It is possible 
to group together a number of pointers so that they are 
considered at the same time. For example, in simulating 
the rules for Housing Benefit you would need to refer to
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the
Head_Of__Household's Wife's Age 
which would be perfectly acceptable in POM. 
Comprehensibility & Accuracy
It is very common with large computer models that 
mistakes will creep in because the model is not readily 
understandable. If several members of the same team are 
working on a model, it is very likely that mistakes will 
occur if variable names are used which are not 
meaningful. Even if only one member of staff works on a 
large model it is likely that problems will arise if the 
same person returns to a program fragment after several 
months of working on something else. The English 
language approach of POM is not only intended to speed up 
the process of defining the model, but also to enhance 
accuracy as a wider number of people will be able to 
understand and check a given model.
Computer Requirements
To use POM you need an IBM compatible computer with at 
least 512 K of RAM, a hard disk, and a Microsoft (or 
compatible) mouse.
Getting Started
In order to start using POM it is essential that you go 
through the fifteen minute tutorial set out below. There 
are a number of features, which have been built in to POM 
that differ from other computer programs. You will find 
it extremely difficult to learn the essential features of 
POM without doing the tutorial.
Conventions Used in the Manual
When the manual invites you to press a series of keys on
the computer keyboard, the keys are enclosed between a 
"Less Than" ('<') and a "Greater Than" ('>') sign, and 
separated by hyphen. Thus the following line
< CONTROL - K - Q >
would indicate that you should hold down the CONTROL key 
and press the 'K' key followed by the 'Q' key. It should 
be remembered that the CONTROL key and the SHIFT key do 
not print out characters themselves, they alter the
meaning of the other keys. If the manual says to press
< CONTROL - K - B >
then the control key should be pressed while the 'K' key
and the 'B' are pressed. If you stop pressing the
CONTROL key before you press the 'K' or the 'B' key then
the command will not work.
When a Function Key is referred to, it is often
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abbreviated. For example, Function Key 10 is abbreviated 
to " F10
POM does not distinguish between upper and lower case 
letters. In general the first letter of a variable name, 
or part of a variable name, is capitalised (such as 
Gross__Income). This is purely to make the name more 
readable. The capitalisation is not necessary for POM to 
work properly.
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TUTORIAL - FIFTEEN MINUTES TO TAX-BENEFIT MODELLING 
Setting Out
The basic prerequisites for undertaking this tutorial are 
that the user should have an elementary knowledge of MS- 
DOS, and that the POM program and data files should have 
been transferred on to the hard disk drive of an IBM 
compatible computer.
In order to start POM working, go to the POM directory on 
your disk, and type < P - 0 - M - RETURN > at the
keyboard (it does not matter whether upper or lower case 
letters are used). You will see the screen change. The 
bottom half of your screen will appear blank and the top 
half will have all sorts of words and figures which you 
probably won't understand (don't worry about this, it 
will be made clear later). Near the top of the screen a 
small window will open up which says 'Please wait while 
the essential variable information is read in'. This is
necessary so that when you use the program all of the
names of the variables and their labels will be available 
to you.
After about thirty seconds the window asking you to wait 
will disappear, and the cursor will start flashing about 
half-way down the screen.
A Tale of Two Windows
At this point the cursor is flashing in the Editing 
Window, this is the lower half of the screen (which is 
blank). The Editing window is the area where you write 
out your tax-benefit policies. It functions like a
normal word-processor. You can type in words, move 
around the screen, search for and replace words. You can 
even move or read in blocks of text.
The top window is the command window/screen. This has 
various specialist commands concerned with tax-benefit 
modelling. Because they appear on the top half of the 
screen you can put them in your text without actually 
typing them in. You will be shown how to do this below.
In order to move between the two windows all you have to 
do is press the < ESCAPE > button on your keyboard. You 
should see the cursor jump from its current position up 
to the top screen. Press < ESCAPE > again and the cursor 
will go back to the editing window. You will probably 
find it more convenient to move between the two windows 
using the mouse rather than the < ESCAPE > key. Instead 
of pressing the < ESCAPE > key take the mouse and press 
the right hand button, this is the same as pressing the < 
ESCAPE > key. You should now see the cursor blinking in 
the top half of the screen as it was before. If you 
press the < ESCAPE > key again the cursor will return to 
the same place it was in the edit window, before you 
moved up. Similarly when you go back to the command
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window the cursor will be placed in exactly the same 
position it was before.
Now move the cursor to the Command Window - and move the 
cursor around by rolling the mouse on your desk top. You 
will see that when the cursor points to a word on the top 
half of the screen it will display that word with a 
highlighted background. This shows you which term is 
selected at any one time. Let's practise writing a tax- 
benefit definition using both the edit window and the 
command window. First press the right-hand mouse button 
to return to the lower half of the screen.
Creating a Definition
The first thing you have to do when creating a tax- 
benefit definition is to specify whether it applies to 
the entire household, the tax unit, or to the individual. 
This is important because POM needs to know who the tax 
or benefit applies to. For example, local authority 
rates apply to the whole household, the proposed 
community charge applies to the individual, and Income 
Tax applies to the Tax Unit (either a single person or a 
legally married couple). When you are using POM you must 
always state the unit of analysis (that is whether the 
definition applies to the individual, tax unit, or 
household). If you forget POM will remind you to put it 
in.
Let's suppose that we are trying to find the number of 
pensioners in the household. In order to do this we 
would need to count the number of people who are female 
and whose age is greater than or equal to 60, or who are 
male and whose age is greater than or equal to 65. In 
POM you could specify this as follows : -
Household's Number_Of_Pensioners =
Number_In_Household ((sex = female) and (age > = 60)
or (sex = male) and (age >=65)) .
The tutorial will show you how to type this is in using 
the various features of POM which help you to remember 
variable names and value labels. Please attempt to type 
this rule in correctly at this stage. You will be told 
how to correct errors later in the tutorial. You could 
just create this by typing it in at the keyboard. PLEASE 
DON'T We are going to create this in a special way which 
will demonstrate the capabilities of POM. First use the 
mouse to move the cursor to the place on the screen where 
you want to start writing the rule. Now press the right 
hand mouse button so that the cursor jumps to the command 
screen. Roll the mouse around until it is pointing to 
the word "Household's" on the command screen. The word 
"Household's" should now be highlighted. Now press the 
right hand mouse button (this is equivalent to pressing 
the < RETURN > key). You should see that the word 
"Household's" appears in the editing window at the place
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where the cursor last was. Now press the right hand mouse 
button to go back to the edit window.
The Screen Editor
Tap the space bar to create a gap after the word 
"Household's" and then type in the term 
Number_Of_Pensioners. Remember to type the underscore 
character (__) to connect up the different parts of the 
word. Now type the "=" sign. Press the return key to
move down a line. You need to insert the term from the
command window, "Number__In__Household", so move to the top 
of the screen as you did before using the "ESCAPE" key. 
Roll the mouse around until it rests on the term
"Number_In_Household" (which should thus be highlighted). 
Now press the return key and you should see that the term 
"Number_In__Household" has been inserted into your line of 
text. Press the "ESCAPE" key again to return to the
lower half of the screen and type in two left hand 
brackets. Make sure the cursor is on the space 
immediately to the right of the second bracket, and press 
the right hand mouse button to move to the command 
screen.
The Variable Windows
Though the next term "sex" is quite short and could 
easily be typed in at the keyboard, let's find out how to 
enter it through the command window. Move the mouse so 
that the term "INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES" is highlighted. Now 
press < RETURN > or the left hand mouse button. You 
should see a pop-up window appear in the upper half of 
the screen. On the top line of the window - the title 
should say "Individual Variables". Roll the mouse up and 
down. The highlighted bar will move in response. The 
items in the window are arranged alphabetically. You can 
roll the mouse down until it points to the term "sex". 
Now try rolling the mouse all the way up until it passes 
the first item in the list. It scrolls around to the end 
of the list and you keep on going. Keep on moving it 
until it points to the word "sex". Now press the RETURN 
key. The word "sex" should now appear in the line of text 
you are building up. Jump down to the edit window with 
the right hand mouse button. Now type an equals sign "=" 
at the keyboard. (You don't need to have a space at the 
end of the term "sex" because POM knows that an equals 
sign cannot be part of a variable name). Now let's see 
how you would find the term "male".
The Value Label Window
Use the right hand mouse button to jump to the command 
window. Roll the mouse around until it points to the 
term "VALUE LABELS". Press the left hand mouse button. 
The pop up window which appears, contains all of the 
variables which refer to sets of categories rather than 
numbers (such as region, housing tenure group, etc.). If 
you want to check the value labels for a particular 
variable all you have to do is press the left hand mouse
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button, while pointing to the appropriate variable within 
the window. In this case roll the mouse down to the term 
"sex", and press the left hand mouse button. A small 
pop-up window will appear with the options "male" and 
"female". Point to the "female" option and press the 
left hand mouse button. The term "male" appears in your 
line of text. If you are in a pop-up window and you 
don't want to select any of the items, all you have to do 
is press the right hand button or the < ESCAPE > key. 
The pop up window will disappear and the cursor will be 
where it was before.
If you use variables which have value labels you MUST use 
exactly the correct word for the value label. You can 
probably remember "male" and "female" easily enough and 
type them in straight from the keyboard. However, 
variables like Standard_Region, Type_Of__-Housing_Tenure, 
and Industry have longer value labels, so it is better to 
use the pop-up windows for these rather than to try to 
remember them and type them straight in at the keyboard. 
If the word you've typed in is not one of the correct 
labels for the variable to the left of the equals sign 
then when you ask POM to check the rule you will be told 
that you have made a mistake.
Now that you've got this far in the
"Number_Of__Pensioners" definition you should be able to 
complete it yourself. Remember to put a full stop at the 
end of the definition. POM needs to know where one 
definition ends and the next one starts.
The Pulldown Menu
So far you have only experienced the command window and 
the editing window. You also have access to a pulldown 
menu system which helps you to find out which commands 
are available. Put the cursor in the lower half of the 
screen, if it is not there already. If the cursor is in 
the upper screen then move it to the lower screen by 
pressing the "ESCAPE" key. Press Function Key 10. You 
will see the top of your screen change, to show a number 
of options such as "Search", "Block", and "File". These 
options give you access to a further set of sub-options. 
Let's see what some of these sub-options are. Move the 
mouse or the cursor keys backwards and forwards. You 
will see that the highlighting of the terms in the 
pulldown menu changes so that you can see which option is 
currently selected. Press the return key while the name 
"Block" is highlighted. A further pop up menu appears 
showing you all the block commands which are available 
with POM. Once again you make selections by moving the 
mouse up and down and pressing the left hand mouse 
button. Press the right hand button and the menu will 
disappear.
Move to the "File" option. Press the Left Hand button.
Let's save the definition you've created to a file.
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Instead of using the mouse pointer, there is another way 
of selecting the option you want. You will notice that 
the options in the window all have one letter which is 
capitalised. This will not necessarily be the first 
letter of the command. For example, in the file sub-menu 
there are separate commands for "Save" and "Save As". 
The save command saves the file currently in memory on to 
the disk with the existing file name, whereas the "save 
As" option allows the user to save the current file "AS" 
a file with a new file name (which the user will be asked 
to type in at the keyboard). Therefore the letter "S" 
has been used to signify the "Save" command, and the 
letter "A" signifies "save As" (if the same letter was 
used the computer would not know which command was being 
chosen). Press "A" for "save As" and you will be asked 
for a name for the file. Type in a name and press 
return. To get back to the editing window press ESCAPE 
twice. After the first ESCAPE the sub-menu will 
disappear, then the main pulldown menu will disappear and 
you will be back in the editing window where you left it.
Creating A Variable
Let's create a variable based on our definition of 
"Number_Of_Pensioners". Make sure that the cursor is on 
the first line of the definition you are about to 
process. If the cursor is somewhere else in the 
definition POM will not understand the rule correctly and 
an error message will be displayed.
Now press Function Key 10. This will open up the 
pulldown menu on the top of the screen. You will see 
that the pulldown menu has a main option called "Model". 
This contains all the commands to do with creating 
variables and tables. Press the letter "M" key, and a 
sub-menu of Model options will be shown. You will see an 
option called "process a rule". Within POM there are a 
series of rules which define the tax-benefit system. The 
sentence you typed in earlier about the number of 
pensioners is one of these rules. When you "process a 
rule" what you are doing is telling POM to work out the 
answer for this rule for every household with the data 
set. So POM will get the information about the first 
household, work out how many pensioners there are, and 
then get the information about the next household. As it 
goes along it will write out the answers to a file for 
future use. This process of calling up the information 
and writing the answers to disk is called "processing a 
rule".
Press the letter "p" for "Process a rule" and you will 
see the cursor moving around the edit window. This shows 
that POM is reading your rule to check that it is in an 
acceptable form. If it is POM will start processing the 
rule and a pop up message will appear in the top part of 
the screen telling you how long you will have to wait for 
the rule to be created. If there is a problem then an
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error message will appear. If an error message does 
appear, it should tell you the nature of the error. To 
correct it press the "ESCAPE" key, and then return to the 
editing screen. You will need to check that the rule you 
have typed in is exactly the same as the definition for 
"Number__Of_Pensioners" shown above. If the variable is 
created with no problems you will be back in the pulldown 
menu at the end.
Remember that you can now do calculations which involve 
the variable you have just created. Let's check this. 
Press ESCAPE twice. You should now see that the cursor 
is back in the lower half of the screen. Press "ESCAPE" 
and the cursor should jump to the top half of the screen. 
Move the mouse around until the cursor rests on the term 
"HOUSEHOLD VARIABLES" (because you indicated that the 
variable "Number_0f_Pensioners" was to be a household 
variable by writing the term "Household's" in front of 
the variable name. Press the Left Hand mouse Button. As 
you scroll up and down the window using the mouse you can 
see that the term "Number_Of_Pensioners" has been added 
to the list at the correct alphabetical position.
Processing an entire Model
So far you have seen how to process a single definition 
and write the variable to disk. You can also process 
several definitions at the same time. To test this lets 
read in a set of definitions which have been saved to 
disk. Press Function Key 10 to call up the pulldown 
menu. Press "F" for File and "0" for Open. You will 
then be asked to supply a filename. It is necessary to 
give a file name in case you want to return to your work 
later. You may be asked whether you want to abandon the 
existing file. If you wanted to save your definition of 
pensioners then you would type in the letter "N" which 
would allow you to go back and save it. Let us assume 
that you don't want to save the existing file. So type 
the letter "Y" indicating you do want to abandon the 
current file. Now key in the word "TAX" and press 
return. Three definitions will then appear. The first 
definition creates a variable called "Original__Income" 
which adds together several forms of income. The second 
one specifies the value of tax allowances each person is 
entitled to. The third one works out the taxable income 
by subtracting "Tax_Relief" from "Original_Income". In 
order for this series of rules to work you need to 
process all three definitions one after the other. This 
is because "Tax_Relief" and "Original_Income" are used to 
work out "Taxable_Income", and they are only temporary 
variables.
Now press Function Key 10 to call up the pulldown menu. 
Press "M" for Model, and "A" for "process All rules". 
You will see the cursor moving through the definition as 
POM checks that it is correct. Just as before, POM will 
show you how long you will have to wait for the model to
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be processed.
Making a Table
In order to make a table, press Function Key 10 to call 
up the pulldown menu. Press "M" for model, "T" for "make 
a Table". The first thing you will be asked is to define 
if the table is going to be about individuals, tax units, 
or households.
Move the mouse button up and down to select "Household", 
and then press the Left Hand Button to make your 
selection. Next you will be asked to define the
structure of the table. The rows and columns must be
category variables rather than numerical variables, so 
when the menu appears asking you what variable is to be 
used for rows and columns only category type variables 
which apply to entire households will be shown. If you 
want to create a table using columns and rows you first 
have to create a variable which puts these values into 
groups. For example you could create a variable for
ranges of income, and then use it in a table.
Select the option "Standard_Region" for the Rows, and 
then "All_Households" for the Column. After you select 
the column and row variables, you are asked to select two 
variables to be shown for each cell of the table. 
Typically one would wish to show net income before and 
after a particular change. You must select two variables 
using the pop up windows. Let's find out what the 
average rent is in each region and compare it to the
average spending on mortgage interest. First point the 
mouse and the variable rent and press the Left Hand 
Button. Then point the mouse at the term 
"Mortgage_Interest" and press the button. Finally you 
will be asked to say whether nought should be considered 
a missing value when the table is constructed. To 
illustrate what this means consider what would happen if 
you wanted to find out the average amount of Family 
Income Supplement (FIS). If you wanted to find out the 
average amount of FIS for all families, the average would 
only be a few pence because the vast majority of families 
do not claim it. However, if you choose to treat zero as 
a missing value POM will show the average amount of FIS 
in those cases where FIS is not zero. Therefore you can 
use this facility to get the average of all non-zero 
values.
After you have answered the question about the treatment 
of zero POM will show you an estimate of how long it will 
take to create the table.
Saving the table
After POM has finished working out the values in the 
table, it will show the table on the screen. The top 
four lines of the table show which variables have been 
used for the rows, columns, and cell contents. You can
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use the mouse or the up/down cursor keys to see different 
parts of the table. When you have finished viewing the 
table press ESCAPE or the Right Hand Button. You will be 
asked if you want to save the table. Answer "y" for Yes. 
You will then be asked to key in a long name to describe 
the table. This should be something long and meaningful 
so you will know what the table refers to if you come 
back and look at it in a few months time. Type in the 
label "Rent and Mortgage Interest by Region". This label 
is not the same as a filename so you can use blank spaces 
in the line, and it can be up to forty characters long.
Displaying a Table
If you want to look at a table which has already been 
created you need to call up the pulldown menu with 
Function Key 10. Press "M" for model, and "D" for
"Display a Table". You will then be shown a list of 
tables which has already been created with POM. In order 
to select the table you want. Roll the mouse up and down 
until it points to the title you are interested in. Then 
press the Left Hand Button. After a moment the 
appropriate table will be displayed on the screen. Once 
again you can use the mouse or the up/down cursor keys to 
look through the table. When you are finished use the 
ESCAPE key/Left Hand Button to finish displaying the 
table.
Leaving POM
You've now used all the main features of POM. If you 
want to exit from POM, remember to save what is in the 
edit window with the keystroke series -
< FUNCTION KEY 10 - F - S >
which stands for (show the pulldown menu, File Options, 
Save File). You are now ready to leave POM. You should 
still be in the "File" option of the pulldown menu. Now 
press "Q" for "Quit" and POM will return you to your 
computer's operating system.
REFERENCE GUIDE
The reference guide below shows you the various commands 
available to you through POM. The left hand column shows 
the command, the middle columns shows the keystrokes you 
need to type to call up the command through the pulldown 
menu, and the right hand column shows the required 
keystrokes if there is a quick way of invoking the 
command directly through the keyboard.
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Figure A.1 Summary of POM's commands
COMMAND:
Autoindent
* Block Begin <
Block Copy <
Block End <
Block Move <
Block Delete <
Change Directory
Cursor Bottom of Window <
Cursor Down a Line <
Cursor Down a Page <
Cursor End of file <
Cursor Left a Character <
Cursor Left a Word <
Cursor Right a Character <
Cursor Right a Word <
Cursor Up a Line <
Cursor Up a Page <
Cursor to Start/End Line <
Cursor to Top of File <
Delete Character Right
<
Delete Line <
Delete Word to Right < 
Directory of Disk 
Exit from Program 
File - Close File
QUICK PULLDOWN
KEYBOARD MENU
KEYSTROKES •• KEYSTROKES:
< F10 - T - A >
Ctrl - k - b > < F10 - B - B >
Ctrl - k - c > < F10 - B - C >
Ctrl - k - k > < F10 - B - E >
Ctrl - k - m > < F10 - B - M >
Ctrl - k - y > < F10 - B - D >
< F10 - f - 1 >
Ctrl - q - c >
Ctrl - x >
Ctrl - c >
Ctrl - q - c > < F 1 0 - g - e >
Ctrl - s >
Ctrl - a >
Ctrl - d >
Ctrl - f >
Ctrl - e >
Ctrl - r >
Ctrl - j >
Ctrl - q - f > < F10 - g - t >
Del,
Ctrl - h >
Ctrl - y >
Ctrl - t >
< F10 - f - d >
< F10 - f - q >
< F10 - f - c >
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File - Copy < F10 - f - y >
File - Erase < F l O - f - e >
File - Open New File < F 1 0 - f - o >
File - Read Block In < Ctrl - k - r >
File - Rename < F l O - f - r >
File - Save with user-
Supplied Name . < F10. - f - a >
File - Save File from
Window < Ctrl - k - s >
File Save&Open New File < Ctrl - k - d >
File Write Block < Ctrl - k - w >
File Exit and Save File < Ctrl - k - x >
Find and Replace < Ctrl - q - a > < F l O - s - r >
Find < Ctrl - q - f > < F l O - s - f >
Find - Repeat Last
Search Command < Ctrl - 1 > < F 1 0 - s - n >
Goto Column < Ctrl - o -  i >  < F10 - g. - c >
Goto Line < Ctrl - o - 1 > < F l O - g - l >
Insert Mode ( ON / OFF ) < Ctrl - v > < F 1 0 - t - i >
Insert Control Character < Ctrl - p >
Logged Directory < F 1 0 - f - l >
Model-Create Variable < Ctrl - o - p > < F10 - M - P > 
Model-Process All Rules < F 1 0 - M - A >
New Line < Ctrl - m >
Quit Program < F10 - F - Q >
Save Text Settings < F 1 0 - T - S >
Scroll Up < Ctrl - w >
Scroll Down < Ctrl - z >
Table Display < F 1 0 - M - D >
Tabulate Data < F 1 0 - M - T >
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TERMS SPECIFIC TO TAX-BENEFIT MODELLING
The following section gives you a list of terms which 
have been specially designed to speed up the process of 
tax-benefit modelling. They allow you to do calculations 
using one line of programming which would normally take 
several lines to achieve.
Any_in_Household
The term "Any_In_Household" gives the value true if any 
of the members of the household meet the conditions in 
brackets following it. For example, one might want to 
determine if any person in a given household was of 
pensionable age. Therefore the following statement could 
be used
Household's Any_of_Pensionable_Age =
Any_In_Household ((sex = female) and (age >= 60) or
(sex = male) and (age >=65)) .
In this example POM would examine each person within the 
household, to see if he or she was of pensionable age.
If any person meets the criteria, POM stops checking and 
returns the value "true11. Otherwise POM carries on until 
the last person in the household and then returns the 
value "false". It is very important to enclose the 
expression following "Any_In_Household" with brackets, or 
else an error message will be displayed.
Any_i n_Tax_Un i t
The term "Any_in_Tax_Unit" is exactly the same as 
"Any_in_Household" above except that, it only looks at 
one tax unit. N.B. There may be several tax units within 
one household.
Head_of_Households'
The term "Head_Of_Household's" is a pointer (that is it 
is an indicator of a person in the household or tax unit 
from whom data is to be gathered). It refers to
information pertaining to the first person within the 
household, who is coded "0" on the variable
"Relationship_To_Head_Of__Household". Suppose that you 
were modelling a form of housing benefit which was 
related to the head of household's income, you might wish 
to use a statement such as
Household's Rent_Allowance =
(80 % of Rent) - (20 % of Head__Of_Household's Gross_Income) . 
Households'
This term is used at the beginning of a definition to
specify that the statement following it applies to the
household level of analysis.
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Husband's
The term "Husband's" is a pointer referring to person 
with the status of husband in relation the person 
currently being examined. If the individual currently 
being processed has a marital status variable showing 
that they are married, and is female, then the pointer 
will return a value relating to the first person in the 
tax unit. For example the following would be acceptable
Individual's Wifes_Earned_Income_Allowance =
If ((Marital = Married) and (sex = female) and
(husband's Tax_Allowance = £ 2425.00)) then = £2425.
Individual's
This term is used at the beginning of a definition to 
specify that the statement following it applies to the 
individual level of analysis.
Number_In_Household
This term is followed by a pair of brackets. The 
brackets should contain a condition. "Number- 
_In_Household" will count the number of people who meet 
the conditions specified in the brackets. For example, 
if you wanted to determine the number of people within a 
household who are under 25 years old and not working you 
could use the following definition
Household's Adult_Dependants =
Number__In_Household ((age >= 18) and (age <25) and
(Employment_Status = Unemployed)) .
Numbe r_In_Tax_Un i t
The term "Number_In_Tax_Unit" counts the number of people 
satisfying a certain set of conditions, in exactly the 
same way as "Number_In_Household" except that it only 
refers to the tax unit rather than the entire household.
Tax_Units'
This term is used at the beginning of a definition to 
specify that the statement following it applies to the 
tax unit rather than the individual or the household.
Total__Household
The term "Total__Household" is used to total a set of 
values across an entire household. The values to be 
totalled should be enclosed in brackets immediately after 
"Total_Household". Suppose that you wanted to calculate 
gross household income you could use the following 
definition:-
Household's Gross__Household_Income =
Total_Household (Investment__Income + Normal_Gross_Wage +
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Self_Employment_Income + Pensions).
Total_Tax Unit
The term ^Tota^Tax^Unit" performs the same function as 
"Total__Household", except that values are summed across 
the current tax unit rather than an entire household.
Wifes'
The term "wife's” indicates that the term following it 
refers to a household's wife. If the current person 
being examined is married and is male, then the pointer 
refers to information about the female partner in the 
marriage. Suppose that you wanted to find out if either 
the head of household is disabled or the head of 
household's wife is disabled then one could use the 
following statement
Household's Needs_Allowance =
if (Head_Of_Household's Health_Condition = Disabled) OR
(Head__Of_Household's Wife's Health_Condition = Disabled) 
then Needs_Allowance = £ 50.00.
Withdrawn_By ... % of
Withdrawn_By is a mathematical term which is relevant to 
many benefits which are reduced gradually as income 
rises. For example, Family Income Supplement is tapered 
away by 50% as income rises. You could express this 
using withdrawn_by as follows
Tax_Units' Family_Income_Supplement =
£50 Withdrawn__By 50 % of Gross_Income.
Withdrawn_By must be followed by a number from 1 to 100 
followed by a percentage sign, and then the value by 
which the benefit is to be tapered away by. Normally 
this would be a single variable such as "Gross_Income". 
However, one could include an expression such as
£50 Withdrawn_By 50 % of (Earnings + Investment_Income).
An important advantage of Withdrawn__By is that it will 
not return a negative value. Once all of the benefit has 
been tapered away, it will be given a value of zero. If 
you used a minus sign you would have to include extra 
statements to prevent the benefit from taking a negative 
value.
347
